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This thesis deals with theologies of the Resurrection in the 
twentieth century. We have chosen for study seven major theologians 
whose work reflects significant achievement in this area. We begin 
with a look at 'dialectical' theologians Karl Barth and Rudolf 
Bultmann and deal with their debate on the nature and meaning of 
the Resurrection. Because of their importance to theology they are 
dealt with extensively. From there we move on to the contemporary 
theologians of 'hope, ' Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
before completing our research with a chapter on the Catholic 
theologians Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Hans KUng. 
It was our purpose initially (and we hope we have been consistent 
throughout) to give a well-rounded purview, and thus a fairer criti- 
cism, of each theology. Yet into the research it seemed obvious 
that a consistent major concern of each theologian centered on 
how one comes to faith in such a unique event. It was certainly 
at the core of the Barth-Bultmann debate and remains crucial. Thus 
it may be stated that the concerns which receive the primacy in this 
work are those discussions in our theologies which deal with the 
nature of the Resurrection, its status as an event of history, and 
its ability to be proved and thus believed as other events of his- 
tory are proved and believed. We ultimately conclude that the most 
satisfactory entry into faith in the Resurrection is through a jux- 
taposing of the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans KUng. 
The focus of the paper is changed in the second half of the 
Conclusion as we suggest what course studies on the Resurrection 
might take in the future. Here we find the perspective of Jewish 
New Testament theologian Pinchas Lapide to be most provocative and 
speculate on the possibilities that the Resurrection might hold 
for Jewish-Christian relations. 
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1. Introduction 
In the early morning hours, as the gospel of Mark relates 
the story, three women - friends of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth - 
came to his tomb with spices in order to annoint his body. There 
was concern among these women for the stone which sealed the tomb 
was heavy, and it was supposed, would effectively block their en- 
trance. Yet as they approached their destination they saw that the 
stone "was rolled back" and, upon entering the tomb, they were amazed 
to hear a "young man" tell them: "He has risen, he is not here. " It 
is thus that the gospel which begins as the self-proclaimed "good 
news of Jesus Christ" ends with the statement that "trembling and 
astonishment had come upon them; and they said nothing to anyone for 
they were afraid. " The awe which met these women still remains with 
us for the most part, although their original silence has given way 
to a panorama of discussions, theories and speculations on what that 
simple statement "He is risen" could possibly mean, both in itself 
and for us. 
In the following pages we will attempt to come to grips with 
seven theologians who have been influential in twentieth century 
thought on the Resurrection. Initially, we will be concerned with 
the two great 'dialectical' theologians of the first half of the 
century, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, who will pave the way for 
a discussion of the counterpart theologies of 'hope' represented in 
Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Our study will continue 
as we deal with three prominent Catholic theologians - Karl Rahner, 
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Edward Schillebeeckx, and Hans Küng. In addition, in our conclusion 
we will speak of the prospect for future discussions on the Resurrect- 
ion with a look at a provocative and promising dialogue represented 
by the Jewish New Testament theologian Pinchas Lapide. 
The issues with which we must deal, and the unique problems 
of the twentieth century in regard to the Resurrection, can best be 
introduced by a brief synopsis of the changing relation of Christian 
faith to history. 
Before the rise of the historical/critical method, a common 
assumption in the Church was that Christian faith was based securely 
on infallibly reported Scripture and historical events. It was pos- 
sible for any rational person to peruse and understand these, regard- 
less of the personal faith of the individual. Thus faith can be seen 
to have been defined in three movements: first, one would "notice" 
what was given in the infallible source and so come to know the 
truth; second, one would give "assent" to the truth of the items of 
belief as being true indeed; third, one would would place his personal 
"trust" in them as his committment of hope for life and death. By 
this means the individual came into personal communion with the God 
who gave them and was, subsequently, known by them. These infallibly 
reported words and deeds were guaranteed both by the authority of the 
Church and by Scriptural self-authenticity. The words and deeds of 
Jesus, supremely the passion and Resurrection, formed the central 
point of the record and were 'guaranteed' in the same way as all 
other truths. 
In the Italian Renaissance and the later Age of Reason, this 
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position came under severe stress. One of the prime reasons was 
that the truths could be separated into those which reason alone 
could substantiate and others - the miracles, the doctrine of the 
Trinity, etc. - which could be supported by authority alone. More- 
over, whereas the rational core of religion was relatively plain to 
all, the special truths were the subject of war as well as debate, 
and no court of appeal promised settlement. 
' 
The second reason proved, in the long run, quite formidable: 
the rise of an historical consciousness which attempted to probe the 
historical actuality of the truths put forward. Initially, other 
documents were uncovered and shown as forgeries, legends or fictions. 
The Protestant Church agreed for instance that the Donation of Con- 
stantine was false, and that, as a result, the temporal claims of 
the papacy were without basis. But when the Scriptures themselves 
began to be investigated, there was a different reaction. Blood 
was spilt between those who wanted to subject the Bible to historical/ 
critical investigation and 
interpretation, and those who stood behind 
the idea of infallible inspiration. The latter's question was: if 
one could not "notice" 
(and there was much wrangling about the place 
of human will and/or the Holy Spirit and reason here) certain true 
words and deeds, and give 
"assent" to them as truth indeed, how 
could one come to "trust" and rely on the promises of God? Was not 
faith itself placed in jeopardy? 
Much of the theological drive of the nineteenth century came 
out of this dilemma. Since historical study and rational criticism 
q 
questioned both the intellectual and historical foundations of 
faith, an attempt was made to define faith so as to make it independ- 
ent of such criticism. It was defined by some as a matter of "fun- 
damental awareness" (Schleiermacher) of the whole of reality in which 
we are but particulars, and so of an absolute dependence upon that 
whole. This awareness is actually a consciousness of God, and is 
elicited by our participation in the communion founded by Jesus 
(whose own God-consciousness was absolute and thus the "original" 
of our own). Others defined faith as a mode of life in which God 
and his Kingdom is the moral ideal, and in which committment to that 
moral ideal in every facet of life is the essence of faith. Thus, 
if one went back to Jesus of Nazareth he would find the embodiment 
of this highest value in his teachings, or perhaps in his exemplary 
communion with God, or in his victory over the world in his obedience 
to the Kingdom (Harnack, Hermann, Ritschl, etc. ) Both of these 
positions could still appeal to Jesus of Nazareth in their way, and 
to some parts of the New Testament which have permanent validity, but 
these theologians forsook the attempt to ground faith in historically 
given propositions. It was thus easier to affirm the efforts of 
historical/criticism to critically investigate the Bible as other 
literary works since faith was essentially a matter of human life 
(either of fundamental awareness or moral will). It was universally 
true, even though shaped by particular historical conditions. But 
its truth did not depend on these conditions, only upon itself as a 
human act appropriate to the reality of human experience. With the 
exception of Hegel and continuing scholastic views, the major 
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nineteenth-century figures forsook the model of knowledge-assent- 
trust as the basic definition of faith - that is, faith based upon 
(somehow) verifiable truths. 
It can thus be seen to follow that the Resurrection of Jesus 
as an event of historical fact tended to recede under the influence 
of the Enlightenment and its offspring historical/criticism in the 
nineteenth century. We may note, again with reference to Schleier- 
macher whose thought dominates and exemplifies much of this century, 
that the natural inclination of self-consciousness and the idea of 
religion as an inborn personal sense for the true and the eternal, 
is to resolve in a suspension of the need for the miraculous and 
the event of Resurrection itself. There is simply no requirement 
that faith be grounded upon the propositions contained in the oldest 
creeds (i. e., Resurrection, Ascension, Judgment). We note Schleier- 
macher's statement in The Christian Faith: "The disciples recognized 
in Him the Son of God without having the faintest premonition of 
His resurrection and ascension, and we too may say the same of our- 
selves. "2 
It is not surprising, then, that in Barth's treatment of 
Protestant theology in the nineteenth century, 
3 
the Resurrection 
receives two scant references 
(Novalis and Strauss) and these tend 
to even further diminish the importance of this 'event' in the 
thought of the times. Strauss, with the times, comes to terms with 
miracles, with virgin 
birth and Resurrection, by divesting them of 
, 
their miraculous character through viewing them as misunderstandings, 
6 
hidden secrets of nature, or as myths; or by enlarging the concept 
'historical' to include such myths. 
The difficult middle ground mentioned above between absolute 
faith on the one hand and its historically conditioned reality on 
the other became impossible after the 'discovery' of apocalypticism, 
and its use in the respective historical studies of the Bible of 
Johannes Weiss (1892) and Albert Schweitzer (1906). 
4 
The work of 
these men led them to see a gulf between what we can know historic- 
ally about Jesus of Nazareth and the various versions of his life 
and teachings which were accepted by most theologians. This so- 
called "historical Jesus" - the ultimate model of trust or moral 
perfection - was shown to be mostly a romantic construction of the 
historian-as-theologian. What came out of their Biblical studies 
was, rather, a strange figure who fit uncomfortably in any modern 
situation, and to whom no one could appeal for the validation of 
his faith. 
5 In a sense the cycle had gone full-circle. Initially, 
critical/historical studies had helped destroy the reliance of faith 
upon historically guaranteed truths. Theologians had thus redefined 
faith so that it ceased to be a simple matter of knowing truths, 
whether rational or historical. But with Weiss and Schweitzer, not 
even a feeling or an ethic could find secure lodging in Jesus of 
Nazareth. On what basis, then, could one call himself a believer? 
What was the content of faith, if nothing could be positively assert- 
ed as to its basis? These are questions which lie behind the devel- 
opment of dialectical theology in all its forms and which center 
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ultimately on the central tenet of the Christian faith - the 
Resurrection - in the twentieth century. 
The purpose of this thesis is, to state as simply as possible, 
to uncover the changing role of the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazar- 
eth in twentieth century theology. It will be our concern to do 
this with some thought to the general context of each theology. 
Yet it has seemed to us, as research has progressed, that the issue 
of exactly what is to be taken historically (and how and w that 
is to be believed) has been the consistent issue in the handling 
of the Resurrection 'event. ' 
The theologians that have been mentioned above and that are 
the essence and inspiration of the following pages have been chosen 
not only because of their considerable influence in the Church but 
also, and perhaps relatedly, because of their insight and innovation. 
Each has drawn upon earlier foundations and influences to produce 
genuine creativity in regard to their theologies of the Resurrection. 
It is in the spirit of appreciation for these considerable efforts 
that we attempt, as far as possible, a sympathetic treatment of each. 
Each in his way, as we hope to bring out, has brought us closer to 
truth, and is important for his particular perspective. 
We thus begin with Karl Barth's theology of the Resurrection 
as we seek to uncover the changing aspects of its role in twentieth 
century theology. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) A major impact of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy was 
his insistence that human knowledge is forever limited in 
its scope to the world of experience - "phenomenal" reality. 
"Noumenal" reality is that reality which is purely intellig- 
ible or non-sensual. Kant drastically curbed the validity of 
meta-physical knowledge which had allegedly been able to 
ascend to the noumenal dimension. The epistemological limits 
set by Kant are indicated in his famous dictum, to the effect, 
'I had to put a halt to knowing in order to make room for 
faith. ' Ideas such as God and immortality were thus no longer 
the undisputed objects of 'knowing. ' 
2) F. D. E. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Macintosh. 
J. S. Stewart (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 418. 
See also pp. 71f., 178f. on 'Miracles. ' 
3) Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl 
tr. B. Cozens (London: SCM Press, 1959). 
4) A. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, tr. W. 
Montgomery (New York: Macmillan, 1961) and J. Weiss, Proclam- 
ation of the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969). 
5) Regarding specifically the Resurrection, Schweitzer pursues 
in The Mysticism of the Apostle Paul how Paul can hold on 
to the eschatological saving significance of Jesus' death 
in spite of the obvious fact that the announced parousia 
failed to eventuate: Paul interprets the "proclaimed" 
Resurrection of Jesus as an emergent breaking-in of the New 
Eon into the Old, which still persists for a short time. The 
New Eon thus initiated is continued in the existence of the 
faithful, who think of themselves as those who died with 
Christ and are awakened to a new life in the Spirit. This is 
an ethically significant internalization of the Synoptic mes- 
sage of the Reign of God, but Schweitzer is persistent in de- 
claring that Jesus' life and message, in terms of their his- 
torico-critical scientific "truth, " will not fit into any 
of our conceptual schemes. Jesus meets us (at the end of 
Schweitzer's Quest) as "an unknown and nameless one. " 
Schweitzer's is thus a theology of experience determined by 
our "reverence for life, " open-ended, speaking to each person 
differently. Schweitzer compares his world-view on one oc- 
casion to a cathedral, incomplete and forever incompletable, 
in whose choir the spirit ceaselessly worships. 
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2. Karl Barth: 
'Geschichte' in Space and Time 
Karl Barth on the Resurrection 
A Comparison of the Changes Between the Early and Later Barth 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whereas Rudolf Bultmann's theology remained virtually 
unchanged his entire career, the same cannot be said of Karl Barth. 
His was a theology in transition, from his earliest days as a 
student of the heritage of nineteenth-century Liberalism, through 
his enormously influential Epistle to the Romans (1922)1 and 
beyond. Romans, his first major work, was the point at which he 
was closest theologically to Bultmann, but this work also stands 
as a springboard from which Barth leapt into the views which so 
separate him from his contemporary. It will not, of course, be 
necessary to trace anything like a theological pilgrimage in 
Bultmann in a subsequent chapter, but it is a necessity for our 
purposes regarding Barth to show how his theology of the Resurrection 
reacts to these broad changes. We may also note that Barth, through 
his enormous influence in the twentieth century, will serve as a 
foundation for much of our future discussion. For this reason we 
are especially aware of a need for a thorough explication of Barth's 
theology of the Resurrection in terms both of its prior influences and 
its subsequent modifications after Romans. 
To understand Barth's views on the Resurrection we must 
12 
initially note a shift of thinking between the publication of the 
second edition of the Epistle to the Romans and the later Barth 
of the Church Dogmatics. 
2 
Despite the fact that Barth had rejected and attacked the 
; 'iberalism presently in vogue, his Romans shows the obvious 
existentialist and anthropological influences of Kierkegaard and 
Dostoevsky. The book abounds in paradox and dialectical thinking 
and it is obvious that he has not yet become fully christocentric. 
He states early on in Romans: 
"if I have ,a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierke- 
gaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time 
and eternity, and to my regarding this as regarding negative as 
well as positive significance: 'God is in heaven and thou art on 
earth. "' 
Again, discussing the most important of his influences in the 
writing of Romans: 
"I have also paid more attention to what may be culled from the 
writings of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky that is of importance for 
the interpretation of the New Testament. The latter I owe more 
particularly to hints given me by Edward Thurneysen. " (Note: 
Thurneysen had just published his book Dostoevsky in Munich in 
1921). 
Kierkegaard and Barth shared a basic problem: the relationship 
of man to God, in their concrete, existential relation. For 
13 
Kierkegaard, who was concerned to counter what he saw as Hegel's 
identification of the infinite and finite, the relationship was 
one of 'infinite qualitative distinction. ' Barth quotes approvingly 
from Kierkegaard. 
"Remove from the Christian religion, as Christendom has done, its 
ability to shock, and Christianity, by becoming a direct communi- 
cation, is altogether destroyed. It then becomes a tiny superficial 
thing, capable neither of inflicting deep wounds nor of healing 
them; by discovering unreal and merely human compassion, it forgets 
the qualitative distinction between man and God. "5 
Kierkegaard's hope was to save the essence of Christianity, 
the redemption of helpless, hopeless man through the Incarnation - 
"the uniting in Himself of two elements which repel each other, the 
divine and the human. "6 This means, on the one hand, that man is 
completely sinful, and on the other hand, that revelation is 
necessarily paradoxical. The distinction is overcome in revelation, 
which, while it is an historical event, is, nevertheless, an instant 
of eternity and has no history. It reveals God as the Deus 
absconditus, and, in this sense, as paradox. 
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In Dostoevsky's novels Barth found the fleshing out of 
Luther's simul justi et peccatores. Man always remains sinful. We 
all live in the realm of the Brothers Karamazov. It 
is here that 
God meets us and in this state that we are justified. God is the 
answer only to the one who has accepted this 
fact, and renounces 
all claims upon Him. 
8 
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This paradoxical or "dialectical" era (as it is so often 
termed) softens in the later Barth. The largely negative "pathos 
of distance, the contrasting of supposedly self-evident truths, 
the recognition of God as the Wholly Other Whom to encounter is 
mortal judgement, the preaching of the diastasis of Christianity 
and culture"9 gives way to a more positive movement, a 'faith 
seeking understanding' (fides quarens intellectum). The influence 
of existentialism gives way to a concentration on the Word of God. 
Dogmatic inquiry based on the analogia fides pushes aside earlier 
dialectical predominance and, above all, there is a shift towards 
the absolute dominance of Christology. 
In assessing Barth's views on the Resurrection it will be 
helpful to investigate initially a series of topics relevant to 
his views in order to note some important changes between the 
earlier and later Barth. 
10 
These topics are as follows: 
I. The Resurrection as History 
a. The Question of Revelatory function 
b. Historicity 
c. The Empty Tomb 
II. The Resurrection and the Parousia 
III. The Relationship of the Cross and the Resurrection 
IV. The Resurrection as History 
(a) The Question of Revelatory Function. Without a doubt 
the Pesurrection forms a central theological theme for Barth in both 
15 
major periods of his life. This is obvious in the early Barth 
both in Romans and in The Resurrection of the Dead. 
11 
Yet the 
shift between the early and later Barth cannot be made cleanly 
between these two writings and the later Church Dogmatics. The 
shift is more progressive. 
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In general, this change between the early and later Barth can 
be noted in his early stress on the revelatory function of the 
Resurrection as opposed to his later dissatisfaction in speaking 
primarily of the 'message' of the Resurrection, and his safe- 
guarding of the indispensable place which the event of the Resurrec- 
tion holds in the New Testament. 
This early stress on revelation is seen initially in the 
following statement from Romans: 
"As the Christ, He brings the world of the Father. But we who 
stand in this concrete world know nothing, and are incapable of 
knowing anything of that other world. The Resurrection from the 
dead is, however, the transformation: the establishing or declara- 
tion of that point from above, and the corresponding discerning of 
it from below. The Resurrection is the revelation: the disclosing 
of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending 
of God in Jesus. " 
13 
The Barth of Romans appears reluctant to speak of historical 
event as regards the Resurrection (as we shall see) and, correspondingly 
the Resurrection is seen primarily as the elucidating of the truth 
of revelation. Put another way, the Resurrection resolves itself 
16 
in revelation, is swallowed up in revelation. 
In a dynamic description of the relationship of grace and 
the Resurrection he again makes the question of revelatory function 
paramount. 
"Grace, as the invisible truth, cannot but press to concretion. 
It cannot do otherwise than stretch out with the possibility of 
impossibility towards that existence, occurrence, desire, achieve- 
ment, which has the permanent impression of sin. Grace determines 
to see and hear and touch. It presses to revelation and to sight. 
The resurrection of Christ from the dead is this revelation and 
sight. " 
14 
Likewise, in The Resurrection of the Dead, we see a connection 
with Romans in the recurring emphasis on the Resurrection which 
claims that it "is only to be grasped in the category of revelation 
and in none other. "15 It should be asserted that the revelatory 
function remains essential throughout Barth's writings on the 
Resurrection. Yet in The Resurrection of the Dead, as opposed to 
, Romans, we begin to see a firm insistence on the factual reality 
of the Resurrection and the post-Resurrection appearances. 
16 
In 
: addition, I Corinthians 15, the Resurrection chapter, is seen as 
"the clue" to the book of I Corinthians and to all the Pauline 
writings, and is deemed as""vitally important (for). .. understand- 
ing the testimony of the New Testament generally. " 
17 The unquali- 
fied acknowledgement of the centrality of the Easter occurrences 
17 
(the Resurrection, the empty tomb, and the appearances of the 
risen Christ) is becoming well formed. 
By the era of the Dogmatics, the factual reality of the 
Resurrection has come to the forefront. As stated, the revelatory 
aspect remains essential. The change is summed up in the fact that 
the Resurrection is no longer spoken of primarily as revelation, or 
'message'; it cannot be reduced simply to its revelatory value. 
In the Dogmatics, the Easter occurrences must be safeguarded as 
historical events. In addition to their revelatory function, they 
stand in their own right as the "Archimedian point" upon which all 
Biblical witness rests. 
18 
Thus the later Barth's reflections on 
Easter, which include claims of the "finally achieved divine 
19 
revelation and grace, " also include the event of Resurrection 
expressed in the following terms. 
"it is not peripheral to the New Testament, but central; not 
inessential or dispensable, but essential and indispensable. .. 
The Easter history is the starting point for the Evangelist's 
portraits of the man Jesus. .. It is the original object which is 
itself reflected in their entire relationship to this man, past, 
present and future. .. While we could imagine a New Testament con- 
taining only the history of Easter and its message, we could not 
possible imagine a New Testament without it. For the history and 
the message of Easter contains everything else, while without it 
everything else would be left in the air as mere abstraction. .. 
It is the key to the whole. .. Either we believe with the New 
Testament in the risen Jesus Christ, or we do not believe in Him 
at all. "20 
To summarize, what we see in the Barth of Romans is a 
reluctance to speak of the Resurrection as event without an accomp- 
anying and overpowering emphasis on its revelatory function. As 
will shortly be shown he speaks of the Resurrection in such terms 
as 'non-historical, ' 'Miracle, ' and 'Primal History. ' His concern 
is to see the Resurrection enveloped in transcendent descriptions. 
It is history, yet a history whose essence is shaped, quoting 
Nietzche, in a "dim and non-historical vapor. "21 The Resurrection, 
to note again, is swallowed up in revelation. 
By the time of The Resurrection of the Dead, there is still 
an overwhelming emphasis on the revelatory function of Easter, but 
this is tempered somewhat by a more pristine stand on the temporal 
history of the events themselves. Barth is no longer reluctant 
to make strides and unambiguous claims regarding the historicity of 
the Easter occurrences. Those who would deny these are criticized. 
The Dogmatics seem to be the fulfillment of the movement we 
notice in The Resurrection of the Dead. Barth has struck more of 
a balance between the revelatory function of the Resurrection (still 
essential) and the "central, indispensable" importance of this event 
as event. 
(b) Historicity of the Resurrection. Let us look now more 
specifically at the Resurrection as historical event 
in the earlier 
19 
and later Barth. As mentioned, the Barth of Romans is hesitant 
to describe the Resurrection as historical and to leave it there. 
His hesitance is so great, in fact, that it almost robs the events, 
as events, of any force whatsoever. How may we understand the 
apparent contradiction of the Barth who claims that "the Resurrection 
is. .. an occurrence 
in history, which took place outside the gates 
of Jerusalem in the year A. D. 30, inasmuch as it there 'came to 
pass, ' was discovered and recognized, " yet who, in the same para- 
graph, claims that "the Resurrection is not an event in history at 
all"? 
22 To understand this we must look at Jesus Christ and the 
Resurrection in the early Barth's theology of Crisis. Recalling 
Barth's Kierkegaardian influence will provide the setting for this 
theology. 
For the Barth of Romans, the theme of the Bible is made clear 
in the 'infinite, qualitative distinction, ' and yet the relation, 
of God and man. Both come together in Christ, Who illuminates the 
distinction and consummates the the relationship. Christ is there- 
fore the theme of Scripture. 
23 
Regarding Christology and the distinction between God and man, 
Barth states: 
"Jesus Christ our Lord. This is the Gospel and the meaning of 
history. In this name two worlds meet and go apart, two planes 
intersect, the one known and the other unknown. The known plane 
is'God's creation, fallen out of its union with Him, and therefore 
20 
the world of the 'flesh' needing redemption, the world of men, 
and of time, and of things - our world. This known plane is 
intersected by another plane that is unknown - the world of the 
Father, of the Primal Creation, and of the final Redemption. " 
24 
The years A. D. 1-30 are the era of revelation and disclosure, 
in which "the unknown world cuts the known world, " and the dis- 
tinction between them is revealed in Jesus Christ. 
We who stand in God's created world are incapable of knowing 
anything of that other world. It is the Resurrection which is 
the transformation. Jesus is the revelation because He is the 
Resurrection. 
"The Resurrection is the revelation: the disclosing of Jesus as 
the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending of God in 
Christ. The Resurrection is the emergence of the necessity of 
giving glory to God: the reckoning with what is unknown and un- 
observable in Jesus, the recognition of Him as Paradox, Victor, 
and Primal History. In the Resurrection the new world of the Holy 
Spirit touches the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a 
tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it. And, 
precisely because it does not touch it, it touches it as its 
25 
frontier - as the new world. " 
As the Christ, as revelation, Jesus is not historical. The 
human Jesus, the man of the years A. D. 1-30, is not revelation 
but rather the 'era' of revelation, characterized by the circle 
touched by the tangent, and by the realization that the "Kingdom 
of God has become actual, is nigh at hand. "26 Barth states that 
21 
"in so far as our world is touched in Jesus by the other world, 
it ceases to be capable of direct observation as history, time or 
thing. " 
27 
It is precisely insofar as the Resurrection is not historical 
that it is revelation: the revelation of God as the Wholly Other, 
and of the limits of mankind and history. God can be revealed 
only incognito. "That the promises of the faithfulness of God 
have been fulfilled in Jesus the Christ is not, and never will be 
a self-evident truth, since in Him it appears in its final hidden- 
ness and its most profound secrecy. "28 Faith is the only attitude 
possible towards Him because it respects this incognito. "The 
demand to believe is laid upon all. .. All 
fleah must be silent 
before the inconspicuousness of God, in order that all flesh may 
2 
see His salvation. "9 Mankind is completely helpless before revel- 
ation in the sense that we cannot perceive it, teach it, hand it 
down traditionally, nor make it the object of our research. 
God is revealed by the Resurrection as utterly distinct from 
humanity, about Whom humanity can know nothing and from Whom for 
that very reason, man receives salvation. 
"God is the unknown God, and, precisely because He is unknown, He 
bestows life and breath and all things. "30 "God! We do not know 
what we mean when we say 
that. He who believes knows our ignor- 
ance. With Job, he loves the God Who, in His 
inscrutable majesty, 
is only to be feared; with Luther, he loves the Deus Absconditus; 
'31 
"-In Jesus Christ, God is revealed as the unknown God. " 
32 
22 
Likewise, man is revealed as utterly distinct from God. 
Jesus Christ's nature is shown in this regard to be two-fold. 
"All are confronted by the eternal two-sided possibility, which 
moves and rests in God alone. As the seed of Isreal, they are 
elected or, rejected; as children of the flesh, they inhabit the 
House of God or are strangers to it; with the Word of God ringing 
in their ears or on their lips, they belong to the Church of Jacob 
or to the Church of Esau. In Christ the KRISIS breaks forth. In 
Him is encountered that by which 
much as the roots of their being 
lightning, at the eternal 'Momen 
are what they are not, the roots 
buried in the unity of God. But 
desolation, inasmuch as, at that 
men are finally established, inas- 
are lit up, as by a flash of 
t' of revelation; for, since men 
of their existence are deeply 
in Christ is encountered also utter 
same 'Moment, ' men recognize that 
they are and were and will be established only in God, in the One 
Whom they are not. "33 
Crisis is thus a dialectical concept involving both a positive 
(man in God) and a negative (man in himself). In this early Barth, 
the negative is stressed to insure its being heard and understood. 
Crisis is the judgement of God on 'humanity, ' 'history, ' and 'I. ' 
"Neither forwards nor backwards can we escape from this narrow 
gorge. .. 
34 
There is, of course, a counter to the judgement of God in 
Christ, this distinction between God and man, found in the Christ 
Who effects the relation between God and man. But the foregoing 
7 3--- -- 
should be sufficient for shedding light on Barth's view of the 
historicity of the Resurrection. 
We began this section by asking how it was possible to under- 
stand Barth's seemingly paradoxical claim that the Resurrection 
is, at once, 'historical' and 'non-historical. ' It should now be 
clear that when Barth speaks of 'non-historical' events he is 
speaking on a different plane than the ordinary usage of the words 
would indicate. For Barth, the 'non-historical' is the revela- 
tional and, though the very term 'revelation' necessarily includes 
an historical aspect (i. e., 'it posits a subject, a person, to whom 
something is revealed), he is rigorous in his defence of the trans- 
cendence of God - His absolute otherness. It is significant in 
this early Barth that the symbol, quoted earlier, of the tangent 
(the unknown world) which touches the circle (the known world) 
touches it without touching it! This portrays ideally Barth's 
idea of two totally distinct spheres of being coming into 'contact. ' 
God acts historically, and yet as soon as this is stated it must be 
qualified, for God is not historical. As such, though the Resurrec- 
tion was an occurrence in history, i. e., it came to pass, was dis- 
covered and recognized, it must as quickly be claimed that it is 
not an historical event. The occurrence was 'conditioned' by the 
Resurrection, not vice versa. Or, as Barth states: 
,,. in so far. .. as 
it was not the 'coming to pass, ' or the discovery, 
or; the recognition, which conditioned 
its necessity and appearance 
and,. revelation, the 
Resurrection is not an event in history at all. 
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Jesus is declared to be the Son of God wherever He reveals 
Himself and is recognized as the Messiah, before the first Easter 
Day and, most assuredly, after it. "35 
Thus, Barth will not allow history to pretend to judge God's 
revelatory act in the Resurrection. 
Barth can also appear in this earlier stage to be indifferent 
to the 'when' and 'where' of the testimony to the Resurrection. 
Inn Resurrection, as regards the "human eyes" of the first witnesses, 
, 
"time and place are a matter of perfect indifference. Of what these 
eyes can see it can really be equally well said that it was, is, 
and will be, never and nowhere, as that it was, is, and will always 
and everywhere possible. "36 There is the danger that his earlier 
, 'historical' assertions in Romans and Resurrection, i. e., that the 
, Resurrection was 
"discovered and recognized" by a particular group 
, of people at a 
definite time and place, will lose their importance. 
. 
For the reader of Barth to accede to this would be a misunderstanding 
-of . 
him (although it must be admitted that he is open to misunderstand- 
: ing; here). He strives, not to debunk the historical, but to confute 
its,. grasp upon the revelatory. Barth's is a protection of the divine 
from the possessive grasp of history and scientific inquiry. It is 
the setting up of the transcendent completely out of the reach of 
the historical. To God belongs the thought, the initiative and 
, the act. 
Barth posits 
"the Resurrection as the deed of God, Whom no eye has seen nor ear 
heard, Who has entered no human heart, neither outwardly nor 
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inwardly, not subjective and not objective, not mystical nor 
spiritistic and not flatly objective, but as a historical divine 
fact, which as such is only to be grasped in the category of 
revelation and in none other. "37 
To be sure, we are left with a residue of historical act 
from the intrusion of the divine, much like "the crater made at 
the percussion point of an exploding shell, "38 yet its real meaning 
is beyond the grasp of mere history and is completely within the 
realm of God. 
It remains, then, to state the obvious. For the Barth of 
Romans 'non-history' is more important than history. We have 
spoken, using his language, of a 'Primal History. ' This term (or 
'Primal Creation') symbolizes for Barth the lesser degree of im- 
portance of the "purely incidental elements" of history and "brings 
out what is common to every happening in history as well as its 
dignity and importance. " Barth quotes from Nietzsche: 
"The non-historical resembles an all-embracing atmosphere in which 
humanlife is conceived and apart from which it shrivels up. For 
the actions which men propose take shape first in this dim and non- 
historical vapor. If it were possible for a man to penetrate with 
his understanding the non-historical in which every great episode 
in history had its origin, he might, by raising himself beyond the 
sphere of history, attain to that knowledge which would absolve 
him 
from the necessity of taking serious account of the actual facts of 
26 
history. A single hour chosen from the first, or it might be 
from the nineteenth, century, or one single individual, whatever 
his condition be he Greek or Turk, would suffice to provide an 
answer to the question how and why men should live. "39 
For Barth, this individualist interpretation of Nietzsche 
is the secular analogy to "The light of the LOGOS" which conditions 
all history, who is Primal to all history, and must therefore be 
placed in the more important realm of the non-historical. We may 
say 'more important' without apology (although Barth nowhere uses 
exactly these words) since all history takes shape in the "non- 
historical vapor, " is illuminated and conditioned by it, is depen- 
dent on it, and is compared to it as the "old world of the flesh" 
alongside the "new world of the Holy Spirit. "40 This new world is 
not an event, an experience, or an emotion. Rather it is a demand. 
"It demands participation, comprehension, co-operation; for it is 
a communication which presumes faith in the living God, and which 
41 
creates that which it presumes. " 
When Barth reaches the Dogmatics period, he moderates the 
tendency to underplay the element of historical reality. Now the 
Resurrection is a spatiotemporal occurrence in its own right. It 
is "a separate event, different from his death, following it in 
time. "43 He speaks of the life of Jesus in this vein. 
"Like all men, the man Jesus has his lifetime. .. The eternal 
content of his life must not cause us to miss or to 
forget or to 
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forget or to deprecate this form, separating the content from it 
and discarding the form,, as though we could see and have the 
content without it. .. If we abstract Him from His time, we also 
lose this content of His life. If we retain the content, we must 
needs restrain the form as well, and therefore His temporality. " 
43 
"Jesus has a further history beginning on the third day after His 
death and therefore after the time of His first history had 
clearly come to an end. In temporal sequence it is a second history - 
or rather, the fragments of a second history - of Jesus. It is the 
Easter history, the history of the forty days between His resurr- 
ection and ascension. "44 "A consideration of what the texts say 
(and do not say) in their attestation of this event, without 
measuring them by an imported picture of the world and history, 
without reading them through these alien spectacles. "45 
Barth is not, however, seeking the acceptance of a well- 
documented historical event. What he wants ultimately is a decision 
of faith, and in this a degree of consistence between the early and 
later Barth comes through. Although the Resurrection is unqualifiably 
historical, the true assessment and acknowledgement of it arises 
from revelation. 
NZt was impossible for the apostles to record and depict the history 
of the man Jesus in his time without adding this post-history, the 
Easter history. For this particular recollection belonged to their 
recollection of the man Jesus 
in his time. And it belongs to it 
decisively as the recollection of the revelation, of the source of 
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knowledge, of the key to the history previously witnessed by them. "46 
"The Easter time is simply the time of the revelation of the mystery 
of the preceding time of the life and death of the man Jesus... 
His mystery first and then its revelation, constitute its content. "47 
Nevertheless, Barth's increased emphasis on the historical 
factuality of the "Easter time" allows him to press the claim that 
an impartial and painstaking investigation of the New Testament 
texts in their character as historical documents can create a neutral 
and objective knowledge as the presupposition to "the genuine and 
fruitful knowledge of love and faith. "48 
Let us summarize briefly before going on. The Barth of Romans 
stands in danger of refusing to recognize the Resurrection as 
historical event. His frequent use of'terminology such as 'non- 
historical, ' and qualifications such as 'Primal-History' might lead 
one to think this the case. Yet his use of these terms, in reality, 
was to explicate the effective proclamation of man's real salvation, 
of the grace of God through Christ, and it entailed in Barth's 
theology first of all - and especially on the heels of Liberalism - 
the disentanglement of man and God. The 'Yes' had to be first of 
all a 'No' in order to be a real 'Yes. 
49 Nothing in man's historical 
sphere must claim possession over the unilateral act of God 
in Jesus, 
seen in its fullness 
in the Resurrection. Yet we assert that the 
Resurrection as actual fact was a part of Romans, (swallowed up 
though it was by revelation), and later and more clearly a part of 
The Resurrection of the Dead. The Resurrection in the Dogmatics 
is unqualifiably historical although the revelational aspect 
is 
still present. 
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This leads Barth to say, as was stated above, that impartiality 
in New Testament exegesis can actually create a neutral and objective 
knowledge as a presupposition to actual faith. 
To proceed now with the logical question: can the Resurrection 
then be 'proved' by scientific historical investigation? Barth's 
ultimate answer: 
"There is no proof, and there obviously cannot and ought not to be 
any proof, for the fact that this history did take place ( proof, 
that is, according to the terminology of modern historical scholar- 
ship. 0j)50 
Barth lays down various conditions which would have to be met 
if we were to unqualifiably state that we were on "historical 
ground" in relation to the Easter events. We must know (1) the 
explication of the 'How' of the event, both (2) independently of 
the'standpoint of the onlooker and (3) within its general and specific 
context, and (4) in its relation to the analogies of other events. 
It` is his contention that neither (1) nor (2) has been satisfied in 
Scriptural accounts. 
Regarding (1), the 'How' of the events, Barth calls attention 
to the "strong impression" one receives reading the Gospels that 
a''different kind of historical sphere is encountered 
between the 
passion narratives and the story of Easter. Though we receive a 
"full account of how Jesus suffered" there is "no real account of 
his resurrection" save the empty tomb. Then presupposition takes 
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over quietly in the accounts of the Resurrection appearances. 
"this is all the more striking because the Gospels did fully 
narrate and describe other resurrections, that of Jarius' 
daughter (MT. 9: 18-25), that of the young man at Nain (Lk. 7: 11-16), 
and that of Lazarus (Jn. ll: ) the latter in a direct and almost 
plastic way. But here it is not possible to speak of someone 
superior to Jesus Christ who took Him by the hand and by his word 
called Him to life from the dead. Here we can only think of the 
act of God which cannot be described and therefore cannot be narrated, 
and then of the actual fact that Jesus Himself stood in their 
midst. " 
51 
Regarding (2), the need for outside impartial witnesses, Barth 
is just as firm in his denial of our ability to satisfy this pre- 
requisite. "No such proof is adduced or even intended in the New 
Testament" he states, in calling the list of names in I Cor. 15: 4-8 
an "appeal for faith, " rather than "an attempt at external objective 
52 assurance. 
I Yet Barth is quick to claim that there is "no reason to deplore 
this. " The Resurrection, by virtue of its nature, character, and 
function is simply not the place for the 'historicist' concept of 
history. It rather falls into the category of "saga" or "legend; " 
events which - unlike myths - 
did in fact occur, but whose nature 
evades verification 
by the historical method. Yet we should be 
guilty of a 
fundamental misunderstanding if we try to interpret 
the Resurrection as 
if it never happened in space and time, just 
31 
like Jesus' death. Though it cannot be grasped historically it 
is still actual and objective. Barth uses the term "pre-historical" 
to describe it, but fails to carry through with his early affinity 
for such terms, and states that whatever terms we use, the concrete 
history of the event, underlying the Gospel accounts, is spoken 
of. 
53 Although much of the critique of Barth's views on the 
Resurrection will be postponed until those views can be seen in 
light of his debate with Rudolf Bultmann, he invites comment here 
on several fronts which will be of interest to us throughout this 
study. Barth insists on a combination of Heilsgeschichte and 
temporal history in his Resurrection discussions in the Dogmatics. 
What this actually amounts to is a claiming of genuine historical 
reality for the Resurrection and yet a denial of the historian's 
right to pronounce on the matter. On the one hand, as stated 
earlier, it would be "a fundamental misunderstanding"to interpret 
it as though it had "not happened in time and space in the same way 
as the death of Jesus Christ. " On the other hand, the faith 
acknowledgement of the Resurrection arises through the 
intervention 
of the Holy Spirit and remains unattainable by historical research. 
This is perhaps the place to mention the 'why' of this often 
criticized stance, through the mention of two influences on Barth - 
Lessing and Oberbeck. 
Although Lessing can hardly be seen as one of the great in- 
fluences on Barth 
54, his so-called 'Big Ditch' has had some influence 
on Barth's theology. 
55 Barth seems to attempt to avoid the ditch 
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which Lessing indicated: "The accidental truths of history 
can never become the necessary proofs of reason.  
56 
And we may 
here agree with H. Hartwell in commending Barth for the fact that 
Jesus Christ "is never treated in a purely nominalistic way, as a 
mere formal historical or symbolic sign of the event of reconcilia- 
tion, or, to use Lessing's phrase, as a 'contingent fact of history, ' 
serving as the 'vehicle' of an 'eternal truth of reason. , 
57 
From Overbeck, a great positive influence, Barth seems to 
have been led to a determination to find another basis for faith 
than history. It was Overbeck who gave Barth the idea of 
Urgeschichte and the concept of the supertemporal, unsearchable, 
incomparable world, out of which man has come on to the plane of 
temporal history. Between this Urgeschichte and Death, two un- 
known worlds, lie all that we call 'historical, ' subject to time, 
relative. For Overbeck, to place Christianity under the historical, 
to concede that it has become historical, is to say that Christianity 
is of this world, and that it has become as all other earthly life: 
it lives only to die. It must grow, age, and degenerate. Thus, 
Christianity is not history and history is not Christianity. 
58 
Barth was obviously influenced here in his distrust of 'histor- 
icism, ' and of all constructions of Christianity that seek their 
basis for faith in historical events. 
Thus, Barth's answer is not to bind revelation to history 
and thus interfere with God's freedom and sovereignty. Yet if 
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Christianity (the Resurrection) is an historical revelation - 
which Barth constantly and forcefully claims - would it not seem 
that the historian has the right to investigate it and to endeavor 
to determine whether or not the early Church was justified in 
its claim that Jesus had risen from the dead? 
Barth is hardly guilty of detaching the Resurrection from 
history as Overbeck would liked to have done, but he is unalter- 
ably opposed to establishing an historical proof of the faith. 
For instance, we note his section in the Dogmatics on the 'royal 
man. 160 which looks at the historical Jesus. In connection with 
the Resurrection he is open in his admission of similarity with 
temporal history, and he assesses the Resurrection events like 
an historian. While he points up contradictions in these stories 
(because of their "saga-like" quality) he claims that they testify 
to actual events. Here he appeals to the appearance of Jesus to the 
disciples as recorded in Lk. 24: 36f., where the risen Christ demon- 
strates to them that He is not "a spirit" but has "flesh and bones, " 
and to the story of Thomas in the book of John. He also brings 
out the forty-days tradition and the empty tomb as evidence. What 
we actually see then strangely enough, is Barth's use of these 
stories to show the Resurrection's historicity and then subsequently 
informing us that they are above historical analysis. 
Let us lastly refer back to Barth's criteria of acceptability 
regarding what can be 'proved' by historical investigation. We 
recall that Barth denied (1) that we may know the 'How' of the 
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Resurrection since it is Scripturally excluded. Nor may we see 
in these stories anything meeting the criterion of (2) "impartial- 
ity. " 
Regarding (1), we may claim, according to Barth, the historical 
fact that Jesus was buried, and, in addition, the subsequent histor- 
ical fact that He was resurrected. This means, we believe, that the 
question 'How? ' (i. e., how the Resurrection happened) is not non- 
sensical. As to the nature of this Barth is quite correct in noting 
the absence of textual reference. But the fact remains according 
to Barth, that the event transpired historically, even if also 
supernaturally. At some point in elapsed time there was a 'moment' 
in which Jesus was no longer simply to be numbered among the dead; 
which marks the periods of time Barth would call his "earthly 
history" and his "subsequent history" on earth. Must we not claim, 
in admitting this 'how' that there is a true historical level to this 
moment in history, in fact to all the other events of the Resurrect- 
ion also, based on other enlightening texts and our increased under- 
standing of natural phenomena? 
61 
Barth scorns as superstition the 
view that "only the historically verifiable could take place in 
, 
time. "63 This is puzzling, and it has been the view of other 
theologians (as we shall see) that, to the extent that Jesus' 
Resurrection is synonymous with the other events of his life, 
historically speaking, it must like them become a proper objective 
of the historians' attention. 
Regarding (2), the question of impartiality, by what criteria 
35 
does Barth require such neutrality on the part of his witnesses? 
The most obvious analogy to his 'impartial witness' discussion 
would be, it seems, the legal sphere, and there is here no stringent 
requirement such as Barth would presume for New Testament verifi- 
cation. In fact, it is rather the highly involved 'insider' 
whose testimony is often the most -reasonable and reliable. Further, 
could actual witnessing of the risen Jesus leave anyone an 
'impartial witness? ' In addition, let us note that Barth repeats 
at the point of his argument on historicity in the Dogmatics his 
contention which first appeared in The Resurrection of the Dead: 
Paul does not intend the list of witnesses in I. Cor. 15 as a 
proof of the Resurrection. 
63 
It will suffice to say here that both 
Bultmann and Pannenberg will dispute this interpretation of Paul's 
intention, 
64 
(c) The Empty Tomb. For the early Barth the tomb is of little 
concern. In Romans, for all the talk of Resurrection, the subject 
is not even broached. Not that the matter is too trivial for Barth, 
for he does speak of it in The Resurrection of the Dead. Yet his 
attitude as to the historicity of the event is ultimately one of 
indifference. 
"The tomb may prove to be a definitely closed or an open tomb; 
it is really a matter of indifference. What avails the tomb, 
proved to be this or that, at Jerusalem in the year A. D. 30? "65 
Barth doesn't seem to say that the tomb was not empty, if we 
understand him rightly, 
in fact he leans to the belief that it 
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probably was. His attitude is again, however, seeming indiff- 
erence to this 'historical' fact, which might be paraphrased with 
the query 'yet what is to be proved? ' 
"What do these eyes* see? We naturally feel impelled to inquire, 
and to this question no other answer can be given than: the tomb, 
the stone, the linen, the handkerchief, and everything pertaining 
thereto; the evangelical tradition, following its own point of 
view, described in detail this residue and its discovery as the 
last word that can be said on the basis of historical observation: 
a fact as doubtful as all earthly facts are: he might, in fact, 
have been stolen, he might only have appeared to be dead. .. 
Critically considered, it might even mean: the tomb is the bomb, 
and he who is dead does not return. "66 *(referring to Paul's list 
of witnesses in I. Cor. 15: 3-7) 
Barth's early emphasis is much more on the Resurrection and 
the appearances of the risen Christ than on the empty tomb. 
By the time of Credo (1936) Barth has come to see the issue 
of the tomb as meriting more importance. In fact he states that to 
discredit the Gospel accounts of the empty tomb is to seriously 
tamper with the apostolic witness. 
67 
There is some semblance of 
his early caution regarding this event, such as is seen in The 
Resurrection of the Dead, primarily in statements like: 
"The empty tomb was obviously a very ambiguous and contestable 
fact (Mt. 27: 62f.; 28: 11f. ). And what has happened around this 
sepulchre is a warning against making it a primary focus of 
37 
attention. The empty tomb is not the same thing as the 
Resurrection. .. Hence it is only a sign. "68 
Yet for Barth it finally becomes as "indispensable sign. . 
.a sign which obviates all possible misunderstanding. 
" Although 
"Christians do not believe in the empty tomb but in the living 
Christ, " this does not imply "that we can believe in the living 
Christ without believing in the empty tomb. "69 
"Rejection of the legend of the empty tomb has always been 
accompanied by rejection of the saga of the living Jesus, and 
necessarily so. Far better, then, to admit that the empty tomb 
belongs to the Easter event as its sign. "7° 
II. The Resurrection and the Parousia 
As we have seen, the early Barth manifests a tendency to 
disassociate the Resurrection from temporal history through an 
overwhelming stress on the revelatory aspect of the Resurrection. 
This seems to evolve naturally into a readiness to identify it with 
the parousia. The extinction of the difference of past, present, and 
future are a direct influence of Kierkegaard. Since the early 
Barth71 nowhere spells out precisely his debt to Kierkegaard for 
this line of thought, we may look briefly to Kierkegaard himself 
for our insight into Barth's thinking. 
Kierkegaard accepts the definition of time as infinite 
succession. 
72 Yet he immediately argues that under this definition 
of time the dimensions of temporality - past, present, and future - 
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are not inherently present in time. Put another way, the 
present cannot find a foothold in infinite successiveness, whereby 
time can be divided so that past and future can emerge. 
"But precisely because every moment, like the sum of moments, 
is a process (a going-by), no moment is a present, and in the 
same sense there is neither past, present, nor future. "73 
No moment is itself present, because it itself is infinitely 
divisible; therefore there can be no duration, no 'present' in 
time such that a before and after can be established. Kierkegaard 
continues that the problem with the orthodox view of time is that 
the present is incorrectly considered as a momemt of time. This 
makes of the present something "infinitely void" and "infinitely 
vanishing. " 
Kierkegaard's answer to this is that "the present is the 
eternal, or rather the eternal is the present, and the present 
is full. " Only in introducing the concept of the eternal 
present into time, which he describes as "the instant" or 
"the first reflection of eternity into time" is it possible to 
establish the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future. 
He states: 
"Thus understood, the instant (a 'glance of the eye, ' in other 
words) is not properly an atom of time 
but an atom of eternity. 
It is the finite reflection of eternity in time, its first effort 
as it were to bring time to a stop. .. the 
instant is that 
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ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another, 
thereby positing the temporal-, where time is constantly inter- 
secting eternity and eternity is constantly permeating time. 
Only now does that division we talked about acquire significance: 
the present, the past, and the future. "74 
Thus, for the early Barth, an eternal 'now' absorbs the future 
and the past. The second coming of Christ ceases to be something 
truly future, that is, without the revelational function of being 
seen as a timeless symbol for an immediate relationship to God 
which is always possible. 
"We remove from the 'Moment' when the last trump sounds all 
likeness to the past and future, and thereby proclaim the likeness 
of all times, of all past and future, for we no longer perceive any 
past or any future which, in its complete distinction from the 
'Moment, ' does not participate in its dignity and meaning. "75 
The end of time is transmuted into the 'beyond' of eternity. 
"Since it is the sovereignty of God which gives significance to 
time, it is for that very reason not in time. It is not one temp- 
oral thing among others. What is in time has not yet reached the 
boundary of death, has not yet been taken under the government of 
God. It must yet die in order to enter into life. The moment 
when the last trump is sounded, when 
the dead shall be raised and 
the living shall be changed, is not the last moment of time, but 
is times Teleos, its non-temporal limit and end. "76 
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"For the hour of awakening, the striking of the last hour, the 
time of fulfillment, which is here announced, certainly does not 
mean some succeeding chronological hour, as though it. .. could 
be a period of time succeeding anouther period-of time. .. It is 
not time but eternity that lies 'beyond. ' Standing on the 
boundary of time, men are confronted by the overhanging, precipitous 
wall of God, by which all time and everything that is in time are 
dissolved. " 
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Barth in the Dogmatics still shows a readiness to describe 
the Resurrection, the outpouring of the Spirit and the parousia 
"as forms of one and the same event. " Yet he quickly follows up 
with the question "how else could we distinguish them except within 
the unity of the whole? "78 The time of the Church constitutes an 
"interim period" in which we are still moving towards the second 
coming of Christ. 
79 He offers a depreciation of his earlier work 
in Romans which, under the Kierkegaardian influence, interpreted 
the parousia (in expounding Rom. 13: 11f. ) "as if it referred only 
to the moment which confronts all moments in time as the eternal 
'transcendental meaning' of a moment in time, " and did not move 
"towards a real end. "80 Barth claims, with characteristic humor, 
that with all his "art and eloquence, " he actually missed the 
distinctive feathere of the passage, which he has come to see as 
the teleology which it ascribes to time as it moves toward this 
real end. Like the Resurrection, "it is clear enough that the 
end of the last time is a historical and therefore temporal- 
event. " 
81 
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To summarize, the early Barth, using the Kierkegaardian 
principle of simultaneity, sees an eternal 'now' absorbing both 
future and past. The Resurrection and the parousia tend to be 
identified as the 'moment which confronts all moments in time, ' 
which is always and everywhere possible. In the Dogmatics he 
has come to see the Resurrection and the parousia as related 
but separate events, and the Church age as that which recalls 
the Resurrection while moving temporally toward the second 
coming. 
III. The Relationship of the Cross and the Resurrection 
As the early Barth tends to merge the Resurrection and the 
parousia to the point of identifying them, so does he likewise 
merge together Easter and Calvary. Within this link Calvary is 
supreme. "Only in the cross of Christ, " he states, "can we 
comprehend the truth and meaning of his Resurrection. "82 
For Barth, the life of Christ is His obedientia passiva, His death 
on Calvary. 
"Neither the personality of Jesus, nor the 'Christ 
idea, ' nor the Sermon on the Mount, nor His miracles of 
healing, nor His trust in God, nor His love of His brethren, 
nor His demand for repentance, nor His message of forgiveness, 
nor His attack on tradition. .. nor the eschatological or the 
immediate aspects of His teaching concerning the Kingdom of 
God - none of these things exist in their own right. Everything 
shines in the light of His death, and is illumined by it. No 
single passage in the Synoptic Gospels is intelligible apart 
83 
from the death. " 
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The later Barth modifies his earlier views, not by a 
drastic weakening of his initial like between the cross and 
Resurrection, but by emphasizing the illuminating predominance 
of the Resurrection. For the Barth of Credo, "one cannot 
understand the cross of Christ otherwise than from His 
resurrection. " 
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From now on in Barth's writings, the 
Resurrection illuminates the crucifixion rather than vice versa. 
In the Dogmatics it is hardly a rarity to find statements of "the 
being and action of Jesus Christ in His preceding life and 
death. "85 The event of crucifixion should not be underestimated 
in Barth, to be sure. 
"This event, the redemption and reconciliation there 
accomplished, the overcoming and destroying of death which 
there took place, and [which] now form the starting point for 
those who believe, is for the New Testament no more and no 
less than the end of time, the last day. .. What is to happen 
in time and as the meaning of the cosmos existing in time has 
happened in this event. "86 
Yet he goes on to say: 
"Its dawning after the midnight hour is the resurrection 
of Jesus and the appearance of the forty days as an indication 
that this event has happened, that death has been deprived of 
its power and that time is at an end. . . (thus) those who 
believe in Jesus, continue to live in the only possible way, 
namely, in the light of. .. the resurrection of Jesus. "87 
For the later Barth then, we face an irreversible sequence 
and may not go behind the Resurrection to make Calvary, in spite 
of its accomplishments, paramount. In contradiction to his 
earlier thought, the cross must be seen, and can only be under- 
stood, in the light of Easter. 
In the following section we shall look into this important 
relationship in more detail. 
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Cross and Resurrection in Karl Barth 
(Part Two) 
We have seen over the last few pages shifts of opinion 
between the earlier and the later Barth. Building upon this 
previous discussion let us look now at Barth's theology of 
the Resurrection in a more integrated sense, focusing on the 
relationship of the Cross and the Resurrection. We will begin 
by discussing the concept of reconciliation in Barth. 
Reconciliation and the Resurrection 
Reconciliation is the resumption of a fellowship which 
once existed between God and man: the fulfilment of a covenant 
between the two. 
' 
This covenant which Jesus fulfilled had been 
threatened with dissolution. His work has the character of 
reconciliation and restitution through the restoring and up- 
holding of that fellowship in face of an element which disrupts 
and breaks it - in defiance and by the removal of an obstruction. 
It triumphs over human sin. God has remained faithful despite 
man's unfaithfulness. The essence of the work of Christ as 
almighty and unilateral grace becomes unmistakable. 'Where sin 
abounded, grace did much more abound. " (Rom. 5: 20). 
It is completely God's own work, who removes our enmity 
toward God. This is accomplished in the presence and activity 
of His Son Jesus Christ. In Him He accepts complete solidarity 
with sinners. He takes our sinful nature upon Himself (minus 
the culpability obviously), so that we might be made the right- 
eousness of God. In Christ sin is objectively removed and man 
is at peace with God. 
2 
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For Barth, then, reconciliation with God has taken place. 
It is an actuality, not a possibility. The death and resurrec- 
tion of Christ has, in fact, changed mankind. 
"The event of Easter Day is the removing of the barrier 
between His life in His time and their life in their times. 
In His resurrection it is fixed that what He did in His time 
He did in their time for and to them. .. Thus the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ are together. .. the basis of the 
alteration of the situation of the men of all times. In virtue 
of the divine right established in the death of Jesus Christ, 
in virtue of the justification which has come to them in His 
resurrection, they are no longer what they were, but they are 
already what they are to be. They are no longer the enemies of 
God but His friends, His children. "3 
God accomplishes this in the presence and activity of His 
Son Jesus Christ, in the form of a substitution and exchange. 
"He stands before the Father at Golgotha burdened with 
all the actual sin and guilt of man and of each individual man, 
and is treated in accordance with the deserts of man as the 
transgressor of the divine command. "4 
Christ thus entered fully into man's seemingly fatal alienation 
from God, took the place of the sinner and became the object of 
divine wrath. God asserted his right against sinful humanity 
by judging (forgiving) them in the death of their representative. 
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"The death of Jesus Christ was, of course, wholly and 
altogether the work of God to the extent that it is the judgement 
of death fulfilled on the Representative of all other men appointed 
by God. "5 
Yet, asks Barth, is there any doctrine which is more 
contestable than that of the doctrine of justification? Is there 
any which is more perilously affirmed? It defies understanding, 
and yet calls for proof. The "act of divine proof is the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. " Through it God's act of justifi- 
cation is understood and constituted as our justification. 
"The sinful man who was condemned and punished by God 
on account of his sin is acquitted and justified by the same God, 
bieng invested with all the glory of one who is righteous, and 
therefore rescued from the death into which he had fallen. And 
this man was sinful in the sense that he was the bearer of our sin 
and took our place before God, and there accepted God's sentence 
and punishment for us. As our Head and Representative, he was 
sinful and died for sin. And as our Head and Lord He also rose 
from the dead, and beyond that sentence received God's justifica- 
6 
tion. " 
To summarize, the work of reconciliation, the "fulfilment 
of the covenant between God and man, " has taken place in the 
death of Jesus Christ. 
7 
To be sure, the "theologia resurrectionis 
does not absorb the theologia crucis, nor vice versa, "8 yet 
the Resurrection must be understood as the true, original and 
typical act of revelation. In Barth's words: 
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"His raising, His resurrection, His new life, confirmed 
His death. It was God's answer to it, and to that extent its 
revelation and declaration. .. It was God's acknowledgement of 
Jesus Christ, of His life and death. .. It came 
in the midst 
of His real death and delivered Him from death. To that extent 
it was. .. the 
divine approval and acknowledgement of the obed- 
ience given by Jesus Christ, the acceptance of His sacrifice, 
the. .. bringing 
into force of the. .. saving consequences of 
His action and passion in our place. "9 
Put more simply, the death of Christ, the negative act of God, is 
resolved in the Resurrection "with a positive intention. .. 
(humanity's) putting on of a new life. "10 
Excursus: 
Barth's grasp of the Resurrection as the basis of the 
reconciliation effected by Christ is not difficult, but his par- 
ticular expression of this makes it incumbent that we detour for 
a moment to look more closely at 
his handling of reconciliation. 
He understands reconciliation under two related terms: penal 
suffering and exchange. 
Barth's explication of penal suffering has already been 
sketched and the mechanics of this view are at any rate well, 
known. The difficulty encountered may be summarized as follows: 
"That Christ acted as the representative of other men lies beyond 
t.. 
dispute. That he could literally carry the moral guilt of others 
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remains an ethical puzzle. ' Barth seems to realize the diffi- 
culty inherent in claiming that culpability for personal sin 
is transferred from a guilty party to an innocent party (even 
if it is a willing acceptance). Yet he deals with the problem 
in a vague manner, alluding numerous times to the depth and 
unique nature of this substitution, yet eventually claiming its 
reality as done in Christ without ethical explanation. Before 
continuing with Barth let us look at a solution to this 'puzzle' 
as set forth by Wolfhart Pannenberg. Attempts of this sort are 
rare and Pannenberg's seems to us to have good basis. 
Pannenberg looks at the historical resistance to the con- 
cept of substitution initially in his noting of the Socinian's 
view that it was something "unthinkable, " and Socinus' own stand 
that it would be unjust of God to punish the innocent for the 
guilty, since the guilty are within his power and could themselves 
be punished. Likewise Ritschl (The Christian Doctrine of Justi- 
fication and Reconciliation, p. 268) argued against the idea of 
substitution. Yet both these, according to Pannenberg, were 
predicated upon "an extreme ethical individualism" that has 
characterized modern man's self-understanidng up to the middle 
of this century. 
The Hebrew understanding of this involvement of the indi- 
vidual and society is taken as the point of departure from this 
modern individualistic view by Pannenberg. The consequences 
of an individual's actions, in the Hebrew view, are not only 
for 
himself but for all society. Thus the evildoer was a danger to 
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society because the wrong done reflected in one way or another 
on society unless it removed itself from solidarity with the 
offender. "Therefore, the evil deed must be turned back upon 
the doer; if not, it seeks out another victim in the offender's 
vicinity. This extensive independence of the deed from the doer 
also makes it possible that the catastrophe inherent in the deed 
can be directed to some other being and so be annulled. .. This 
transferability of guilt is the fundamental concept underlying the 
Israelite institution of the sin offering. " 
13 
Biblical evidence is not hard to find in the ceremonies of 
Israel, which generally focus on animal sacrifice (Deut. 21: 1-9), 
or on the animal's "bearing away" of the sins of the community 
(Lev. 16: 21f. ). Yet such actions are not autonomous and required 
divine involvement. 
Thus, in this conceptual sphere of 'substitution, ' the 
catastrophic power of the deed can be released somewhere other 
than the doer and the doer's community, within the general frame- 
work of a demonstration of Yahweh's grace. The decline of this 
conception of unity comes, as it came with Israel, when the idea 
of the unity of the people is dissolved; when the individual 
becomes independent of the people. This was the essence of the 
Enlightenment's criticism of the idea of substitution and of the 
Socinian's individualistic conception of guilt and responsibility. 
The social transformation of the present day has shaken this 
long held individualistic view according to Pannenberg. It is a 
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basis of the social character of human existence that every 
person is involved in society by what he does and by his share 
in the deeds of others. In social life, there is nothing unusual 
or unbelievable about 'substitution. ' Even the division of 
labor, vocation, has 'substitutionary' character. Pannenberg 
states: 
"If substitution is not a universal phenomenon in 
human social relationships, if the individualistic interpretation 
of responsibility and recompense need not be rejected as one- 
sided because it overlooks the social relationships of individual 
behavior, then it is not possible to speak meaningfully of a 
vicarious character of the fate of Jesus Christ. Substitution 
as such cannot be a miraculously supernatural uniqueness of 
Jesus. The particular vicarious significance of Jesus' fate 
'for us' can be defended only on the basis of an understanding 
of human behavior generally which - as in ancient Israel - sees 
individuals interwoven with one another in the results of their 
actions and certainly also in the ethical problem. Only in the 
tradition of such an understanding could the New Testament con- 
cepts about the vicarious significance of Jesus' fate have been 
, 14 constructed. " 
Thus Pannenberg claims that there is "an element of substitution 
active in all social relationships, " and that only under this 
presupposition can we understand Jesus' death as a vicarious 
event. Yet this must 
be seen in view of an unparalleled 
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reversal: "that the one rejected as a blasphemer is, in the 
light of his resurrection, the truly just man, and his judges, 
in contrast, are now the real blasphemers. " 
15 
God, who raised 
Jesus from the dead, has placed upon him the chastisement for 
blasphemy through the legitimate government. Jesus was subse- 
quently legitimated as being justified in what he preached by 
his Resurrection from the dead. But prior to this, Jesus went to 
his death in the place of the people whose rejection of Jesus is 
revealed, in the light of the Resurrection, to be rebellion against 
God. 
So far Pannenberg. It is obvious, even in this too concise 
rendering of his thought, that he is approaching the meaning of 
substitution through the Resurrection, rather than expressing it 
as an interpretation of the Incarnation. 
16 
Jesus must be seen 
here, consistent with Pannenberg's christology, as being fully 
man before the Resurrection. 
17 
As a man he died 'for us. ' As 
a man he was raised from the dead. Pannenberg's point, and we 
see it as well taken, is that Jesus, only as a 'social' entity 
and a fully 'social' entity, could effect the involvement of 
society in his actions. Jesus must be seen as man, with no 
diminution in his manhood for the concept of substitution to be 
legitimate. Pannenberg has laid out clearly the mindset of the 
tradition in which Jesus lived and in which the story and inter- 
pretation of Jesus was subsequently written. Keeping this 
in 
mind let us look again to Barth's concept of penal substitution 
and his incarnational christology. 
i 
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The concept of penal substitution or suffering carries 
with it inherently the idea of Jesus' death in our place. 
Barth is insistent about this and often prefers to let Scripture 
carry the weight of his argument in speaking for itself. He states 
for instance: "'He hath made him to be sin for us (in our place 
and for our sake), who knew no sin (God Himself being present 
and active in Him). ' Here we have it in its simplest possible 
form. "18 Regarding the effect of the cross/Resurrection upon all 
society and creation there can be no compromise for Barth. The 
event was 'for us; ' in complete solidarity with us. It would seem 
then, that Jesus Christ was a man among humanity, a true 'social 
entity' for Barth. 
Here we turn to an informative article by Charles Waldrop. 
19 
Waldrop takes the conventional stand that Barth follows Alexandrian 
theology in affirming that the divinity of Jesus Christ is inherent, 
and is possessed prior to and apart from his assumption of human 
nature. By way of contrast, Antiochene christology emphasizes 
that Jesus' humanity is his inherent nature and that divinity 
is conferred upon him by nature of his relation to God. Barth is 
Alexandrian, Waldrop demonstrates, in understanding the personal 
unity of Christ as "a unity between the fully personal LOGOS and 
the human nature of all people. " This human nature is complete, 
although it is not a person. On the other hand, Antiochene 
christology understands the person of Christ as the unity of two 
persons, God and Jesus, generally described as the conjunction 
V 
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of the human will with-the divine in such a way that Jesus was 
indwelt with the wisdom of God but in such a way that the 
personality was human. When Barth uses the name "Jesus Christ" 
he uses it in an Alexandrian manner to denote the one divine 
person. Even terms which suggest humanity ( i. e., Jesus) denote 
divinity rather than, as in Antiochene christology, a human person 
united with God. According to Barth, Jesus Christ is absolutely 
himself; therefore "Jesus" is God's name. Thus, according to 
Waldrop, Barth minimizes the significance of Christ's humanity. 
Pannenberg assesses Barth in much the same way. For 
Pannenberg there is no significant difference between the Barth 
of Romans, who "understood the cross of Christ primarily as the 
expression of the contrast between God and the world" and the 
later Barth of the Dogmatics who claims that Jesus is the one man 
who was rejected, 
20 for our sake, and thus the one judged by God 
for our own sake. 
21 "In these statements, Barth has once more 
developed the doctrine of atonement as interpretation of the 
incarnation, not of the historical life of Jesus. " 
22 
This brings us to the topic mentioned earlier. Barth 
understands reconciliation not only in penal substitutionary 
terminology, but also as 'exchange, '23 This means that God's 
activity takes the place of man's in the work of reconciliation. 
According to Colm O'Grady: 
"For us' means solely 'in our place' (an unsere Stelle). 
He insists so repeatedly on the divine activity that he leaves 
no place for a cooperating activity of Christ's nature as man. 
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'In the atonement we are dealing with a sovereign act of God. 
.. This sovereign act 
is the act of God's grace. .. original, 
unilateral, glorious and truly divine - in which he acts quite 
alone' (CD, IV/1, pp. 81- 2). 'Atonement is altogether the work 
of God and not of man; katallassein is said only of God and 
katallagenai only of man. '(CD, IV/1, p. 74). The events 
leading to Christ's passion, and the passion itself, are a 
divine act. "24 
In summary then, we must state our belief that Barth tends 
to minimize the humanity of Jesus in relation to his divinity. 
25 
Although we see in the Dogmatics a genuine emphasis on the 
Resurrection regarding reconciliation (and this itself is not to 
be minimized), it must also be noted that the basis for the 
doctrine of the Atonement in Barth is strictly incarnational. 
It is Pannenberg who claims that whenever this is the case, the tru; 
humanity of Jesus of Nazareth becomes problematic and all christ- 
ological concepts are given a mythological tone. It is also to 
be noted that, regarding the question of the 'ethical puzzle' 
of how one can literally carry the moral guilt of others, Barth 
has missed the opportunity to account for this in any meaningful 
sense with his consistent minimalization of Jesus' humanity. From 
the point of apologetics then, substitution can simply be 'claimed' 
as` the gracious act of God, with no further reference as to the 
'How. ' We do not fault Barth in his expression of atonement through 
penal substitutionary theology as some have done. 
26 
Again, with 
63 
Pannenberg (commending Luther) we believe "that Jesus' death in 
its genuine sense is to be understood as vicarious penal 
suffering. "27 Rather we regret, not that Barth has made atonement 
"altogether the work of God and not of man, "28 but that the 
humanity of Jesus of Nazareth becomes in Barth only an'incident 
regarding the concept of substitution, and thus in danger of 
becoming a rather innocuous characteristic. 
Beyond Negativity: The Subjective Reality of the Resurrection. 
We had mentioned just prior to the Excursus that the death 
of Christ, the negative act of God, is resolved in the Resurrec- 
tion with a positive intention: mankind's putting on of a new 
life (see p. 3). Let us look more closely at this positive aspect 
of the atonement in Barth. Although he is consistent in bring- 
ing out the worth of the cross, its effectiveness, and its 
grounding in the grace of God, Barth is also concerned that we 
pass beyond the general negativity of the event, characterized 
in humiliation, subordination and subjection. 
29 
This is possible, 
claims Barth, because the Resurrection fulfills at least five 
conditions needed to achieve a "beyond" of this kind. 
1) "Our recognition of this beyond must rest on, and 
refer to, the fact that. . . God. .. has spoken a new word after 
the first one. "30 "This (is the) happening on the third day 
which followed that of*Golgotha. 
of God. "31 
.. (and is) exclusively the act 
2) "This beyond must be actual and revealed in a new act 
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of God which is clearly marked off from-the first. "32 The 
resurrection is a new act of grace which has its own form and 
content. It is not swallowed up by the cross. 
3) Nevertheless, there must be "a positive connection 
between the death of Jesus Christ and his resurrection. "33 
"According to the resurrection the death of Jesus Christ as a 
negative act of God took place with a positive intention. It 
has as its aim. . . (humanity's) putting on of a new life, his 
freeing for the future. "34 
4) God's new act must happen "in the same sense as His 
crucifixion and His death, in the human sphere and human time, 
as an actual. event within the world with an objective content. "35 
We must not move from the historical to the timeless, non- 
historical. - 
5) With reference to'the connection between the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, these two acts must form a unity, 
and-Barth in fact calls them "one. " , we do not speak rightly of 
the death of Jesus Christ unless we have before us His resurrection. 
We-do not speak rightly of His Resurrection if we conceal and 
efface the fact that this living One was crucified and died for 
US. , 
36 
We can see that conditions (4) and (5) have been dealt with 
earlier under the theme of the 
historicity of the Resurrection. 
Conditions (1) and (2) are stated with the Resurrection theology 
of Bultmann very much 
in mind as we shall see in the forthcoming 
section comparing Bultmann and 
Barth in this regard. Lastly 
we should note that 
(3) seems to recall Aquinas' view of the 
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relationship of cross and Resurrection as God's exaltation 
of the divine self-humbling of Jesus Christ. The positive of 
the Resurrection has built upon the negative of the cross. 
37 
The question now to be asked of Barth is one regarding 
the subjective reality of the Resurrection: how is it effectively 
made present for us today, or, how can the event of reconciliation 
there and then be made actual for us here and now, over the vast 
spatio-temporal gulf? Although his explication of this is to be 
found in later volumes of the Dogmatics, Barth realizes from 
the start that Easter cannot be couched merely in terms of 
recollection. 
"The recollection found in the New Testament cannot be 
14 
mere recollection, a mere backward look at a once for all 
happening. If it is, it will inevitably be, like all other 
recollection, merely recollection of a past event. But the 
Easter story, though it is a happening that once became an event 
in datable time, does not merely belong to the past. Easter 
cannot just be regarded in retrospect. Recollection of Easter 
cannot be merely the repetitive reflection, which is all that 
any other kind of recollection 
is, even the most living and 
realistic. " 
38 
Barth does not take lightly the fact that the relation- 
ship of faith and history, the 
"great gulf between 'Jesus Christ 
for us' and ourselves,  
39 has been areal problem. Yet the problem 
of faith and history 
is not one of spatio-temporal distance. It 
is a symptom of a root problem which mankind seeks to avoid 
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confronting. The problem is summed up in the saying of Peter 
in Luke 5: 8: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, 0 Lord. " 
The difficulty is quite rightly described as a problem of dis- 
tance, but distance of another kind. As we see in the end of the 
genuine St. Mark (16: 8), the risen Christ evoked fear. The dis- 
tance Barth speaks of is the distance between holiness and carnality, 
and its true dimensions are seen only in direct encounter with 
the Lord. The real problem is thus spiritual and it concerns the 
bridging of this distance. 
40 
In light of this real problem, no solution is found in the 
historical bridging of the spatio-temporal gap. "Indeed, " Barth 
claims, "if everything does hang by this thread, it is obviously 
a'very disturbing fact.  
41 In his denunciation of "indirect or 
historical" mediation by the "report and tradition and proclamation 
of others, bound up with their truthfulness and credibility, "42 
Barth is obviously alluding to Bultmann. If there is to be true 
mediation, recollection must become presence, indirect speech must 
become direct, and history must become present day event. We must 
be met by Christ, not only as He is remembered historically but 
as He Himself saves us today. This does not minimize the role of 
preaching as a form of mediation, but Christ Himself directly 
makes this word His Word. 
Again with regard to Bultmann, Barth casts aside any 
solution which claims 
that the meeting of man and God has not 
already taken place. 
He is reproachful of the distinction between 
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objective and subjective atonement, which reaches its height 
in Bultmann with "the description of the antithesis in cate- 
gories of possibility and actuality. " 
"That which Christ has worked out once and for all for 
the whole race, that which is available for everyone in Him, 
now has to come to every individual, so that there is a real 
fellowship of men with God. .. And what do we find in R. Bultmann 
of our own day (Theology of the New Testament, E. T., 1952, I, 
p. 252)? 'By Christ there has been created nothing more than the 
possibility of which does, of course, become an assured 
actuality in those that believe. ' That is the very thing which 
wil not do. " 
43 
The objective and the subjective are but 'moments' of the one 
redemptive occurrence which comes to humanity in the simul of 
the one reconciliation event. 
44 
Thus Christ's act of redemption was redemption for all. 
His death on Golgotha was really the death of all. Christians, 
in their suffering, their repentance, their prayer, their humil- 
ity, their works, and in the sacraments should attest this event. 
But- it can only be attested. It is self-sufficient and needed no 
preparation as it needs no repetition. It itself is "The one 
mysterium, the one sacrament, and the one existential fact before 
and beside and after which there is no room for any other of the 
45 
same rank. " 
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The solution to the problem must be centered on the 
Resurrection, for "this is a key position for our whole under- 
standing of the man Jesus in His time. "46 It is impossible to 
read the New Testament in the sense intended by its authors, 
without the understanding that the Jesus of whom the writers speak 
is the One who was resurrected from the dead. If we wish to under- 
stand the New Testament, and consequently our own being and 
action and time, we must understand the place of the Resurrection 
as the "key. " 
Easter was not for the New Testament writers and the 
earliest Christian communities a 'timeless and non-historical 
truth. ' It was not a vision nor a merely mental appearcnce. 
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Nor was it a product of their faith. It was real, a "subsequent" 
history and as real event it gave rise to their faith and witness. 
Christ came in His post-Easter history in the incorruptability 
and immortality which are proper only to God (1 Cor. 15: 53). 
But this was the same one who had come before, had been crudified, 
dead and buried, in short, who had perished like all flesh. His 
new appearance was "the concrete, visible, audible, and even 
tangible" new presence of the man Jesus who was crucified, dead 
and buried. 
48 
The Resurrection was to the early community the mediation 
of a perception hitherto inaccessible to them: it unequivocally 
disclosed in a new act of God that 'God was in Christ' (2 Cor. 
5: 19). The subject of this Resurrection is not simply God(9E07 
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according to regular useage, but God the Father ( 
OFoS `rail n) 
(Gal. 1: 1; Rom. 6: 4). It was first and foremost God's "judicial 
sentence that the action and passion of Jesus Christ were not 
apart from or against Him, but according to His good and holy 
will. "49 In dying on the cross Jesus bowed His head to the 
Father (Jn. 19: 30), thus signifying what Luke records as 'commend- 
ing His spirit into his hands'(Lk. 23: 46). In and through the 
Resurrection God confirmed the verdict, which He had already 
pronounced at Jordan when He began on the way which would ultim- 
mately lead Him to Golgotha: "Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I 
am well pleased" (Mk. l: ll). 
The intimate relationship between cross and Resurrection, 
which results in Barth's calling them 'one, ' is thus seen. God's 
Yes is effected and seen through both, but in a larger sense the 
reconciliation of the world takes place in these two events 
together: in the Son's obedience (humiliation) and in His recep- 
tion of the Father's vindicating grace (exaltation). It takes 
place in the sequence and correspondence of Christ's death and 
Resurrection; in the death which points toward Resurrection, and 
in, the Resurrection which has death as its negative foundation. 
Yet besides their correspondence in ultimate meaning, the 
death and Resurrection are also together in time, and this is 
critical for Barth's answer 
to the problem of how these events 
are made relevant 
for us. Although these events succeeded one 
another in time 
they are also very much fused together. 
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"The resurrection of Jesus Christ tells us - and it 
is decided in this second divine act, the act of God fulfilled 
in His verdict - that as the Crucified "He lives and reigns to 
all eternity' (Luther), that as the One who was, having been 
buried, He is not of the past, He did not continue to be 
enclosed in the limits of the time between His birth and death, 
but as the One who was in this time He became and is the Lord 
of all time, eternal as God Himself is eternal and therefore 
present in all time. .. His being as the One who suffered and 
died, became and is such His eternal being and therefore His 
present-day being every day of our time. "51 
He is the living Saviour, who has life in Himself (Jn. 5: 26), and 
He, is thus the same here and now as He was there and then. In 
the words of Heb. 7: 25: "He is the One that ever (? iaýýforf ) 
liveth to make intercession for us. "52 
The crucifixion and Resurrection are so intimately related 
that they are really one. There is no cross in abstracto. There 
is no preaching of or faith in the cross in abstracto. Serious 
objections must be raised against all representations of the 
crucified Christ as such. All theologies of the cross, no 
matter how pious, must be repudiated at once in the light of 
"He is not here. He is Risen" (Lk. 24: 6). There can be no theology 
of the cross without a theology of the Resurrection. The One 
who has delivered Himself up to death is risen and dies no more. 
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Likewise He has delivered us up to death and, with Him, we 
have life before us and not death. "Death is swallowed up 
in victory" (I Cor. 15: 54). 
Subjective Reality and the Christian Community; Christ's 
Prophetic Work. 
The history of Jesus Christ is representative, claims 
Barth, Christology including both anthropology and ecclesiology. 
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This is both effected and revealed in the cross/Resurrection event. 
The Resurrection proclaims both Jesus' exaltation, and our exalta- 
tion in Him. The Christian community is called upon to respond 
to the crucified Christ present and operative in history through 
the power of His Resurrection. As this response takes place there 
follows not their justification, for this has already occurred, 
but the earthly human correspondence to His and their glorified 
being. 
"We can now say that this creative and revelatory divine 
verdict, as this divinely effective approval, acceptance and 
justification, the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead 
is the answer to our question concerning the participation of 
the whole race in the person and work of the one man Jesus Christ 
as the Son of God, our question concerning the significance of 
His being and activity as it embraces us, as it embraces the 
anthropological sphere. In so far as this divine verdict has 
been passed and is in force in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
Jesus ; 
Christ lives and acts and speaks for all ages and in 
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such a way that we are promised a future and hope, a being 
before God in reality and truth. In this connexion we remember 
once more the words of John 14: 19: 'I live and ye shall live 
also. '" 
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But how is it possible to claim the reality of an historical 
and social body of this exalted Head? Barth claims that from all 
eternity Jesus Christ does not exist without His body. His very 
essence, His entire action is directed towards our salvation. 
It is not fulfilled except in our response. This response is 
a result of His reaching us and enabling us to respond. This 
is the work of Christ's prophetic office, which is seen as an 
integral part of His reconciliation. And draws at times special 
attention from Barth. 
The primal and basic form of His prophetic work is the 
Resurrection. The New Testament witnesses see the Resurrection 
as His self-attestation "in respect of the universality, inclus- 
iveness and continuity of His particular being and action, " 
which reaches out to claim and effect a corresponding form among 
us. 55 The Resurrection is the coming afresh of Jesus Christ as 
the one who came before. It is His parousia, His "effective 
presence, " His epiphania, the manifestation of His 
hidden divinity, 
and His revelation in glory (Jn. 1: 14). 
56 The Word of God does 
not return to Him void (Is. 55: 11), but is effected as 
it is spoken 
"57 The "life procured 'and stands fast as He commands (Ps. 33: 9). 
, for the world and us 
in the high-priestly and kingly work of 
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Jesus Christ (is) revealed and therefore imparted in His prophetic 
work. 
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This is the christological answer to the problem of 
the legitimacy of reconciliation as applied to the sphere of the 
community from the sphere of Christ Himself. 
Thus there is an intimate relationship between the Resurr- 
ection and the Church. The Resurrection is the instigation of 
the life of the community and in a sense we experience the truth 
of the Resurrection through this community. The divine power became 
history in order to make history. Here the three offices of Christ 
tend to merge. 
"As the Risen One, Christ is Lord of His Church, calls 
and carries it, leads and rules it, once and for all, yet also 
daily anew. The three offices of Christ differentiated by the 
older dogmatics run into each other at this place so as to be al- 
most-indistinguishable. " 
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The Risen Christ creates the community in order to found the 
Church through them. 
60 Christ's reconciliation of all is revealed 
to certain ones who are enlightened to accept it in faith and 
thus, the community is gathered. Subsequently they serve his pro- 
phetic work in being sent out. The Resurrection is the presuppo- 
sition of the community, and at the same time the goal of the 
community. 
The primary aim of the Resurrection was not personal deliv- 
erance and transformation. "The form in which it came to them 
was - the missionary command: 
'Go ye into all the world. '"61 
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. Barth stresses 
'all. ' The real goal of the Resurrection of 
Jesus was the going into all the world, the reconciliation of 
. all the world and not 
just the satisfaction of a little flock 
of believers. The mission of the Church has "its ontological 
, ground, 
its practical basis and its sure point of departure in 
the universalism of the Easter revelation itself. "62 The commun- 
"ity cannot integrate the power of revelation into itself. It 
, can only attest 
to the fact that God's revelation in Jesus Christ 
. is. an ongoing revelation, recalling 
His words: "and, lo, I am 
with you always, even unto the end of the world" (Mt. 28: 17f). 
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Christ's cross, Resurrection and his Easter appearances 
were temporal events. The ascension was both their crowning 
conclusion and their end. It was their crowning conclusion in the 
.. sense 
that it pointed back to the revelation of the cross which 
occurred in the Resurrection. It was their end in the Sense that 
with the ascension Christ's direct, historical presence was 
. terminated. 
With it began the time between the times, the Church 
Age and the time of the Holy Spirit. Christ continued to be 
-present, but spiritually, 
through the mediation of recollection, 
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, tradition and proclamation. 
In the compilation of the Gospels, the writers were not so 
much interested in history, per se, as in the living existence 
of Jesus in His community in the present. They regarded their 
present existence as a life of direct discipleship. 
75 
"While there is recollection and tradition from the stand- 
point of the community, objectively and in fact He Himself is 
the acting Subject who lifts the barrier of yesterday and moves 
into today, making Himself present and entering in as the Lord. 
This is the inner connexion between Easter and Pentecost. The 
living One, who is no longer to be sought among the dead, who 
'died once but. .. liveth unto God' (Rom. 6: 10), is not only 
alive Himself as the Creator and ground and soul of life. Having 
risen from the dead, He promises His followers His Spirit who will 
shortly come down from heaven as depicted in Acts 1-2. (The time- 
table is speeded up in John 20: 21-23 and 2 Cor. 3: 17-18. ) For 
all the variations, however, it is clear that Pentecost is the 
result of the resurrection, achieved in the time of the apostles, 
yet not by the apostles, but in and to them. It is the result of 
the revelation of the fulfillment of time accomplished in His 
life and death. It is the bridging of the gulf between His past 
and their present; The assumption of their time into His. "65 
The power of the Resurrection continues to shine in 
between His ascension and His final coming, no longer visible, 
tangible form but as the power of the Holy Spirit. Thus the 
Church age is not a vacuum as regards Christ's own prophetic 
action. It would be this is He exercised His authority only in 
the form of representation, or if He spoke prophetically only 
in the form of their vicarious words. Thus He would cease to be 
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personally present and active and His Lordship and prophetic 
function would be given over to ecclesiastical institutions 
(Roman Catholicism) or pious individuals (neo-Protestantism). 
But Christ is not simply present as a memory and/or a hope. 
He is directly present and active as Lord of His Church. 
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Summary 
Before moving on let us summarize what we have seen in 
the previous few pages and attempt to pull together Barth's main 
ideas. 
Reconciliation is the resumption of a fellowship which 
once existed between God and man, and which is effected through 
Jesus Christ. This act is completely God's own work and has 
taken place once and for all in the death and Resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. We have seen that Barth describes the atonement 
process in penal substitutionary terms which may be characterized 
briefly as Christ's acceptance of God's judgement for our sin, 
as the negative of the cross, which for Barth is followed, en- 
lightened by and resolved in the positive intention of the Resurr- 
ection. 
Barth is concerned, in spite of the worth and the effect- 
iveness of the cross, that we pass beyond the general negativity 
of this event to see the "positive connection" between the two 
events of cross and Resurrection. These merge for Barth into 
one event of reconciliation. 'Theologies of the cross' are to 
be rejected if portrayed apart from God's primal act of 
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revelation in the Resurrection. This seems especially important 
for Barth in light of the fact that his solution to the problem 
of faith and history is based on viewing the cross in light of 
the Resurrection. This problem is bridged only by understanding 
the risen Christ as having become, through His Resurrection, the 
Lord of all time and thus able to be present in our day. Thus 
His presence is not reduced only to recollection, tradition and 
proclamation, but His presence, the presence of the Holy Spirit, 
enlightens these forms of mediation. He is thus in every way 
the active Lord of His Church. 
Appendix - The Appropriation of Justification 
On the whole we can have much praise for Barth's treatment 
of justification in Christ's death and Resurrection. Save for 
its prodigious bulk and the variety of sections which must be 
studied to gain the whole picture (although we understand Barth's 
disclaimer of systematizing) it is an excellent and clear work 
which raises the all to often secondary importance of the 
Resurrection to its rightful and Biblical place. That nothing 
is lost regarding the importance and completion of Calvary is a 
major achievement and was obviously a source of concern for Barth. 
One element of what we have seen in Barth's theology, how- 
ever, reveals a certain ambiguity in his thought. It has been 
noted that "something of a puzzle remains with respect to the 
objective reconciliation effected by God for all men in Jesus 
Christ and the subjective appropriation by man. ON the one hand, 
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Barth speaks as though 
tion with God has been 
other hand, he depicts 
tion of fulfillment of 
possible to speak of r4 
everything necessary for man's 
accomplished by Jesus Christ. 
the work of the Holy Spirit as 
God's reconciling work. 
67 Is 
: conciliaiton being effected in 
reconcilia- 
On the 
the comple- 
it really 
man without 
at the same time speaking of man's appropriation of the reconcil- 
iation? 
That Barth considers Christ's death and Resurrection to have 
completed and universally effected humanity's reconciliation is 
a recurring theme in Barth's writings on the subject (we trust 
this has been made clear). Regarding the counter side of this, 
Barth is just as emphatic. 
"He clearly moves forward from this place, from this 
commencement. Although it has taken place even as revelation 
in His resurrection, His work in its form as revelation is not 
ended or concluded. As the Revealer of His work He has not yet 
reached His goal. He is still moving towards it. .. The eternal 
light has already gone out into the world. The new and future 
redeemed and perfected world is already present. In this commence- 
ment, however, the goal is not yet reached except in Him. It is 
not yet reached in the situation of the world and man. "68 
He speaks likewise of "the Resurrected, who is still on the way, 
still in conflict, still moving towards the goal which He has 
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not yet reached. " 
The passages indicate a consistence in Barth rather than 
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a stage, an evolvement, or a certain perspective within the 
Dogmatics, and for that reason also merits our attention. 
Justification is that act by which the sinner is declared 
just. It issues in newness of life. But when is the sinner 
declared just and when is this newness of life received by the 
individual? In other words, when does God's gracious saving 
judgement of the sinner occur? 
An extremely helpful insight into Barth's thinking on 
justification has come from Hans Küng, who has attempted to re- 
concile Barth's theology with that of Roman Catholicism. Kling 
works off the aspects of 'objective' and 'subjective' justifica- 
tion and claims this type of approach for Barth. 
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The Biblical account of the judgement of God, claims Kung, 
shows that it is inexorably bound up with the crucifixion and 
Resurrection of Jesus Christ. In the death and Resurrection of 
Christ the sinner is declared just(note Rom. 3: 21-26; 4: 25; 5: 9). 
In reading texts which speak of justification in connection 
with the death and Resurrection of Christ, Küng notes, it is 
striking to see that all of these refer emphatically to faith 
as*well. Only the one who believes is justified. Thus it is 
our task to relate the 'objective' act of justification, which 
took place in the death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, with 
its 'subjective' realization. On the one hand, the justification 
accomplished in Christ must not be separated from the process 
which reaches down to the individual man: this would in one way 
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or another lead to apokatastasis. On the other hand, personal 
justification must not be separated from the general act of 
justification on the cross, for this would lead to predestin- 
ation. 
"Rather both must be seen as two sides of a single truth: 
all men are justified in Jesus Christ and only the faithful 
are justified in Jesus Christ. The generic act of justification 
on the cross is the 'permanently actual presence of salvation, 
accessible for personal appropriation' (Schrenk, S. V., 
in Theological Workbook of the New Testament). 
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Justification is never a purely private affair, but one 
which concerns the community. In the cross and Resurrection 
of Jesus Christ, God's gracious saving judgement on sinful man- 
kind is promulgated. God pronounces the judgement which causes 
the one just man to be sin and in exchange makes every sinner 
free in Christ. Biblical language, especially Pauline, speaks 
of those justified by the cross and Resurrection as "the many" 
and "all" (Rom. 9: 26,32f.; Col. 1: 20; Phil. 2: 11). 
We may say in general then that Barth and Kung agree on 
the 'universality' of the objective event of God's reconcilia- 
tion. It cannot be seen simply in terms of so much "busy work, " 
to use Kiing's phrase, as though God's judgement must be pronounced 
in every individual case. But, for Küng, this individual element 
is deserving of consideration also and it is this element of 
emphasis that leads us to their difference, in fact to Barth's 
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difference regarding also, historical Protestantism. How does 
the individual behave in this work? What is man's attitude in 
God's justification? 
Kling concedes that Barth's answer to these questions is the 
; answer of Luther and the Reformers-sola fides. Man has to respond 
to the justifying activity of God with faith alone. And Kling 
: claims the same for Catholic teaching, in spite of Barth's polemics 
-against Catholicism regarding sola fides. 
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"The formula means the same thing in Catholic teaching as it 
. 
does in that of Barth: no human works, not even the best works, 
are responsible for justification. Man is justified by God on the 
basis of faith alone. " 
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, Thus Kling reaches the conclusion, which is carried throughout the 
; book, that Barth and he (and Catholicism) are in substantial agree- 
, ment on the question of 
the 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects 
of reconciliation. He claims a "basic accord" with Barth in the 
claim that faith is obviously not a condition for 'objective' 
. 
justification, which occurs for all the death and Resurrection of 
Christ, and also in the claim that it is not a condition which merits 
the grace of justification. - Yet: 
"faith is indeed a condition. .. inasmuch as it 
is man 
alone who has subjectively realized in himself the 'objective' 
justification, who actively submits to divine justification. And 
in-submitting he is not doing works but is relying in trust on the 
Lord. To this extent we can say that there is no justification 
without faith and we can speak with Scripture of a justification 
'through' faith. " 
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That Küng should claim to find in Barth such a kindred 
spirit is itself surprising, and Barth himself seems to be sur- 
prised in his opening letter in the book. 
75 Yet we must believe 
that all is not so well as Küng claims for it is possible to see 
a seed of contention laid in his own fear of apokatastasis. 
` In our prior discussion of Barth's alleged universalism (see 
footnote 44) we stated the view, in agreement with J. D. Bettis, 
that Barth is not a universalist in the true sense of the term. 
Now we must amend that statement, although standing by these 
earlier assertions. Kling takes the view that "nothing that precedes 
justification, neither faith nor works, merits the grace of justi- 
fication (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum), "76 (in deference to 
the fact that God Himself justifies the sinner). Barth seems to 
hold this same view yet goes significantly beyond it in his over- 
whelming emphasis on the 'objective' event of cross and Resurrection 
, for us, ' meaning for all. He states: 
"Does this mean universalism? I wish here to make only three 
short observations, in which one is to detect no position for or 
against that which passes among us under this term. 
1. 'I One should not surrender himself in any case to the panic 
which this word seems to spread abroad, before informing himself 
exactly concerning its possible sense or nonsense. 
2. ý-.: One should at least be stimulated by the passage, Colossians 
1: 19,. which admittedly states that God has determined through His 
Son as His image and as the first-born of the whole Creation to 
"reconcile all things (j ffaür& to himself, " to consider whether 
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the concept could not perhaps have a good meaning. The same 
can be said of parallel passages. 
3. One question should for a moment be asked, in view of the 
'danger' with which one may see this concept gradually sur- 
rounded. What of the 'danger' of the eternally sceptical-critical 
theologian who is ever and again suspiciously questioning, because 
fundamentally always legalistic and therefore in the main morosely 
gloomy? Is not his presence among us currently more threatening 
, 
than that of the unbecomingly cheerful indifferentism or even anti- 
nomianism, to which one with a certain understanding of universalism 
,. could 
in fact deliver himself? This much is certain, that we have 
no theological right to set any sort of limits to the loving-kindness 
of God which has appeared in Jesus Christ. Our theological duty 
, 
is to see and understand it as being still greater than we had seen 
. 
before. "77 
It is little wonder that Barth has been widely interpreted 
as a universalist, although he disclaims it here, and in other of 
, 
his writings can be quite candid in claiming the possibility and 
rightfulness of man's condemnation. 
78 Yet the possibility of 
. universal 
salvation, its promise, so colours Barth's thought that 
time after time he lapses into what is truly universalist language. 
This is the force of his insistence on the 'objective' event of 
, reconciliation 
to be seen in cross and Resurrection. And this is 
where he and Küng, Catholicism, and to a great extent Protestantism, 
have a point of contention. For Barth, the objective event of 
reconciliation is such an overwhelming thing, the sovereignty of 
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of God so revered, that this cross/Resurrection event of salvation 
must at least raise "the possibility" that there are no limits to 
the loving-kindness of God. This is hardly to deny the sola fides 
of the Reformers and, by the same token, it is to claim with Kung 
that "only the faithful are justified in Christ" (see footnote71). 
Yet, for Barth, the 'when' of this faithful response is broadened 
to include the possibility (belief) of a great eschatological 
Divine revelation to all humanity: that the cross/Resurrection 
event was the pronouncement of God's intention to "reconcile all 
things to Himself" (Col. 1: 19). It is an interesting theological 
phenomenon that Kung and Barth can often share the same terminology 
and language, can sound indeed like one voice, and yet be so far 
apart (indeed almost diametrically opposed) due to this 'future' 
element in Barth's thinking. The saving action (reconciliation) 
of God has been fulfilled in the incarnation, cross and Resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. Yet this work in its eschatological aspect is still 
a future reality, the universal revelation of this saving action 
still to occur.? 
We began by asking about the relationship between Barth's 
claim that everything necessary for man's reconciliation had 
been accomplished in the cross and Resurrection, and his idea of the 
ongoing work of the Holy Spirit, still seeking "His goal" of that 
reconciliation. We are in a position now to state simply, and 
hopefully not anti-climatically, Barth's claim that "He will 
certainly complete this revelation. "80 For Barth the relationship 
is grounded in the fact that the presence of the future of salvation 
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is already actualised in Jesus Christ. He will certainly actualise 
it for us and in us as the presence of the future of the salvation 
of all creation. His perfect work is moving towards its consummation. 
Thus Barth is not claiming that, since some do not as yet believe, 
this is due either to a restriction in God's love or to man's 
recalcitrance and his refusal of God's love which can lead to 
retributive justice. Barth's universalist tendencies (and they are 
no more but certainly nothing less than this if we let Barth inter- 
pret himself) overwhelm here and the above mentioned relationship 
is obvious: the price has been paid and the future bodes well. 
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Karl Barth's Theology of the Resurrection 
(part 3), 
Revelation 
r; ' 
a. 
. Having covered a series of 
distinctions between the 
earlier and the later Barth, and having viewed the concept bf 
reconciliation in light of Barth's theology of the Resurrection, 
it-. remains finally for us to look at Barth's theology of the 
Resurrection as it is related to his concept of revelation. This 
has not been absent in our previous discussions but is important 
enough to be dealt with as a separate topic here. 
We may begin by saying that, for Barth, the Resurrection is 
Biblically unprecedented (unique to Scripture and to 'Salvation 
history') because it involves the "pýre presence of God. " Most 
of Scripture is regarded as eschatological in character: the Old 
Testament points to the coming Christ, the New Testament speaks 
of the Christ who has come and will come again. But in the Resurr- 
ection accounts Scripture speaks of the Christ who is present. 
"In. the slender series of the New Testament accounts of the 
disciples' meetings with the risen Lord we are dealing with the 
attestation of the pure presence of God. .. The Easter story 
(with, 
if you like, the story of the transfiguration and the story of the 
transfiguration and the story of the conversion of Saul as prologue 
and epilogue respectively) actually speaks of a present without 
any future, of an eternal presence of God 
in time. So it does not 
speak eschatologically. 
" 
But if Barth speaks of the pure presence of God 
in the Resurrection, 
it, is just as important to note that he does not do this 
in the 
earthly confrontations 
during the ministry of the man Jesus. 
The Resurrection is unique for Barth and, as the "pure presence 
of God, " carries in its essence a unique revelational function. 
Historie and Geschichte: 'Describing' the Resurrection 
We may begin to probe and to clarify this function by taking 
note of Barth's rather strange use of the words Geschichte and 
Historie. We have postponed investigation of these terms until now 
since they enlighten the revelational aspects of the event of the 
Resurrection along with the historical. Some discussion of histor- 
icity is inevitable, however, and so we will attempt to avoid reit- 
eration as much as possible. Common German usage of the word 
'history' is to speak of Geschichte. All events, then, which fit 
the popular conception of an historical event are geschichtlich. 
Barth and Bultmann (following, as we shall see, the lead of other 
theologians) have changed this popular usage in theological dis- 
cussion. The two words Historie and Geschichte, both of which may 
be'translated 'history' in the German, have come thus to be opposing 
concepts in much modern theology. Historie is that history which 
can- be approached and 
investigated scientifically, that can thus 
be'perceived and understood rationally. It deals with the cause 
and effect of events 
in history which are analgous to every other 
kind of event. 
It would seem, then, that Historie covers history en toto, 
for it pertains to the events of which scientific 
historical study 
is concerned. Geschichte, 
however, has come to have a very vital 
usage in theological 
discussion for it pertains immediately to God, 
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to His divine activity within the investigable events of history 
(Historie). It is always the salvific activity of God, in the 
realm of the order of grace; that which is imminently real, yet 
which cannot be seen and objectively approached. 
2 
We will be able to further illumine this at times confusing 
use of language as we continue through discussion of our current 
topic. 
Barth, in speaking of the death and Resurrection of Christ 
as temporal events yet 'above' time in their significance, points, 
in one instance, to the fact that: 
"His history (Seine Geschichte wurde nicht Historie)did not become 
dead history. It was history in His time to become as such eternal 
history (ewige Geschichte) - the history (Geschichte) of God with 
the men of all times, and therefore taking place here and now as 
it did there and then. He is the living Saviour. "3 
Whenever Barth speaks of the historicity of the Resurrection, 
he favors the word Geschichte, and denies (although this must be 
put in context) that it is an object of Historie (which, we should 
note, he calls "dead history"). While he regards the Easter and 
passion narratives as inseparable, they do differ in the sense that 
the passion relates "the hidden work of Jesus Christ, " while 
this is "subsequently revealed and believed in His Resurrection. "4 
Not surprisingly, the historical character of these events differ 
also. While the passion takes place totally within the realm of 
Historie, the Resurrection is Geschichte. 
5 
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We have also noted previously Barth's placing in contrast 
the detailed descriptions of other Resurrections and the laconic 
nature of the descriptions of Jesus' Resurrection. Much more detail 
is given of the raising of Jairus' daughter and the young man of 
Nain, and the account of Lazarus' resurrection is given in "a 
direct and almost plastic way. "6 The difference, claims Barth lies 
in the fact that in the case of Jesus: 
"it is not possible to speak of someone superior to Jesus Christ 
who took him by the hand and by His word called Him to life from 
the dead. Here we can think only of the act of God which cannot 
be described and therefore cannot be narrated, and then of the 
actual fact that Jesus Himself stood in the midst. "7 
There is an interesting dialectic in Barth that shows up in light 
of what has thus been said. We have just noted that the "hidden 
work" of the passion of Christ (which is Historie) is "subsequently 
revealed" through the Resurrection (Geschichte). The Resurrection 
is thus that which illuminates the issue of the passion and in its 
light faith is made possible. Yet we mist also understand Barth 
to claim that the event of the Resurrection as Geschichte differs 
from other events of Historie, which are open to the light of 
historical objectivity, in its very nature as hiddenness, as that 
"which cannot be described. " Yet such is the nature of the 
Resurrection for Barth. It performs its illuminating function out 
of its very nature as Geschichte, that which is over and 
'beyond' 
Historie, hidden to every probing of inquisitive man. In light 
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of this we can understand what Barth means by his claim that "the 
evangelical theologians of the nineteenth century - my father, for 
instance - were wrong in trying to arrange things so as to prove 
the historicity of the Resurrection. "8 For Barth, the Resurrection 
account "'calls for a decision of faith, not for the acceptance of 
a well-attested historical report. "9 For the latter is not possible 
according to Barth's view of revelation. 
"There is no proof, and there obviously cannot and ought 
not to be any proof, for the fact that this history (Geschichte) 
did take place (proof, that is, according to the terminology of 
modern historical (Historie) scholarship. " 
10 
Yet we have seen, and need not elaborate, Barth claims that 
the events of the Resurrection were events which happened in time, 
just as did the passion events. When Barth uses the word "histor- 
ical" (Geschichte)with respect to revelation, rather than using 
terms such as 'un-historical, ' 'non-historical' or 'myth, ' he 
uses it in the sense of "an event as a fact with no court of refer- 
ence above it by which it could be inspected as a fact and as this 
fact. " 
11 
By means of the distinction between Historie and Geschichte, 
and a rather dualistic conception of history, Barth seeks to 
retain the Resurrection as an aspect of Geschichte and thus to 
avoid the completely non-historical character of the Resurrection 
as found in Bultmann's term "myth. "12 For Barth, revelation 
always takes place "vertically from heaven. "13 However, such 
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revelation always befalls a man who is "such and such a man living 
in such and such place at such and such a time and in such and 
such circumstances. "14 The historical contingencies of such an 
event may be written up as Historie, but this cannot be done with 
respect to the revelation which comes to the man, since this reve- 
lation is rather to be seen as "the ineffable confronting man, 
15 Thus the role of Historie in revelation (Ges- getting at man. " 
chichte) becomes clear in Barth as its "factual circumstantial- 
ity, "16 giving it "a definite historical position. "17 
But Barth is also concerned that revelation retain its mystery 
and as mystery there is no direct, objective revelation of God in 
history. 
18 According to Barth we may not describe 
"A single one of the events of revelation narrated in the Bible 
as 'historical' (Historie), i. e., as apprehensible by a neutral 
observer or as apprehended by such a one. What the neutral observer 
of these events might apprehend or may have apprehended of these 
events, was the form of the revelation not regarded by him as such 
and, moreover, not to be regarded by him as such, some sort of 
happening unrolling itself in the human sphere, having all the 
possibilities of interpretation appropriate to this sphere, but 
19 
in no case revelation as such. " 
Simply put, the revelational event has form and content. The form 
of. the revelation with which the neutral observer would come 
into 
contact, is the element of 
Historie. This is for Barth the 'vehicle' 
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of revelation. When revelation occurs, at God's pleasure, it 
is with this form that he 'clothes' his revelation, and thus 
makes it accessible to human observation. 
20 Yet all the neutral 
observer can apprehend is the historical (Historie) non-revelational 
form of this act, and this form is not the revelation. 
A good example of Barth's views on this are found, according 
to him, in the life of Jesus. Here "historical" must be taken to 
mean "Historie. " 
"Thousands may have seen and heard the Rabbi of Nazareth. 
But this historical (historisch) element was not revelation. Even 
the historical (historisch) element at the Resurrection of Christ, 
the empty grave regarded as an element in this event, that might 
possibly be fixed, was not certainly revelation. This historical 
(historisch) element, like everything historical, (historisch) 
is admittedly susceptible of an even highly trivial interpretation. "21 
Barth thus sees the man Jesus, and the events of his earthly 
existence, as elements of Historie but not of revelation. This 
is indicative of his dualistic view of revelation as form and 
content, and also informative as to Barth's view of Jesus Christ, 
who in one view of Barth, "can more accurately be expressed as 
22 
Jesus-Christ. " 
In the light of these statements regarding the historicity 
(Geschichte) of revelation, we might also look at Barth's view of 
revelation as Geschichte. Here let us recall the problem dealt 
with in the last section, namely, that of faith and history: 
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whether and how far our time may be regarded at any definite point 
as the time of God's revelation. This question Barth states 
bluntly, "rests upon a portentous failure to appreciate the nature 
of revelation. "23 For he claims that "Revelation is not a predicate 
of history (Geschichte) but this history (Geschichte) is a predi- 
cate of revelation. "24 In other words revelation becomes history 
(Geschichte) but this history does not become revelation - God is 
and remains the subject. Any utterances about time as such have 
lost the meaning of the revelatory event. 
25 
Can we now say with regard to Barth that he does not regard 
the Resurrection, or any revelation of God, as historical in the 
sense that the historian would regard an event as actual, real, 
datable? 
26 With appreciation of the fact that this is a some- 
what nebulous area in Barth, we must firmly answer - Yes. We must 
at once say, however, that Barth wishes to maintain that revelational 
events really happen in space and itme but only according to their 
nature, character and function. As such extraordinary events, they 
are beyond the scrutiny of the scientific historian. We must also 
take care to state that, according to Barth, the Resurrection of 
Jesus does not participate in ordinary history int he same way as 
do the passion and crucifixion of Christ, even thouch we have seen 
that Barth considers them as two spatio-temporal events which are 
chronologically connected. We must always recall that Barth deals 
-with the Resurrection as 
Geschichte. "The death of Jesus Christ 
can certainly be thought of as history (Historie) 
in the modern 
sense, but not the resurrection., 
27 
There is no reason to protest, 
claims Barth, "if 
in common with the creation story and many others, 
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indeed the decisive elements in Biblical history (Geschichte), the 
history (Geschichte) of the Resurrection has to be regarded and 
described - in the thought-forms and terminology of modern scholar- 
ship - as 'saga' or 'legend. ,, 
28 However, he is firm in insisting 
that the designation of the Resurrection of Geschichte presented 
in the form of saga does not involve a denial of the Resurrection 
as a spatio-temporal happening. 
"on the other hand, we should be guilty of a fundamental mis- 
understanding of the whole New Testament message if, because the 
history (Geschichte) of the resurrection is not history (Historie) 
in this sense, we tried to interpret it as though it had never 
happened at all, or not happened in time and space in the same way 
as the death of Jesus Christ, or finally had happened only in faith 
or in the form of the formation and development of faith (cf. Bult- 
mann, FHK). .. Even acounts which by the standards of modern schol- 
arship have to be accounted saga or legend and not history (unhistor- 
isch) - because their content cannot be grasped historically 
(Historie) - may still speak of a happening which, though it cannot 
be grasped historically (Historie), is still actual and objective 
in time and space. When we have'to do with the kind of event pre- 
sented in such accounts, the event which has actually happened 
although it cannot be grasped historically (Historie), it would be 
better to speak of a 'pre-historical' happening (prahistorischen 
Geschehen). But whatever terms we select to describe the New 
Testament records of the resurrection and their content, it is quite 
certain that we do not interpret them, i. e., we do not let them say 
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what they are trying to say, if we explain away the history 
(Geschichte) which they recount, a history (Geschichte) which did 
take place in time and space, and that not merely in the development 
of a conception of the disciples, but in the objective event which 
underlay that development., 
29 
Finally, regarding Barth's use of Geschichte, we must mention 
one other concept he himself raises early in the Dogmatics. What 
effect would the negative historical judgement of a scientific 
historian have upon a certain Biblical event and its nature as 
Geschichte? Could it still be regarded as an event of Geschichte 
if its actual historicity were disproven? Barth admits that "even, 
stories of events which have taken place between God and men, of 
course, fall on their human side ... under (the) general concept 
of history (Historie). "30 Thus many revelation events of Geschichte 
are accessible to the scientific historian. Yet these events do not 
fall under this domain regarding their divine side. The non-temporal 
side, the revelational side, is not accessible to the scientific 
historian. Thus if a certain Biblical story were to be judged as 
not historical, it could "neither assert not deny that then and 
there God has acted on man. "31 It would not make it impossible to 
regard the Biblical story as Geschichte and thus still as a witness 
to revelation. "The question that decides the hearing or not hearing 
of the Bible story cannot be the question as to its general histor- 
icity (Historie): it can only be the question as to its special 
historicity (Geschichte). "32 How this would apply to Barth's view 
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of the Resurrection is not made clear, either in this context or 
in later volumes. The example cited does indicate something of an 
enigma in the Geschichte concept. 
Let us now summarize the main point of this section noting that 
Barth's view of the Resurrection as Geschichte is a complex one 
that does not altogether avoid ambiguity. Geschichte, which 
is the revelatory aspect of spatio-temporal events, is denied to 
be an objective, datable occurrence to which the scientific historian 
has access. The Resurrection as the event of revelation, and "the 
pure presence of God" falls thus into a unique position regarding 
spatio-temporal events. While Barth does assert that the Resurrection 
is an objective event in time and space, it is always referred to 
as Geschichte, which represents a certain kind of happening (the 
acts of God) which occurs in ordinary history but which is not a 
part of ordinary history. It happened, yet it cannot be approached 
historically. When such events of Geschichte are described, such 
as the Resurrection, the category of "saga" is introduced. The 
question which looms for us is exactly how Barth's view of the 
Geschichtlichkeit of the Resurrection is to be understood. It should 
also be clearer from this section that certain of Barth's views of 
the Resurrection differ markedly from orthodox Reformed theology. 
33 
Revelation: Fundamental Significance of the Resurrection 
For Barth then it is clear that the fundamental significance of 
the Resurrection is that of revelation. His most basic consideration 
regarding the Resurrection is that in this event we have the 
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definitive act of revelation, constituted in "the pure presence 
of God" (see quote, p. 93). 
With the exception only of some basic terminology (which we shall 
note) the early Barth was consistent with his later stand on the 
centrality and revelatory function of the revelation. Let us quote 
in its entirety an important passage from Romans, from which we have 
quoted previously only fragments. The following section comes from 
Barth's exposition of Rom. 1: 4, where Paul states that Jesus Christ 
"was declared to be the Son of God with power. . . by the resurrection 
from the dead. " 
"In this declaration and appointment - which are beyond historical 
(historisch) definition - lies the true significance of Jesus. 
Jesus as the Christ, (Historie) as the Messiah, is the End of History 
(Historie), and He can be comprehended only as Paradox (Kierkegaard), 
as Victor (Blumhardt), as Primal History (Geschichte) (Overbeck). 
As Christ, Jesus is the plane which lies beyond our comprehension. 
The plane which is known to us, He intersects vertically, from 
above. Within history (Historie), Jesus as the Christ can be under- 
stood only as Problem or Myth. As Christ, He brings the world of 
the Father. But we who stand in this concrete world know nothing, 
and are incapable of knowing anything, of that other world. The 
Resurrection from the dead is, however, the transformation: the 
establishing or declaration of that point from above, and the 
corresponding discerning of it from below. The Resurrection is 
the revelation: the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing 
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of God, and the apprehending of God in Jesus. The Resurrection 
is the emergence of the necessity of giving glory to God: the 
reckoning with what is unknown and unobservable in Jesus, the 
recognition of Him as Paradox, Victor, and Primal History. In 
the Resurrection the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old 
world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent touches a circle, 
that is, without touching it. .. The Resurrection is therefore an 
occurrence in history (Historie), which took place outside the 
gates of Jerusalem in the year A. D. 30, inasmuch as it there 
'came to pass, ' was discovered and recognized. But inasmuch as 
the occurrence was conditioned by the Resurrection. .. the 
Resurrection is not an event in history (Historie) at all. Jesus 
is declared to be the Son of God wherever He reveals Himself and 
is recognized as the Messiah, before the first Easter Day and, 
most assuredly, after it. This declaration of the Son of man to 
be the Son of God is the significance of Jesus, and apart from this, 
Jesus has no more significance or insignificance than may be attached 
to any man or thing or period of history (Historie) in itself. "34 
True to his dialectic, which is expressed in the paradoxical 
language (Kierkegaard) of positive and negative assertions, God 
is the sovereign creator of the universe and the sole redeemer of 
man. There is no innate human capacity for knowing God. Only God 
can create the "Moment" or "Miracle" in which a person is able to 
3 
confess Jesus as Lord and Saviour. 
5 Faith is created in the 
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moment of Revelation, when a person understands and responds to 
the self-disclosure of God in the man Jesus. This moment occurs at 
(beyond? ) the actual boundary of human existence where sin is touched 
as a "tangent touches a circle" (without touching it) by the word 
of 'Revelation, ' keeping it from all human distortion, for this 
miracle is not a moment in time. When a person hears and responds 
to God's revelation one of two things must happen. Either (1) that 
which is Divine and Transcendent must become Immanent and therefore 
humanized and relative, or else (2) that which is human must be raised 
above its relativity into a relationship of faith which is beyond 
sin's distorting influence. Of the two Barth obviously chooses the 
latter and he is quick to claim Scriptural reasons. 
Revelation is always, therefore, an event from above, 
36 initia- 
ted by God and not created by human experience. For this reason it 
never participates in world history, it rather neutralizes it thus 
creating its own circumstances true to its purpose and nature. It 
occurs at the extremity of human experience. 
The Resurrection is an event which occurs then at the boundary 
of human existence and which declares to man that what God has done 
for His own Son, He will also do for His other children. For this 
reason the "Resurrection is the revelation, the disclosing of Jesus 
as the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending of God 
Thus it must be in one sense an historical (historisch) in Jesus. " 
37 
event, but the historical (historisch) process as such did not pro- 
duce the event, it was on the contrary initiated from "Above" by 
God. 
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On this basis then the Resurrection is for Barth the pivotal 
point for revelation. In and through the Resurrection the Deus 
Absconditus becomes the Deus Revelatus, yet he is "attained by 
no man. "38 What is clearly seen is His invisibility. By defin- 
ition He does not become the known - an Object subject to and under 
human control. What He is by nature always remains a mystery. 
In a 1920 lecture entitled "Biblical Questions, Insights, and 
Vistas" Barth names the Easter message as "the theme of the Bible"39 
and he goes on to state: "Let us be satisfied that all Biblical 
questions, insights and vistas focus upon this common theme. " 
40 
Continuing, he claims that the Resurrection - the Easter message - 
can be summarized in five elements: 
41 (1) the sovereignty of God; 
(2) the eternity of God; (3) God's world of a new quality and kind; 
(4) a new corporeality; and (5) the one experience of man, in which 
he is made in the image of God. 
42 
We note, as a matter of summation, that one sees in these 
early thoughts of Barth basically the same idea as in the Dogmatics 
as to the historicity of the Resurrection (taking into account the 
subsequent qualification in terminology) and the emphasis upon the 
Resurrection as the paramount event of revelation. Now we must turn 
our attention exclusively to the Dogmatics. 
Early on in the Dogmatics Barth contends that the crucifixion 
and the Resurrection are inseparable. In the crucifixion (Historie) 
"the hidden work of Jesus Christ takes place and this is subsequently 
revealed and believed in His resurrection. "43 So it may be seen 
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that throughout the Dogmatics the death of Jesus, as Historie, is 
viewed as the hidden work of God, while the Resurrection, as 
Geschichte reveals this hidden work. 
"But the function of the resurrection is to make the passion of 
Christ, in which the incarnation of the Word of God was consumm- 
ated, clearly and unmistakably revelation, the realisation of the 
covenant between God and man, God's act for us, as reconciliation. 
The occurrence of the resurrection is not a second and further 
stage, but the manifestation of this second dimension of the Christ 
event. The resurrection is meant when it says in Jn. 1: 14: 'We saw 
his glory. " The resurrection is the event of the revelation of the 
Incarnate, the Humiliated, the Crucified. Wherever He gives Himself 
to be known as the person He is, He speaks as the risen Christ. The 
resurrection can give nothing new to Him who is the eternal Word of 
the Father; but it makes visible what is proper to Him, His glory. "44 
Klooster notes that "the emphasis upon the resurrection as revela- 
tion is so strong that Barth at times calls it a definitive and 
conclusive 'general revelation of the man Jesus' (111/2, p. 489; 
cf. p. 489), although "this is not to be taken in the ordinary sense 
of general revelation to which Barth still thunders: NEIN! °45 
Recalling our previous treatment of the Resurrection within 
the context of reconciliation we may thus state without further 
elucidation that Barth regards the Resurrection as the revelation 
of the objective justification of all men which has been consummated 
in the hidden work of the incarnation and crucifixion. That this 
objective justification is 'for all, is clear enough as we have seen. 
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But it is equally important to recognize that this justification 
is not achieved by and through the Resurrection as a further accomp- 
lishment of the work of Christ. The Resurrection functions simply 
as an act of revelation. It is the Resurrection which makes of the 
crucifixion "not something which belongs to the past, which can be 
present only by recollection, tradition and proclamation, but is 
as such a present event, the event which fills and determines the 
whole present. " 
46 
Yet Barth is quick to add (in true dialectic fashion) that 
although they are "together, " they also have a "relationship of 
temporal sequence. "47 But here too the crucifixion is the event of 
reconciliation, and the Resurrection the event of revelation. 
"What took place in these days was the divine acceptance, putting 
into effect, and revelation of what had taken place before, something 
complete in itself, sufficiently clear as a living word for the 
men of all times, sufficiently true as the divine verdict on the 
whole world, sufficiently high and deep to alter its situation, a 
sufficient missionary impulse for the disciples and basis of the 
community which receives and proclaims that verdict. "48 
Revelationally the two events simply cannot be distinguished. 
Each rests upon the other for its raison d'etre. In this sense, 
and only in this sense, can the Resurrection be seen as a part of 
God's act of reconciliation, and God's accomplished reconciliation 
in its character as revelation. 
"The being of Jesus Christ was and is perfect and complete in 
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in itself in His history as the true Son of God and Son of Man. 
It does not need to be transcended or augmented by new qualities 
or further developments. The humiliation of God and the exaltation 
of man as they took place in Him are the completed fulfilment of 
the covenant, the completed reconciliation of the world with God. 
His being as such (if we may be permitted this abstraction for a 
moment) was and is the end of the old and the beginning of the new 
form of this world even without His resurrection and ascension. 
He did not and does not lack anything in Himself. What was lacking 
was only the men to see and hear it as the work and Word of God - 
the praise and thanksgiving and obedience of their thoughts and 
words and works. What was lacking was only their service of wit- 
ness and proclamation. ... It 
is here that His resurrection and 
ascension came in, and still come in. For when the New Testament 
speaks of these events, or rather this one event, it speaks of the 
perfect being of Jesus Christ, and His accomplished reconciliation 
of the world with God, in its character as revelation. ... The 
resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ are the event of His 
self-declaration. ... Thus the resurrection and ascension add 
to 
what He was and is and to what took place in Him. .. only the new 
fact that in this event He was tobe seen and was actually seen as 
the one He was and is. "49 (my emphasis) 
Thus the Resurrection (and the ascension) is "simply a 
lifting of the veil" and as such "the authentic communication and 
proclamation of the perfect act of redemption once for all accom- 
plished in His previous existence and history. "50 The Easter 
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time is simply the time of the revelation of the mystery of the 
preceding time of the life and death of the man Jesus. " In the 
Resurrection this man stands "manifested in the mode of God. "51 
In his discussion on 'The Glory of the Mediator' Barth again 
discusses the role of the Resurrection in mediating a knowledge of 
who Christ is and what He does. "In the event of His resurrection 
from the dead, His being and action as very God and very man 
emerged from the concealment of his particular existence as an in- 
clusive being and action enfolding the world, the humanity distinct 
from himself and us all. "52 
The Resurrection is unique as an event of revelation in that 
it is "the definitive and comprehensive, the decisive and unequivocal 
event of revelation. "53 The Resurrection has this character because 
the reconciling work of God was completed in the crucifixion. The 
humiliation of God and the exaltation of man was "indeed virtual 
and potential from the very beginning of His history and existence, 
54 
but it was not completed until His death on the cross. Thus the 
Resurrection and the ascension constitute the completed revelation 
corresponding to the completed works of Christ on the cross. 
Resurrection as Historie? Looking Ahead 
Before we move ahead to Rudolf Bultmann and compare his theology 
with Barth's, let us pave the way for this discussion by an inter- 
pretation of Barth in light of issues that we will surely see. As 
we read Barth, there seem to be two excesses regarding the Resurr- 
ection: to exclude Historie from consideration altogether, and to 
admit nothing but Historie. To exclude Historie is to make of the 
U' 
Resurrection a 'non'happening, ' to place it in the realm of 
'nothingness. ' Yet to say it is only an event of Historie violates 
the Barthian Concept of revelation, making the Resurrection a thing 
of brute fact and compromising the hiddeness of God's dealings in 
the world. 
Barth has in fact developed a Resurrectional concept within 
his theology, difficult to comprehend and even harder to describe. 
It is a concept which is comprehended neither by Geschichte or 
Historie, for Barth actually speaks of the 'historicity' of the 
Resurrection as Geschichte (and not Historie) while, at the same 
time, wanting to ascribe to it a certain historisch status. Other 
events of revelation (the cross for instance) can best be described 
by the compound Historie-Geschichte. Although Barth nowhere uses 
this compound himself it nevertheless gives an accurate notion of 
revelation in Barth's thinking by juxtaposing two contrasting concepts 
and describing (as best it can be described) the historisch nature 
of revelation while at the same time doing justice to the mysterious 
Geschichte of God's action within the historisch. Though Barth may 
at times use the term Historie to speak of the Resurrection, we must 
acknowledge that the thrust of his thought as we have seen seems to 
be to deny the Resurrection as Historie. In this sense the Resurr- 
ection is not an event of Historie-Geschichte as other revelational 
events. It is rather, strange to say, an event of 'Geschichte 
which happens in space and time! There does actually seem to be this 
distinction in Barth regarding the Resurrection, between the event 
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as 'Historie' and the event in'space and time. 'although it is an 
extremely subtle one. 
A consistency of sorts would have been preserved if Barth had 
seen the Resurrection as another revelational event, establishing 
it as both true Geschichte and true Historie. Barth's special regard 
for the Resurrection however summarized in his understanding of it 
as "pure presence of God, " dictates that it has "factual circumstan- 
tiality" while he denies it as an event of Historie. To wit, we are 
left by Barth with the conviction that the Resurrection event must 
be regarded as true (the central event of all Scripture! ), that the 
Easter message must be literally understood and that, therefore, a 
central tenet of the Christian faith is bodily resurrection ("leib- 
liche Auferstehung"). At the same time, the appearance of the 
resurrected Christ "calls for a decision of faith, not for the 
acceptance of a well-attested historical (historisch) report. "55 
It is by the use of the two terms Historie and Geschichte (and 
his dualistic understanding of reality/history) that Barth attempts 
to retain the Resurrection as an event of 'Geschichte in space and 
time' and thus avoid what he sees as the non-historical character 
of revelation as myth in Rudolf Butlmann. 
Yet we may note that it is not Barth's task to build a case 
for the "factual circumstantiality" of the Resurrection, for it is 
of course his contention ( or his fear) that no certain case can be 
built. Barth is in no way up to showing us 'proof' of his view 
that this event happened in space and time. It seems, rather, 
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that Barth attaches great importance to the observation that factual 
certainty is lacking in regard to this event. Our certainty will 
rise or fall on faith. 
It is just this which underscroes the importance of viewing 
Barth's theology of the Resurrection in its context. It must not 
be overestimated nor underestimated. 
It should not be overestimated. When one begins seriously to 
inform himself regarding this theology, it soon becomes the task 
to penetrate it concerning its possible sense or non-sense. It is 
unwarranted to conclude that Barth's is a return to eighteenth and 
nineteenth century evalgelical theology, nor may it be identified, 
beyond a certain face value, witht he Biblical orthodoxy of classic 
Reformed Creeds and Confessions. In this sense his leibliche Aufer- 
stehung fits the mold of orthodoxy, if at all, only with great effort 
due to Barth's numerous qualifications. It is just as certain that 
Barth's understanding of the Resurrection is not that of rationalism. 
Despite Barth's great stress on the rational aspect of faith56, he 
seems to strain reason (if not 
faith) to the breaking point in his 
analysis of the Resurrection as 
'Geschichte in space and time. ' 
This attempt has seldom been embraced wholeheartedly even in Barthian 
circles. 
It should not be underestimated. Barth's is a serious attempt 
to, 'let God be God. ' He has recognized and dealt with the fact 
that revelation is nowhere an overpowering historical (historisch) 
occurrence. Barth's earliest views-of the 
Resurrection seen in 
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Romans , that God 
"touches the world as a tangent touches a circle, 
that is, without touching it" is shown to be a consistent element 
in every phase of Barth's theology of the Resurrection. Here is 
Barth's early (and continuous) attempt to give room to faith, to 
make it the basis of knowledge, to establisht he dictum "faith 
seeking understanding" (fides quarens intellectum) as his theological 
and rational model. In this sense he follows Augustine 
57 in asserting 
that existential certainty is routed, finally, not in pure reason 
but in the credo of the biblical message. Barth's approach to the 
Resurrection is through'the submission of reason, through belief in 
authority (God, Scripture). It is only in this way that the truths 
of Scripture can be made intelligible, at least to a point. Yet it 
must also be stated that, for Barth, it is never a question of an 
irrational but, he claims, a rationally justifiable faith. His is 
not rationalism, but rationality; not blind, but 'reasonable' 
submission. Reason submits, if we may again interpret Barth, 
because it is judged that there are occasions when it ought to submit. 
It is right, then, that it sould do so. 
Faith, as we understand Barth, is not something that lies 
beyond the created nature of man. It is not "simply blind subjec- 
tion to a law imposed on our mind and will from without. "58 It does 
not invade as some alien force from without but awakens in the 
nature of man (as it proceeds fromt he Word of God) an action that 
is truly proper to him. Ont he other hand "we must reject the 
notion that faith is simply a matter of human conviction about the 
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legitimacy and importance of an objective situation. "59 
For man must surrender his own desires, subjecting himself to a 
light which falls upon human life from without. Yet (with regard 
to Barth's first notion) it is not a light which shines totally 
from without, but also illumines our hearts and wills from within. 
"The Incarnation of God's Son epitomizes the nature of faith. It 
becomes real and concrete in the total obedience and total sovereignty 
of Christ's actions. The reality of faith stands above much oppo- 
sition and subsumes them within itself. Faith is wholly God's work 
and wholly man's work, wholly a binding and wholly a loosening. 
Roused to life by the Word of God, it lives and breathes within 
this integrated totality. " 
60 
Thus faith is, in Barth's scheme, both supernatural and posi- 
tive, yet also in conformity to nature. It lives wholly from the 
Word of Revelation, reflecting and echoing the "yes" that God 
, uttered in the Resurrection and thus participating in the divine 
activity. It is not a mere spectator to God's deeds. 
61 
It is also our own action, even though gratuitous grace, calling 
for the response of our own intellect and will, for without our 
-response it could not be God's gift to us and for us. Yet, as 
. stated, 
it is not blind, irrational, but made with absolute certainty 
as a result of our encounter with the Word. Christian faith sees 
what it is holding on to. It is not vain boasting, idealism, nor 
is it a weak resignation to paradox, antinomy, the insoluble. Even 
though faith may not see the object directly, for we peer through 
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earthly reality to glimpse God, assurance comes nonetheless and 
it is an assurance that comes with its own measure of completeness 
and perfection. For Barth, "To hear God's Word means to know God. "62 
In summation, then, Barth's theology of the Resurrection denies 
a strict separation of faith and knowledge. But it does so in the 
context of fides quarens intellectum. For Barth, surety is a conse- 
quence of faith which, by its very nature, results in absolute cer- 
tianty. The argument may be seen as circular but it must always be 
seen as beginning with the Word of God. Thus the Resurrection, as 
an event in space and time, must be understood so, can only be under- 
stood so, if it is first believed to be the Word of Revelation. We 
enter the drama of God's activity in the Resurrection not through 
a decision regarding Historie but through a decision of faith. 
It will be our task next to look at the theology of the 
Resurrection as we find it in Rudolf Bultmann. It will obviously 
be a much different theology and yet we hope to lay the groundwork 
not only for discussing the 
differences between these two theologians 
but for assessing their similarities as well. We will thus be 
holding much of our critique of Barth's theology (and of Bultmann's) 
until a suceeding chapter where we will deal specifically with a 
comparison of the two through several relevant themes. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) K. Barth, Church Dogmatics [CD], (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark), vol. 
1/2, p. 114. [References will normally be made to volume number]. 
2) I am indebted to a variety of sources which discuss the use of 
these terms in Barth, particularly so to an excellent article by 
F. H. Klooster, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Resurrection of 
Jesus Christ, " Westminster Theological Journal, Vol. 24, Oct. 1962, 
pp. 137-72. See esp. pp. 141f. Also J. Hamer, D. Marcusa tr., 
Karl Barth (Newman Press, 1962), pp. 117f. 
3) IV/1, pp. 313-14. 
4) 1/2, p. 122. 
5) With the qualification that its sign, the empty tomb, can also be 
regarded as Historie. 
6) IV/1, p. 334 
7) Idem. 
8) K. Barth, The Faith of the Church, tr. G. Vahanian (London: 
Meridian, 1950), p. 92. We have noted previously Barth's placing 
of the Resurrection beyond the reach of historical inquiry. 
9) IV/1, p. 335. 
10) Idem. 
11) I/1. p. 378. 
f 
12) See Barth's discussions in 111/2, pp. 443f., in which he has 
Bultmann obviously very much in mind. 
13) I/1, p. 378. For Barth reality seems located on two planes: that 
of divine action and that of human action, corresponding to Geschichte 
and Historie. It is through "vertical interventions" (Barth using 
the concept of heaven 'above' and earth 'beneath') that God 
plays his real, albeit hidden role in the history of events. Man 
is, of course, unable to transcend to the higher plane, being caught 
within history, within horizontal continuity. (See J. Hamer, D. 
Marcusa tr. Karl Barth (Newman Press, 1962), pp. 210-11). It is 
from this revelation from another plane and its resultant hidden- 
ess that Barth forms his doctrine of Welfhaftigheit des Wortes 
Gottes or the "secular character of the Word of Go . 
"- This s 
te essential character of revelation in our present 'horizontal' 
condition, God revealing Himself without dispelling our darkness. 
See I/1, pp. 170f. 
14) Ibid., p. 379. 
15) Idem. 
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16) Ideen. 
17) Ibid., p. 373. 
18) As is well known, for Barth this also applies to what Reformed 
theology has called "general revelation" and to the orthodox 
Reformed view of Scripture as the objective special revelation 
of God. See J. Calvin, Institutes, I, i-x. 
19) I/1, p. 373. 
20) For Barth's contention is that there is never a revelatory act 
of God which does not also create its response of faith. See 
Ibid., pp. 213f. 
21) I/1, p. 373. 
22) F. H. Klooster, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Resurrection of 
Christ, " p. 148. This is another example of what we have seen 
regarding Barth's minimalization of the humanity of Christ. The 
importance of the man Jesus is found only in His nature as the 
Christ. Humanity becomes simply: the vehicle for His essential 
nature as God. 
23) 1/2. p. 56. 
24) Ibid., p. 58. 
25) Ibid., Pp. 58f. 
26) As does Klooster in his article, p. 150. 
27) III/l, p. 42. 
28) IV/l, p. 336. 
29) Idem. 
30) I/l. p. 375. 
31) Idem. 
32) Idem. 
33) We note in Calvin's Catechism of 1541 that the significance of 
the Resurrection is that "by this he shows himself to be the 
conqueror over sin and death. For by his resurrection he swallowed 
up death, broke the fetters of the devil, and reduced all his power 
to nothing (I Peter 3: 18). " This results in a three-fold benefit 
(Question 74): (I) For by it righteousness is obtained for us 
( Rom. 4: 24); (II) it is a sure pledge of our future immortality 
(I Cor. 15); and (III) even now by its virtue we are raised to 
newness of life, that we may obey God's will by pure and 
holy 
living (Rom. 6: 14). " See Calvin Theological Treatises, tr. J. K. S. 
Reid, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 100. Barth, 
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33) commenting on these three benefits states in The Faith of 
the Church: "Hence the resurrection is nothing else than the 
revelation of what Christ's death brings us: the exaltation 
reveals to us the meaning, the end and the import of his humil- 
iation. " (p. 88). Along with the historical qualifications we 
have seen in Barth, the extreme revelatory function of the 
Resurrection also seems different from what Calvin intended, 
although he certainly included this. For Calvin the Resurrection 
does something; for Barth, it enters into active participation 
in justification by revealing something already done. 
34) Romans, pp. 29-30. We note the use of the terms "Problem" 
and especially "Myth, " and recall how Bultmann welcomed the 
early Barth as a theological companion. 
35) Ibid., p. 442. See J. A. Veitch's summary of Barth's use of 
revelation in Romans in "Revelation and Religion in the Theology 
of Karl Barth, " Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 24,1971, 
pp. 1-22. 
36) See Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 192-93. 
37) Romans, p. 30. 
38) Ibid., pp. 422-23. 
39) Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 86. 
40) Idem. 
41) Ibid., Pp. 88f. 
42) We recall the five "conditions" of Barth found in the Dogmatics 
regarding the "genuine beyond" of the Resurrection which we have 
covered earlier. The five elements in The Word of God and the 
Word of Man are basically the same as we have seen in the Dogmatics, 
although with a slightly different order and focus. See IV/1, 
pp. 297f. 
43) 1/2, p. 122. 
44) Ibid., p. 111. 
45) Klooster, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, " p. 160. Barth's meaning of 'general' in this sense we 
take to mean representative, i. e., capturing the essence, impor- 
tant characteristic and divine message of all revelation. This 
is supported by Barth's speaking of the Resurrection as the 
"pure presence of God. " 
46) IV/1, p. 313. 
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47) Ibid., p. 318. 
48) Idem. 
49) IV/2, pp. 132f. 
50) Ibid., p. 133. 
51) 111/2, pp. 445,448. 
52) IV/3, p. 283. 
53) IV/2, p. 140. 
54) Idem. 
55) IV/1, p. 335. 
56) See Hans Urs von Baithasur, J. Drury tr. The Theology of Karl 
Barth (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp. 127f., on "Faith and 
Reason" in Barth. Barth, says von Balthasur, "has often been 
accused of rationalism by Protestant spokesmen. Lutherans, in 
particular, have accused him of betraying the element of simple 
trust in their notion of faith. " This is in relation to the fact 
that for Barth faith is not a blind, irrational decision, but a 
decision made with absolute certainty, as a result of our encounter 
with the Word. 
57) See the discussion in von Balthasur's The Theology of Karl Barth, 
op. cit., pp. 127f. regarding "Faith and Reason" and Barth's 
relationship to Augustine. Likewise J. Hamer's Karl Barth., op. 
cit., pp. xii-xxxviii. Also Hans Kung's Does God Exist? tr. 
E. Quinn (NY, Doubleday, 1980), pp. 59f. on "Faith as the Basis 
of Reason" in Augustine and Pascal. 
58) 111/3, p. 280. 
59) Ibid., p. 281. 
60) Idem. 
61) III/1, pp. 422-455. 
62) 111/2, p. 210. 
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3. Rudolf Bultmann: 
The Primacy of Meaning over Objective Fact 
r 
Introduction 
Our purpose in this chapter will be to investigate Rudolf 
Bultmann's theology of the Resurrection. Bultmann's theologi- 
cal system is a network of often difficult and always interrelated 
thought. Some of this difficulty is reflective of Bultmann's 
style, most however is simply due to the nature of the material. 
We will be concerned initially to lay the foundations for 
a proper understanding of Buitmann's theology of the Resurrection, 
for besides the obvious complexities of thought there are numerous 
subtleties which must be understood in order to grasp it. Repres- 
entative of these are the notions of myth as this applies to the 
Resurrection ("Is it not a mythological event pure and simple? " 
Bultmann asks) and his existential perspective on faith and 
history. It seems to be the popular notion that Bultmann does not 
believe - or else does not care - that the cross and Resurrection 
ever happened as events of history (Historie) due to his Christian 
(a. la Heidegger) existentialism, and here we note his claim 
that "the resurrection is not an event of past history (Historie). " 
To understand Bultmann's theology of the Resurrection (it seems 
necessary to say, in order not to misunderstand it) it is paramount 
that we define terms and lay the conceptual/philosophical founda- 
tion of his thought. Bultmann has a penchant for statements that jar 
the reader (we note the above). Too often these statements, outside 
the context of his thought, have led to misunderstanding, and need- 
lessly unsympathetic responses. It is thus with the purpose of 
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illuminating this difficult theology that we look at his notions 
of faith and history, and demythologizing. In spite of the fact 
that we have marked off faith and history, demythologizing and 
Resurrection under separate headings. The three are intimately 
related as will be seen. The first two, in fact, form the indis- 
pensible groundwork for understanding the third. 
FAITH AND HISTORY 
Anyone familiar with the works of Bultmann is aware that as both 
an historian and a Christian theologian he is concerned with the 
problem of the relationship of faith to history to a great extent. 
It has in fact been called "the one great theme which claims his 
thought. "1 Bultmann realizes that the Christian and Resurrection 
faith is inseparably linked to the historical person of Jesus Christ 
and to the New Testament documents which report that event. 
2 
The 
primary task of interpretation is bridging the spatio-temporal gap 
between that history and man's present history. 
3 
So the problem of 
understanding history is central in the task of interpreting the 
Resurrection. 
It will be useful for us to look initially at four words which 
are critical to his view of faith and thus his theology of the Resurr- 
ection: (1) Historie, (2) Geschichte, (3) eschatology and (4) his- 
toricity. 
Historie, Geschichte: Away From Objective Fact 
Regarding (1) and (2), we may recall our discussion on Barth 
regarding the differences 
between Historie and Geschichte, for which 
124 
there is no real English distinction. 
4 This is a highly specialized 
use of language, distinctions being given which are not applicable 
to everyday German. Historie designates, in its theological sense, 
what actually occurred, meaning those events which can be studied 
by historians employing scientific methods. Geschichte, on the other 
hand, designates those events of history which continue to have mean- 
ing and/or influence on later persons and events. It deals with the 
encounter of persons, and its emphasis for Bultmann is on the personal 
meaning of event, or existential history. The term would be used, 
for instance, regarding Jesus as the Christ, in so far as he is the 
object of an individual's faith, the content of our preaching, and is 
confessed by the community of believers as Lord and Saviour. 
5 (As 
we recall the cognate adjectives for Historie and Geschichte are, 
respectively, "historical" (historisch) and "historic" (geschichtlich), 
thus assuming a difference inordinary English between an "historical" 
fact and an "historic"event. 
6) 
The distinction which Bultmann makes between Historie and 
Geschichte is evident in his response to the 'quest for the histori- 
cal Jesus. ' 
7 Bultmann has consistently voiced the view that Christian 
faith and thus the Resurrection is not dependent upon history. 
8 
In. other words, as the Jesus of Historie must give way to the Ges- 
chichtlichkeit of the Christ event, so the Resurrection must be under- 
stood through the latter. This 
is illuminated in a famous quotation 
from his book Jesus and the Word, where Bultmann states: 
I do indeed think that now we can know nothing concerning the life 
and personality of 
Jesus, since the earliest Christian sources show 
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no interest in either, are moreover fragmentary and often legend- 
ary; and other sources about Jesus do not exist. "9 
Likewise he claims in The History of the Synoptic Tradition that the 
Gospels lack "specifically biographical material" and that Scripture 
in general gives us "not the historical Jesus, but the Christ of the 
faith and the cult.... thus the kerygma of Christ is cultic legend 
and the Gospels are expanded cult legends. "10 
Bultmann's attitude toward history can be enlightened by a 
"momentary digression. In the nineteenth century Soren Kierkegaard 
had taken a similar line. Faith for him did not depend upon histor- 
ical facts about the life of Jesus. "If the contemporary generation 
had left nothing behind them but these words: 'We have believed that 
in such and such a year the God appeared among us in the humble 
figure of a servant, that he lived and taught in our community, and 
finally died, ' it would be more than enough. "11 
Bultmann has also been compared to the nineteenth century 
theologian Strauss because of his historical scepticism. 
12 
This is 
an apt comparison. It was Strauss who was probably the first, claims 
Alan Barr, "to bring into the clear light of day the true character 
and importance of the eschatological teaching of Jesus" and who 
"startled his contemporaries by applying the category of myth to a 
great part of the Gospel records. "13 Both of these views have had 
obvious consequences for Bultmann's theology of the Resurrection. 
Yet Bultmann's historical scepticism was not only the result 
of positive direct influence but was also in reaction against the 
nineteenth century's 'quest for the historical Jesus. ' Bultmann 
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basically considered Liberal theology to be in error in that its 
focus was upon man rather than God, Who is the only proper subject 
of theology. 
14 One result of these views can be seen according to 
Bultmann, in a fascination with the man Jesus: the fact that the 
historical Jesus must be the object of faith. 
Also influential on Bultmann (as on Barth) was Martin Kahler, 
who published a small but important book on the subject of the quest 
entitled The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical 
Faith (1896). While Kahler did not consistently distinguish between 
Historie and Geschichte as did Bultmann, it is clear that he made 
the basic distinction. The historical Jesus was regarded by Kahler 
as an object of historical-critical research and, at the same time, 
as irrelevant for faith. The object of faith was the "historic" 
Christ. Kähler's influence on Bultmann was obvious early on, 
16 
and appears decisively in Bultmann's work on the Resurrection. 
(As is well known, Bultmann has been a consistent antagonist of the 
quest and has refused to join the group involved in the 'new' quest 
even though some of his former students did. 
17 We may summarize 
his two main reasons for this, (1) the failure of the old quest and 
(2) the unsuitable nature of the sources, as being at least partially 
the result of Kähler's influence. ) 
Eschatology: Authentic Existence 
The term "eschatology" when defined in the context of history 
as Historie, means the end of history. The end of history can mean 
not only its termination, however, but its goal or its teleology, 
i. e., in Jewish apocalyptic literature, eschatology was seen as the 
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end of history brought about dramatically by the action of God. 
18 
When eschatology is defined in the context of history as Geschichte 
by Bultmann, it takes on the Resurrectional theme. The meaning is 
not a future termination, but rather an existential realization of 
"authentic existence" int he present. 
19 
One 'rises' by meeting the 
'Risen' Lord. Couched in Butlamnn's language, eschatology comes to 
mean then, the "end" of the "old world" of "inauthentic existence. " 
Specifically, what these terms signify for Bultmann will be seen 
directly. Bultmann realizes and acknowledges that the New Testament 
contains the Judaistic apocalyptic eschatology as well as the present 
tense eschatology found in such statements as the Johannine "I am 
the resurrection" (Jn. 11: 25), 
20 
yet he strongly favors the under- 
standing of Christ as the great eschatological event, 
21 
and existence 
in faith as eschatological existence now. When eschatology loses 
its sense of futurity, and is known existentially, it becomes "his- 
toric" existence, an important, Resurrectional concept for Bultmann. 
Historicity 
The term "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit) as used by Bultmann, 
is identical in meaning with the terms "existence" or "self-under- 
standing, " as they can all be used equally well to stress "being-in- 
the-world" - the radical nature of man's existence as a fact only 
in the entanglements of history. 
22 Thus "historicity" calls atten- 
tion to the fact that man is at the mercy of history. 
23 A person's 
existence is necessarily in part determined by the historical cir- 
cumstances that surround him. He does not simply pass through history, 
observe and investigate 
it. He is "nothing but history, " a being 
to whom things happen. 
24 
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"Historicity" not only stresses that a person is thrown into 
history with numerous limitations and liabilities over which he 
has no control. It also means that at any given time the nature of 
a person's existence is in part determined by what he himself has 
done, or what has been done to him in his own past. His decisions 
and acts count, and in his personal history his actions have conse- 
quences for his future. 
25 
So, a person becomes what he is partly because of factors over 
which he has no control, his historical circumstances, but even more 
because of the way he responds to the challenge of those circumstances. 
He lives a concrete life in the actual world and necessarily is a 
part of and partakes in the accidents and ambiguities of Historie 
but, as a person, decides to a degree his own personal history and 
thus becomes "historic. " "Historicity" is existence with authentic 
, meaning. 
The decisions which determine one's existence in the world 
can only be made, in response to a confrontation at the level of his 
, existence. 
Thus to speak, for instance, of Jesus in a way which is 
significant for our existence, we must understand how He encounters 
us at the level of our historicity. Bultmann is very concerned to 
show this, and its consequences are enormous for his view of the 
cross and Resurrection. 
Bultmann's Philosoph' 
Let us look now 
and see how Bultmann 
Our best recourse to 
tures, History and E! 
y: Nihilism or Meaning? 
intot he actual problem of faith and history 
handles the problem of its nature and meaning. 
his thought here is found in his Gifford Lec- 
3chatology. 
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As we have seen, Bultmann understands man as a being delivered 
over to history. 
27 History takes shape not only through our actions 
but through fate or destiny. In the times of the Greeks the true 
existence of man could still be thought of as an unchanging sub- 
stratum, an "eternal element, " underlying all the changes of history. 
28 
The accidents of man's being may be altered, but man's substance is 
never-changing. This world-view has disintegrated since the time of 
the Gnostics, however, and we have subsequently come to perceive that 
man himself changes with history. 
29 
No area of his existence is un- 
touched by this fact. Bultmann states: "His historicity does not 
consist in the fact that he is an individual who passes through his- 
tory, who experiences history, who meets with history. No, man is 
nothing but history, for he is, so to speak, not an active being but 
someone to whom things happen. Man is only a process without 'true 
existence. ' the end, it seems, is nihilism. "30 In light of this 
understanding of historical consciousness the question of whether 
there can be a salvation from nihilism becomes urgent. 
Bultmann offers a provisional answer (we shall see his definitive 
answer subsequently) as 
follows: "Must we say that the historicity 
of man is not yet fully understood and must be thought out to its 
final conclusions in order to banish the conclusion of nihilism? 
Such questions can be answered only when we consider exactly the 
essence; the idea of history. 
It seems to me that the very problem 
31 
is veiled by the one-sided question about meaning in history. " 
This is actually Bultmann's working hypothesis for the remainder of 
his Gifford lectures. 
The oldest and most primitive narratives of peoples are not. 
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history but myth. 
32 This mythology originated, and is still alive 
today among more primitive cultures, because people lack(ed) real 
history. It is essentially imagination occupied with the observation 
of both the order and the frightening occurrences of nature. When 
nations appeared, an historical consciousness, and thus historical 
narrative, also appeared. The memory of important events thus begins 
to be handed down in growing degrees of complexity. In Greek thought 
history was connected to natural events and with cosmic movement, 
which gave rise to the idea of cyclic history, and made history ana- 
logous to natural science. For them "the future will be of the same 
kind as the past. "33 
Old Testament concepts were determined primarily by theology, 
and, consequently, history was the actual deeds of persons who were 
understood in their relationship to God. 
34 
History was not seen in 
respect of analogy with nature but in terms of human response to the 
3 
judgement of God. 
5 
Jewish apocalyptic literature dropped the idea 
of restoration as found in the cyclical view and added the eschato- 
logical view. In later Judaism human destiny replaced the destiny 
of the world, the cyclical periods were dropped altogether and the 
idea of the two Aeons came into prominence. With this a real escha- 
tology is established. 
In the New Testament, claims Bultmann, both the Old Testament 
view of history (persons in relationship to God) and the apocalyptic 
view ( the two Aeons) are present but in such a way that the apocalyp- 
tic view prevails. The event of Christ is not an historical event like 
Moses and the prophets which people look back to. Rather, He is the 
eschatological event 
bringing through His Resurrection, the close of 
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the "old age. " In early Christianity history is swallowed up in 
eschatology. 
36 
The early Christian community understands itself as 
an eschatological rather than an historical phenomenon. It belongs 
to the new Aeon which has arrived. But the early Church had expected 
the imminent arrival of Jesus bringing the world to an apocalyptic 
conclusion. The "problem" of eschatology grew out of the fact that 
the expected end of the world failed to arrive. 
37 
The young Church 
lost the understanding of the Spirit as their real power and declined 
into a religion and its various forms of sacramental piety. 
38 
it 
passed from community to institution and tradition, eye-witness, and 
doctrine gained increasing importance. 
39 
The Pauline understanding of history is, according to Bultmann, 
determined by eschatology. The end of history will not be the result 
of historical development, but a "breaking off, accomplished by God. ""40 
Tö this extent Paul recognizes a meaning in history although this mean- 
ing is certainly not evident within history itself. "The Pauline view 
of history is the expression of his view of man: man can receive his 
life only when he knows himself annihilated before God; therefore 
the sin into which man is plunged is paradoxically the presupposition 
for the reception of grace. " 
4 Bultmann maintains that although the 
history of the world had lost interest for Paul, he brought to light 
another phenomenon, namely, the historicity of man, through which he 
experiences history for himself and by which he gains his real essence. 
Paul's view is thus for Bultmann an existentialist interpretation and 
the forerunner of what has been re-discovered by the modern historical 
42 
consciousness. Man is a being-in-the-world, and becomes what he is 
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what he is through his decisions. 
Bultmann rejects the historicism of the nineteenth century in 
which history was treated causally and came to be regarded as a 
science of facts. 
43 Historians seemed to think that they could 
withdraw from it or stand above it in order to objectively appraise 
it. Bultmann claims that history is about man, not merely facts. 
44 
The activities whose history he is studying are not events to be 
observed but experiences to be lived in his own mind. Every moment 
of history is one of possible self-knowledge. Historical knowledge, 
45 
to be meaningful, must be existential knowledge. 
The distinctively Christian element in the discussion comes as 
Bultmann goes on to ask: what is the intent of self-knowledge? Must 
we not say that self-knowledge is consciousness of responsibility over 
against the future? And is not the act of self-knowledge at the same 
time really an act of decision? It is on this ground that Bultmann 
not only affirms with Collingwood (see footnote 44) man's radical 
historicity, but interprets it from the aspect of Christianity. The 
self of man in its being delivered over to history is ultimately the 
self in an existential situation of decision before God. "The Christian 
faith believes that man does not have the freedom which is presupposed 
46 
for historical decisions. " It comes to one only as a gift to be 
grasped in faith. Christian faith understands that freedom is a gift. 
This is the specific character of Christianity, that the historical 
consciousness 
is taken with more radical seriousness than it ever 
47 
could be by itself. 
Bultmanr's philosophy of history also has an essential epistemo- 
logical aspect which helps to clarify his understanding of history. 
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This is the hermeneutical question of how to understand historical 
documents delivered by tradition. 
48 
Bultmann divides this aspect 
of epistemology into two questions: (1) How is it possible to under- 
stand historical documents transmitted by tradition? (2) Is it possi- 
ble to obtain an objective knowledge of history at all? 
Bultmann answers the first hermeneutical question with his con- 
cept of "pre-understanding" in which a particular understanding of 
49 
the matter is pre-supposed. Bultmann believes that the interpreta- 
tion of historical texts is possible only because the author and the 
interpreter live in and share the same world; each is "moved by the 
50 
question of his own existence. " The interpreter goes to the text 
with a pre-understanding, and therefore he asks a variety of different 
questions of the text. He can evidence a scientific interest in facts, 
attempt to represent psychological and psychic factors or evaluate the 
document aesthetically. Finally he can also bring out the-rtieatiing or 
importance of the text, and become involved in "the existential encounter 
with history. ": the understanding of man and the possibilities offered 
. 
there. 
51 
The complexity of the various viewpoints on the part of the 
historian is possible and legitimate because man is a ocmplex being. 
"He (man) consists of body and soul, or if one prefers, of body, soul, 
and mind. He has appetites and passions, he feels physical and spirit- 
ual needs, he has will and imagination. He is a political and social 
being. .. and 
from each viewpoint something objectively true will 
appear. The picture is falsified only if one single viewpoint is 
52 
made an absolute one, if it comes to a dogma. " 
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Bultmann answers the second hermeneutical question - whether 
we can obtain objective knowledge of history - by claiming that it 
would seem that such an interpreter could "know" only subjective 
matter and that an objective historical situation could not be 
known. Bultmann, however, does concede that we can know some objec- 
tive historical events, but never the entire event. "Indeed, strict 
methodical research can recognize objectively a certain part of the 
historical process, namely, events in so far as they are nothing but 
occurrences which happened at a certain place in space and time. It 
is possible, for instance, to fix objectively the fact and the time 
at which Socrates drank the cup of Hemlock, the fact and the time when 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the fact and the time when Luther affixed 
the ninety-five theses to-the door of the Castle-Church of Wittenberg, 
or to know objectively the fact that and the time when a certain battle 
was fought or a certain empire was founded or a certain catastrophe 
happened. " 53 Yet Bultmann goes on to ask "whether history is suffi- 
I 
ciently comprehended when it is only seen as a field of such events 
and action as can be fixed 
in space and time. " It is thus Bultmann's 
claim that 'brute' facts of history are important only in that they 
convey meaning to=the interpreter. The historian, or interpreter, 
encounters history existentially, and he must re-enact the event in 
his understanding of it. Thus "the object of historical knowledge is 
man himself in his subjective nature. " 
54 
The historian does not assign a meaning to history or to its 
events, for these events 
disclose their meanings to men. As a result 
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we cannot say what is the meaning of history, since we cannot see 
55 
the end of history. But in individual historicity there is the 
possibility that events and epochs have meaning. Thus we may at last 
see Bultmann's definitive answer to the problem of salvation from 
nihilism which comes from history without true meaning. "The meaning 
of history lies always in the present, and when the present is con- 
ceived as the eschatological present by Christian faith, the meaning 
in history is realized. Anyone who complains 'I cannot see meaning 
in history, and therefore my life, which is interwoven in history, 
is meaningless, ' is to be admonished: 'Do not look around yourself 
into universal history, you must look into your own personal history. 
ALways in your present lies the meaning in history ... In every 
moment slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. 
56 
You must awaken it. " 
summary 
We may see clearly now that Bultmann has redefined what con- 
stitutes the historical. (The historicity of the Resurrection shall 
be redefined with it. ) The term historical has been extended to in- 
clude not only (or even mainly) the objectively historical but the 
eschatological significance of history as well. The distinctive thing 
about man is his "historicity, " which is to state man's situation in 
being bound up with his past and yet decisively responsible for his 
-future. 
Regarding the past, man must eschew any pretence of object- 
ivity, admitting that he is himself a part of history, and understand- 
ing that he is also its object. In other words, the object of histor- 
ical knowledge is man in his subjective nature. Historical knowledge 
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is self-knowledge, existential knowledge. Although there are many 
different courses to self-understanding throughout the philosophies 
and religions of the world, radical human historicity is the cri- 
teria for legitimacy. Radical understanding of human historicity 
has appeared in Christianity. Through the concept of "sin" the 
Christian faith has recognized man's harness to the past and the 
corresponding restricting of freedom for the future. Through the 
"eschatological event" of Jesus Christ (and Bultmann will call the 
Resurrection "the eschatological event par excellence") man is offered 
the "end" of the "old world" of "inauthentic existence" (as we have 
previously noted). Time has ceased to be a factor. The Christ event 
of so long ago can be decisive for us today because this event is 
"eschatological" (i. e., significant for salvation). Butlmann intends 
that "eschatological" be understood as signifying the "end of the 
world. " "Jesus Christ is the eschatological event, the action of 
God by which God has set an end to the old world. "57 This is not in 
the sense of an objectively established historical (historisch)event, 
for Bultmann strongly denies that such an event can be verified 
scientifically, but 
is rather an "eschatological" occurrence which is 
always present here and now, at 
the moment (and we must look ahead 
here) as it addresses us in the Word of preaching. Preaching is thus 
the Concrete present action in which saving event, eschatological 
occurrence, takes place again and again and 
in which the meaning of 
the cross and Resurrection is grasped in the response of faith. Thus 
one "dies" to 
his past and to its power, experiencing the eschatolog- 
ical "end"of the "old world. " Subsequently comes the "rise" to freedom 
for God's future, to new self-understanding and to a life of 
"authentic existence. " "For the old world has reached its end with 
the fact that. . . 'the old man' has reached his end and is now 'a 
58 
new man, ' a free man. " (The cross and Resurrection motif can be 
seen clearly here). Responsible decision is not removed as a result 
of faith, for man is still historical. But all responsible decisions 
are born of love, which "consists in unreservedly being for one's 
59 
neighbor. " This is possible only for the man who has become free 
for himself. 
The paradox of the Christian message hinges on the fact that the 
"eschatological event" does not speak of the end of history or of 
time in any objective sense. Quoting Erich Frank, Bultmann speaks in 
terms of "an event in ther ealm of eternity which is incommensurable 
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with historical time. " This event had its advent within history in 
the person of Jesus Christ, and in continuity with this takes place 
again and again within history through the event of preaching and in 
the subsequent decision of faith. Through this understanding of 
Jesus Christ as the "eschatological event" Buitmann claims to have 
illuminated the paradox of Christian being. This is to say that 
Jesus Christ, understood eschatologically as the "end of history, " 
yet within history, seen as 
both the historical Jesus and the present 
Jesus Christ, opens up th:: related paradox of the Christian man as 
both an historical and an eschatological being. In the Now of each 
individual lies the key to the meaning in history. And Bultmann can 
thus conclude that "in every moment slumbers the possibility of being 
the eschatological moment. " Through the present "Christ event" this 
can, he claims, be realized. 
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Critique 
Some serious questions must be put to Bultmann before we 
continue. We may initially ask after the role of Historie for the 
Christian faith. Is Bultmann's view of 'objective' history and its 
relationship to faith too negative? This has certainly been raised 
many times regarding Bultmann and rightly so, for its presence looms 
over our entire discussion. 
The difficulty of an 'objective' answer is perhaps shown best 
by the replies of his critics. If probed deeply enough various shades 
of meaning are uncovered from seemingly similar accusations. We note, 
for instance, David Cairns (A Gospel Without Myth? ) who attacks Bult- 
mann's views in this regard as a "flight from history, " leading to the 
separation of faith from any event of past history and making it an 
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affair of "blank immediacy. " Bultmann is criticized for his desire 
to keep faith independent of the never-conclusive results of scientific 
historical inquiry through this "flight. " Is such a negative view of 
Historie, and of the scientific historian, really warranted, Cairns 
asks? With the conviction that 
"the whole enterprise resembles too 
much the remedy of depitation as a cure for headache, " 
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he calls upon 
both W. Hermann ( i. e., the Biblical impression of the figure of Jesus 
is enough to secure its general historicity; such a figure could not 
have been invented) and P. Althaus (i. e., historians may correct the 
detail but never the main outlines of the life of Jesus) to allay the 
fears of historical inconclusiveness. Cairns' concern is centered 
not so much in historical 
inconclusiveness (although he is not uncon- 
.. cerned) 
as in Bultmann's overreaction to this problem and the perceived 
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attenuating subjectivity. For this over-reaction has led, in 
Cairns' view, to the role of history becoming "the merest spring- 
board in fact for the leap into existential significance of 'what 
63 
God wishes to say to me. '" One gets the strong impression that 
Cairns fears the selling out of our distinctively Christian birth- 
right for a mess of pholosophical, existential, and analytical 
pottage. 
John Macquarrie seems initially on much the same track as, Cairns 
with his comments regarding Bultmann. Iki Macquarrie's view the 
"Christ of faith" which Bultmann proposes is related to the "Jesus 
of history" only very tenuously, and he states that "a purely exist- 
ential interpretation of the sacred history needs supplementation if 
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it is not to lead to a gnostic view. " He therefore immediately calls 
for a "minimal core of 
historical factuality_ a core which may reason- 
ably be assumed to be constant and unshakeable through all the shifting 
patterns of research. " His ocncern is much like Cairns', that demyth- 
ologizing may degenerate into a complete subjectivizing of sacred 
history. 
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Now Bultmann himself has championed a "core" of historical 
factuality about Jesus. We can believe, for instance, that he lived, 
taught and was crucified outside the gates of Jerusalem. Yet when 
we discover what this "core" of Macquarrie's is, we must ask if this 
is not precisely the realization of Cairns' own worst fears. For it 
is simply the fact "that there was someone who once exhibited in 
history the possibility of (authentic) existence which the kerygma 
proclaims... 
6 
The mere possibility is insufficient, an objective 
refuge is necessary to 
demonstrate that the possibility is genuine. 
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It is at least possible, we should think, to hold such assumptions 
without recourse to God (although we do not accuse Macquarrie of 
this), much less to an even more problematic "Christ" event. Could 
this not be called truly "revelation disintegrated into philosophy, " 
67 
to use Thielicke's phrase? 
Yet is a "disintegration into philosophy" necessarily where 
Bultmann's proposals lead? In spite of all talk of "logical outcome, " 
and the numerous warnings from the disciples of orthodoxy, we must 
take care to let Bultmann speak for himself. The logical sequence of 
this concept of faith might seem to be that Bultmann needs no histor- 
ical Jesus at all. As Schubert Ogden has criticized, why can God 
not speak directly to me without the necessity of an historical Jesus? 
What avails any unique acting of God in Jesus, for "the word addressed 
to men everywhere, in all the events of their lives, is none other 
than the word spoken in Jesus and in the preaching and sacraments of 
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the church. " Yet Bultmann insists that God has acted in Jesus, and 
that it is only by virtue of this act of God that authentic existence 
becomes possible. We are obliged to hear all that Bultmann says in 
light of a very high estimate of the central and decisive place of 
Christ. 
Might we do better to change the focus of our question? Instead 
of pursuing the somewhat arbitrary problem of Bultmann's "negativity" 
toward the historisch element of the Christian faith may we better 
see Bultmann as groping after a new sense 
in which faith and history 
are connected? 
We speak here of course of the "eschatological 
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occurrence" which takes place within history, which is ever present 
in the Word of preaching, and in which the cross/Resurrection event 
becomes of salvific significance for the one who responds in faith. 
We must admit that the issue of objective history and faith has not 
been side-stepped (that simply cannot be done with Bultmann), but we 
have at least moved to a different dimension of the problem. 
Granted that the facts of Historie are uncertain at best, 
Bultmann would seem to lead us to an event which is completely beyond 
the purview of science, one which receives its validity from existen- 
tial encounter with the crucified and risen Christ. Quite obviously 
some objective-historical facts come into play here, for the cross 
is central, as it has happened historically in space and time, and 
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thus constitutes the bedrock of the "salvation-occurrence. " The 
preaching of the Word is for Bultmann a "continuation of the Christ 
event. "70 Thus, in this Word, God's saving act (cross and Resurrection) 
is ever present. 
It would seem that what we have in Buitmann is less a complete 
disposal of the historisch as it regards faith, than a change of 
emphasis in the concept of the doctrine of revelation. Before we 
make the difficult impossible 
let us clarify that last statement. 
Bultmann is not so radical, objective-historically speaking, to deny 
the need for, or the truth of, the objective-historical Jesus. 
The Christian faith may rightly claim a certain historisch person, 
Jesus of Nazareth, and certain events of his life as its own. Yet 
where, historically, orthodoxy has taken a stand on the Biblical 
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sources to the life of Christ, claiming these sources to constitute 
in general a reliable historisch witness to the revelation of God 
in Christ (if not, in fact, claiming these sources to be revelation 
themselves), Bultmann does not. And whereas orthodoxy would empha- 
size that in the earthly life of Jesus we see the revelation of 
God, upon which our present faith is based (as subsequent to the 
act of revelation), Bultmann does not. For Bultmann would place 
the emphasis of revelation not on past historical events, even though 
he insists that God has acted in Christ. "At the very point where 
man can do nothing, God steps in and acts - indeed he has acted 
already -one man's behalf. " 
71 He would, rather, emphasize that we 
can truly know this historisch event only in faith (we can begin to 
see his applications of 'radical historicity' to the Christian faith, 
i. e. Collingwood). Consequently, "hearing" God is really an "en- 
counter" with Him. Bultmann, in true dialectical fashion, never 
tires of pointing out that revelation does not consist of proposit- 
ional truth about God, but is God's disclosure of himself. 
72 Reve- 
lation is God in Christ putting man in a new situation - Now 
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It is certainly clear that this concept of revelation answers 
no questions for the curious bystander. It rather confronts the 
individual hearer with radical questioning about his own existence. 
Revelation, for Bultmann, is personal address. 
74 The emphasis is 
"that" God has disclosed himself rather than "waht" has been dis- 
closed. Iii light of this we can begin to understand Bultmann's 
statement: "Thus revelation consists in nothing other than the fact 
75 
of Jesus Christ. " 
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Let us move. to the conclusion of this section by noting 
several questions which can be asked of Bultmann ragarding his 
existential perspective of faith and his concept of the faith/history 
relationship. 
1) We have seen that, for Bultmann, God is known only in terms 
of existence, i. e., personal existential encounter. This might be 
clarified from Bultmann's writings by noting his claim that, though 
we speak "of" God we cannot speak "about" God without lapsing into 
the sin of idolatry. 
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Does this not preclude any communication about 
what God means to us? Without the capacity to 'compare notes, ' so to 
speak, do we not run the chance of being locked up into individualis- 
tic interpretations which may also be idolatry? It would seem that 
this places the existential encounter with the Resurrection in a 
rather precarious position. 
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2) When he is criticized for reducing the concept of God to 
subjective existence Bultmann unequivocally denies that this is either 
his intention or a necessary outcome of his method. 
78 Yet, as we 
have seen, Bultmann will only allow us to say "that" God is (the 
'Dass') not "what" (Wass) God is like. There seems to be a weak seam 
here. Does not knowing "that" illuminate at least some character of 
the "what? " If we can know "that" God is on the basis of human exis- 
tence, may we not at least know something of "what" God is? It seems 
a clear and present 
danger that, should we rule out the historical 
consensus of 
Christianity that some rather definite things can be said 
about what 
God is like, i. e., the "what" of our faith, we also run 
a reasonable risk that 
the affirmation "that" God is, is also illusory. 
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3) Some serious implications for Bultmann's theology grow out 
of his individualistic understanding of existence. This is true 
not only in the area of what we can say about God, but in an almost 
profound lack of emphasis on social ethics and on the doctrine of 
the Church. 
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Bultmann interprets Jesus as advocating neither a theory of 
social or individual ethics (and we think correctly). It was rather 
Jesus' contention that man should obey God and love his neighbor. 
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But Bultmann goes further and maintains that Jesus saw man as insecure 
before that which confronts him in each new moment. Although it is 
true that Jesus laid down no firm set of rules, Bultmann maintains 
that belief in God runs a real danger of being stifled by community 
in light of this insecurity. Have we understood Bultmann correctly 
here? How else can we understand him when he claims that such living 
together presents a danger "of losing our real character as a community 
of free and isolated persons, and of deteriorating into a clamor 
of voices weakening us and deceiving us about our solitariness. . 
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Must the eschatological event, the Resurrection event, then be approp- 
riated so privately that 
isolation is desirable? This radical stress 
on the individual's existence seems to do less than justice to the 
New Testament idea of loving one's neighbor. And how can it square 
with Bultmann's own claims 
in his Gifford Lectures that, in becoming 
risen with Christ, 
in living the life of authentic existence "all 
responsible decisions are 
born of love. For love consists in un- 
reservedly being 
for one's neighbor. . .? 
82 It it necessarily true 
that the isolated 
individual is spared the arrogance and false 
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security which befall those who become engulfed in community? 
It is indeed a challenge to make responsible decisions in loving 
one's neighbor and simultaneously to remain an isolated self. 
Bultmann's theology of the Resurrection thus makes the Resurrection 
not so much the inauguration of the Church, as the inauguration of 
an historical series of individual encounters. This may be put for- 
ward as a definition of the Church, but it is a rather unhappy way 
of doing so. 
83 Bultmann does not, of course, completely ignore the 
Church, but we might say that the Church is more conspicuous by 
its relative absence than in any other way in his writings. In a 
sense this is quite surprising for the proclamation of the kerygma 
is very important to Bultmann, and only the Church makes this proc- 
lamation. Can we so drastically alter the New Testament texts which 
tell us that faith results in involvement with other believers (and, 
even more so, with unbelievers)? We are told that believers shared 
their lives even to the extent of pooling their property. Does not 
, this witness of Scripture 
have a positive 'social' bearing on the 
individual Christian's self-understanding today? ) 
4) We may grant that Bultmann is essentially correct in his 
refusal to let faith 
hinge upon historical Research, and that faith 
is best understood in an existential context. Also, we are mindful 
of Bultmann's "eschatological occurrence": a new sense in which 
faith and history are connected. Still, is Bultmann correct in his 
radical pulling apart of 
faith from the objective historical? We 
shall be forced 
to deal with the passionate response of Karl Barth 
8 
to this question before long. Let this point suffice for the present. 
a 
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Biblical faith is distinct from most other religions and/or 
philosophies precisely because of its grounding in historical 
(historisch) events (as opposed to a code of teachings or law or 
a certain world view). One may look, for instance, to the Exodus. 
Hebrew faith did not rest on the minutiae of this event, i. e., 
exactly when or how many were involved. Neither are we led to believe 
that the Egyptian observers saw the revelation of God in the various 
occurrences recounted here. Faith is subjective and existential. 
However, the Hebrews looked back to the Exodus in its significance 
both as Historie and Geschichte. It is hardly conceivable that they 
could have been as indifferent to the historical event as Butlmann 
is toward the historical Jesus. In the same vein, we have already 
noted Bultmann's acceptance of the fact that various New Testament 
passages seem to attempt a proof of the Resurrection. 
5) Related to this, we may note that one of the most frequent 
criticisms of Bultmann is that he seems to ignore the continuity 
between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith. It is of con- 
siderable interest that, aware of the dangers of being committed to 
the worship of a 'de-historicized' Lord, some of Bultmann's own 
followers have explored the relation of the Christ of faith to the 
historical Jesus of Nazareth. One of the most prominent among these 
has been Günther Bornkamm who claims that the records which we have 
do not entitle us to be resigned or sceptical about the historical 
Jesus, and that "we must look for the history in the kerygma. "85 
Bornkamm and others have proceeded to do this with some success. 
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Bssed on these studies we must say that, at the least, the question 
of the relationship of faith to history is an open one. 
But let us be more specific with regard to Bultmann. We can 
say without equivocation that there is in his work a real contin- 
uity between the historical Jesus and the kerygma. Jesus is the 
source, i. e., the Word of God found its beginning in the historical 
Jesus. The redemptive (or eschatological) significance of the cross/ 
Resurrection event is its continuing historical occurrence (it 
happens to me in my historicity) which originated in the past histor- 
ical event: the crucifixion of Jesus. In other words, we may say 
that the Word in which God now confronts us is the proclamation 
inaugerated with Jesus. Yet we may look to an important statement 
by Bultmann in which the difference between the situation of Jesus' 
disciples and us today is made clearer. "For them (the first 
disciples) the cross was the cross of Him with whom they had lived 
in personal intercourse. The cross was an experience of their own 
lives. It presented them with a question and it disclosed to them 
its meaning. But for us, this personal connection cannot be repro- 
duced. For us the cross cannot disclose its own meaning: it is an 
event of the past. We can never recover it as an event 
in our own 
lives. All we know of it is derived from historical report. But 
the New Testament does not proclaim Jesus Christ in this way. The 
meaning of the cross is not disclosed 
from the life of Jesus as a 
figure of past history, a life which needs to be reproduced by 
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historical research. On the contrary, Jesus 
as the crucified; He is also risen form the 
to say that the actual historical event was 
it also the existential event it cannot be 
same direct Word only in the "proclamation" 
orary kerygma. 
is not proclaimed merely 
dead. " 86 Buitmann seems 
for those who experienced 
for us. We can find the 
of the event, the contemp- 
The question to be asked of Bultmann is: can his theology be 
correctly interpreted by the insistence that the event consists not 
of what happened in Jesus but what happened "in" the hearers of His 
Word? Bultmann would most surely deny this. 
87 Yet some doubts 
still persist in the reading and one feels inclined to respond to 
Bultmann that even though we may not be able to know very completely 
the Jesus of history, what is known is of more importance to his- 
torical persons than Bultmann's viewpoint seems to allow. Can we deny 
the fact that we are both persons of faith and of history? We ask 
questions of history and are thereby 
historically limited. Even 
though Bultmann does not totally deny us the Jesus of history, it is 
a fact that many have 
felt impoverished by the wholesale historical 
reduction of His relativity 
to faith. 
nomythologization: 
We can say that the debate over this issue began at the time of 
the publication of the essay "New Testament and Mythology" in 1941.88 
It must also be said that Bultmann has, if anything, been theologically 
consistent and 
that he had been preaching, teaching and publishing 
along this 
line for two decades. 89 We shall, however, look to this 
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article (which is one of the main insights into the Resurrection) 
for our understanding of Bultmann's concept of myth. If Bultmann 
claims that the Resurrection is an event to be, "demythologized" 
what precisely does he mean? 
Bultmann defines myth as "an expression of man's conviction 
that the origin and purpose of the world in which he lives are to be 
sought not within it but beyond it - that is, beyond the realm of 
known and tangible reality - and that this realm is perpetually 
dominated and menaced by those mysterious powers which are its source 
and limit. Myth is also an expression of man's awareness that he is 
not lord of his own being. It expresses his sense of dependence not 
only within the visible world, but more especially on those forces 
which hold sway beyond the confines of the known. Finally, myth 
expresses man's belief that in this state of dependence he can be 
90 
delivered from the forces within the invisible world. " 
Thus Bultmann defines myth in terms of its purpose, which was to 
express man's own understanding of himself in the world in which 
he 
lived. The three-fold purpose of myth in the New Testament was to 
express man's belief that 
(1) the origin and purpose of the world 
are not to be sought within 
it but beyond it; (2) man "is not lord 
of his own being" since he 
is dependent on things both seen and un- 
seen; (3) man can be delivered 
from those powers. 
The real purpose of myth can be understood then as man's desire 
to speak of transcendent powers. It is man's way of talking about 
God, or the other-worldly, in human, this-worldly terms. In Jesus 
0 
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Christ and Mythology Bultmann reaffirms this notion of man speaking 
in tangible terms of other-worldly powers, and in the process 
giving them objective reality. 
9 
This is of real importance to 
Bultmann's theology since the mythology portrays a "certain under- 
standing of human existence. "92 
Bultmann believes that the New Testament writings have come to 
us wrapped in an essentially Babylonian mythological world view and 
terminology, which is both obsolete and impossible for modern man 
93 
to accept. The world is viewed in the New Testament as a three- 
tiered structure of heaven, earth and hell. The earth is the scene 
of supernatural activity focused, on the one hand, on God and his 
angels and, on the other hand, of Satan and his demons. These super- 
natural forces intervene in the course of nature and directly upon 
the minds of all humanity. Miracles are common. The Christian 
message (kerygma) proclaims, 
in the language of mythology, that: 
r 
"In the fulness of time God sent forth his Son, a pre-existent divine 
Being, who appears on earth as a man. He dies the death of a sinner 
on the cross and makes atonement 
for the sins of men. His resurrection 
marks the beginning of the cosmic catastrophe. 
Death, the consequence 
of Adam's sin, 
is abolished, and the daemonic forces are deprived of 
their power. The risen Christ 
is exalted to the right hand of God 
in, heaven and made 'Lord' and 'King. ' He will come again on the 
clouds of heaven to complete 
the work of redemption, and the resurr- 
ection and 
judgement of men will follow. Sin, suffering and death 
will then be 
finally abolished. All this is to happen very soon; 
St. Paul thinks that he himself will live to see it. " 
94 
indeed, 
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Modern man has, however, inherited a world view determined 
more by science than by mythology, and it is no longer possible 
for him to hold the New Testament world view seriously. For the 
contemporary world view nature and history are a closed system, 
that is, dependent upon an observable cause-and-effect sequence. 
Myth is the expression that outside powers interfere with this 
normal cycle, which Bultmann concludes, is abhorrent to the modern 
Weltanschauung. Scientific understanding of nature makes belief in 
evil spirits no longer tenable. 
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Likewise Bultmann rejects the 
miracles of the New Testament, observing that modern man's attempt 
to explain their historicity by appealing, for instance, to nervous 
disorders or hypnotic effects only serves to underline the fact. He 
further states that: "the mythical eschatology is untenable for the 
simple reason that the parousia of Christ never took place as the 
New Testament expected. History did not come to an end and, as every 
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schoolboy knows, it will continue to run its course. " 
Not only has modern science challenged the mythological view, 
but modern man's understanding of himself has also demanded a new 
interpretation. This involves the New Testament notion of the 
Resurrection. 
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Bultmann's solution to this challenge of the modern world to 
the mythological world view is demythologizing. Bultmann initially 
points out that this does not mean the complete elimination of the 
kerygma, in fact, we cannot eliminate a of the kerygma for "we 
cannot save the kerygma 
by selecting some of its features and sub- 
tracting others. .. if we accept one idea, we must accept everything 
98 
which the New Testament 
has to say. " 
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Reductionism of the kergyma was, for Bultmann, one of the major 
faults of the liberal theologians who, in the case of Harnack for 
instance, reduced the kerygma to a few basis principles of religion 
and ethics. 
99 It is Bultmann's contention that the entire kerygma 
has come to us intertwined with the mythological and that they can 
not and should not be separate. But mythology must be interpreted. 
Demythologizing is a hermeneutical method, a method of interpreting 
the text. 
100 
Bultmann gives a rationale for his program of demythologizing 
which includes his argument that there have been previous attempts 
in interpretation similar to his own. The New Testament itself in- 
vites this kind of criticism, in light of the fact that some of its 
features are actually contradictory. 
101 But he cites the early Church 
attempts at allegory, modern Liberalism, and the History of Religions 
School as examples of "demythologizing" which dealt unsuccessfully 
with the problem of myth and 
interpretation. 
An "existentialist interpretation" is the only solution. Having 
acknowledged that 
"the mythology of the New Testament is in essence 
that of Jewish apocalyptic102 he concludes that beneath these layers 
there was a basic understanding of human existence. It is his belief 
that, with the help of Heidegger's existential analysis of human 
existence, 
103 we have an adequate means for interpreting the kerygma 
so that contemporary man can understand 
it in terms of the meaning 
of his existence. 
This "existentialist interpretation" is an important concept 
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for Bultmann and his position can be made clearer at this stage 
by noting briefly two concepts of fundamental importance for the 
existentialist understanding of human existence. 
104 
The first of these concepts may be seen by comparing the 
significant differences involved in the mere 'putting of the question' 
of human existence or of its relationship to God. For instance, to 
ask whether there is a God is perhaps a common question, yet our 
reasons for asking may make all the difference in our understanding 
of the answer. The question can be asked, for instance, (1) out of 
academic or speculative concern, or (2) out of an existential concern 
by someone at the end of his moral and spiritual resources. If both 
find the God they ask after, one has found the metaphysical being 
which supports the universe, the other has found the God of love 
and concern which supports the 
individual. Bultmann's concern is 
to find the latter, for he is seeking the answer to the question of 
human existence. 
105 His concern is about God in so far as He is 
significant to man's existence. 
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When we speak of God, we are in 
reality speaking of a new understanding of man's own existence 
in 
relation to God. Thus, 
theology and Biblical interpretation, center 
in the question of man's existence. 
The second concept has to do with the context of ideas expressed 
in terminology. This has come to Bultmann through the Begrifflichkeit 
(conceptualization) of Heidegger. 
107 Existentialism has had to dev- 
elop categories appropriate 
to the subject-matter, for traditional 
categories 
have proven inadequate. Heidegger's term for the basic 
constitution of the 
being of man, i. e., being-in-the-world, must not 
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be seen, for instance, to refer to spatial relationships but rather 
to the existential relationship of man who is bound up with the 
108 
world in his existence. Existentialist understanding seeks to 
show thus how the being of man differs from the being of other 
objects in nature and how he must be differently understood and 
described. Bultmann, as an existentialist theologian, approaches the 
Scriptures with the question of human existence in the forefront. 
His task has thus been to approach Scriptural terminology with an 
appropriate Begrifflichkeit, and thus to interpret Christian doctrine 
into suitable categories of Christian-existentialist thought. 
Questions Arising 
Several criticisms directed toward Bultmann have centered on 
the ambiguity of his concept of myth. We may note Ian Henderson, for 
instance, who claims that "it seems fair to say that Bultmann groups 
together a number of not particularly homogenous elements under the 
109 
heading of the mythical. " We must agree with this to some extent. 
The initial section of Bultmann's "New Testament and Mythology" 
is sufficient to illumine the problem. Here Buitmann applies the 
term "mythical" to (a) the primitive Church's world-view, (b) the 
event of redemption and (c) to Biblical language. We may note init- 
ially that (a) and (b) are not co-ordinate (i. e., "view" and "event"), 
yet "myth" is the term assigned to each. 
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Furthermore, Bultmann's 
usage of (a) and (b) leaves one with the impression that these are 
tenuous and insubstantial entities. We find ourselves asking: are 
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are these the kinds of things that could actually happen? Yet 
regarding (c) Biblical language, we are left with a different 
impression. Now we must begin to consider the possibility that 
the problem is not so much with the views or events themselves 
but with the manner in which we are to use or interpret them. It 
would seem that Bultmann intends an ontological sense of mythical 
when he speaks of (a) and (b), but a linguistic or interpretive 
sense when he is speaking of the content of the kerygma. We may 
thus see that Bultmann is-vague in defining his problem and leaves 
the reader (at this point in the essay) to make some rather diffi- 
cult and relatively unenlightened judgements. 
John Macquarrie has labeled Bultmann's use of myth "a very 
111 
confused one" in two ways. First, it "is scarcely a wide enough 
definition, for.... there are secular myths, such as the Nazi myth 
of the masterrace and the Marxist myth of the classless paradise 
into which the divine does not enter at all. " 
712 Secondly, Bultmann's 
view of myth seems incapable of accounting for his contention that 
the world picture of the new Testament is a mythical one. "What 
does he mean by myth in this sentence? ", Macquarrie asks. "He goes 
on. . . to speak of the 
flat earth under the vault of the firmanent - 
in other words, the Babylonian cosmology. But this is not myth 
within the sense of his own formal definition. It is primitive 
science or primitive world-view, not a description of the divine 
in terms of this world, but a description of this world itself as 
113 
these early thinkers imagined it to be. " 
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It seems to us, however, that Schubert Ogden has answered 
these charges satisfactorily. 
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Regarding the former, Ogden points 
out Bultmann's rejection of any "wider" definition, especially 
regarding simply an "ideological" sense. It would certainly seem 
that such applications of myth regarding Bultmann would be super- 
fluous to his objectives and we agree with Ogden that this hardly 
warrants the charge of "confusion" it brings from Macquarrie. As 
reluctant as we would be to counter any criticism which would impel 
Bultmann to develop his terms/themes, it must be admitted that he 
seems quite guiltless here. 
With regard to the latter argument, Ogden recalls "Bultmann's 
concession of only limited validity to the claim that myth is really 
primitive science. " 
15 This Babylonian cosmology, in itself not 
necessarily mythical, becomes so when used in the realm of mythical 
thinking, for then the upper and lower stories become the realms of 
either divine or demonic character. This second contention must, 
we concede, still be open. to question, but it would seem as if Mac- 
quarrie can only maintain his argument by imposing on Bultmann's view 
a distinction that Bultmann explicitly denies, and we think justi- 
fiably. 
Let us move on to the last question with which we shall be con- 
cerned in this section on mythology, and one which will focus on 
Bultmann's view of the Resurrection, namely , his concept of de- 
mythologizing as self-understanding. We shall allow Barth to put 
the question. 
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"I can see that we can only interpret the New Testament aright 
if we share in the life of its message and in the obedience which 
responds to it. I can see, too, that this sharing takes the form 
of interpreting the message and my own faith as one who hears or 
reads it. But I cannot see why this should involve an act of self- 
understanding on my part. That hardly seems the right way of putting 
it. The message may bring me face to face with God and with myself 
as the one who hears it. It may lead to the obedience of faith. 
But how astonishing then and how incomprehensible I would find myself! 
.... How can this come about when 
in actual fact I am engaged in turn- 
ing away from myself and looking to where the message calls me to 
look? Is that what Bultmann really means to say? I should like to 
6 
know, for it is just this that I cannot be certain about. "1, " 
In spite of Barth's tentativeness here, we suspect that he is 
quite certain of his understanding of Bultmann. Barth has already, 
in Volume I of the Dogmatics, attacked Bultmann's philosophical pre- 
suppositions regarding the possibility of dogmatic prolegomenal17Barth 
criticizes Bultmann here for his concept of a Vorverständnis (pre- 
understanding) of revelation which Barth understands to mean an 
"ontological existentiell capacity" for faith, 
l through which we 
gain a preliminary understanding of Christian language, theology, 
and especially of exegesis. Barth claims that Bultmann begins with 
a general ontology or anthropology, with an existentiell "poten- 
tiality distinct form the actuality of revelation" which is 
"universally human, of which this special thing can be claimed sub- 
sequently as the realization. "119 
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Barth, for his part, denies that there is "an ontological 
and existentiell human capacity for the Church's being. " That being 
is rather a pure act of God "intelligible only in itself and of 
itself, not a deed that anthropology can understand beforehand. " 
120 
In summary, then, there is nothing pre-divine in man, no general 
potentiality for knowing God before He makes Himself known to us. 
121 
Andre Malet has attempted to resolve this seemingly fundamental 
difference between Bultmann and Barth as a misunderstanding by 
Barth. Bultmann, he claims, admits no "existentiell" capacity for 
faith in man, "only an existential capacity, by which he simply means 
that in order to receive revelation one must be a man and not a 
stone. . 
122 What Bultmann has proposed, it is claimed, is rather an 
"ontological" capacity for revelation, which is no more nor less than 
what Barth himself has proposed. There exists within man, as Malet 
understands Buitmann, only an ontological capacity for understanding 
revelation -a capacity which a stone (or any lesser 
being than man) 
does not have. 
Malet's view seem adequate to us to detect in these two theo- 
logians basis for an ultimate synthesis in a fundamental area. It 
is an area too central to our understanding of Bultmann to pass 
quickly, therefore let us attempt, albeit briefly, to place 
Bultmann 
in some sort of philosophical and historical context in this regard 
to attempt to ascertain the meaning of his thought about 
'self-under- 
123 
standing. 
' 
The Christian existentialist tradition is almost unbroken since 
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Augustine, whose philosophy was a metaphysic of personal and 
religious experience. It rests, to a great extent, on immediate 
self-consciousness: "I am and know and will; I am knowing and 
willing; I know myself to be and to will; I will to be and to know. "124 
This self-knowledge is unique because it is known from within; all 
other things are known form without. Thus, the mind apprehends 
itself by direct and immediate awareness. But this immediate self- 
consciousness (and here we come to the essence of Augustine's theism) 
is not a conscousness of the self alone, for we also realize that 
before we were, we were not. Our self-consciousness is the self- 
consciousness of the Creator-God-consciousness. Thus he can state: 
"In order to know God do not go outside yourself. The dwelling- 
place of truth is the inner man. And if you discover your own 
nature as subject to change then go beyond that nature. .. Press 
on, therefore, towards the source from which the light of reason 
itself is kindled. "125 The insistence that Christian theism is 
`primarily a metaphysic of self-consciousness (rather than a meta- 
physic of nature, i. e., the Aristotelian, Thomist tradition) thus has 
roots in Augustine. 
The next great expositor of this metaphysic was Anselm, with 
his apparent paradox that Christian philosophy is fides quarens 
'intellectum. W. H. V. Reade has summed up Anselm's teaching on this 
point with the following statement: "The Church. .. had not invented 
new intellectual 
instruments, but rather proclaimed the advent of a 
new spiritual experience, 
itself the condition of understanding 
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the meaning of life. Mere rationalism. . . could originate 
nothing; for reason. .. depends for its material on a higher mode 
of experience. " 
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Behind both Augustine and Anselm in this regard lies a thought 
which Plato had broached centuries earlier. If all knowledge is in 
principle self-knowledge , drawn by reason out of the dim and con- 
fused sub-conscious mind into the clear light of the understanding 
then, in effect, the characteristic product of philosophical inquiry 
is, not an item of knowledge which we did not previously have, but a 
clearer apprehension of a truth of which we were in some sense aware 
before the inquiry began. 
127 R. G. Collingwood has pointed out that 
this "flexible reversibility" is what chiefly distinguishes phil- 
osophical from scientific forms of argument` and inquiry. "Irreversi- 
bility is a necessary feature of exact science; it can only argue 
-forward from principles to conclusions, and can never turn round and 
, argue backwards from conclusions to principles. .. philosophy does 
not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of 
which we were simply ignorant, 
but brings us to know in a different 
way things which we already 
knew in some other way. .. Establishing 
a proposition in philosophy, then, means not transfering 
it fro['% 
the class of things unknown to the class of things known, but making 
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it known in a different and better way. " 
Christian philosophy for Anselm, states J. V. L. Casserly, "did 
not mean a dialectical process which proceeded to 
demonstrate cer- 
tain 'truths, ' Rather it discovers our inward experience of God 
given in and through our self-consciousness, to be supremely 
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revealing and significant among all other experiences, and then 
goes on to interpret all other experience in terms of it. God is 
not known through nature but nature is known in God. " 
129 
. Kierkegaard also 
follows this Augustinian tradition in his real- 
ization that all self-consciousness is essentially creature-conscious- 
ness. "The exceptional is a particular relation to God. .. It is the 
God-relationship that makes a man a man. " 
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According to Kierkegaard 
we. have not probed our self-consciousness to its depths until we have 
discovered our responsibility to the Other, who both transcends, and 
is known in, our self-consciousness. To use Kierkegaard's phrase, 
an "existing individual" is one who realizes that he is not merely 
a movement in the world process, nor one item among the infinite in 
the cosmos, but rather that he stands in a unique relation to the 
eternal located 
in time. Kierkegaard thus comes through to a genuine 
objectivity, but to which intense subjectivity is the only possible 
means of approach. We have to choose between "existing subjectively 
with passion" or "objectively 
in distraction. " 131 
Others could be mentioned in this existentialist line, but the 
foregoing is sufficient to give some idea of an historically basic 
supposition of this movement, 
that of "immediate self-consciousness" 
- the very 
thing of which Barth accuses Bultmann. Without a doubt, 
132 
Bultmann stands within this tradition of Christian existentialism, 
and it is a 
long and distinguished tradition. The premise that we 
have pointed out, that self-consciousness implies a creature-conscious- 
ness, and thus a 
knowledge of God, is basic to existentialist under- 
standing and 
becomes the necessary postulate for Bultmann's claim 
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that "to speak of God is to speak of myself. °133 It by no means 
follows that God is not outside the believer, for as Bultmann claims, 
134 
faith cannot be interpreted as a purely psychological event. 
Nor is there any reason to claim, so far as we can find, that the 
above stated premise constitutes any theistic negation, or statement 
as to where God is not. It is true that such a theology speaks of 
a knowledge of God which is possible on the basis of a universal 
revelation (general revelation) in the human consciousness. Barth's 
denial of this is well known. Yet may it not be maintained that 
whenever man knows God - whether through Jesus Christ or through a 
"general" revelational sense - we are dealing with God's initiative 
and grace? Barth is -repelled by a theology which, it is claimed, 
speaks "of a man as believer, apart from God. "135 But this is most 
certainly not the case, either with the existential tradition or 
with Bultmann. We 
find here none of the self-centered scepticism, 
termed solipsism, which would 
deem the self to be the only object 
of true existence. 
But it is the most important existence in the 
sense that all 
knowledge is a kind of revelation, and all creaturely 
experience 
implies a more profound intercourse with the Creator. 
our "inwardness" moves us 
into the light of day and, in making us 
aware of all that 
is involved in being human, makes us aware at the 
Same time of our 
dependence upon God, in whom, most literally, "we 
live and move and have our 
being. " 
In the past few pages we have attempted a preliminary under- 
standing of 
Bultmann's concepts of the nature of the historicity 
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of the Christ-event (or more particularly, our relation to that 
event and how we today are incorporated in it), and demythologization, 
including the concept of revelation and self-understanding. This has 
been a "preliminary" understanding because we have so far talked 
about these concepts with a degree of abstraction. We may state our 
aim for the following section; to build on and to enhance our under- 
standing of these two concepts in the closest relation to the approp- 
riate (Resurrectional) section of the text of the essay "New Testament 
and Mythology. , 
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Bultmann's Understanding of "Myth" and "Faith and History" in light 
of the Resurrection. 
Bultmann's discussion of the Resurrection is primarily focused 
on its relation to myth. He asks of us initially: "is it not a myth- 
ological event pure and simple? 
" Bultmann has come to a more or less 
final description of myth only a few pages earlier. We have learned 
there that myth must be interpreted. 
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What Bultmann seems to be 
suggesting is that myth 
is not to be interpreted primarily by dis- 
covering some alternative 
form of wording with which to give it 
expression 
(the normal meaning of the term). The crux lies in 
determining the meaning of the purpose which the myth is attempting 
to serve. Thus the goal of 
his essay comes into focus, that being a 
re-definition of what constitutes 
the historical. It is in light of 
this that Bultmann can state: 
"obviously it (i. e., the Resurrection) 
is not an event of past history with a self-evident meaning. 
Bultmann goes on to make several statements of a more general 
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nature, starting with the statement that (1) the cross and 
Resurrection form a single, individual cosmic event. The Resurrection 
is not a subsequent event, chronologically succeeding the cross, 
which cancels or reverses it. The cross 'wants no reversal, for in 
this event lies victory over the power of death. Butlmann has told 
us nothing novel here, although in the reading its starkness is char- 
acteristically somewhat jarring. We find ourselves forced back upon 
our previous interpretations of the cross-Resurrection relationship 
and, quite possibly, upon our disposition towards seeing the 
Resurrection as a great "rescue" relative to Calvary. Was it not the 
cause for the rise in faith of the disciples, a faith destroyed by 
the gloom and defeat of Calvary? How do we come to believe the 
saving efficacy of the cross? These questions will, we trust, be 
answered, yet Bultmann's only concern initially is to stress that 
the cross and Resurrection are not contrasting events. Nothing is 
bestowed upon the cross through the REsurrection, no vindication is 
forthcoming. For "Jesus was already the Son of God" when he died, 
and this needs no vindication, no enhancement. 
138 We must see the 
two as one, bringing in their unity both judgement and the possibility 
of authentic life (see above, pp. 4,12f. ). 
(2) If this is true, the Resurrection cannot be seen then as a 
"proof" of the eschatological significance of the cross. There is 
nothing to turn 
the head of the sceptic. We must note here that 
Bultmann is leading us (rather subtly) farther away from the Resurr- 
ection as 
"an event of past history with a self-evident meaning". 
It, is "historic" (Geschichtlich) rather than "historical"(historisch) 
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in its emphasis (see above, pp. 5,12f. ). To see the Resurrection 
as such an historical fact might prompt many to see it as such a 
proof. We know this from Scripture. (Acts 17: 31; Lk. 24: 39-43; 
I Cor. 15: 3-8). Yet Bultmann finds this practice deplorable and 
a literal bodily Resurrection from the dead "utterly inconceivable. " 
At any rate we would be going too far to say that such an histori- 
cal (historisch) fact would actually constitute proof of the value 
of the cross, a nd that it might thus be seen as the objective "vin- 
dication" of the cross event. For it could in no way express Jesus' 
"eschatological" character, much less vindicate it. But this is to 
deal in speculation for Bultmann, for this is simply not the nature, 
nor is it the purpose, of the Resurrection. It asserts a great deal 
more. 
(3) The Resurrection, like the eschatological (salvific) value 
of the cross of Christ, is itself an article of faith (not something 
empirically observable, or historically demonstrable) and so it cannot 
be used to prove another article of faith. It is thus not something 
to believe on, but to believe in. It is of the same 'essence' as 
the cross since botha re faith events. Thus Bultmann's claim that 
the Resurrection is "the eschatological event par excellence". What 
he now says of the term "eschatological" follows what we have already 
noted in regard to its usage (see above, pp. 4,13). In Christ all 
died; and in Him are all raised. Now they share newness of life 
with Him, being dead to sin. In this new life, the Resurrection life, 
, they enjoy freedom 
from sin. For this is not a future-oriented prom- 
'-ise, but a present tense reality. 
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Scriptural evidence is produced next to show that in everyday 
life we participate not only in the death of Christ (Rom. 6: 11) 
but also in his Resurrection (II Cor. 4: 10f.; Rom. 13: 12f.; Phil. 3: 
10; pp. 40,41). Thus the Resurrection is not a-mythological event 
whose purpose is to vindicate the cross, but an article of faith 
just as the cross itself. Bultmann reaches a crescendo (indeed the 
apex of his whole discussion of the Resurrection thus far) in his 
statement that: "faith in the resurrection is really the same thing 
as faith in the saving efficacy of the cross. " Yet in spite of a 
long prelude, Bultmann feels the need for further elucidation as to 
what he is really saying- here. We may wish he had not, for he 
states: "The saving efficacy of the cross is not derived from the 
fact that it is the cross of Christ: it is the cross of Christ because 
it has this saving efficacy. " This is a difficult statement (it seems 
to have become a considerable source of frustration for Barth - see 
KM, II, p. 100) and one that bears some further consideration. What 
is Bultmann really saying here? Let us attempt to summarize and 
interpret what we have seen so far in order to clarify this state- 
meet. 
To understand the Resurrection of Jesus as a 'miracle' (an 
objective, earthly phenomenon) 
is to mythologize the divine. This 
is the way it is presented to us in the New Testament. Of itself, 
a resurrection in this world no more manifests God than 
do any 
phenomena that we might call normal. They simply 
belong to the realm 
of 'data, ' of things which man controls or objectifies 
(see above, 
139 
pp. 8,9). In other words they belong to the realm of sin. 
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How could such an event, supposing it did happen, express the 
eschatological character of Jesus, much less vindicate it? Bultmann 
strongly believes it could not. 
Thus the Resurrection cannot be as the. Easter narratives describe 
for, as an eschatological event, it asserts a great deal more than 
the return of a dead man to earthly life. Its essence is found in 
the term Geschichte rather than Historie (see above, pp. if. ). Christ's 
Resurrection means judgement upon the world, annihilation of sin, 
and the promise of authentic (historic) existence. Before Christ the 
world in sin is one of radical self-assertion and willful pride, and 
is cut off from God, at enmity with him. Thanks to Christ everything 
is changed. The world becomes God's creation once more, capable of 
faith and love, of authentic life. 
For this type of transformation to take place, the risen Christ 
must be different from the One whom we meet in a superficial reading 
of'the Gospels. He must be God's eschatological (saving) deed (see 
above, p. 13). To believe 
in Jesus because he supposedly returned 
to earthly life is only to believe in oneself; there is no real other- 
ness except that which saves 
by becoming man's Verständnis. 140 Says 
Malet (paraphrasing Bultmann): "The risen Christ is only such if he 
raises me from the dead; as raising me from the dead he is the risen 
141 
Christ. " Otherwise he is only an apparition, an extension of myself 
like any other objective thing. To quote Malet again: "It is just 
because Jesus did not objectively rise form the dead that he really 
142 
(eschat ologically) rose 
from the dead. " Bultmann is seeking to 
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tell us that Jesus is only man's saviour and Lord as long as he 
is the risen Christ. As he states in Theology of the New Testament: 
"The meaning of Jesus' resurrection is not that he is translated into 
the beyond, but that he is exalted to the status of Lord. "143 
Now we can begin to see why Bultmann claims that the Resurrection 
is nothing else than the meaning of the cross, its underlying reality. 
A crucifixion is only that. Scores of persons have been crucified. 
What causes the crucifixion of Jesus to be different is the meaning 
of his death (the Geschichte aspect). Detached objectivity sees, at 
most, "the tragic end of a great man. " For the historian "there 
can be little doubt that Jesus was crucified as a messianic prophet, 
like other agitators. " 
lntl For the unbeliever, the crucifixion was 
simply the death of a religious 
idealist. Brute facts thus tell us 
little; their essence is in their meaning. 
Bultmann's much maligned phrase that "the saving efficacy of 
the cross is not derived from the fact that it is the cross of Christ: 
it is the cross of Christ because it has this saving efficacy" is, as 
we understand it, meant to stress the primacy of meaning over object- 
ive fact. It is the inevitable outcome of all that has been said 
before by Bultmann regarding this primacy. The true meaning (being) 
of the cross 
is its divine meaning (being), which is conveyed by the 
Resurrection, and can only be perceived by the 'self-understanding' 
of the believer 
(the antithesis of objectivity). The cross is the 
cross of Christ 
insofar as it is God's eschatological deed (hidden 
from objective view). The Resurrection is the Resurrection of Christ 
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insofar as it is God's eschatological deed (Hidden from objective 
view). It is not the resuscitation of a corpse. 
Continuing now in the text, we find ourselves at last confronted 
by questions of tremendous importance: "How do we come to believe in 
, 
the cross as eschatological event? How does Christ encounter us at 
the level of our historicity? " Bultmann is firm, there is only one 
answer. The cross is presented to us in preaching as the cross of 
the Christ who has died and been raised again (see above, p. 13). 
"The faith of Easter is. .. faith in the word of preaching" (p. 41); 
faith, that is, in the Word of God. This has been a statement of 
. some controversy 
regarding the faith/historical aspect of Bultmann's 
theology. 
At the basis of this statement, as we might anticipate, is the 
position that the Easter faith is not something that can rest on 
historically verifiable foundations. It is rather something that is 
created in the actual encounter of the sinner with the living Word 
of God. We are challenged as to whether we will decide against it 
or for it. Bultmann does not mean to say that the entire meaning 
of Easter comes down to the 
impact of its preaching upon the hearer 
here and now. Let us remember that this quotation has come as the 
, answer 
to the question: how do we come to believe in the efficacy 
of the cross for us? Bultmann's answer is thus that we are brought 
to this belief by the hearing of the message concerning the cruci- 
fied and resurrected Christ. This belief (faith) comes when we 
receive the preached Word; 
it does not come through historical 
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verification. If we understand this controversial sentence rightly 
then, it espouses the claim that the Easter faith is received in the 
context of the preached Word and is not apprehended through man's 
claim to knowledge, and not that faith in the Resurrection is no more 
than faith in the power of preaching. 
This is likewise the thought behind Bultmann's statement that 
"the Resurrection itself is not an event of past history (Historie)" 
(pp. 38,42). We must not take this to mean that the Resurrection 
did not happen in some form (although it sometimes seems that Bult- 
mann gives us every reason to think that it did not; see above, pp. 14f. ). 
This is perhaps a result of his unabating stress in safeguarding the 
Resurrection from the scientific-historical approach. We can and 
must believe, however, that something happened (see above, p. 1g). 
145 
This is resolved for Bultmann swiftly and cleanly (too cleanly? ) in 
the claim of an "act of God in which the redemptive event of the 
cross is completed. " This "act of God, " whatever else it may signify, 
is the disciple's insight into the mystery of the cross. It is 
identical with their faith. It is the focus of divine encounter and 
realization in the disciples. 
Why does Bultmann not pursue doggedly so important a concept? 146 
This question almost seems to be anticipated by him, for its answer 
is at least partially given. "We cannot buttress our own faith in 
the resurrection by that of the first disciples and so eliminate the 
element of risk which faith in the resurrection always 
involves. " 
(p. 42; note the Kierkegaardian "element of risk" from Fear and 
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Trembling). And, at any rate, the nature of this "act of God" 
is beyond our knowing in any objective sense. It is known only in 
the confrontation with the living Lord. Yet Bultmann is quick to 
point out that we are at no loss here when compared with the dis- 
ciples, for the apostolic preaching is itself a part of the eschat- 
ological event of redemption. This is not difficult when we recall 
the meaning of "eschatological" which has been expounded by Bultmann. 
The term is applied to those events through which divine salvation is 
mediated to us. While emphasizing that the salvific character of 
the Resurrection (and the multitude of associated events) is not to 
be taken as scientifically provable, Bultmann does not attempt to cut 
it entirely loose from that kind of history. The event of the cross 
"inaugurates" both the judgement and the salvation of the world. The 
preached Word carries this 
inauguration to the conclusion which God 
designed for it, by making that eschatological event of cross and 
Resurrection present here and now. 
We must continue to look at Bultmann's theology of the Resurr- 
ection, for now we shall 
do so from the perspective of critique. 
Questions Arising 
One of the more interesting debates in modern theology has been 
that between Bartha nd Bultmann concerning the Resurrection. Yet once 
Barth's critical analysis of Bultmann 
147 (which we must see in our 
next chapter) 
is passed one may feel that 'there is nothing new under 
the sun' critically speaking. Most of Barth's arguments seem to 
be 
echoed, 
in one form or another, with more or less acumen and penetration, 
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by the subsequent critics of Bultmann. Mindful of a comparison of 
the two ahead then, let us approach Bultmann's theology of the 
Resurrection here in a manner that we hope is at least somewhat 
fresh. 
We may begin with a comment on Bultmann's numerous critics. 
Most of the questions asked of Bultmann, i. e., regarding the "mythical" 
nature of the Resurrection, or its "tenuous" attachment with Historie, 
seem to have a common denominator. We may put it this way. When 
Bultmann says that "the belief in the resurrection of Christ and the 
belief that in the proclamation of the Word Christ himself -yes, God 
himself - speaks, are identical"148 is he making a claim that genuinely 
sets out the essential significance of the Resurrection for the 
Christian faith? Or, to rephrase, is it sufficient for Christian 
faith that the understanding of the Resurrection is the understanding 
of an existential-historical (geschichtlich) as opposed to objective- 
historical (historisch) or eschatological event? 
We must agree with Bultmann that it is exceedingly difficult to 
attempt to prove the Resurrection and any attempts to reach an objective 
understanding of it (to prove the empty tomb, etc. ) stand to bypass the 
essential point. The Resurrection, to be understood as saving event, 
must be understood existentially. This is an important contribution. 
As far as faith is concerned, the Resurrection is present. It cannot 
be primarily understood as objective history, but rather as the 
present possibility of new life, authentic existence, whichr ests on 
my decision. This is the meaning of the existential-historical 
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understanding of the Resurrection as eschatological (salvific) 
event. It reaches me through its eschatological nature, as an authen- 
tic, repeatable possibility. 
It seems that we must then answer "yes" to our question. The 
essential significance of the Resurrection for the Christian faith 
is set out by Bultmann. This is true because, as Bultmann portrays 
it, the Resurrection is of essential eschatological significance for 
the Christian faith. And our faith begins, it can be claimed, with 
the present possibility which Christ offers in the proclamation of 
the Word. From this we infer that 'something' happened once, although 
precise attempts to discover what that 'something' was are, in some 
degree, hopeless and of secondary relevance to our faith. 
Yet our approval is tinged with a reservation. In spite of what 
we have said, must the objective-historical understanding of the 
Resurrection be so arbitrarily dismissed as it is in Bultmann? Can 
the Resurrection not possibly be understood also in fact initially, on 
objective-historical grounds? 
It seems clear that Bultmann's cursive dismissal of this under- 
standing of the Resurrection is not directly due to any existentialist 
influence. Indeed existentialism (if we understand correctly) has 
nothing to say at all about such a possibility. This prior assumption 
of Bultmann's has been criticized as a holdover of liberal modernism 
which, it has been claimed, is both pseudo-scientific and obsolete. 
149 
Whether this is true or not, the miracle, it is decided a priori by 
Bu ltmann, has no place in this scientific age because, as we are told, 
modern man will not accept it. "It is impossible to use electric 
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light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and 
surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New 
Testament world of daemons and spirits"(p. 5). Bultmann has no doubt 
articulated the feelings of many Christians. Yet can we ignore the 
fact that in this scientific age thousands of persons go to Lourdes 
each year, and that in the last decade every major denomination (at 
least in the U. S. ) has seen an increased interest in spiritual healing 
and supernatural manifestation? John MacQuarrie has claimed that "many 
of us have rn difficulty both in appreciating the developments of modern 
thought and the advance of medical science, and in believing that our 
Lord had a power of spiritual healing - without, of course, necessarily 
believing in demons! . 
150 It would seem then that the question of what 
modern man will believe is, at least, an open one and that, more likely, 
Bultmann's universal judgement is somewhat deficient. But to return to 
our question, even if there is a willingness to consider the Resurrec- 
tion on objective-historical grounds (as Mirakel) is such a willingness 
justified? 
As we have seen, for Bultmann, the historisch Resurrection, the 
Mirakel, is of very little importance. It is in fact detrimental in 
many respects to the Christian faith. The word of God is sufficient; 
there is no need for belief in such supernatural events. And yet the 
question of the relationship of 'signs' to faith is not an easy one, 
because the data seem to look in two different directions. Bultmann 
himself states that "the 'signs' reveal Jesus' glory (Jn. 2: 11; cf. 9: 8; 
11: 4), and the disbelief that refuses to be convinced by so many mira- 
cles is reproved (12: 37). On the other hand, however, Jesus says in 
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rebuke: 'Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe' 
(4: 48). And the risen Jesus addresses to Thomas the reproving word: 
"Do you believe now because you have seen me? Blessed are those who 
see me not and yet believe' (20: 29). " This "rebuke" of v. 29. is_of 
more than passing interest to Bultmann. 
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Yet this verse can be understood in another way. We note, for 
instance, R. E. Brown's exegesis. 
152 Brown interprets the contrast 
in v. 29 as that which exists between two types of blessedness, not 
between blessedness (29b) and an inferior state (29a). Those are called 
"happy" who see and believe (and this joy is presumed for Thomas from 
v. 20). It is true, Brown stresses, that the evangelist wants to empha- 
size that those who do not see are equal in God's estimation with those 
who did see and are even, in a certain way, nobler, but this is a 
markedly different approach form that of Bultmann. The contrast between 
seeing and not seeing is hardly the contrast between seeing and believing 
Brown explicitly denies Bultmann's contention that the faith spoken of 
in 29a (despite the fact that it gave rise to the expression "My Lord 
and my God") is not praiseworthy because seeing is sensible perception 
and thus radically opposed to faith. This is rather seen as another 
instance of Bultmann's thesis that the words of Jesus should suffice 
(see Bultmann, The Gospel of John, p. 696) and that there is thus no 
recourse to 'signs' (or, we might add, to belief in objective-historical 
'signs', i. e., the Resurrection). 
We must ask if, rather than a blanket denial of the concept of 
'Mirakel, ' or a near-blanket denial of the relationship of objective- 
history to faith, we might instead probe the possibility of the 
validity of such concepts and relationships, and specifically, the 
possibility of an increased understanding of the Resurrection as 
objective-historical event? 
Do the writers of Scripture place an emphasis at times on histori- 
cal (historisch) evidence for the Resurrection? Bultmann accepts that 
they do. (p. 39). The Resurrection narratives (esp. Lk. 24: 39-43), the 
Pauline Mar's Hill sermon (narrated by Luke in Acts 17: 31), and especially 
Paul's attempt to prove the miracle of the Resurrection by adducing a 
list of eyewitnesses (I Cor. 15: 3-8) are duly noted (in contradiction 
to Barth) by Bultmann as attempts to 'prove' the event. It is true that 
these attempts are spurned by him as misguided and "dangerous. " But 
was not Paul at least, among the Scripture writers, a giant of the 
faith? He is certainly no mean Christian, and yet must we not say that 
his theology admits, to a degree, basis on the objective-historical fact 
of the Resurrection? Can Bultmann really so easily dispense with the 
justification for this? 
The answer to the relationship of signs to faith may, we think, 
be-enlightened in sensing a sort of tension between the two. One re- 
quires faith to recognize the true meaning of the signs and their wit- 
ness to Jesus; to those who 
had (have) no faith the signs are instead 
a source of mystery, ambiguity, and misunderstanding. 
153 To those who 
were (are) responsive, 
the signs were (are) the means of confirming 
and deepening 
faith. 
On the one hand, the signs are sufficient testimony to those 
1 
who can otherwise 
'see' what is happening in his mission. 
54 On the 
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other hand it seems clear that Jesus' signs were not designed to 
compel faith. 
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Jesus' works, for those who cannot 'see, ' will serve 
as a means of confirming blind men in their sinfulness. , If I had not 
done among them the works which no one else did, they would not have 
sin; but now they have seen and hated both me and my Father" (Jn. 15: 24). 
This leads us to the further conclusion that John does not speak 
about faith in a rigorously consistent manner but recognizes 'levels' 
of faith. Bultmann has grasped this with a profound insight. While 
the signs evoke no faith at all in some people, in others a superficial 
type of faith is evoked that may recognize in Jesus, for instance, a , man 
sent by God, yet which falls short of the total committment of full- 
fledged faith. We read in the Gospel of John about the signs Jesus 
did in Jerusalem at the passover and how many were led to "believe in 
his name" (2: 23), but Jesus "did not trust himself to them, because he 
knew. . . what was 
in man" (2: 24-25). Nicodemus recognized in Jesus 
a man sent from God because of his signs (3: 2), yet Nicodemus failed 
to reach an existential faith, a "born again" faith. After the feeding 
of the multitude, many "followed" Jesus because of His signs (6: 2). 
After the multiplication of the loaves, many confessed that He was the 
prophet who was to come (6: 14). Yet while this statement reflects a 
measure of faith, it is not enough; for after Jesus explained that the 
reality behind the loaves pointed not to a victorious messianic king 
(6: 15) but to a broken human body (6: 51), "many of his disciples drew 
back and no longer went about with him (6: 66). The writer of the Gospel 
seems to tell us that a certain acceptance of signs is not real belief. 
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The insufficient faith is that based simply on impression by miracles 
and wonders wrought by the power of God, for those signs must also 
be seen as a revelation of who Jesus is, and his oneness with the 
Father. This, we take it, is what is supported by the fact that Jesus 
reserves his warmest commendation for those who will have no signs 
whatsoever but still believe (20: 29). Such faith without signs will 
not be superficial faith but a believing response to a genuine revel- 
ational encounter with the living Lord. 
In summation, then, though we agree with Bultmann that the-signs 
of Jesus were not designed to compel faith, 
156 indeed could not compel 
real faith (existential faith), we question whether it could not be 
said that, for those who are responsive, the (Biblical) signs are the 
means of confirming and deepening faith? Bultmann himself seems to 
admit that this is the Biblical intent. 
157 Likewise, we must confess 
with Bultmann the utter impossibility of establishing real faith on the 
ambiguities of historical verification. But does this ambiguity warrant 
what has been called (as we have seen) Bultmann's "flight from history. " 
We must agree with MacQuarrie that "Bultmann does not take the trouble 
to examine what evidence could be adduced to show that the resurrection 
was an objective-historical event. He assumes that it is a myth. "158 
Neither is this difficulty overcome by referring the Resurrection back 
to the objective-historical event of the cross (p. 38f). 
Looking Ahead 
We have so far offered comment and critique where we thought 
warranted. Nevertheless, a systematic discussion is called for regard- 
ing the counterpole theologies we have seen. 
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Accordingly, we will deal with them in a chapter which 
juxtaposes Bultmann's and Barth's theologies of the Resurrection 
in an attempt to define and illuminate how these theologians stand 
in relationship to each other. This is also a part of our attempt 
to further probe these theologies in order that we may place them in 
the broader context of twentieth-century theology. 
We may note here, however, several issues and ideas which will 
be of relevance for our coming discussions of the Resurrection both 
Protestant and Catholic and which have arisen in our study of Bult- 
mann. 
Historical knowledge, to be meaningful, must be existential 
knowledge (p. 9). 
Bultmann's concept of an ontological existential capacity for 
faith which 'prepares' us for the revelation of God. (pp. 10,31f. ) 
Bultmann's idea that events disclose their own meaning (p. 12). 
His idea that Resurrection life is (in spite of his stress on 
individuality) "unreservedly being for one's neighbor" (pp. 13,20). 
179 
FOOTNOTES 
1) Heinrich Ott, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History, " tr. 
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Christian faith. The immanental view of history (in which the 
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immanent powers working within history itself - see H&E, pp. 104- 
109) are radicalized. This is not a variety of natural theology 
which is simply shifted from nature to history, says Ott. Rather 
it indicates that the Christian faith is in contact with the ex- 
perience of reality, in that as far as the revelation of the Gospel 
actually encounters our existential reality, to that extent it 
really is revelation. By its illumination, this reality can be 
understood more deeply. 
We refer alto to F. Gogarten, Demythologizing and History 
(London: SCM, 1955), whose discussion of the problem of history 
can enlighten much of the discussion in this paper so far. 
Gogarten basically agrees with Ott that the Christian worldview 
is not the end result of an evolutionary process but has, rather, 
"re-emerged in the modern approach to history" after having been 
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4. Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann: 
A Comparison 
In this concluding chapter on Barth and Bultmann we shall be 
concerned to make use of our previous discussions through compar- 
ison of our two theologians, and to mark the way for much of our 
future discussion in this work. To aid in this we shall look at 
the basic themes of 1) the historicity of the Resurrection, and 
2) the revelatory value of the Resurrection. Both of these themes 
deal directly with the question of how one comes to faith in such 
an event. 
The Historicity of the Resurrection 
As we have seen, Bultmann claims that the Resurrection is not 
an objective-historical event of past history. It 
is rather to be 
explained around the "rise of faith" in the saving efficacy of the 
cross. 
For Barth the Resurrection was an actual historical (in Barth's 
own sense of 'historical') event 
followed by a period of time 
(Barth considers the forty days to be traditional) in which Jesus 
1 
actually appeared to his 
disciples. He contends that Jesus en- 
countered not faith but unbelief which had to be overcome before 
2 
faith was established. It is thus initially obvious that Barth 
takes a more traditional line. He claims that Bultmann is controlled 
by a set of dogmatic presuppositions which he goes on to attack. 
This brings out important differences between the two. 
In the first place Bultmann rejects the claim that the Resur- 
rection of Jesus was an event 
in time and space, claims Barth, be- 
cause such an event 
is not an element in the Christian understanding 
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of human existence. True enough, he grants, but in fact none of 
the major affirmations of the creed fulfils this postulate. Al- 
though they have a bearing on human existence, they are primarily 
concerned to "define the being and action of the God who is dif- 
ferent from man and encounters man. "3 How can an event like the 
Resurrection be reduced to a statement about the inner life of man? 
Our first major difference is immediately obvious. 
Bultmann can affirm as readily as Barth a "God who is differ- 
ent from man and encounters man. " It is, in fact, the basis of his 
entire theology and it is difficult to see how Barth can have failed 
to grasp this. 
In response to the question 'Is God pure Erlebnis (psycholog- 
ical experience) deprived of objective reality? '4 Bultmann states 
that: "From the statement that to speak of God is to speak of my- 
self, it by no means follows that God is not outside the believer. "5 
Faith grows out of genuine encounter with the risen Christ. This 
faith, which is our knowledge of God, cannot be observed by object- 
ive methods but only through personal experience and response. Thus, 
"the fact that God cannot be seen or apprehended apart from faith 
does not mean that He does not exist apart from faith. "6 God is 
the object of faith and yet is not to be proved objectively, for 
if this relation (between faith and God) were open to the proof of 
temporal subject-object relationships, then God would be placed on 
the same level as the world (where such demand for proof is legit- 
imate. ) Bultmann calls upon his teacher Wilhelm Herrmann for the 
claim that the ground of 
faith and the object of faith are identical. 
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"They are one and the same thing, because we cannot speak of what 
God is in Himself but only of what He is doing to us and with us. "7 
Throughout all of Bultmann's writing one can sense the sovereignty 
of God, His 'Otherness' in the sense that He is qualitatively dif- 
ferent from, and vastly superior to, man. There is nothing in the 
existentialist tradition (as we have seen), or in Bultmann specif- 
ically, to soften this. Yet for Bultmann and Barth the concepts 
of 'encounter' and 'the God who is different from man' take on dif- 
ferent meanings and are arrived at by different paths. This can 
be shown through the claim by Bultmann (quoted, although perhaps, 
misunderstood by Barth) that the Resurrection is "a statement about 
the inner life of man. " 
Indeed, Barth grants, Bultmann insists that Jesus' Resurrect- 
ion is an act of God, but it is an act of which we can say noth- 
ing except that it has found its way into the kerygma and faith. 
8 
We can say nothing about the Resurrection as the basic fact of 
Christianity, that is, as the foundation, object and theme of the 
kerygma. We can claim nothing about the risen Christ in himself and 
thus nothing about his own life after his death, nothing about his 
meetings with his disciples who did not yet believe in him, and 
nothing about the Christ who was seen "in space and time" after his 
death on the cross. His Resurrection seems to have taken place 
nowhere in fact; it rather appears as an explanation of the kerygma 
and of faith, confined within them, and one which could be dispensed 
with if necessary. Does the New Testament not make everything, or 
practically everything, depend. on "the priority of the personal 
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resurrection of Jesus Christ ? "9 
We must understand Bultmann to affirm the primacy of the Res- 
urrection of Jesus Christ. Barth's contention that for Bultmann 
the Resurrection "could be dispensed with if necessary" 
10 is tot- 
ally unfounded. Yet for Bultmann - and this could never satisfy 
Barth - it is enough (a la Kierkegaard) that it happened, that 
something happened. And yet as long as our thoughts are fixed on 
this something outside of ourselves and our existence, we are con- 
trary to the very purpose of the act. Bultmann has stated that 
"a piety which wished to base itself on this idea of God (i. e., the 
"metaphysical being... quite different from man") would be flight 
from God, because in it man wishes... to escape from the reality in 
which he stands; he wishes indeed to run away from his concrete 
existence in which alone he can comprehend the reality of God. "11 
What Barth seemingly fails to realize is that for Bultmann the 
risen Christ exists extra me only to the extent that He exists rho 
me. Claims Bultmann: "The thought of God as the wholly other can- 
not mean therefore, if the talk is to be of God the Almighty, that 
God were something apart from me which I must first seek, and that 
I must first flee from myself in order to find. That God, who de- 
termines my existence, at the same time is the wholly other; that, 
insofar as I am world, he confronts me as the wholly other. "12 
The "risen Christ as such" of Barth contains for Bultmann, the 
essence of both 
fact and fantasy. Fact because, although Bultmann 
has been greatly misunderstood at this point, he does not deny that 
Jesus was resurrected (whatever that may mean). Such a passage 
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simply cannot be found in Bultmann's writings when he is correct- 
ly understood. Yet the "risen Christ as such" becomes the source 
of sham when, working from philosophic assumptions that a thing can 
only be real if it is quite independent of the subject who percieves 
it, one claims that in reality there can only be dealings between 
object and subject. For Bultmann, Barth's "risen Christ as such" 
must smack of self-deception and subjectivism since, insofar as we 
know Him before He becomes'to us existentially meaningful, we are 
simply "knowing" (or speaking) from a standpoint apart from God 
and thus denying the claim of God upon us. He has been reduced 
to an "object" and thus under our control. 
Bultmann's concept of "encounter" is thus not assenting to 
a lesson of ancient history (see Kerygma and Myth, p. 42). It is 
rather expressed in existential terms: "if it be asked how it is 
possible to speak of God, then it must be answered, only by speak- 
ing of us. "13 If we would understand how this could be "the God 
who is different from man" we must recall that the ground and the 
object of faith are identical. God cannot be spoken of "in Him- 
self but only of what He is doing to us and with us. "14 
The second difference would center on the claim that Bultmann, 
asserts Barth, rejects the claim of the historicity of the Res- 
urrection since an event alleged to have happened in time can only 
be accepted as historical if it is open to verification by the 
methods, and above all the tacit assumption of modern scholarship. 
Far from being an accusation against which only Bultmann 
must defend himself, it seems to us that Barth must also carry the 
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argument to show that he has a reasonable position from which to 
claim that all historical events are not open to verification. 
Barth obviously is much more lenient than Bultmann in his def- 
inition of what constitutes the historisch. He seems to hold that 
an event may be-true even when it cannot be verified by the methods 
of historical scholarship or even approached by those methods. Re- 
garding the Resurrection he states openly: "Why should it not have 
happened? It is sheer superstition to suppose that only things 
which are open to 'historical' verification can have happened in 
time. There have been many events which happened far more really 
in time than the kind of things Bultmann's scientific historian 
can prove. "15 The difference between Historie and Heilsgeschichte 
(salvation history) is that the former can be compared and integrat- 
ed with other events of the same basic type. But Heilsgeschichte, 
having as its content God's mighty deeds, cannot be subjected to 
this procedure. It is unique and cannot be classed. 
16 
The Resurrection, for the later Barth, is undoubtedly a real 
event because it was personally witnessed by certain observers and 
was about a 'bodily' Resurrection. He claims that the Resurrection 
was 'bodily' on the ground of Luke 24: 36f. and John 20: 24f.; -Thomas 
17 
is told to touch Jesus. It is the fact that He can be touched 
that proves He is the man Jesus. In order to have been an apostle 
means not only to have seen but to have touched Him physically 
(Acts 1: 22): "Unless Christ's resurrection was a resurrection of 
the body, we have no guarantee that it was the decisively acting 
subject Jesus himself, the man Jesus, who rose from the dead. "18 
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Thus the Resurrection is described by historical accounts in part; 
there is relation and similarity with our history. It had human 
witnesses and observation. 
On the other hand, Jesus was present in the mode of God. Dur- 
ing the period of the Resurrection the disciples came to realize 
that the deity which had always been present during his earthly 
life, but was veiled, now became unveiled. Thus their observation 
and understanding take the form of "saga" because they are describ- 
ing an event beyond the reach of historical research or definition. 
The Scriptural narrative then becomes vague and there are "obscur- 
ities and irreconcilable contradiction. " 
19 
This is indicative that 
the Resurrection (like the Creation for Barth, which is also "saga") 
simply cannot be grasped historically. 
20 
Is this last statement leading to a partial synthesis between 
Bultmann and Barth since it can be made as strongly by either? We 
can see from our previous discussions that both are against an his- 
torical examination of the Resurrection narratives. But as to 'why' 
there is significant difference. 
Both Barth and Bultmann admit an element of transcendence with- 
in history; Barth with his "saga" and Bultmann with his concept of 
the "act of God" (which myth is attempting to expound. ) Sagas (or 
legends) are events which did in fact occur "within the confines 
of time and space" yet contain 
"prehistorical, " or transcendent, 
reality. 
21 Their main character, we might say, is God, and they 
speak of His deeds 
in time. The Resurrection narratives tell us, 
says Barth, of actual 
historical fact in time and space and yet the 
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transcendent element - which makes them saga - forecloses any pos- 
sibility of objective/historical verification. 
22 
Thus what we see 
in Barth is a Resurrection which 1) enjoys true historical reality 
so that it would be "a fundamental misunderstanding" to interpret 
it as though it had "not happened in time and space in the same 
way as the death of Jesus Christ. "23 Ane yet 2) the Resurrection 
is of such a nature that it remains unattainable through historical 
research. For when we move from the cross to Easter we enter "a 
historical sphere of a different kind, " but only in the sense that 
we pass beyond the historically verifiable. 
24 
The Resurrection is, 
for Barth, as we have seen, a "pure act of God, " yet taking place 
as an historisch event. 
Bultmann's "act of God" speaks also of a transcendent element 
within history, yet is not understood "as an action which intervenes 
between the natural, or historical, or psychological course of 
"25 There is nothing miraculous to be seen in such an event, events. 
indeed it is not to be thought of as an event which happends on the 
level of secular (worldly) events. In Bultmann's words, the "act 
of God" does not happen "between" worldly events but "within" them. 
It is not worldly happening in its own right but is accomplished 
in such happenings in such a way that "the closed weft of history" 
is left undisturbed. 
26 "The action of God is hidden from every 
27 
eye except the eye of faith. " 
Regarding Barth's position on the historical character of the 
Resurrection it has been critically noted that it "seems too good 
to be true. It looks like claiming genuine historical reality for 
203 
the Resurrection and yet denying historians the right to pronounce 
on the matter. "28 This seems to us precisely what Barth intends 
to propose. The common ground between Barth and Bultmann, the fact 
that they are against an historical examination of the Resurrection 
narratives, is thus short-lived. And, should we stop here, it must 
be clear that Bultmann is the more logical since he does not contend 
for any historisch aspect as part of the Resurrection. 
29 
One's ac- 
ceptance or rejection of Barth's approach to the historical examin- 
ation of the Resurrection narratives, however, should also be made 
in light of his concept of the "imaginative-poetic" status of the 
Biblical narrative regarding the Resurrection appearances and his 
claim for the uniqueness of the Resurrection. 
30 
Regarding the former, the relationship of fact to fiction is 
broached. This seems to have been a highly debatable topic at least 
since the post-Renaissance rise of historical criticism. 
31 
Its es- 
sence is that there is always a creative element in the restoration 
of past events which tries to do justice to their richness, and which 
can lead to the historical novel expressing truth even more fully 
than conventional history. The difficulty of separating fact from 
fiction is especially evident when the subject is a vivid character, 
claims D. F. Ford 
in his study of this aspect of Barth. 
32 
When an 
individual of great significance and complexity is being portrayed, 
how important is a scientific verification of details? What consti- 
tutes falsification, given that the rendering does not contradict 
known facts but embraces them? Barth attempts to resolve these prob- 
lems. 
33 
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He is aware of the complex intermingling of literary form which 
is presented in Scripture and is committed to reflecting theologic- 
ally on the whole synthesis, taking it in its totality as literary 
work. As regards the Gospels, he recognizes that, on the basis of 
four versions, we have to some degree, creative reconstruction. But 
he also claims that these works offer quite enough to identify Jesus 
unequivocally, and he centers his understanding of Jesus on the passion, 
death, and Resurrection, i. e., where the accounts agree to the great- 
est extent on the bare facts. The very fixing of the Gospels in the 
canon may be seen as saying that the rendering of Jesus given in 
these stories is the best available and so we may confidently begin 
our theological reflection from them. In other words, "Barth does 
not see the Gospels as biographies of Jesus, but their portrayal of 
Him by His words, acts, and sufferings and by the reaction of others 
to Him is of great importance for his theology and it is just these 
elements which in the first century were accepted forms of character 
34 Barth is willing to accept that the accounts of the portrayal. " 
Resurrection appearances are in saga form, but he holds that they 
are faithful renderings of Jesus' identity through death and that 
any reconstruction of events which denies this is contradicting all 
the sources and engaging in pure imagination on its own account. 
Regarding the uniqueness of the Resurrection, Barth goes beyond 
any parallel in fiction or 
history. Granted that the events of this 
story are not to be verified 
by referral to historical criticism, 
Barth suggests an alternative referent: Jesus Christ alive now. 
35 
The main character is alive to confirm the story. Yet how does this 
affect the historical status of the story? Barth answers that it 
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makes history "significant in and by itself, "36 for now the story 
becomes the means of knowing Jesus Christ, Who is present Himself to 
speak through it. "He speaks for Himself whenever He is spoken of 
and His story is told and heard. "37 By making the identity of Jesus 
Christ the referent, Barth has, it seems, created a closed circle 
of the accounts and the presence of Christ, in which any look outside 
to confirm historical details is unavailing. In D. F. Ford's view, 
this is "Barth's Christocentric sharpening of God's freedom to speak 
through the Biblical text as it stands. "38 Christ is willing to 
speak through the text as it stands and no amount of historical 
'honing' will make Him more willing. 
39 
What is claimed to have hap- 
pened is described in such a way that verification is inseparable 
from faith in the presence of Jesus. 
40 
Thus the logic of the story 
converges uniquely with the necessity for faith; and Barth's theology 
includes, at its very heart, his literary insight. 
Questions Arising 
Barth seems to have grasped better than most, and thus has made 
a real contribution regarding, the significance of realistic narrat- 
ive form in the Bible. 
41 He has achieved a middle ground between 
those who would see the Resurrection accounts as 'pious fiction' and 
those who, on the other hand, would attest an extreme Biblical liter- 
alism. It has been no small 
insight for this writer to be led by 
Barth into a deeper understanding of the Biblical place of the empir- 
ical and the fictional, combined in a mode of narration which is more 
complex and rich than either could be by 
itself. A number of issues 
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are raised by Barth, however, which deserve fuller treatment. 
We speak of the relation of truth to fact and fiction, the role 
of imagination in 'knowing, ' and the possibility that realistic nar- 
rative is the highest form of religious language about a God who acts 
in history. By taking the Resurrection as his main methodological 
principle he draws attention to its claim to uniqueness and to the 
decisiveness for the identity of Christianity of the question of the 
presence of the living Christ. None of the above can be ignored 
because one finds that Barth's statements regarding the historicity 
of the Resurrection (or any other event) fall short of one's own 
norms of historical proof. On the other hand, we must ask with num- 
erous others, whether Barth has not defrauded us historically speak- 
ing. Gerald O'Collins notes that Barth's view (that "it is super- 
stition that only the historically verifiable could take place in 
time")42 has proved a puzzlement to "Pannenberg and many others. 
What happens in the spatio-temporal sphere of history must surely 
be open to historical inquiry. To the extent that Jesus' Resurrect- 
ion is placed on an historical par with the episodes of his life and 
death it must then become a proper objective of the historians at- 
tention. "43 At the very least should not Barth admit a criterion 
of historical falsification 
into his theology? And should he not 
accept, in light of his stress on the freedom of the 
Holy Spirit, 
that God is free to make historical reconstructions or the results 
of redaction criticism 
into data for theological reflection? Such 
a position would certainly make 
his theology more complex, but per- 
haps that would be the proper result of trying to reflect such a 
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rich and complex reality and individual. 
The third difference centers around Barth's citing of the fact 
that in his opinion Bultmann rejects the Resurrection as history 
as a result of its incompatibility with the modern world-picture. 
Barth's attack here focuses on placing the modern world-picture 
into a frame of context. "Is there a modern world-picture which is 
incompatible with the mythical world-view and superior to it? ", he 
asks. "What if the modern world-view is not so final as all that? 
What if modern thought is not so uniform as our Marburg Kantians 
44 
would have us believe? " 
Barth's comments propel us back to consider Bultmann's motives 
and methodology. It is, of course, well known that Bultmann con- 
siders the New Testament world-view to be obsolete. The miracles and 
supernatural activity it speaks of so routinely cannot be accepted 
by modern man in the scientific age. 
45 
We have covered this thor- 
oughly. And we have also criticized Bultmann for what we see to 
be a rather impoverished view of what is and is not acceptable to 
modern man. In our estimation 
Barth has his finger more firmly on 
the pulse of much of the modern world with his disregard of the de- 
mons and spirits of 
Scripture and yet his acceptance of the possibil- 
ity of miracle and the Resurrection. 
46 
Yet we cannot claim associ- 
ation with Barth 
in all that his above criticism implies. 
In his essay "Rudolf Bultmann - An Attempt To Understand Him, " 
Barth turns eventually to contemplate the results of 
demythologiz- 
ing. 
47 He begins by noting that Bultmann's view of Jesus' virgin 
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birth, the miracles, the atonement, the bodily resurrection from 
the dead, the parousia, Satan, sin, death, the Church, the Sacram- 
ents, the Holy Spirit, etc., would completely discard some of these 
elements (namely the image of a three-story universe, Satan and his 
demons, the angels, the virgin birth, the empty tomb, and the ascen- 
sion) and interpret the remainder. 
48 Why does Bultmann see the neces- 
sity of interpreting these elements of the New Testament, Barth asks? 
Bultmann's answer is given: because their content is cradled in myth- 
ological language. Myth defines the divine in terms of this world, 
objectifies what is not objective. Because there is nothing spe- 
cifically Christian about its mythological trappings, the New Test- 
ament can be, in fact must be, demythologized, for in such an "en- 
shrinement" it defies comprehension. The mythological view of the 
world and of man is as dead as the age that produced it. To expect 
the man of today to accept it would be to demand 
of him a sacrificium 
intellectus (here Barth refers specifically to Kerygma and Myth, p. 4). 
Moreover faith would be dragged down to the level of a work and its 
true scandal ignored. And, after all, we meet the need through de- 
mythologizing which the New Testament itself requires. 
"I should like to follow but I cannot, " claims Barth. In the 
first place, he proceeds, can a man understand any text at all, 
whether ancient or modern, 
if it is approached with preconceived 
notions about the extent and the 
limit to which it can be understood? 
Should we not rather wait for it to disclose itself and patiently 
follow what it has to say? Can we really understand the text if we 
think we have the criteria at our finger tips to judge the outward 
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imagery from the actual substance? Must that criterion not be looked 
on purely as tentative, a working hypothesis? Do we not lock our- 
selves out of a text if we approach it with a ready-made criterion, 
alien to the spirit, content, and aim of the text, of what can and 
cannot be understood, if before one has so much as read the text one 
thinks one knows exactly what is not real content but the mere cat- 
egories and forms of thought in which the content lies wrapped? Has 
Bultmann's notion of myth really anything to do with the New Testa- 
ment texts? To which is the exegete accountable: to his contempor- 
aries' way of thinking and his own, or to the spirit, the substance 
and the purpose of the text he has under examination? 
49 
Thus Barth's 
questioning. 
We must ask initially if Barth has not missed the mark somewhat 
in his claim that Bultmann would "eliminate" parts of the New Test- 
ament (the three-storied universe, Satan and his demons, the virgin 
birth, the empty tomb, Christ's ascension. ) 
50 
Bultmann has repeat- 
edly stated that nothing in the New Testament mythology can be elim- 
inated. 
51 Everything has a meaning which need only be discovered 
through interpretation. The narratives of the virgin birth and the 
empty tomb, for instance, are later mythologizing images of Jesus of 
Nazareth's divine significance as the Word of God. 
52 
It is incumbent 
upon the interpreter to hold fast to what the texts mean while dis- 
-carding when necessary the way 
in which they say it. 
53 
We further believe that Barth deserves criticism of the same 
kind he applies to Bultmann regarding the latter's attitude toward 
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the New Testament. 
54 
It may be asked, in light of his "attempt to 
understand" Bultmann: has Barth not approached the estimation of 
Bultmann with his mind already made up as to how far he can or can- 
not be understood and followed, instead of patiently following what 
he has to say? This Vorverständnis of Barth's results in occasional 
significant misunderstandings on his part, in our opinion. It seems 
as if he has at his fingertips a ready made criterion, alien to Bult- 
mann, by which Bultmann is to be tested to determine what is accept- 
able. This test is, of course, the Barthian criterion. Does Barth 
choose to ignore Bultmann's writings on hermeneutics which claim 
that the basic rule of interpretation is to listen to a text in two 
ways: scientifically, by using the tools of the deepest possible 
familiarity with the language of the text, the age to which it be- 
longs, and its spirit; and existentially, by being ready to give up 
all that one has and all that one is so as to be able to listen to 
the newness, even the strangeness (scandal) of the text, and welcome 
it? 
55 
Barth also goes astray in asserting that Bultmann's underlying 
purpose (as if it 
is his only purpose) is to translate the New Test- 
ament message 
into modern Begrifflichkeit and parlance. - For Bult- 
mann's primary aim must surely 
be seen, as one becomes more intimate 
with his writings, not as adapting God's word to the man of today, 
but rediscovering the very Begrifflichkeit of the New Testament or, 
to be more precise, of revelation itself. It would thus seem that 
Bultmann's one yardstick in his undertaking is the very intent of 
scripture 
(as he sees it), the Word of God Himself. If Bultmann 
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finds fault with the New Testament writers and their Begrifflichkeit 
it is because the latter often ill befits the reality they are try- 
ing to convey. His concern is based upon the intent of Scripture 
and the Word of God then, and not primarily in the name of modern 
man. 
This brings us to our final comment regarding Barth's criticism. 
He states, "What if the modern world view is not so final as all 
that? " His meaning is, of course, that Bultmann writes for twenti- 
eth century man, and it is implied that Bultmann thinks we have 
reached some ultimate truth regarding Weltanschauung in this cent- 
ury. This is, as we see it, another indication that our previous 
criticism of Barth - his failure to patiently follow Bultmann's 
thought, and thus to really understand him - is on the right track. 
It is rather our understanding of Bultmann (and we must inter- 
pret him here) that twentieth century man is in no real position 
of supremacy regarding the first century writers of Scripture. The 
ages have surely increased our factual knowledge of our world and 
its processes, and our achievements in technology are not to be den- 
ied. But Bultmann's comment that "history... as every schoolboy knows, 
will continue to run its course" (Kerygma and Myth, p. 5) is signif- 
icant in this regard we believe. Two thousand years from now we 
might assume with Bultmann that civilization will certainly have 
advanced far beyond our present 
knowledge. Our world view may have 
changed substantially. Yet this hardly affects Bultmann's premise 
in the way Barth would have us believe. For the Bible, according to 
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Bultmann, will need interpretation just as now. What is read in 
Scripture will necessarily be-interpreted in light of the outlook 
of 'modern' man of future ages, the same as it is today. New vistas, 
attitudes and insights are certainly possible. Seen in this way how 
can we accuse Bultmann of a dogmatic and unshakeable 'death-grip' on 
the twentieth century? We may also project backwards and say that 
even as the words of the New Testament were being penned they were 
in need of some interpretation, for they speak of the transcendent, 
the other-worldly, the "act of God, " that seeks to affect My exist- 
ence. Suffused through Bultmann's writings is a definite (though 
hardly blatant) stress on the timelessness of the Scriptures and 
their need for continuing interpretation. We believe that Bultmann's 
basic aims, when properly understood, reflect well that timelessness, 
and that he has added a new dimension to the phrase "reformed and 
always reforming. " 
We might then say that to dwell on Bultmann's assessment of the 
mind of modern man (and this assessment is open to some criticism 
in our view) and his denial of the Babulonian world-view, is to almost 
completely miss the point. 
Bultmann's aim is rather that 'modern' 
man of whatever age, must 
interpret Scripture so that its essential 
message is brought out: the possibility of authentic existence through 
God's act in Jesus Christ. Bultmann is after nothing but the Sach- 
lic hkeit (the essence, or actual content) of the New Testament. This 
task, as Barth well understands, is never ending. 
summary 
Regarding historicity there is a wide divergence between Bultmann 
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I 
and Barth (though perhaps not as great as is popularly thought. ) 
Both make use of the terms Historie and Geschichte. For Barth, the 
Resurrection was actual Historie, an event in space and time. Yet 
he favors the word Geschichte when speaking of the Resurrection, 
denying that the Resurrection is like other events of Historie. As 
the "pure presence of God" the Resurrection is Geschichte, "eternal 
history, " above Historie, defying investigation or talk of 'proof. ' 
Geschichte is characteristic of the Resurrection since it passes 
beyond "dead history" to become "the history of God with the men of 
all times... therefore taking place here and now as it did there and 
then. " 
Likewise Bultmann would classify Historie as those events which 
can be studied by historians employing scientific methods, and Ges- 
chime as those events of history which continue to have meaning 
and/or influence on later persons and events. Yet Bultmann's em- 
phasis on Geschichte extends to an existential usage not approved 
by Barth. Where Barth would see the Geschichte of the Resurrection 
event grounded in its Historie, Bultmann would voice the view that 
the importance of the event is not dependent on its Historie. Bult- 
mann's emphasis 
is the subjective one of existentialism. Barth at- 
tempts to develop the necessity for a relationship between meaning 
and event, 
fearing that the event of the Resurrection will become 
only symbolic of 
the existential encounter. 
We believe that Bultmann has perceived the heart of the Resur- 
rection message as 
has Barth: that the Resurrection is taking place 
in the present, is eternal, because Christ "is the living Saviour" 
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(Barth). Yet Bultmann has been faulted for an under-emphasis on 
the Historie of the Resurrection. Although Bultmann would claim that 
a Resurrection (of some sort) did take place, and was made apparent 
to the disciples through an 'act of God, ' there is nowhere the em- 
phasis on the 'event' that we see in Barth, or any concern whatsoever 
with the bodily Resurrection that Barth sees as so necessary. Barth 
in turn has been faulted for his use of Geschichte, speaking of the 
Resurrection as an "event" which takes place in time but is not avail- 
able to historical research. 
Revelatory Value of the Resurrection 
The key to the theological revolution Barth initiated with his 
Epistle to the Romans was centered upon his understanding of the 
revelation of God as the decisive category of theological thought. 
His readers were called upon to take revelation seriously, namely 
as the KRISIS which confronts persons when God reveals Himself. 
56 
-It is not, " he explained, "the right human thoughts about God which 
form the content of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts about 
man. The Bible tells us not how we should talk about God but what he 
says to us-" 
57 
In light of the nearly absolute dominance given to the theme of 
revelation during his dialectic period, it is not surprising to dis- 
cover that Barth develops his theology of the Resurrection along rev- 
elational lines. In The Resurrection of the Dead he declared that 
the Resurrection "as such is only to be grasped in the category of 
revelation and none other. " It expressed the "miracle" which God 
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performed (performs) in revealing Himself to humanity. 
58 
Barth had 
made similar assertions in his Epistle to the Romans. There he 
claimed that "the resurrection is the revelation; the disclosing of 
Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God in Jesus. "59 The Resur- 
rection was given a central function in revelation and was very near- 
ly absorbed into revelation. 
The early Barth - that of Romans and, to an extent The Resurrect- 
ion of the Dead - resembles Bultmann to a considerable degree. Both 
admit an historical (historisch core regarding the Resurrection, as we 
have seen, yet seem to place little emphasis on this aspect. 
60 
Barth 
sees the Resurrection as'the "disclosing of Jesus as the Christ" 
thereby merging the Resurrection into revelation. In the case of Bult- 
mann, it would be overstatement to say that he allows the Resurrection 
no independent status as a further event subsequent to the crucifixion, 
for as we have noted previously, that something happened is not to 
be denied. Yet Bultmann does interpret the Resurrection as expressing 
the meaning of the cross. The Resurrection, as narrated in the New 
Testament, indicates that Christ's death is not a simple human death, 
not the tragic end of a sublime life, but rather the liberating judge- 
ment of God. In the Resurrection the cross is understood to be the 
cross of Christ. 
61 
In this respect we may also approach the Barth of Church Dogmatics. 
Barth points to the Resurrection as the event in which Christ stands 
"wholly and unequivocally and irrevocably manifest. "62 Without losing 
His divine being, God could take the form of a servant and humble 
Himself in Christ through the crucifixion. 
63 The Resurrection lifts 
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the veil on the obscurity of Calvary. "The Easter time is simply 
the time of the revelation of the mystery of the preceding time of 
the life and death of the man Jesus. " In the Resurrection this man is 
"manifested in the mode of God. "64 
The parting of the ways comes however where Barth presses for 
the historisch element of the Resurrection in its own right - the 
resurrected Lord seen, heard, and touched. For Bultmann, on the other 
hand, the emphasis on the Eschatological Event (the life, death and 
Resurrection of Jesus) is not as a past event but as an event which 
is always present here and now, in the moment. Being crucified with 
Christ means present death to worldly, human standards. The Resur- 
rection occurs when man accepts the cross and rises to a new life. 
In the present proclaimed Word Christ becomes the Messiah. 
65 
The 
preached Word is the present Eschatological Event. So Eschatological 
Event is composed of the life and death of Christ, the Easter event, 
and the apostolic preaching prolonging these to the present moment. 
The essence of this Word is that it challenges man to decision. 
It is not a simple announcement or recounting of a past event (on 
which it surely depends! ) but is concrete action in which saving 
(Eschatological) event occurs here and now. Man's meeting with the 
Word is an encounter, a personal relation between two subjects - the 
individual and the risen Lord. The Word is not understood abstractly 
but through actual experience. Through Jesus, according to John, man 
encounters the revealing God. 
66 
Paul, too, speaks of encounter with 
God through His Word. 
67 
The Israelites thought of God as the "ever 
coming, ever encountering God. " 
68 
As the God os history, God came 
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to man as a person, a person determining man through historical 
encounters. Encounter is, therefore, an essential revelational (and 
Scriptural) category. The revelational encounter always involves 
demand and decision; 
69 
man is presented with the alternative of life 
or death. In this decision God discloses Himself. That is revelat- 
ion: the disclosure of God in encounter. 
70 
This concept of the present Christ is not unknown to Barth, nor 
is he totally opposed to the concept of human existence in our under- 
standing of the Christian faith. 
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He states, for instance, that 
"the essential content of the New Testament is a unique event (with) 
... a significance 
for men of every age... (that) all men of every age 
can become contemporary with it. "72 He speaks of the Word which has 
proceeded once (once for every Now) from God and was spoken in this 
act which happened once (once for every Now). What then is Barth's 
actual source of contention, especially regarding the Resurrection, 
with Bultmann? 
One of the primary problems posed by Bultmann's particular con- 
cept of a Word encountering man and offering him the possibility of 
authentic existence is that for Barth the cross and Resurrection, 
and even Christ, tend to become only a symbol. 
73 Though Bultmann 
does not deny the historical reality of Christ's life and death 
(the Resurrection, Barth claims, is denied in any historisch sense 
though we must disagree), any divine significance is achieved only 
through man's acceptance of the preached Word. 
74 
At best, claims 
Barth, events of the past are linked in a very tenuous way with the 
present preached Word. Eschatological significance is attained when 
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man accepts birth through the Word, life through the Word, death 
through the Word, Resurrection through the Word. The problem for 
Barth is the problem of imbalance between objectivity and subject- 
ivity. 75 
The object of faith for Bultmann is a challenging, demanding 
Word which proclaims birth, death, and Resurrection. The reality of 
these hinges on man's inner acceptance. What constitutes the birth 
of Christ? The new life of man. What is the significance of the 
cross of Christ? Man's death to the 'old man' - the standards of 
this world. What is the essence of the Resurrection? Man's Resur- 
rection from his unauthentic existence. As a result any actual life, 
death and Resurrection of Christ receives its eschatological signifi- 
cance when and if one accepts the Word. 
The Word comes to be, claims Barth, therefore, a symbol for these 
events. If the events in question be allowed to pertain to the per- 
son of Christ, they are tolerated as nonessential by Bultmann. 
76 
Thus, as Althaus would state it, Christ is left a dishonoured cas- 
ualty to the preached Word, the subjective appropriation of revelat- 
ion. The Word itself is the total incubator of saving event. 
77 
Barth has seen correctly that, regarding the Christ event(s) 
for Bultmann, any divine significance is achieved only through man's 
acceptance of the preached 
Word. We have already seen this through 
reference to Bultmann's analysis of "The Christological Confession 
of the World Council of Churches. " Yet he fails to penetrate to the 
heart of the issue, and once again seems to fail to truly understand 
Bultmann. The contention is that regarding subject/object relationship. 
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When Barth calls for the event of Christ to come first and 
later the preaching of it (Kerygma and Myth, 2, pp. 95f. ), Christ 
first and then the kerygma (p. 96), Christology first and then soter- 
iology (pp. 96-7), God's activity first and then man's transformation 
through that activity (pp. 97-8), and when he upholds a "significance 
of his own" (p. 98) for Christ, Barth seems to be espousing his views 
of the relationship of subject to object (the traditional view accord- 
ing to which otherness can only be the otherness of the object and 
genuine transcendence can only be objective) with very little attempt 
to truly understand Bultmann. 
Barth seems to fail to see that, for Buitmann, God has a sig- 
nificance of his own which may even be discussed ontologically (though 
this is not particularly desirable. ) God exists, Bultmann would 
claim, outside of me. And yet it is at the center of Bultmann's 
theology that God (in Christ) can have no 'significance of his own' 
for me until he transforms me, and that he only becomes transcendent 
with respect to my person when he makes me a new person. So long 
as he has not transformed me I remain in control, at least in the 
sense that I remain neutral towards him. Significance of his own, 
when it relates to God, must have the relational, soteriological 
aspect for Bultmann, or else do we not really speak of the Platonic 
god dwelling in lonely, self-contemplation? If God is not relational, 
soteriological, transforming, can he really have 'significance'? 
What Bultmann is about then, as best we understand him, is to safe- 
guard the absolute otherness of Christ by showing that He is not 
really the other, for me, until the moment when, through the encounter 
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with the preached Word, He saves me. "Christ is the Wholly Other 
when he makes me wholly other, when I allow him to be 'himself' by 
allowing him to determine my life... Only then does he acquire a 
'significance of his own "' . 
79 
Bultmann and Barth seem to be striving for the same purpose - 
to defend the lordship and primacy of Christ and to assert that he 
is significant for us. Neither would exalt man's supremacy to deny 
God's. And each captures a real element of truth in his rendition 
of this purpose. We find it not impossible to imagine a synthesis 
which captures the essence of both, which admits that the significance 
of Christ is really such only as it applies to His transforming power 
in the preached Word, and yet which draws sustenance from the histor- 
isch revelation of God through Jesus (at least once the former has 
been accomplished. ) 
Summary 
To briefly summarize, there is an immediate harmony between 
Bultmann and Barth regarding the revelatory value of the Resurrection. 
Barth sees the Resurrection as "lifting the veil on the obscurity of 
Calvary" or "the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ" while Bultmann's 
phrasing concerns 
'the resurrection as expressing the meaning of the 
cross. ' Bultmann's emphasis presses for the Resurrection to be seen 
as an event always present 
here and now in the Moment. It occurs 
when man accepts the cross and rises to new life. The Eschatological 
Event, composed of the life, death and Resurrection, thus transpires, 
Christ becoming the Messiah in the Word of preaching. 'Reality' for 
Bultmann thus brings on a concrete, yet inner, experience. Barth 
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presses for the objective element of the Resurrection in its own 
right. He recognizes in his theology the concept of the present 
Christ but (as we saw in discussing the historicity of the Resurrect- 
ion) his fear is that, in light of Buitmann's approach, the events 
of cross, Resurrection, even Christ, may become mere symbols to an 
intense personal awareness. Barth's concern is related to the im- 
balance he sees between the objective and the subjective in Bultmann. 
The Barth - Bultmann Dispute: Historical Certainty and the Role of 
Faith 
In these closing remarks we might recall the substance of some 
of our discussions of these theologians and ask: can something 'hap- 
pen' in space and time yet not be historical (historisch)? It seems 
that the Barth-Bultmann dispute causes us to ponder, ultimately, 
this strange question. 
Bultmann writes, regarding Barth, that Barth "concedes to me, 
for example, that the Resurrection of Jesus is not an historical 
(historisch) fact which can be established by the means at the dis- 
posal of historical science. But from this he thinks it does not 
follow that it did not happen. , 
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Barth's response is summed up as 
follows: "Can such history (Geschichte), too, not really have taken 
place as history (Geschichte), and can there not also be a legitimate 
recognition of such history 
(Geschichte), which certainly for reasons 
of good taste we will abstain 
from calling an 'historical (historisch) 
fact, ' and which the historian in the modern sense may by all means 
call 'saga' or 
'Legend, ' because it, in fact, shuns the means and 
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methods together with the tacit presuppositions of this historian? "81 
Bultmann is at pains to declare the inconsistency of Barth's 
denying the Resurrection as Historie yet holding on to the idea that 
it happened. If it 'happened, ' Bultmann believes, it falls within 
the realm of that which the historian can establish as fact. He 
fails to see the potency of words like "saga" and "Legend" question- 
ing their sense in this historical context, denying that they carry 
the weight Barth attributes to them. 
We must admit that for both Bultmann and Barth the Resurrection 
'happened, ' yet there is disagreement about what happened historic- 
ally. For Barth it is the liebliche auferstehung which results in 
the empty tomb, while Bultmann would say that whatever happened (and 
something did) it resulted 
in the historisch event of the 'rise of 
faith' in the disciples. 
82 Thus, the impasse between Barth and 
Bultmann cannot be summed up simply as a debate centering around 
whether or not the Resurrection was an historisch event. It con- 
cerns the conceptual relation 
between historisch and happening (or 
an event in space and time. 
) Essential to both views is the notion 
of faith. 
For Bultmann and Barth faith is an essential element for belief 
in the Resurrection texts. Whereas Barth speaks in general terms 
of a believer's endowing these texts with his 
faith, thus making 
the texts meaningful as a real happening (a liebliche auferstehung), 
Bultmann responds this way: "... what kind of way of endowing with 
faith is it, if faith is to be [brought over against] the assertion 
of events which are said 
to have taken place as history in time and 
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history, yet cannot be established by the means and methods of 
historical science? How do these events come into the believer's 
field of vision? And how is such faith distinguished from a blind 
acceptance involving a sacrificium intellectus? "83 
For Bultmann, however, faith is just as important a notion, 
only coming in through a different door. Whereas for Barth faith is 
the means to accept without questioning, for Bultmann it is the very 
thing the texts are dealing with. We must de-mythologize here. The 
texts, while using the "inconceivable" figure of a bodily Resurrection 
from the dead and an empty tomb, really mean to tell us that "faith 
in the Word of preaching" arose in the disciples of Jesus a short 
time after the crucifixion. 
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Both appeal to faith as the means around the difficulty of be- 
lieving in the Easter texts - and both parties assume, in their own 
way, that there is such a difficulty. Faith, whether seen in this 
instance from the Barthian angle (assistance in making the leap to 
a belief in liebliche auferstehung) or the Bultmannian (a category 
needed to account for the Resurrection texts without having to 
assent to liebliche auferstehung) is essential and irreplacable 
from the outset. 
We do not mean to question the role of faith in regard to the 
Resurrection. It seems obvious to say that the Resurrection cannot 
be definitively 'proved' by historical/ critical methods if for no 
other reason than, in the first place, it is an unpublic event that 
cuts the historian off. 
85 Yet one who denies the validity of the 
historical/critical 'intrusion' into this sacred realm runs a risk 
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also. 
It is interesting to note in this regard an article by H. A. 
Neilsen. 
86 Nielsen is concerned to counter the "German critical/ 
historical tradition" which "leads to the idea that "each text 
presents a specific challenge to be believed. "87 Both Barth and 
Bultmann it is observed accept the thesis that the Resurrection 
cannot be established by historical methods, and Nielsen is quick to 
agree. The Resurrection is an unpublic event. Ths historian exists 
at a later time. There is a gulf here which is considerable for 
the historian and precludes establishment of the Resurrection as a 
fact which is positive, certain. Yet this has no legislative power 
over what can and cannot happen, and this is precisely "the rock 
that German theology lost its keel on. " For this theology construes 
the difficulties of positive historical assertion "as entailing 
questions of believing and doubting, questions of what did and did 
88 
not really happen. " If an event is beyond the historian's method, 
the historian's doubt really has no connection; for that kind of 
doubt is allayed or confirmed by that kind of method. Neilsen then 
makes these statements: "To believe that Jesus fed the multitudes 
means nothing more 
than to be able to read Mark 6: 41-42 unvexed by 
the historian's kind of doubt. If a person can do this... he believes 
this bit of the New Testament. 
" Likewise, to believe in the Resur- 
rection is to "celebrate" 
it. "If a person celebrates Easter, he 
can be described as 
'believing in the Resurrection'. "89 It is mis- 
leading to talk of the Resurrection as though the texts call upon 
the reader to perform a separate act of believing, after which 
he may 
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be prepared to celebrate it. 
While Nielsen's conclusion is that historical/criticism has 
no role at all in discussing whether the event in question actually 
happened, and following from this that Barth's concession that the 
Resurrection is not an historisch fact which yet 'happened' is thus 
justified, his approach to this point seems Bultmannian. All one 
must do he claims is read the passage "unvexed" by the historian's 
doubt. If one can do this, one believes. Likewise, one must not 
be concerned for historical fact regarding the Resurrection. It 
must not be probed, but "celebrated. " Nielsen has interestingly 
posited a Barthian attestation of liebliche auferstehung through 
a Bultmannian disregard of history. He has used the historical/ 
critical questioning of the Resurrection as an invitation for these 
very critics to exit the debate. 'If you cannot say for sure that 
it did or did not happen you cannot say for sure what is possible' 
we might paraphrase. One is reminded of the statement of Thomas 
Hardy to the effect that 'Many things are too strange to be believed, 
but nothing is too strange to have happened. ' There is much of what 
he criticizes in Bultmann and Barth in this argument since he too uses 
faith (as he claims of them) as an "all-purpose plank for bridging 
90 
ditches of'this sort. " 
Yet Nielsen has raised the question most pointedly in his treat- 
ment of the Barth-Bultmann 
dispute. It is a question that has been 
gaining impetus throughout our 
discussion so far. Bultmann has prod- 
ded us with two extremely cogent question regarding the Resurrection: 
"How do these events come into the believer's field of vision? And, 
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how is such faith distinguished from a blind acceptance involving 
a sacrificium intellectus. " We may ask on our part: Is belief in 
the Resurrection just 'celebration'? Is the answer to the persist- 
ent problem of faith and history a focused, uncompromising exist- 
entialism that thrives without recourse to historisch grounding? 
Is the Resurrection to be held up before the world as an example 
of an 'historical' event which is not Historie but which none the 
less happened in space and time as 'saga' or 'Legend'? 
We would question whether any path has yet been shown around 
the difficulty of believing in the Easter texts, although we must be 
quick to applaud the value of Bultmann's and Barth's respective 
theologies of the Resurrection. The groundwork is laid here. All 
the important categories have been seen and dealt with by these two 
great theologians: the vital need of being 'resurrected' in the 
existentialist mode, which is the heart of the biblical Resurrection 
message we believe; and the need of a strong historisch assertion 
of the Resurrection without which the existential perspective might 
remain a chimera in the realm of doubt. We appreciate Buitmann's 
questions perhaps more than his answers; we appreciate Barth's an- 
swers though they are, at times, almost timid and rather truncated. 
For the ultimate basis of any positive assertion of the Resurrection 
message must meet head-on the question of historical/critical method. 
This cannot be evaded; it must be gone through, not around. The 
questions which these theologians leave us ultimately are these: 
Is the Resurrection from the outset a mere projection of man's hope, 
or is hope the result of the Resurrection? Can we believe without 
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a ground of reason, that is, can we 'simply' believe? We must not 
make the mistake of cowering before historical/criticism. The rat- 
ional, scientific historical-critic is to be taken quite seriously 
if we are not to be placed by many in the realm of magic and myth 
(in the literary sense), and he must be seen as demanding an account 
of our belief in the Resurrection before a world which has seen the 
Church increasingly, though in different ways, on the defensive re- 
garding this cardinal belief. But does hope still linger for a 
'proof' of the Resurrection? We shall take what we can from Barth 
and Bultmann and proceed to deal with these questions as we move on. 
Closing Remarks 
As we move into the contemporary theologies of Jürgen Moltmann 
and Wolfhart Pannenberg we shall, of necessity, be obliged to build 
on our previous discussions for, if we have so far dealt with two 
'theologies of the Resurrection, ' we look ahead to what may properly 
be called 'Resurrection theologies. '91 If the Resurrection was a 
part, albeit an integral part, of the theologies of Bultmann and 
Barth, it comes to hold an even more basic, and thus comprehensive, 
place in the theologies of 'hope' that we shall see. Among the num- 
erous areas for discussion 
between Bultmann, Barth and these theo- 
logies of 'hope' will be the bases for agreement between the former, 
specifically, the attempt to correlate the historical and the exist- 
ential. 
The issue which has been opened by the theologies of hope is 
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that of an adequate theology of the Resurrection; that which does 
justice to its basis in fact while at the same time probing its 
meaning not just for the individual but for society itself. Indebted 
to the theologies of Bultmann and Barth, both Moltmann and Pannenberg 
take, at times, radical exception to them in their attempts to clarify 
the concept and the meaning of Resurrection. 
We shall begin our next section, then, with a discussion of 
Moltmann's theology of the Resurrection. 
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from the dead by God" (Theology of Hope, p. 65). 
235 
5. Jürgen Moltmann: 
Eschatological Verification 
It has now been two decades since Jürgen Moltmann's Theology 
of Hope (1964) appeared in English. This was followed some years 
later by The Crucified God (1974), The Church In the Power of the 
Spirit (1977) and The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1980). With 
the latter, Moltmann's contribution to trinitarian theology, his 
thought has come full circle. Our research into Moltmann will be 
concerned mostly, though not entirely, with these works and the 
insights and developments revealed there in Moltmann's thought. As 
we shall see, the Resurrection is integral to this development. 
Let us first lay the foundation of Moltmann's theology of the 
Resurrection as found in Theology of Hope. It was this book which 
brought Moltmann to international notice and staked out a new road 
for theology after many years of what has been viewed as "depres- 
sing negativities" - demythologizing, religionless Christianity, 
the praise of secularization, the death. 
1 What new element did 
Moltmann offer through this 'hope'? How did it differ from what 
went before? Through this discussion of Theology of Hope we shall 
also lay a basis for discussion of Moltmann's other works. 
Theology of Hope 
Theology of Hope is essentially an appeal for Christianity to 
rediscover its eschatological nature, or rather to rediscover the 
"logos of hope"2 inherent in Christian eschatology. For Moltmann, 
eschatology is not an element of the Christian faith, it is the 
"medium of Christian faith. " "From first to last, and not merely 
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in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward 
looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and 
transforming the present. The eschatological is not one element of 
Christianity, but is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key 
in which everything in it is set, the glow that suffuses everything 
here in the dawn of an expected new day. The Christian faith lives 
from the raising of the Crucified Christ, and strains after the pro- 
3 Theology of Hope is almost mises of the universal future of Christ. " 
a commentary on this passage. Thus we may note initially that 
it is in the realm of eschatology and its subsequent revised and 
enhanced presentation that Moltmann's theology differs from that 
of previous generations. 
As has been noted: "At first sight, the expression 'theology 
of hope' might seem to be no more than a tautology. Theology speaks 
of God and hoope is an essential constituent of the meaning of the 
word 'God'. "4 But there 
is more to it than this, for the contemp- 
orary theologies of hope tend 
to identify theology with eschatology. 
This is strongly hinted at in Moltmann's claim that "there is there- 
fore only one real problem in Christianity, which its own object 
forces upon it and which it in turn forces on mankind and on human 
thought: the problem of the future. "5 
Moltmann begins his book with an overview of the history of 
eschatology in Protestant theology since Weiss and Schweitzer. 
It 
is immediately clear that in Moltmann's opinion no one has taken 
seriously enough the eschatological dimension of the Biblical 
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message, 
6 
which, he claims, must be seen in terms of promise and 
fulfilment. 7 Here we encounter a dynamic view of reality, which 
is constantly flowing headlong into the future. The God of Israel 
and the Christian faith is not the eternal, immutable, Platonic 
God who grounds the status-quo. Rather, He is the God who contra- 
dicts the present experience of reality by His promise of the fut- 
ure He shall create. He is the God who shall make all things new. 
8 
Moltmann is not reluctant to go so far as to say (borrowing a phrase 
from Ernst Bloch) that God's essential mode of being is the future. 
9 
One by one the various eschatological views of the 19th and 
20th centuries are found wanting, in Moltmann's estimation, in re- 
lation to the Biblical promise-fulfilment motif (which we must soon 
see in greater detail). Moltmann begins with a brief look at Kant 
as the chief source of what he calls "transcendental (presentative) 
eschatology.  
10 
This has had recurring historical significance 
under the concept of the "self-revelation of God" (Barth) and the 
"disclosure of authentic self-hood" (Bultmann) among others. Basic- 
ally for Kant there can be no intellectual knowledge of the last 
things since these objects "lie wholly beyond our field of vision. "11 
Yet they are not to be considered void in all respects, for, through 
practical reason, they acquire a moral significance. In Kant's words: 
"The idea of the last things have therefore to be ethically examined, 
and considered in the sphere of moral reason, of the practical a- 
bility to be a self. "12 
This brings about in Moltmann's view, not only the obvious 
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ethical reduction of eschatology, but more importantly, through 
excluding the eschatological categories of hope "the reality appear- 
ing to, and perceptible by, the theoretic reason can now be ration- 
alized on the basis of eternal conditions of possible experience. 
"3 
Karl Barth's early reliance upon the ideas of Plato and Kant 
is familiar to everyone who has read the second edition of his com- 
mentary on Romans. It is natural that Moltmann deals critically 
with this dialectic phase of Barth, where "'end' came to be the 
equivalent of 'origin', and the eschaton became the transcendental 
boundary of time and eternity. "14 Yet Moltmann presses even Barth's 
later (CD, 2/1, p. 716) revision of this transcendental eschatology. 
Barth, who admits that he missed the "distinctive feature of the 
passage, the teleology which... moves towards a real end", still 
holds enough of the eschatological fulfilment motif in his theo- 
logy of the self-revelation of God to evoke the following rhetorical 
questions from Moltmann who states: "Can the impression then be 
allowed to stand that 'self-revelation of God' means the 'pure 
presence of God', an 'eternal presence of God in time', a 'present 
without any future'? Can it be said that the story of Easter 'does 
15 
not speak eschatologically'? " Moltmann fears an apologetic for 
the god of Parmenides from the pen of Barth, an epiphany of the 
eternal present which distorts the eschatological revelation of 
God. History thus loses its eschatological direction. The future 
of Christ can thus be summed up - as it is in Barth - under the 
term unveiling, signifying the revelation of what has already happened. 
16 
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Bultmann, likewise, offers no relief from the Kantian perspect- 
ive (like Barth, through the influence of W. Hermann). Beginning 
from the belief that God's action, God's revelation, and God's future 
are unprovable, all can nevertheless be non-objectively verified 
in man's coming to himself - an existential proof of God. 
17 It is 
noted by Moltmann that, although this leaves the future as God's 
future empty, mythologically speaking, it is a very precise cri- 
terion for discovering what God's 'future' then is - "namely 'the 
realization of human'. " 
18 
Bultmann has claimed for his theology 
says Moltmann that "Eschatology has wholly lost its sense as goal 
of history, and is in fact understood as the goal of the individual 
human being. " 
19 
Thus, as with Kant, Bultmann's eschatology does 
not speak of temporal 'last things'. Rather it becomes a means of 
detaching ourselves from reliance on the world process and frees us 
to understand ourselves relative to the hidden correlation of God 
and self. 
20 As to what is revealed, claims Bultmann, there is 
"nothing at all, as far as the quest for revelation is a quest for 
doctrines... But everything, so far as man has his eyes opened re- 
garding himself and can understand himself again. "21 
The question arises then, what specifically does Moltmann of- 
fer in relation to these and other22 eschatological attempts? 
Moltmann's entire approach rests as we have noted on the category of 
"promise". For him: "The gospel of the revelation of God in Christ 
is... in danger of being incomplete and of collapsing altogether, if 
we fail to notice the dimension of promise in it. "23 His understanding 
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of this "necessarily lies through the Old Testament" and is gener- 
ally based on two distinctions. 
24 
First, it was Yahweh, the God 
of the promise, 
25 
who raised Jesus from the dead: to understand 
fully who God is, as revealed in and by Jesus, one must compare and 
contrast the concepts of Him in the Old and New Testaments. Sec- 
ondly because Jesus was a Jew, his human nature must be seen in 
regard to his relationship with the law and promise of the Old Tes- 
ament (seen specifically, as we shall see, in the relationship be- 
tween the cross and Resurrection). That Jesus was a Jew means that 
the God of Jesus is in every sense the God of the Old Testament, 
of the Exodus and the promise, with "future as his essential nature". 
The God of Greek metaphysics is flatly denied by Moltmann, for Is- 
rael's God is not defined, as it were, through negation of the temp- 
oral, but only through the recounting of the history of his promise. 
In Jesus of Nazareth, however, Yahweh the God of Israel, has 
revealed himself as the God of all mankind. Specifically, through 
the Resurrection of the crucified Jesus the God of the promises of 
Israel becomes the God of all men. The fact that he was a Jew means, 
moreover, that he is not to be seen in the first place as a 'uni- 
versal man' but specifically in connection with the Old Testament 
history of promise. "It is through the event of cross and Resur- 
rection, which is understandable only in the context of the conflict 
between law and promise, that he becomes the salvation of all men, 
26 
both Jews and Gentiles. " 
The promissory character of the gospel was, in Moltmann's view, 
what prevented the Christian faith from presenting itself to the 
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Greek world as another mystery religion, in spite of tremendous 
pressure to do so. These mystery epiphany religions directly opposed 
true Christian eschatological thought by stressing fulfilment through 
the eternal presence of Christ. This influential pressure was 
strong (it was the basis of Paul's struggles with the Corinthian 
Church) and did not leave the Church-at-large wholly untouched. 
Sacramental and Christological understanding were especially open to 
epiphany interpretations with their emphasis on: 1) the goal of 
redemption already attained; 2) extended incarnation; 3) resurrect- 
ion of the dead already imparted and eternally present. 
The result of this "presentative eschatology", which trans- 
formed the event of promise into a cultic repeatable mystery drama, 
was that history lost its eschatological direction. - As Moltmann 
claims: "It is not the realm in which men suffer and hope, groaning 
and travailing in expectation of Christ's future for the world, but 
it becomes the field in which the heavenly lordship of Christ is 
27 
disclosed in Church and sacrament. " 
In opposition to this Moltmann outlines an eschatological under- 
standing of Christ and sacrament which places the emphasis once 
again on hope and promise. Thus the Resurrection becomes present as 
hope and promise, as "an eschatological presentness of the future, 
28 In the place of the ec- not a cultic presence of the eternal. " 
stasy of epiphany, the life of everyday service comes once again to 
the forefront. The fact is once again affirmed that, with the rais- 
ing of the crucified Jesus from the dead, though it must be claimed 
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that "the glory of his lordship which embraces righteousness, life 
and freedom, has begun to move towards man", 
29 
still "all has not 
yet been done. " 
30 
Moltmann is careful to reserve the ultimate future for God in 
the development of his "new eschatology. "31 Faith is radically 
worldly in this view, proclaiming in the everyday world the future 
of the Resurrection, of life and the righteousness of God as it 
takes upon itself the 'cross' of trials and obedience in the body. 
God is not seen as "somewhere in the Beyond, but he is coming and as 
the coming One he is present. "32 Yet the eschatological "new world" 
of life, righteousness and truth is to be found not in some spir- 
itualized present sense, but only in the "fulness of all things from 
God, in God and to God 
33 based on the promises guaranteed in Christ. 
This idea of "the promises guaranteed in Christ" leads Moltmann 
to a consideration of "the 'Death of God' and the Resurrection of 
Christ", and thus to the heart of our discussion regarding Theology 
34 
of Ho e. 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stated: "The whole interest 
of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centered in the three 
following questions: 1) What can I know?; 2) What ought I to do?; 
3) What may I hope? "35 Moltmann forms his discussion of the Resur- 
rection around these three questions. 
'What can I know? ' takes the form: "Is He risen? ", and in what 
sense. 
36 Naturally the question of accessibility to historical 
science is of relevance, but Moltmann refuses here to place any more 
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relevance upon it than upon a number of very different views of 
reality that are possible (i. e., historical, existentialist, uto- 
pian). Moltmann instead opts, somewhat surprisingly at first glance 
for viewing the Resurrection in light of the statement of Hegel and 
Nietzsche that 'God is Dead', for "only then is the proclamation 
of the resurrection, and only then are faith and hope in the God of 
promise, something that is necessary, that is new, that is possible 
in an objectively real sense. "37 
Moltmann lays the basis for his approach to the Resurrection 
within the parameters of Hegel's 'speculative Good Friday'. Since, 
in our opinion, a thorough understanding of this concept in Hegel is 
beneficial for an understanding of Moltmann, let us briefly lay some 
background. 
Hegel reacted sharply to the basic dualism of modern philosoph- 
ical/theological development, which can be traced back in modern 
times to Rene Descartes' (1596-1650) cogito ergo sum. The conclus- 
ions of this view, expressed religiously, posited the usefulness, 
even the superiority, of rational analysis in the perception of 
God's existence, goodness, truthfulness, etc. The 'god of the phil- 
osophers' could be juxtaposed, then, with the God of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob, the father of Jesus Christ, and this methodical dissoc- 
iation could be logically followed with a real dissociation from the 
Biblical God. 
38 
Hegel's concern was to escape the dualism that Cartesianism 
expressed in philosophical form. He was likewise concerned to 
bypass the difficulties arising out of the pantheism of Baruch 
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Spinoza (1632-77) in which nature becomes a particular way in 
which God himself exists, and human consciousness is a particular 
way in which God himself thinks. Thirdly, Hegel was in reaction 
against the Kantian view which would, he feared, tend to remove 
the idea of God to little more than a marginal concept (since the 
latter's critique of the proofs of God). Instead of being spoken 
of as the operating, present world Creator and ruler, more and 
more after Kant God began to be spoken of merely as the 'Absolute', 
the 'Deity' - beyond all finite determinations of human thought. 
In this same line, J. Fichte (1762-1814), in turning to a moral 
primal certainty (equating human destiny and the moral sense of 
duty, and seeing these as absolute) finally brought the charge of 
atheism to Enlightenment philosophy. 
39 
For Fichte, God became 
synonymous with the moral order of things. Through the following 
of the 'supreme good' the Kingdom of God is unconditionally brought 
about. 
Hegel's concern was that faith, so strongly on the defensive 
from the domination of the understanding since the time of the 
Enlightenment, would retire into a pure Protestant 'interiority', 
the inwardness of emotion, of feeling, of man's self-assured subject- 
ivity (which Schleiermacher would later immensely popularize). 
But, argued Hegel, this Pietist alternative would surrender object- 
ive (worldly) reality to atheism. The dualistic conflict, present 
in Kant and Fichte, was in Hegel's view, behind much of the modern 
feeling of the loss or "death" of God. The Cartesian dualism 
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between infinite God and finite man had to be overcome and unity 
attained. 
40 
Not only a subjective but a real unity of finite and infinite 
became the aim of Hegel, and the means to this unity was found in 
God himself, the Absolute. Denying that unity can be maintained 
by a rationalistic/deistic juxtaposition of the finite and the in- 
finite, he instead stressed a pan-en-theistic "sublation"41of the 
finite in the infinite. 
According to Hegel, philosophy must take up the cause of 
Christian theology since, for him, this sublation is depicted in 
Jesus Christ, his death and Resurrection. The death of Christ - 
in which God himself died, but also later rose - is a self-exter- 
nalization of God into the world. In relation to a philosophical 
understanding of the Absolute as the unity of the infinite with the 
finite, philosophy will not merely recall the historical event of 
Good Friday. It will rather understand the atheistic basic feeling 
of modern times. Hegel claimed, as an interpretation of the Good 
Friday event, "so that it becomes a speculative Good Friday of the 
forsakeness of all that is (and)... there arises... the possibility 
of conceiving this foundering world in theological terms as an ele- 
ment in the process of the now all-embracing and universal revela- 
tion of God in the cross and resurrection of reality. "42 The process 
of dialectic has thus consumed (sublated) the god-forsakeness of 
the world and sees it within the movement of the process toward the 
future of God. "From the theological standpoint, " says Moltmann, 
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"one thing at least is unforgettably plain in Hegel - that the 
resurrection and the future of God must manifest themselves not only 
in the case of the god-forsakeness of the crucified Jesus, but also 
in that. of the god-forsakeness of the world. "43 
In Theology of Hope then we see the spirit of Hegel's under- 
standing of Resurrection (and world process) receiving the blessing 
of, and making a profound impact on, Moltmann. The Resurrection of 
Christ as the basis of Christianity, as the promise of the future 
of Christ, is not the Resurrection in isolation but the Resurrection 
of the Crucified within the process of the universal revelation of 
God. Yet Moltmann makes a clear and important distinction with 
Hegel. 
That the universalizing of the historical Good Friday makes 
Resurrection a necessary prospect for all that is, so that the 
'death of God' can become an element in the dialectical process of 
God both would agree. Yet Moltmann is quick to point out the short- 
comings of the dialectical process in regards to revelation. This 
process presents too neat a package and fails to comprehend the 
paradox that the risen Christ is and remains the crucified Christ, 
thus revealing himself in his own contradiction. 
44 On the basis of 
this revelational self-contradiction, Moltmann believes that the 
god-forsakeness of the cross cannot, as it is in Hegel, be made 
"into an element belonging to the divine process and thus immanent 
45 This would make the dialectical self-movement of the in God. " 
Absolute Spirit into a modification of the dialectical epiphany. 
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Revelation is history, not an eternal event. And the cross is 
not 'completed' and passed over in God's revelation but rather is 
taken up for the time being into the promise and hope of'a real, 
though still outstanding, eschaton. "The cross is the mark of an 
eschatological openness which is not yet closed by the resurrection 
of Christ and the spirit of the Church, but remains open beyond 
both of these until the future of God and the annihilation of 
death. "46 In this way, claims Moltmann, the 'death of God' leads 
not to the enthronement of deified man but, based on the Resurrect- 
ion, to an utterly new hope for life and a world whose proper set- 
ting in the historic process is made clear. Nihilism is vanquished 
in favor of the 'not yet' of hope. 
Historicity of the Resurrection 
With this contextual setting, which establishes the Resur- 
rection of Christ as the basis of Christian hope, we move to the 
historical question of the Resurrection as dealt with by Moltmann. 
We will not deal with the question of historicity fully here, although 
we shall follow Moltmann's own progression and thus lay out his main 
points. Our critique and discussion will be made shortly. 
That the writers of the Gospels are speaking of historical fact 
is Moltmann's first observation. Their statements contain not only 
the existential certainty ('I am certain') but also the objective 
certainty ('It is certain'). Pointing to Bultmann, Moltmann rejects 
that hypothesis that the point of the Easter narratives is simply 
a "new self-understanding of faith. "47 Rather, we are also compelled 
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to ask about the reality behind the events of which they speak. 
Certainly with Barth in mind, Moltmann also underlines the 
legitimacy of historical examination, 
48 if such examination approach- 
es the text without prior understandings of what is historically 
possible. 
49 Theology most certainly has no right to postulate 
'historical facts exclusively on dogmatic grounds. Yet, by the 
same token, Moltmann is critical of E. Troeltsch's historical 'ana- 
logy', with its Greek presuppositions of a "common core of similar- 
50 
ity " 
Obviously, this almost universal conception of history has 
caused grave difficulties for Christian theology as it seeks to 
reflect upon the proclamation of the Resurrection. Faith has at- 
tempted, for instance, to regress from the question of historical 
reality of the Resurrection and seek a line of defense around other 
realities of the Resurrection, primarily the question of the charact- 
er of the witnesses. This concentrates obviously on the existential 
decision to which the Easter kerygma leads. Other attempts have 
been made to posit a revised understanding of history which takes 
into account its element of contingency (Pannenberg). Initially 
promising, the theological category of revelation itself renders 
this concept void through radical, eschatological contingency. 
"For the raising of Christ involves not the category of the accident- 
ally new, but the expectational category of the eschatologically 
new. "51 Only if the entire historical picture, contingency, 
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continuity and all, can be shown to be contingent, Moltmann declares, 
do we raise the possibility of the eschatologically new fact of the 
Resurrection of Christ. For its possibility does not lie within 
history, but as a new possibility altogether for the world, for 
existence, and for history. Only when the freedom of God is under- 
stood in its relation to creation - ex nihilo - can the Resurrection 
make sense as nova creatio. "By the raising of Christ we do not 
mean a possible process in world history, but the eschatological 
process to which world history is subjected. "52 
Only with this does it become clear what Moltmann is proposing. 
We see it actually as a modification of Troeltsch's 'method of ana- 
logy. ' For Moltmann any view of the Resurrection which concentrates 
simply on its 'historical' character, and/or the value and disposit- 
ion of its witnesses, is hopelessly myopic. One can gather in the 
momentous proportions of this act only by a sweeping view of all 
world history (especially that to come) for "the resurrection does 
not offer itself as an analogy to that which can be experienced any 
time and anywhere, but as an alalogy to what is to come to all. "53 
Based on the Resurrection then, all experience is provisional and 
all reality is incomplete, straining after what is held in prospect 
for it. Historical analogy (Troeltsch) reflects this provisional 
nature. True as it may be in most instances it fails to conceive 
of the eschatological analogy which foreshadows and anticipates the 
future. The Resurrection is not 'historic, ' then, because it took 
place within history (to which other categories of some sort provide 
a key). Its historic nature lies rather in the fact that it makes 
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history by its novel and shattering possibilities which point the 
way for future events. 
Lest we make the mistake of supposing that this whole quest- 
ion is an innocuous, semantical struggle regarding a detail of the 
distant past, Moltmann submits that it is no less than "a struggle 
for the future of history and for the right way of recognizing, 
hoping and working for that future. "54 The Resurrection, then, 
helps form the basis for ethics in Moltmann and informs the life of 
the Church pursuant to its missionary activity. For the 'what can 
I know? ' points us on to the related question 'what am I to do? ' 
We shall return to the discussion of historicity shortly. 
The Bultmannian Perspective 
For reasons which have begun to be obvious Moltmann draws a 
wide line between himself and the form-critical view of the Easter 
narratives. Moltmann impugns the fact that form-criticism no longer 
strives after the historically accessible events which the accounts 
relate, and which possibly give rise to the accounts, but instead 
inquires-into the kerygmatic motives which shaped the accounts. It 
is, for Moltmann, a sociological method. Thus, for the form critic, 
the Easter texts present themselves primarily as kerygma, as pro- 
clamation by the Church in faith and to faith. The center of the 
research has shifted from the event to the proclaimer of the event. 
Moltmann notes the existential claim to reality held by the 
great form-critic Bultmann and his followers, and the immediate 
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advantage that the Resurrection no longer confronts one in the 
"doubtful image of historical tradition" but instead, in the Easter 
faith and proclamation of the disciples, becoming a reality which 
confronts us with personal decision. The "reality" of the Resur- 
rection thus encounters us as kerygma asking for a decision of 
faith, not belief in historical legitimacy. 
55 
Reality, yes. But a sad reality, for this entire approach 
leaves out of account the fact that these texts speak of God in 
his concrete, historical action on Jesus. To reduce this to a mere 
expression of a new self-understanding is inexcusable, and impov- 
erishing to the Christian faith. 
56 
Yet self-understanding is doubt- 
less one of the realities of our New Testament faith. The attempt 
must be made to correlate the two - historical and existential. 
Claims Moltmann: "If we no longer ask merely how the Church preached 
and to what changes the form of its proclamation was subjected, but 
w it spoke as it did and what provoked its proclamation, then we 
are on the road to raising the historical question in a new way and 
seeing the existential truth of faith as grounded in the factual 
truth of what is to be believed. The question is then no longer 
whether this proclamation is correct in the 'historical' sense, 
but whether and how the proclamation is legitimated and necessarily 
called to life by the event of which it speaks. "57 The focus thus 
shifts to the still outstanding future of the event, which can be 
spoken of "only in the form of remembrance and hope. "58 
The Resurrection can only be understood in the modus of promise. 
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It is an 'historic' phenomenon only in its relation to its future, 
and it mediates to those who know it, not only a new concept of 
self-understanding, but a future which will to a great extent de- 
termine their movement in history - the "What shall I do? " - comes 
into play. 
The 'Future Horizon' of Hope 
While late Jewish apocalyptic plays a part in the experiencing, 
and thus the communicating, of the Easter experiences, it is not 
enough to contain the experience. When Jesus is described as "the 
f irstfruits of them that slept" the bounds of apocalyptic are broken 
according to Moltmann for what is meant is that the raising of the 
dead has already taken place in this one case for all. Furthermore, 
this Resurrection happened, not to one faithful to the law but, to 
one who was crucified. As a consequence, future Resurrection is 
to be expected from the justification of sinners resulting from 
faith in Christ. This Resurrection does not contain an element of 
'secrets revealed' regarding the future of world history. Rather, 
"the universal future of the lordship of the crucified Christ over 
all is spotlighted in the Easter appearances. " 
59 
The Resurrection is thus to be recognized as illuminating the 
future of God for the world and the future of man promised by this. 
This means, obviously, that questions are raised regarding-, the mis- 
sion of Christ and the 
intention of God in this Resurrection. First, 
His future lordship over every enemy, including death, is proclaimed. 
Secondly, as a consequence, the Christian mission is stressed, for: 
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"The gospel must be published among all nations" (Mark 13: 10). 
Christian eschatology speaks of the future of Christ which brings 
man and the world to light, not on the contrary, of man whose good 
will brings Christ to light. It is not a datable event of world 
history but comes when and as God wills. Its openness cannot be 
eternalized - there is an end, in which Christ's future finds its 
fulfilment. 
Moltmann is at pains to point out immediately that Christian 
eschatology does not lead to a theology of mere expectancy; a mark- 
ing time which is analogous to the atheistic 'opiate' allusions. 
The tendency of the Resurrection is to a practical knowledge of 
mission in this unredeemed world. "The Easter appearances of 
Christ are manifestly phenomena of vocation. "60 
Cross and Resurrection in the Identification of Christ 
Regarding the actual Resurrection Moltmann states the obvious: 
what actually happened between the crucifixion and burial and the 
Easter appearances is hidden in God. To term this event 'resur- 
rection from the dead' is certainly not to be guilty of misnomer, 
but it is to be recognized that this term covers an event for which 
there is no basis in experience whatsoever. 'Raising of the dead' 
looks toward some future proof of God. What 'actually happened' 
is something that not even the New Testament writers profess to 
know. Rather, they use the term 'raising' to express not only a 
judgement about something that happened to Jesus, but also an 
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eschatological expectation. 
But how can it be possible to identify two radically contra- 
dictory experiences - the cross and its god-forsakeness and the 
Resurrection and its nearness of God in the god-forsaken one - in 
one and the same person. 
Moltmann looks for this identification in the post-Resurrection 
statements of the one who appeared so risen. The Bultmannian claim 
of 'visionary' post-Resurrection appearances is tentatively accepted 
by Moltmann, with the qualification (certainly not directly contra- 
dicting Bultmann) that these were not merely "dumb" visions but aud- 
itions as well. 
61 
The identification of the risen one as the cruci- 
fied one is thus a self-revelation of Jesus, this within the total 
contradiction of cross and Resurrection, of god-forsakenness and 
the nearness of God. 
With this in mind Moltmann approaches the identification of 
Jesus as an identity understood only in, not "above and beyond, " 
cross and Resurrection. It remains bound up in the dialectic of 
the cross and Resurrection. 
62 In this sense Moltmann maintains a 
firmer sense of the integrity of each event than perhaps either 
Buitmann or Barth, who choose instead to stress their oneness. 
Moltmann rather revels in the paradox of the terms 'crucified' and 
'risen' as they apply to the one Jesus of Nazareth, for in this 
way he places the "point of 
identification" not in Jesus but in 
the God who creates life out of nothing. This self-revelation of 
Jesus then points back to the promises of God and simultaneously 
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forward to an eschaton in which His divinity is revealed'to all. 
States Moltmann: "The Lord who appears as risen is not then re- 
cognized as one who is eternalized or clothed in heavenly glory, 
but he appears in the foreglow of the coming, promised glory of 
God. What happened to him is understood as the dawn and assured 
promise of the coming glory of God over all, as the victory of life 
from God over death. Cross and Resurrection are then not merely 
modi in the person of Christ. Rather, their dialectic is an open 
dialectic, which will find its resolving synthesis only in the 
eschaton of all things. " 
63 
The Future 
Moltmann's persistent stress on the fact 1) that the return of 
Christ will come only when God wills, and 2) the absolute newness 
of God's creation at the end of time, dictate that his 
discussion 
of the future 
64 
will not be some metaphysical speculation regarding 
specific dates and apocalyptic 
imagery. His discussion, rather, 
centers on "striving to 
bring out the tendencies and latencies of 
the Christ event of the crucifixion and resurrection, and in seeking 
to estimate the possibilities opened up by this event. 
 65 The Res- 
urrection appearances are a stimulus regarding 
the future - an urge 
to know who He is and what 
is hidden and prepared in Him; a pursuing 
of righteousness. 
For Moltmann righteousness is not to be divorced from history. 
It is not mental assent to a creed or an ideal norm so much as 
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something that 'happens, ' as is evident for Moltmann from the Old 
Testament. The righteousness of God was, for Israel, "the summary 
expression of the right relationship between God and man, man and 
fellow man, man and the world. "66 It thus deals with. the 'univers- 
ality' of God's rule. The promised divine righteousness, the ground 
and guarantee of which is the Resurrection, sets us on a path toward 
the recognition of Christ's exaltation, to be completed only at the 
parousia of Christ. 
Yet, to be sure, Christianity is a "this-worldly" religion; 
its relevance is. not tied just to the parousia. From Israel's 
religion of promise we understand the heritage which points us to 
the historical fulfilment of promise, and which gives us the pre- 
supposition for understanding the Resurrection of Jesus as the 
Resurrection of the crucified one - not as opiatic symbol for the 
hope of immortality and a resigned attitude to life. 
Resurrection in the Israelite sense is not immortality67 (which 
has its roots in Greek philosophy), but is based rather in the theo- 
logical context of the God of promise who shall "make all things 
new. " This Resurrection is no natural reanimation, but a creatio 
ex nihilo, which in Israel's religious view, is the ultimate confirm- 
ation of life and life's fulfilment, found in giving praise in the 
presence of-God. 
Furthermore, this Resurrection is not understood exclusively, 
but in universal terms - God will achieve His judgment and His due68 
in both righteous and unrighteous. The ideas of creatio ex nihilo 
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1-ý-, 
and resurrectio mortuorum red; the eschatological extremities of 
the religion of promise. 
Moltmann explains the significance of the death and Resurrection 
of Jesus, in the context of these expectations, in the Hegelian terms 
previously discussed. 
69 As Jesus was the Messiah of God, his death 
therefore implies the "death of God. " His death must be experienced 
through a variety of negative terms: god-forsakeness, judgment, curse, 
exclusion from the promised life, reprobation and damnation. In the 
context of these expectations of life, his Resurrection must be 
seen not as a mere return to life but as "a conquest of the dead- 
liness of death... as a negation of the negative (Hegel), as a neg- 
70 
ation of the negation of God. " 
Further, Jesus' Resurrection was not seen in isolation, as a 
private Easter for His private Good Friday, but as an event with 
universal consequence marking the beginning of the abolition of the 
universal Good Friday - the god-forsakenness of the world that comes 
to light through the absolute understanding of His death on the 
cross. To understand the fullness of the Resurrection it is imper- 
ative to enter into the dialectic of suffering and dying in expect- 
ation of eternal life and of Resurrection. This sums up the work 
of the Holy Spirit for Moltmann, i. e., the leading of the individ- 
ual into suffering and conformity to Christ's death, and the pro- 
mise of His future. 
71 For "this eternal life here lies hidden 
beneath its opposite, under trial, suffering, death and sorrow. "72 
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Summary 
Let us here attempt a general review of the line of thought 
that Moltmann has been following. 
Eschatology is critical to understanding the Christian faith. 
This eschatology speaks of Christ and his future and, with an eye 
also to the Old Testament, speaks the language of 'promise. ' Es- 
chatology understands history as a reality instituted by promise. 
Yet there is a contradiction between present unrealized hope and 
the given reality. This is the historical character of reality, 
and its contradiction is nowhere revealed as clearly as in the 
event of promise constituted by the cross and Resurrection of 
Christ. Against the background of the Old Testament history of 
promise Moltmann opens up the promise contained in this event, lead- 
ing directly to an immediate understanding of the mission of the 
Church ("the promissio of the universal missio of the Church to 
all nations"). The future of Christ, based on the historic pro- 
cess of mediation between subject and object, can be assigned neith- 
er to some system of world history (to be brought about by the 
progress of the human spirit in league with the self-movement of the 
Absolute Spirit, i. e., progressive revelation) or to the e:: istential 
futurity of man. Yet the Christian consciousness of history is 
ful2l historical as a consciousness of mission. Only to that extent 
is it also a consciousness of world history and of the historic 
character of existence. 
It is imperative for Moltmann that we perceive the relationship 
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not only of promise and fulfilment but also the contradiction in 
which promise stands to reality. The appearances of the risen Lord 
acquire the characteristic of progressiveness from within, by un- 
masking the temporalness of death and godlessness in the present 
world. There is no entering into history here (in the sense of the 
'progressive revelation' theology); the promise alone of the Res- 
urrection of the dead, of divine righteousness leads to love for the 
proper existence of a groaning creation. The revelation of God in 
the cross and Resurrection thus sets the stage for history, and 
the possibility of a new creation. 
The future of Jesus Christ then means his parousia ("the pres- 
ence of what is coming towards us, so to speak an arriving future"), 
a different thing from the reality now experienced. Yet it works 
upon the present by awakening hopes and establishing resistance to 
injustice and depravity. 
This parousia is also called the revelation of Christ (oclTOKocA- 
, ºýýrc 
öý , (Dýöý ). It is thus not simply an unveiling of "that which 
is" (Barth), or that "which is already reality" (W. Kreck). The 
Christ event did not fulfill all promises, leaving only a 'sequel' 
of its being unveiled so that all may see. Christian hope expects 
not only unveiling but final fulfilment. The latter brings the 
redeeming of the promise which the cross and Resurrection contain. 
With this foundation of Moltmann's theology we are now in a 
position to move forward into the various topics which seem to be 
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especially relevant in Moltmann, including a continuation of our 
discussion of the historicity of the Resurrection. 
Historicity of the Resurrection (con't. ) 
Hope, for Moltmann, does not come under the category of wish- 
ful thinking. We can justifiably hope only if we can, in the words 
of 1 Peter, "make a defense... for the hope that is in us. "73 But 
is the proper way to defend those hopes found in the appeal to 
past evidence? 
The Resurrection of Jesus is central to Christian hope, for 
this hope must clearly encompass existence after death. 
74 
Only on 
the basis of this Resurrection do we have the hope that transcends 
death. 
75 
How then to approach a Resurrection that contradicts our mod- 
ern view of historical possibility. Such an event, because of its 
radical newness, cannot be encompassed by appeals to analogy and 
similarity that provide the basis for contemporary historical re- 
search. Even a method which takes account of the contingent or 
the accidentally new seemingly cannot handle the Resurrection. 
76 
Moltmann likewise looks at that theology which has attempted to 
subjectivize the Resurrection, understanding it as part of the 
kerygmatic event that repeatedly transforms human self-understanding, 
and rejects its change of focus from the miracle of Resurrection to 
the faith of the believer. 
77 
Christ's Resurrection, claims Molt- 
mann, is not merely an idea or an event in our lives. We are 
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compelled rather to ask about the reality behind the Biblical 
events, for these statements contain not only existential certain- 
ty but objective certainty. The question, "What can I know about 
the historical facts? " is a legitimate one. 
78 
It is a disappointment, and a rather weak seam in Moltmann's 
theology, that very little is done with the question once it is 
put (and it is put rather forcefully). We must agree with one 
critic who claims that Moltmann "seems to show the necessity for 
a historical argument like Pannenberg's and then turns around and 
79 
denies its possibility. " The only kind of verification approp- 
riate to this event is eschatological verification according to 
Moltmann. We will comprehend the truth of the Resurrection from 
the end of history rather than from within history. 
80 
Moltmann appreciates the contributions of historical criticism 
which have served the positive function for theology of keeping the 
contradictory character of the Resurrection in focus. We are forced 
to acknowledge that our understanding of the present as well as the 
past is breached by an event that moves our focus to the future for 
its verification. The miraculous character of the Resurrection, 
' forcing theology into an impasse with modern historiography, is the 
'eschatological source of hope in this event. The Resurrection's 
non-conformist tendencies thus keep it an open question. At the 
same time, historical research, with its continual criticism of 
fantasies and illusions, keeps our Resurrection faith honest. Molt- 
mann thus labels historical criticism a kind of "negative theology, " 
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the "iconoclasm of hope turned backwards. "81 
This is all well and good. But what it amounts to with regard 
to Moltmann's burning question (based upon Kant) "What can I know? ", 
would seem to be: "Not very much. " In Moltmann's own words: "The 
act of the raising of Jesus is not an historically observable and 
ascertainable event... The Christian resurrection faith is thus 
historically unverifiable. "82 Moltmann, unlike Barth, Bultmann, 
and Pannenberg as we shall 
evidence in any depth. Ra 
1) To argue that Jesus was 
suppose the possibility of 
presupposition must itself 
see, does not even examine the historical 
ther, he makes two methodological points. 
83 
raised from the dead one must first pre- 
Resurrection from the dead. But that 
arise from our faith in Jesus' Resur- 
rection. "Resurrection and the concept of history then contain a 
vicious circle for the understanding. " 2) All historical arguments 
involve appeals to analogy. Since the Resurrection of Jesus has no 
analogy in past or present experience, a scientifically historical 
argument for it is impossible in principle. 
We must pause here momentarily to remark on Moltmann's first 
point. This "vicious circle 
for the understanding" belongs to the 
same class of argument as those by which the Eleatic philosophers 
proved that motion was 
impossible. 84 Other examples of this type 
of argument might be: 'we must 
have faith to believe and yet must 
believe to have faith'; 'we must support ourselves in water to swim 
and must be able to swim to support ourselves in water. ' The fact 
remains that we do swim, and we do have faith. Our point is that 
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this is a somewhat anachronistic and worn-out argument (though 
perhaps no longer a common one) which does Moltmann a disservice. 
But to summarize, Moltmann's proclamation of Christian hope 
includes the claim that it must involve the expectation of Resur- 
rection after death. Such an expectation cannot be a mere flight 
of fancy, it must be defensible. Moltmann turns to Jesus' Resur- 
rection for that support with the strong claim that its historical 
nature is integral to its understanding. He then concludes that 
its historicity is unverifiable. 
We are back to square one and fell compelled to ask afresh 
just what Moltmann means by claiming that the Resurrection is an 
historical event. John Macquarrie claims that this remains "com- 
pletely vague" in Moltmann and questions whether we are not subtly 
introduced to a form of "remythologizing. "85 While existential 
interpretation of eschatology at least had the advantage of intel- 
ligibility by relating it to existential experience here and now, 
Moltmann, who is dissatisfied with the Bultmannian account and in- 
sists that the Resurrection 
is historical, fails to ground the 
meaning of 'historical. ' Moltmann offers "no philosophical con- 
ceptuality from which can be derived an understanding of resurrect- 
ion that would offer a genuine alternative to Bultmann on the one 
86 
side and mythology on the other. 
" 
Macquarrie expands his concern by looking at the idea of his- 
tory implicit in Moltmann, claiming it "speculative, " with a dis- 
regard of the canons accepted 
by the secular historian. Whereas 
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Bultmann believed that the critical methods of the historian must 
be applied rigorously and consistently to the New Testament, he 
denied that this was destructive to faith. Moltmann, on the other 
hand, is very critical of what he calls the 'positivist' historian, 
as is shown in his treatment of Troeltsch's principle of historical 
analogy. Bultmann's existential interpretation, in terms of Christ's 
appearances to the disciples and their resulting experience of new 
life, obviously meets no problems regarding analogy. Thus Bult- 
mann can say that any moment has the possibility of being the es- 
chatological moment. For Moltmann, however, the historical reality 
of the Resurrection precedes its existential one. But he must con- 
cede that, as the Resurrection is an event without parallel, there 
are no analogies to defend its authenticity. How then can it be an 
historical event? Here Moltmann shows a lurking respect for the 
principle of analogy in spite of his otherwise cavalier treatment 
of it. In spite of the obvious fact that there is no present ana- 
logy, Moltmann claims one to come - the future Resurrection of the 
dead. 
87 This presents an obvious difficulty. Again citing Mac- 
quarries "It 
is on the basis of a resurrection of Christ in the 
past that he 
looks for a resurrection of the dead in the future; 
yet it will only 
be this future resurrection of the dead that will 
give us reason to 
believe in the report of a resurrection in the 
past - or will even enable us to understand what could be meant by 
88 such a report! 
Based on this criticism we may move on to see that it becomes 
obvious that Moltmann has not extricated himself entirely from the 
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"vicious circle for the understanding" (of which he accuses Pan- 
nenberg). Instead of basing 1) the Resurrection of Jesus and 2) 
the Resurrection of the dead, on each other in a type of mutual, un- 
founded support (as he claims Pannenberg has done), Moltmann sub- 
stitutes for 2) the Resurrection of the dead, 3) the future Res- 
urrection of the dead. This is in fact no substitution at all. 
What we can derive here is the understanding that Moltmann 
has, at times, and at crucial points, implicated himself in what 
are little more than word games. We recall Macquarrie's accusation 
of a "remythologization" in Moltmann regarding the meaning of 
'historicity. ' While the term seems to us somewhat inappropriate, 
if not remythologizing, at least Moltmann follows the form-critical 
principle of taking the real focus off the historical nature of the 
Resurrection, while at the same time leaving an impression of the 
relevance of historical inquiry upon, and the historical aspect of, 
the Resurrection. 
Moltmann has, in addition, based his understanding of the his- 
torical verifiability of the Resurrection on a thesis that claims 
to be different than what it is. Having denigrated Troeltsch's 
principle of historical analogy as an impoverished viewpoint based 
on Greek cosmology, 
89 
he goes on to make it the basis of his views 
regarding historical verifiability. He states, with considerable 
respect for the principle of analogy: "The resurrection of Christ 
does not offer itself as an analogy to that which can be experienced 
any time and anywhere [note: here he is speaking of Bultmann] but as 
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an analogy to what is to come to all. "90 Thus the difficulty. 
The principle of analogy, based on a 'common core of similarity, ' 
dictates that the Resurrection, to be believed, must be historically 
demonstrated, which it obviously cannot. The Christian faith based 
on the Resurrection has then, according to some, surely come to a 
disastrous clash with modern critical integrity. Moltmann, in seek- 
ing to find a way around this clash with analogy, has claimed that 
only this future Resurrection of the dead will give us reason to 
believe in the report of a Resurrection of the past. Has the problem 
then been solved, or even somewhat illuminated? We feel rather 
that it has been put off until the parousia, the Christian faith 
being allowed to live alongside historical science in a smug 'just 
you wait and see' posture. Meanwhile, there has been a Resurrection 
and there will be a Resurrection, but there is no Resurrection now - 
perhaps a linguistically nonsensical statement but nevertheless true 
to what Moltmann has said. The question is: how can past and fut- 
ure be used to verify each other without any reference to the pres- 
ent, which is the only directly accessible 'dimension' to us? 
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This hardly inspires confidence that the Resurrection either has been 
or will be present. 
It becomes increasingly clear that there is an affinity between 
Moltmann, Barth, and Bultmann regarding the historicity of the Res- 
urrection, that we have perhaps alluded to but not clearly defined. 
Heretofore we have attempted a thorough understanding of Barth and 
Bultmann regarding this historicity, for much that has been written 
about their views seems to us ill-founded, especially so since these 
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same critics often claim that both Barth and Bultmann deny the 
true historicity of the Resurrection. As we have tried to show,, 
it is not that simple. 
Both, in fairness, are open to misunderstanding. Barth, in 
claiming that. the Resurrection can neither be refuted or supported 
by historical science, does not really attempt to move it from the 
temporality of human history. It is an event that really happened 
though not in the same sense as Jesus' birth or crucifixion. It is 
an event in space and time, but not in the sense that it can be 
shown to have occurred or not to have occurred. 
Bultmann, while claiming we believe that 'something' happened, 
which is again a 'something' to which historical science has no 
access, focuses rather on the 
fact of the historicity of the Easter 
faith. We deal here with the results of this 'something' rather 
than the 'something' itself. Bultmann does not disregard Troeltsch 
and, with a consistency lacking 
in Barth. refuses to bring the 
Christian faith into an impasse with modern critical integrity by 
playing upon the strength of 
its historical nature. To believe in 
the Resurrection is to believe in the redemptive significance of the 
cross for one's own life, 
leading to a completely new self under- 
standing. But let us recall again that whatever 
led to the "rise 
of faith" in the disciples, and 
Bultmann speculates very little 
about what it was, 
it had an effect upon our temporal existence. 
It must be, with very little qualification, called 'real, ' and 
historical in the sense of its impact upon history. While Bultmann 
can appear to be saying 
(and Barth seems to understand him thus) 
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that the Resurrection did not happen at all, this does not truly 
seem to capture his point. Neither is it entirely correct to say 
that the rise of faith in the disciples (and in us) is the totality 
of the Resurrection. The objective basis for the Resurrection, as 
an act of God, must be recognized in Bultmann, as we have tried to 
show, in spite of its relative obscurity. 
When one penetrates beneath the sizable amount of antagonistic 
rhetoric these two great theologians have fired at one another re- 
garding the historicity of the Resurrection, some important simil- 
arities are unmistakeable. Whether we view the Resurrection as in- 
accessible event of revelation and/or new self-understanding, both 
speak of the Resurrection as historical in a somewhat contrived 
and ambiguous sense. Both are out of step with what the word 'his- 
torical commonly means, having developed the completely theological 
distinction between Historie and Geschichte. Both are thus open 
to the criticism of divorcing faith from concrete history. 
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The 
principle of analogy seems to have a heavy influence with Barth 
and Bultmann, going essentially unquestioned through the instigation 
of new uses of the term historical. 
Has Moltmann given us anything genuinely new in this area? 
Very little, as we have noted previously. To us the similarities 
far outweigh the distinctions. In spite of his initial confirmation 
of the historicity of the Resurrection, which comes at us like a 
gathering storm of new reflection, he seems hardly preoccupied with 
verifying the Resurrection as an event of the past. His 'eschatological 
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verification, ' though having dogmatic merit perhaps, is basically 
a somewhat circuitous nod to Troeltsch, while still lacking any 
potential for dialogue with the historical critics. When Moltmann 
speaks of the Resurrection as an 'event of promise' (an event whose 
importance is not so much in being history as in making history, 
i. e., opening history up and disturbing all our so-called estab- 
lished facts) the similarities with Bultmann are obvious. Moltmann's 
aim is likewise to stress that the Resurrection is not important so 
much for its historicity as for the history that it makes, giving 
to us the possibility of "rising again with Christ in the present 
tense. "93 Bultmann's emphasis on the Resurrection as the "escha- 
tological event par excellence" points up the "victory over the 
power of death" and the resulting new life which ensues. 
94 
It is 
possible to superimpose Moltmann's social perspective upon the 
framework of Bultmann's existential one rather neatly at times. 
Given Bultmann's speaking of the Resurrection in terms of 'victory 
over death' (from 'inauthentic' to 
'authentic' existence), we may 
note Moltmann's desire to see the church's "anticipation of the 
future of Christ" transform itself into the liberation from the 
"Vicious Circles of Death" which hold the world's oppressed. 
95 
We have noted that Moltmann proclaims the necessity for 
Christian hope of existence after death, insists on its support- 
ability and turns to the Resurrection for such support, recognizes 
that we are forced to ask behind the Biblical claims regarding 
historicity, and then concludes, following the lead set by Barth 
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and Bultmann, that its historicity is unverifiable. Let us look 
further into ways Moltmann has tried to resolve this problem. 
In an interesting transitional move he seemingly tried to focus 
more on the crucifixion than the Resurrection. In Religion, Revo- 
lution and Future Moltmann expanded the idea that "the cross is the 
present form of the resurrection. "96 These efforts were only part- 
ially successful. Although decreasing the intensity of questions 
about the Resurrection Moltmann admits that "committing oneself with- 
out reserve to the 'crucified God' (i. e., a theology of the cross) 
... 
is dangerous. It does not promise the confirmation of one's 
own conceptions, hopes and good intentions... It offers no recipe 
for success. "97 In losing the element of Christian hope it also 
fails to perceive the crucifixion in its entirety. He denies that 
we can "talk about the cross of Jesus just as a 'veil' of suffering, 
tortured flesh through which we can see a pleasant sky illuminated 
by the brilliant rays of the sun of God's love. "98 Moltmann gen- 
erally denies the view stressed by both Bultmann and Barth, that 
the cross and Resurrection are one event or, put anothe way, two 
modes of being of the same thing. 
99 
The cross, truly understood, 
is not in itself a sign of hope. 
From this Moltmann returns to the Resurrection (within the 
context of The Crucified God) and to its verification. Denying 
Pannenberg's analytic style of verifying the historical evidence, 
he offers what he terms "orthopraxy, " or "translating (an event) 
into act and experience. " 
100 The focus of the New Testament writers 
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is not precision in factual reporting, but rather a concrete mis- 
sionary proclamation. Quoting approvingly from a Japanese Christ- 
ian student union which states that "God does not exist in this 
church, but rather in the living deeds of a man involved in human 
relationships, " 
101 Moltmann proposes the idea that perhaps the only 
way of talking about this event is in terms of self-emptying for 
the sake of others. 
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What finally comes of this is a strange twist in which Molt- 
mann seems to be offering the self-fulfilling possibility that our 
hope should rest on our own actions. Now this holds some merit, 
so far as we are approaching something that is within our ability 
to accomplish. Hope can be a source of confidence that can make 
belief come true. Moltmann's call for a politically active theo- 
logy approaches Christian belief in this way. 
103 
On the other hand, 
Moltmann seems to recognize the intrinsic fallacy of such belief 
when applied rigorously to Christian hope. "Ultimately, one's 
belief is not in one's own faith... one believes in someone else 
who is more than one's own faith. " Likewise: "The real future is 
not identical with the successes of our activities. It must come 
towards us that our activity be 'not in vain. '"104 Hope finally 
resides in something beyond ourselves; we trust in God not in man 
and his achievements. If that hope outside ourselves, then, is not 
to be mere speculation we must, according to Moltmann, have good 
reasons for believing it, i. e., that it is true and merits our 
trust. And thus the puzzling circular argument of Moltmann regarding 
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the historicity of the Resurrection. The problem remains with 
little hope of insight we believe, should we pursue Moltmann's 
line of thought exclusively. 
Summary 
In conclusion let us summarize for clarity and for future 
reference Moltmann's views on the Resurrection and its historicity. 
. The Resurrection cannot be fully understood by sidestepping 
the issue of its historical validity. The Scriptures themselves 
push us to consider the question: "What can I know about the his- 
torical facts? " 
105 
. Yet the Resurrection contradicts our modern view of histor- 
ical possibility. such an event seemingly cannot be incorporated 
within the schemes of analogy and'similarity that foYm the basis 
of contemporary historical research. Even a method that takes 
into consideration the contingent could not handle the Resurrect- 
106 
ion. 
. We are thus left with 
"eschatological verification" as the 
only kind of verification appropriate to this event. It is thus 
to be understood from the end of history rather than from within 
107 
history. 
. Historical research does serve a positive function for theo- 
logy, however, by keeping the paradoxical nature of the Resurrection 
in focus. Believers are forced to accept the fact that their un- 
derstanding of the present as well as the past is disrupted by an 
event that looks to the future for verification. The source of 
hope in this event, its miraculous character, is the very thing 
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that stymies modern historiography and forces the Resurrection 
to remain an open question. Historical research with its criticism 
of fantasy keeps Resurrection faith honest, and serves as a kind 
of "negative theology. " 
108 
. Theology must accept 
this contradiction between the Resur- 
rection and historical research, allowing it to point to the pro- 
mised future. With this in mind we must understand the practical- 
ty of such an event for it will be truly known to others only 
through the difference it makes in human affairs. All questions 
regarding theory of history pale in comparison to the Christian 
challenge regarding the practice of history. 
109 
Moltmann's emphasis on the "eschatological verification" of 
the Resurrection, the 'promise' aspect which we have uncovered in 
our historical sections, leads us to a discussion of: 
The Revelatory Value of the Resurrection 
Speaking of the difference between Moltmann and the theo- 
logians of the previous generation it has been noted: "Barth and 
Bultmann... made revelation central to their thinking, but accord- 
ing to Moltmann, they neglected the eschatological character of 
revelation. He himself does not deny revelation, but he insists 
that revelation has the form of promise - indeed, it would not be 
going too far to say that for Moltmann, promise has the central role 
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that Barth and Bultmann assigned to revelation. " 
We shall not attempt here to recount the revelational aspects 
of the Resurrection as found in Barth and Bultmann, which would 
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simply reiterate the substance of previous sections. The gist 
of this insight can, however, be summed up in saying that Molt- 
mann's chief contention with these theologians revolves, as we 
have seen, around his dislike of the concept of 'epiphany. ' The 
problem does not lie in the assertion of divine revelation as such, 
rather in the different ways of conceiving and speaking of that 
revelation. "It is one thing to ask: where and when does an epiph- 
any of the divine, eternal, immutable and primordial take place in 
the realm of the human, temporal and transient? And it is another 
thing to ask: when and where does the God of the promise reveal 
his faithfulness and in it himself and his presence? The one quest- 
ion asks about the presence of the eternal, the other about the 
future of what is promised. " 
ill 
As we have noted previously, Moltmann is obviously at logger- 
heads with the concept of the creator required by classical phil- 
osophical theology. The eternal, immutable God of Greek metaphys- 
ics is an impoverished God in Moltmann's view. To be sure, this 
philosophy has shown us some truth, such as, that God does not 
change like creatures, nor 
does he suffer in the same sense, yet 
theism was wrong, according to Moltmann, to go to the extent of 
denying any mutability to God and of not considering that God 
might voluntarily open himself up to suffering on behalf of his 
112 
creatures. 
Moltmann's God is intimately involved with this world and with 
his people. He is the "God (who) experiences history in order to 
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effect history. He goes out of himself in order to gather into 
himself... (to effect) his completed felicity at the end. "113 Thus 
we are led into the goal of God's activity in the form of promise/ 
fulfilment, namely its future orientation which subsumes all his- 
tory and all humanity. 
The whole force of promise, and of faith in terms of promise, 
says Moltmann, is to keep a tension in the affairs of men, to keep 
them on the move, aware of struggling after the promise which has 
not yet found its answer in reality. 
114 
To dispel any vagueness 
Moltmann goes on to fill in more specifically what is to be under- 
stood by the 'promise of God. '115 He begins with an understanding 
gained from the Old Testament history of Israel. 
1) A promise is a declaration which announces the coming of a 
reality that, as yet, does not exist and which may also appear im- 
possible by the standard of present experience. 
2) The promise draws our gaze - and our actions - toward the 
future. The future which it discloses is made possible and deter- 
mined by the promised fulfilment. 
3) The history which is thus initiated is not cyclical but 
linear, striving towards the promised and outstanding fulfilment. 
An 'interval of tension' is thus created. 
But what of the 'goal' of promise? Towards what did Israel 
strive? Echoing W. Zimmerli 
Moltmann claims that: 
4) "Yahweh himself is the future of which the prophets speak. 
Everything that Yahweh has to tell his people and to announce to 
them appears as a development of the basic declaration 'I am Yahweh. ' 
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. The history of 
the promise then serves towards even profounder know- 
ledge of God on man's part. " 
116 
Thus God is not first known at the 
lend of history but even while it is in the making in an anticipatory 
sense. He is known, in effect, by his very 'same-ness, ' in historic 
faithfulness, in the constancy of his freely chosen relation to his 
creatures. Something is then revealed about God. These promises 
. tell us who 
he will be, that he will be found on the road his 
promises point to the future, and where he will be found on that 
road. "Knowledge of God is then a knowledge that draws us onwards - 
not upwards - into situations that are not yet finalized 
but still 
, outstanding. " 
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This then is the initial aspect of Moltmann's understanding 
-of promise. 
God is not aloof but involved, practical, and faith- 
ful. His person is not known in the first instance in the language 
, of 
'completed'facts, ' or epiphanies but in the tension of promise/ 
-fulfilment which draws us towards the future. He becomes known to 
us as we move towards that 
future. But from a distinctly Christian 
perspective we may ask, what 
then of Jesus? In the midst of the 
history of promise, the tension towards the future, precisely what 
-role 
does Jesus - and his Resurrection - occupy? To understand 
this we must look to Moltmann's Christology and move 
in great part 
from Theology of Hope to The Crucified God. 
In spite of a consistent eschatological approach to theology, 
. Moltmann 
does not let the future - and the importance of the pro- 
_mise/fulfilment motif 
-diminish the importance of the death and 
the Resurrection of Christ. He rather takes up this importance in 
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relation to promise, stressing the fact that The Crucified God does 
not involve an essential shift from the perspective of Theology of 
Hope. 
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In some ways Moltmann's Christology is traditional. The Chal- 
cedonian categories of the two natures of Christ are used to organ- 
ize an important part of his discussion, 
119 
and he follows the re- 
former's three-fold office of Christ as a formative notion. 
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Moltmann is also very reliant upon Luther for his general orienta- 
tion focusing upon the death and Resurrection of Christ. 
121 
But 
whereas traditional Christology is mainly directed toward the 
past, 
122 the Christology of Moltmann is essentially directed, 
through a primary concern to understand the death and Resurrection 
of Christ, towards the future. Let us see how this takes place. 
As to what actually transpired Easter morning Moltmann declines 
speculation since no Biblical witness claims actual knowledge of 
this event. Yet he does provide some interesting insights on the 
concept of Resurrection 
itself. 
123 
1) The gospel writers speak of 'resurrection' rather than elev- 
ation or eternalization, 
because of its apocalyptic symbolism. 'Res- 
urrection from the 
dead' symbolizes 'the end of history, ' of un- 
righteousness, evil, 
death and abandonment by God, and subsequently 
the beginning of the new world of the righteousness of God. 
2) 'Resurrection of the dead' excludes any idea of a revivi- 
f ication of the dead Jesus, which was a reversal of death. It pre- 
cludes the understanding that 
he returned to this life only to die 
again. Rather, it stands 
for new life, qualitatively different, 
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which knows no death. 
3) 'Resurrection of the dead' excludes any idea of a 'life 
after death' of which many religions speak, meaning the immortal- 
ity of the soul or the transmigration of souls, etc. Moltmann is 
somewhat vague here, but his stress seems to be once again on the 
newness of life that 'resurrection of the dead' implies. 
124 It is 
important to note that this term does not seek to deny the fatality 
of death with the help of ideas of life after death. Its emphasis 
is opposed to a mere continuation of existence, stressing rather 
"the future of the dead" perceived in Jesus' appearances in the 
light of the coming glory of God. Thus the individual shall not 
continue as is but shall be radically changed. 
In Moltmann's scheme the raising of Jesus from the dead is 
both our hope and our promise. The future of the new world and of 
the righteousness of God has dawned in the raising of this man, and 
in this sense Moltmann can claim that "the future has already be- 
gun. " Jesus' Resurrection makes possible reconciliation in the 
midst of strife, grace in the midst of judgment, creative love in 
the midst of legalism. Thus, over against the "distinct expecta- 
tions of Jewish apocalyptic" we find expressed here in Moltmann 
intimations of a new, eschatological understanding of time. 
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We shall look at this again shortly. 
Regarding the post-Resurrection appearances Moltmann attempts 
to discover a fuller sense of the Resurrection than can be under- 
stood by looking 
individually at either the pre-Pauline _1_aß _ 
280 
(Christ was seen; Christ showed himself; God showed him) or the 
strictly Pauline use of (o-jOtX (relating the revelational 
aspect of the Resurrection). When the 'appearing' and 'seeing' 
group of words are connected with the 'revelational' expressions, 
Moltmann presents his understanding (rather reminiscent of Barth) 
of what is meant by the New Testament witnesses regarding Christ's 
appearances. He states: "God is disclosing something which is con- 
cealed from the knowledge of the present age of the world... which 
cannot be known by the mode of knowledge of the present time... 
'the mysteries of the end-time, ' i. e., God's future and the right- 
eousness of his kingdom... are concealed and cannot be known under 
the conditions of the present age... (which) cannot tolerate the 
righteousness of God... But in the history of the unrighteous world 
there are already anticipatory revelations of his future. "126 
Moltmann basically then follows Pannenberg in asserting that 
the Resurrection of Jesus before other men should be seen prolept- 
icall : it was an anticipation of the future which was to affect 
all men. He approvingly quotes Pannenberg's claim that: "In the 
fate of Jesus the end of history has taken place beforehand as an 
anticipation.  
127 
Yet he differs from Pannenberg in several import- 
ant ways. As we have seen Moltmann denies that any historical 
proof for this prolepsis 
is provided since the claim of the earthly 
Jesus (proleptically claiming the distant kingdom of God) and his 
resurrection 
from the dead are "referred to God for future confirm- 
°128 There is no unpartisan knowledge established on a neu- ation. 
tral basis such as one might obtain for the crucifixion, for visions 
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do not have this character. The Resurrection does not speak in 
the 'language of facts, ' but only the 'language of promise, ' 
although for Moltmann this captures the anticipation which, for 
Pannenberg, lies in the 'fact' itself. Moltmann, as we have seen, 
prefers to speak of 'promise event' rather than Pannenberg's 'an- 
ticipatory event' for the reason that this is more faithful to the 
"continuing difference between the demonstrably 'unredeemed world' 
and faith in the coming of reconciliation in the midst of strife 
than the verbally pacifying talk of the actual anticipation of the 
129 Yet Moltmann does not claim that the proleptic feature end. " 
of anticipation is really the special element in the christian 
Easter faith as does Pannenberg. 
For Moltmann there is this valid proleptic dimension in the 
Resurrection. Yet - and this will reflect Moltmann's social per- 
spective - he is even more concerned with asking who this resur- 
rected one was. He cites Ernst Bloch as having understood bet- 
ter than most theologians that "the hope for resurrection is not 
a human hope for good fortune, but is an expression of the expect- 
ation of divine righteousness. "130 Only when we understand that 
Jesus was condemned as a "blasphemer" (by the Jews) and as a "rebel" 
(by the Romans), and that he died with every sign of being abandoned 
by God, can we see the true "new and scandalous element in the 
Christian message of Easter": not that Jesus was raised before 
anyone else, but that He died, and was raised, as the condemned, 
executed and forsaken Son of God. 
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To put it another way: the 
problematical area regarding the Resurrection does not center just 
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on its conceivableness - is it physically, biologically, or his- 
torically possible? - but also on whether the Resurrection of the 
crucified Christ corresponds to the righteousness of God. For 
then the possibility must be considered that through His uncon- 
ditional grace God makes righteous the unrighteous and those with- 
out rights. 
Yet Moltmann claims this as more than a possibility; it is 
"unequivocally a joyful hope. "132 Its message proclaims that the 
executioners will not finally triumph over their victims, nor will 
the victims triumph over their executioners. The One will triumph 
who died for both, breaking through circles of both hate and ven- 
geance. 
The question of universalism has come up in our discussion so 
far only in a very accessory sense. For Bultmann, we recall, the 
cross/Resurrection (i. e., Eschatological) event opened up the pos- 
sibility of authentic existence based upon one's response to the 
confrontation of the person of Christ in preaching. "This is pre- 
cisely what will not do, " Barth retorts, going on to give a uni- 
versalist, tone to his theology. Yet Barth shys away from full- 
fledged universalism by taking refuge in the infinite "possibilities" 
of God's grace, of which we should never be surprised. In Moltmann 
however we see a true universalist, one who revels in the "law of 
grace for unrighteous and self-righteous alike, "133 and who brings 
his universalism to the forefront where it is openly proclaimed as 
integral to the ultimate purpose of God's love. 
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The question has been asked by critics of Theology of Hope: 
is it any more than a sell-out to a new wave of optimism? Is suf- 
ficient stock taken of the cross, that 'darker' side of the New 
Testament and the other side of the Gospel of the Resurrection? 
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In The Crucified God it has become evident that Moltmann is not 
simply offering a new Hegelianism, or a new version of process phil- 
osophy, but a theologia crucis tied intimately to the Resurrection. 
The Crucified God seeks to unravel and understand a dialectical 
unity of cross and Resurrection: the Resurrection of the crucified 
Christ, and the cross of the risen Jesus. 
Moltmann is well aware of the 'darker' side of reality as it 
is exhibited in the cross event. He does not attempt to gloss over 
these realities by virtue of some glib message of hope. Indeed, we 
may say that it is by facing head on the forbidding side of the 
crucifixion, i. e., the temporal aspect which exposes itself in con- 
demnation, suffering and forsakeness, that Moltmann draws the sub- 
stance of his message of hope. For the cross, as the cross of the 
risen Christ, is the reflection of the righteousness of God, giving 
hope to the very ones who are described by these terms. It is God 
who suffers on their behalf, as one of them. The cross thus becomes 
for Moltmann not only the event in which "Christ died for us" (Rom- 
ans 5: 8) in the special sense of 'for our sins. ' It also becomes 
the promise that this sacrifice of love is not in the least exclusive, 
that both victims and executioners will take part in God's new 
righteousness, as exemplified in the Resurrection. This is the meaning 
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of "for us. " 
Thus, in Moltmann's eschatological time sense135 the Resur- 
rection, which confirms the eschatological status of Jesus, shows 
the cross as the dying of this eschatological person. As by his 
Resurrection he is qualified in his person to become the Christ of 
God (Romans 1: 4), so His suffering and death must be understood to 
be the suffering and death of the Christ of God. The Resurrection 
does not undo the cross but qualifies it so that it becomes an 
eschatological saving event by saying who suffered and died here. 
That is why Moltmann can say that: "Only in the light of his Resur- 
rection from the dead does his death gain that special, unique sav- 
ing significance which it cannot achieve otherwise, even in light 
of the life he lived. "136 The dying of this eschatological man 
then, in abandonment, means that he died 'for us' who likewise are 
abandoned and helpless. The Resurrection makes the cross the ontic 
expression of God's universal love. In saying who died on the cross 
it follows, claims Moltmann, that the saving significance of Christ's 
death on the cross 'for us' must start to be understood backwards 
from his Resurrection. 
Yet saying that only his death has a true saving significance 
for us (which Moltmann does) means that his death on the cross 
expresses the significance of his Resurrection for us and not vice 
versa. "The resurrection from the dead qualifies the person of 
the crucified Christ and with it the saving significance of his 
death on the cross for us, 'the dead. ' Thus the saving significance 
of his cross manifests his Resurrection. It is not his Resurrection 
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that shows that his death on the cross took place for us, but on 
the contrary, his death on the cross 'for us' that makes relevant 
his resurrection 'before. "'137 
Basically, one must again think eschatologically (with a re- 
versed sense of time) and return from the future of Christ to his 
past, seeing him dying as the risen Christ. Through his suffering 
and death the Christ who was raised before us becomes the Christ 
for us. As Moltmann puts it: "The anticipation of the resurrection 
of the dead in him gains its saving significance for us only through 
his offering for us on the cross. "138 
Questions Arising: The Eschatological Problem 
This seems an acceptable place to raise an area of concern. 
Moltmann's affection for the primacy of hope in the Christian faith 
has led to what one critic has called a "dreadful elephantiasis of 
the eschatological dimension of the Christian message. " 
139 
We 
must concur. 
Now this is not to deny the importance of eschatology in either 
the old or New Testaments. The fact that Moltmann takes the eschat- 
ological character of Christianity with such seriousness is one of 
his strengths and a source of real power in his theology. John 
Macquarrie, often critical, has sung his praises on this point 
stating that: "For nearly a century, we have been hearing that the 
New Testament is deeply imbued with eschatological and even apoca- 
lyptic beliefs. Weiss and Schweitzer, Barth and Bultmann and a 
host of others have all hammered home this point. But (with the 
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exception of the early Barth) none of them took it seriously when 
faced with the constructive tasks of systematic theology. The 
heady ideas of primitive Christianity were in one way or another 
defused or demythologized or otherwise rendered inoffensive to 
modern minds. Moltmann, on the contrary, accepts that eschatology 
is no mere accidental ingredient in Christianity, a dispensable 
relic of first-century mythology, but of the very essence. "140 
This theology's very conception, then, as an attempt to bring to 
fruition finally the exegetical findings of nearly a century relat- 
ed to the eschatological nature of Scripture, is an asset. 
The problem, as we see it, is not in the eschatological con- 
ception of Moltmann's theology, but in the fact that Moltmann does 
not content himself with bringing out the eschatological aspect 
that is contained in Scripture. Moltmann tends (systematically) to 
ignore or rule out everything that does not have an eschatological 
character as its essence. We may see this in pursuing Moltmann's 
treatment of epiphany. 
We have noted the negative connotation of this word for Molt- 
mann and seen the reasons for this. Yet does Moltmann really up- 
hold the integrity of Scripture in his exclusion of this aspect of 
traditional theology? Such a unilateral approach seems to us con- 
trived. Does not the preaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of God 
relate not only to the future but to the present (and past)? 
Jesus speaks of the Kingdom as being "at hand" (Matthew 4: 17) and. 
"among you" (Luke 17: 21). John relates eternal life, which we 
identify with the future, as already present in this life (John 3: 
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18-26; 5: 24; 6: 47). Does Moltmann not owe it to his readers to 
deal with passages such as these? 
We may press on further to state that there need not be the 
conflict between present and future which is claimed by Moltmann. 
Indeed, is it not more in line with Scripture to notice the relat- 
ionship between these two periods of revelation as one of dependen- 
cy? As has been noted: "If there were not present epiphanies of 
God among the ambiguities of the world, how could we have any bel- 
iefs about His actions in the past or the future? "141 When one op- 
erates as exclusively within the category of promise as does Molt- 
mann some aspects of theology are rendered troublesome. Is not 
God the God of the present as well as the future? We may confident- 
ly hope for the total disclosure of his Lordship but at the same 
time do we not do more than hope? Can we not be said to live, move, 
and have our being within the fact of God's presence. It is clear 
that Moltmann can speak of God's presence, as we shall see subse- 
quently regarding the sacraments, 
but how this is to be taken re- 
mains vague. It seems to us that without genuine epiphany hope 
would be without 
foundation. The category of 'promise' itself, so 
integral to Moltmann's eschatology, brings up the necessity of asking 
upon what is the promise 
based? Are not the 'promises' regarding the 
future based on God's definitive acts in history? 
142 
And is not a 
promise of God taken seriously 
because God has acted in history and 
shown himself to 
be reliable? Moltmann makes a strong case for 
travesty in the history of theology and the Church based upon mis- 
conceptions of epiphany. 
But Moltmann's uncompromising reaction 
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seems in its own way just as improper. As one critic has noted: 
"God is not only ahead of us in the future but God is also prior 
to time. Moltmann understands the former but not the latter. "143 
Indeed, when one claims that God's essential being is future, there 
is a ready made tolerance for the destruction of categories of the 
14 
past and present in order to realize this future. 
4 
Moltmann: Eschatological Verification? 
Moltmann quotes approvingly Kant's declaration that "a relig- 
ion which, without hesitation, declares war on reason, will not, 
in the long run, be able to hold out against it" yet follows this 
with the qualifying statement, that "even reason, in its enlight- 
ening victory over what it called faith, could not hold out alone, 
but developed highly unreasonable forms of naive credibility. " 
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Moltmann's statement of the symbiotic relationship between theo- 
logy and natural science has been echoed and expanded recently by 
Hans Kung in his discussion of the place of reason in modern under- 
standing. 
146 'What are the limits to natural science? ', Kün5 asks. 
Can it serve, with its mathematical-scientific ideals of clarity 
and distinctness, as a foundation for the modern world picture? 
Perhaps surprisingly this Catholic theologian answers: yes, if its 
limitations are also held in view. The foundation must not be made 
the whole structure. In its field - from atomic physics to medicine - 
it has an autonomy which no churchman may deny by appeal to a higher 
authority (be it Bible or Pope). Demarcation between mathematical- 
scientific and metaphysical-theological statements are necessary. 
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On the other hand (as may be implied from this last statement) 
this autonomy does not necessarily carry over into other fields. 
Questions of law, politics, morality, religion, history must be treat- 
ed with methods that correspond to their object and style; not every 
discipline corresponds to the greatest possible mathematical cer- 
tainty. But here is the point, reflective of Moltmann's, which 
Kling makes so well: theology must stand for critical rationality 
while, at the same time, standing against an ideological rationalism. 
147 
We must be aware of our debt to the tradition of critical thought 
while rejecting the "absolutizing and mysticizing" of the rational 
factor. Moltmann has brought us to a point which forces us to re- 
examine the role of the Resurrection in 20th century theology by 
confronting faith and rationality in a novel way. 
Heretofore we have seen two ways in which the Resurrection of 
Jesus Christ has been verified - history and faith. Both Barth and 
Bultmann have had a degree of reliance on both.. Barth has offered 
an apologetic for historical verification which 
is based on the 
enhancement of possibility. 'Why should such a thing not have 
hap- 
pened? ', he asks. 'Is it really too difficult to believe? ' But a 
surprising category, that of "good taste" stops Barth from calling 
the Resurrection an historical, thus placing it in the realm of 
"saga. "148 Bultmann has, in his own way, legitimated the history 
(Historie) of the Resurrection by his stress on the "rise of faith" 
in the apostles. This historisch rise of faith must have an under- 
pinning of considerable sway and power - the 
'something' to which 
Bultmann obliquely refers. 
Yet, for the most part, these theologians must be seen to 
leave behind the historisch question and suggest that faith is the 
evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus. 
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Bultmann is perhaps 
the more obvious in pursuing this line of thought in his emphasis 
on the existential experience, but Barth, too, appeals strongly 
to faith as evidential since he denies the possibility of histor- 
ical validation for the Resurrection. Moltmann offers now a third 
solution. For him the Resurrection is verifiable eschatologically 
but not historically. Future 'proofs' are substituted for past 
and present ones. The initial advantage of this view is obvious: 
it allows Moltmann to make claims of an historical nature, much as 
Barth does, without the necessity of having to offer what would be 
normally acceptable bases for these claims. 
In Moltmann's interpretation of Christian hope, Christian faith 
lives from the Resurrection-fact of Jesus Christ. The one who died 
on the cross has a future because of his Resurrection. And this 
future which he has because of his Resurrection is the object of 
Christian hope. 
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It is thus easy to understand Moltmann's initial 
claims that the historical nature of the Resurrection is integral 
to its understanding. But the dissonance is the more jarring, be- 
cause of this initial emphasis, when one discovers the truth of 
Moltmann's 'historical' viewpoint. 
Moltmann's concept of history, from which he draws his under- 
standing of the future of Jesus Christ is described as going "beyond 
both historicism and existentialism. " Moltmann speaks of "a historic 
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0 
relation to history, " which "will not seek merely to illumine the 
factual sequences of events and their laws, nor merely to explore 
past possibilities of existence in order possibly to repeat them. " 
He says that it will rather "search the reality of the past for the 
possibilities that lie within it. " 
151 Positivistic historicism 
dates and localizes the realities of the past, forgetting that 
"unborn future lies in the past, " while the existentialist discovers 
existential possibilities in past experience in order to repeat them 
for the sake of man, who lives his life in the present, without re- 
alizing that past existence contains within it the future possibil- 
ities that can be truly called "historic. " 
Having rejected then both historicism and existentialism, Molt- 
mann goes on to locate his 'hope' theology somewhere between the 
two alternatives which he has just refused. His concept of history 
which he gradually makes clear to his readers is a future-oriented 
concept: he interprets and evaluates all historical events in the 
light of the meaning which they have for the future. Christian 
hope, for Moltmann, is not directed backward to the Resurrection 
event, in spite of 
his approach through Kant's categories, i. e., 
'What can I know? ' Christian hope means a hopeful expectation which 
the Christian has towards the future of Christ which, however, can- 
not be grounded 
("localized") in time and space and which exists 
transcending history while at the same time bringing 
into it hith- 
erto unknown possibilities. 
Moltmann is concerned at crucial times to separate himself from 
Buitmann, and this is often justified. But it is legitimate to ask 
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whether there is any real difference between Moltmann's views and 
Bultmann's existentialist ones, which regard hope as lying in man's 
experience of the triumph of grace over the fallenness of existence 
in his own life. There is, in one sense, basically no difference, 
for both views wish to look at Christian hope in the light of a 
future which transcends chronological time (past and future) and 
can be grasped only in its existential relation to history. 
152 
There is here the distaste for the objective, historisch approach to 
history which the scientific historian takes. Thus the term "his- 
tory, " when used by Moltmann, does not necessarily, and at a fun- 
damental level, convey an historical meaning in the sense that an 
average historian would understand and/or approve. Moltmann has 
certainly not freed himself (as he seems at times to desire) from 
the existentialist view of history at strategic points. For the 
term "history" is, beyond a superficial emphasis on the historical 
(historisch character of the Resurrection, meant to designate a 
category or form of thought by means of which one can conceive real- 
ity meaningfully. 
Moltmann's answer then, to Kant's question 'What can I know? ', 
is actually to plead'the remaining two: 'What must I do? ' and 'What 
may I hope for? ' (a novel form of answering a question with a quest- 
ion). We are compelled, he claims, to seek the reality behind the 
Biblical events, to ask about objective certainty, yet we cannot 
"merely embark on a historical examination of the past that once 
was, nor yet merely provide an existentialist interpretation of 
present claims, but we must inquire into what is open... and outstanding 
and consequently into the future announced by this event. " 
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is the future which unites our present age with history. The Res- 
urrection event is understood "only in the modus of promise. " Thus, 
for Moltmann, any discussion of the reality behind the Biblical 
events must initially and consistently be set within the horizon 
of Kant's third question 'What may I hope for? ' 
Perhaps the summary of Moltmann's view on verification of the 
Resurrection is to be recalled from his juxtaposition of promise 
and epiphany. The Resurrection is not an epiphany, a "coming into 
congruence with the eternal being, " but the anticipation of the 
promised future. Arguments for the existence of God and schemes 
of verification for the content of divine revelation presuppose 
that "truth is experienced in correspondence, conformity, and agree- 
ment. "154 The Resurrection, however, contradicts experience. It 
fails to correspond and conform to established standards of scien- 
tific experimentation. It fails to agree with our attitudes about 
the prescribed limits of historical truth. This contradiction then 
between divine revelation and scientific limits of truth can be an 
argument against the latter as well as the former. The classical 
'proofs' of God which initiate from the world of human experience or 
155 The from God himself are pieces of "anticipated eschaton. " 
pursuit of the proofs of 
God, with the resultant implication that 
'God is all in all' can only anticipate a God that is yet to come, 
not demonstrate a God that 
is here and now. The 'immediate (his- 
torical) presence of God is not in reality constitutive of our 
faith but is its goal. Put simply the Resurrection contradicts our 
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modern view of historical possibility. Thus the only kind of 
verification appropriate to this event is eschatological verifi- 
cation, comprehension from the end of history rather than from with- 
in. Moltmann would claim that historical research does serve a 
vital, positive function for theology by keeping this contradict- 
ory character of the Resurrection in focus, forcing us to realize 
as believers that our faith is based on an event that looks to the 
promised future for verification. He would also claim that theology 
must overcome the temptation to avoid the contradiction between the 
Resurrection and historical-scientific method, and allow it to be- 
come the point of departure for an understanding of the present 
and the past that is oriented to the promised future. 
Yet should the principle of future hope be the overarching 
principle of reality? Should the future so define and relativize 
God's definitive acts in history? Is Moltmann's theology tantamount 
to "allowing for the destruction of categories of the past in order 
ý to realize the future.  
156 Granted that we must recognize the im- 
portance of seeking to transform rather than just interpret reality; 
that the Resurrection will be known to others only through the dif- 
ference it makes in human affairs. 
157 
Yet does not Moltmann him- 
self verbalize the need for that historisch 'ground of hope, ' as 
difficult as it may be to consolidate? Can our "practice of his- 
tory" disengage itself to such a degree from historical conscious- 
ness and still 
hope to retain the full impact of its'possibilities 
for change'? These questions are not alien to Moltmann's theology. 
They are in the fullest sense, we believe, questions that Moltmann 
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asks of himself, or brings the reader to the very point of asking. 
His own concerns about verification betray the conclusion which 
underlies his discussion: the Resurrection cannot, for Moltmann, 
be verified in any practical sense. If Resurrection history tends 
to dissolve for Bultmann into the present moment of truth, if Bult- 
mann takes Christianity out of history and replaces it by the con- 
cept of the word received by faith, 
158 
so Resurrection history 
ultimately dissolves for Moltmann, not in the present as for Bult- 
mann, but in the future. The result is much the same. 
Looking Ahead 
It will be of considerable interest then to look at our other 
theologian of 'hope' who is likewise proclaiming the role of Res- 
urrection and eschatology for theology. We shall see if Pannen- 
berg's reinterpretation of the Christian message is substantially 
different than Moltmann's, but this one thing must carry our dis- 
cussion: we have not so far seen a theology that truly attempts to 
call the Resurrection an historisch event, without immediately 
qualifying the nature of the reality of the event that stands in 
question. Is is even possible, then, to tie the question of the 
reality of the Resurrection down to questions of historical proba- 
bility? It might well be that a proper recognition of the reality 
of the Resurrection calls this very attempt into question. But 
let us remember as we move to Pannenberg that both Barth and Molt- 
mann (and even Bultmann in a rather back-handed way) have made 
questions of the historisch nature of the Resurrection of considerable 
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importance to their theologies. Moltmann's "war on reason, " which 
he so mourns for theology, continues, as we see it, unabated. 
There follows an appendix to the Moltmann chapter dealing with 
"Trinitarian History in Moltmann. " This is given in an attempt to 
provide a more complete understanding of Moltmann's theology of the 
Resurrection and to deal in more detail with his The Trinity and the 
Kingdom. It is not imperative that it be read in order to follow 
the line of thought presented in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX TO MOLTMANN 
Trinitarian History in Moltmann 
We recall an earlier claim of Moltmann, that through his suf- 
fering and death the Christ who was raised before us becomes the 
Christ for us. Representative suffering thus holds a place in Molt- 
mann's theology, making the Resurrection more than a miracle or a 
forerunner of the future. But Moltmann is not really concerned to 
speak of representative suffering's significance for those who are 
already 'open' to the world and the future. His stress is rather 
that this representative suffering can reach the outcast and the 
hopeless with hope where the anticipation of the Resurrection of 
the dead cannot. 
159 
The difference is that of a purely future event 
and an event of liberating love. Further, it can provide a legit- 
imate Christian response to atheism. What is the basis of this 
response? 
In The Crucified God we see a decided shift of emphasis (not 
a change of direction) from the God whose essential mode of being 
is the future (Theology of Hope) to the "Trinitarian history of 
God. 11160 This shift is, of course, consummated in The Trinity and 
The Kingdom. What happens on the cross manifests an intimate re- 
lationship between Father and Son (and Holy Spirit). In other words, 
since Jesus was God and Jesus was crucified, God may be called the 
'Crucified God., 
161 
Thus God himself may be said to have suffered 
and died on Calvary. By 
The Trinity and the Kingdom Moltmann pre- 
fers "The Pathos of God, " "The Eternal Sacrifice of Love, " or even 
"The Sorrow of God. " But the meaning is much the same: "The living 
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God is the loving God. The loving God shows that he is a living 
God through his suffering. "162 
Needless to say, Moltmann's criticism of the concept of creator 
required by classical philosophical theology must be raised once 
again. 
163 In particular, the assumption that God is immutable, 
eternal, etc., seems contrived to be the counterpart and complement 
of finite, creaturely being. 
164 
Moltmann prefers to see the nature 
of God in a more open and flowing manner, containing a higher degree 
of involvement, including the ability to suffer, to sense pathos, 
sorrow and tragedy. Not only does Moltmann deny that this death 
"does not affect" God, but quoting Karl Rahner, claims that "this 
death itself expresses God. "165 God, the Father, is involved in 
and suffers to the extent that we can speak finally of the "death 
of God, " or "the Father suffering the death of the Son. "166 
Taking his lead from Barth here he nevertheless goes beyond 
Barth in his interpretation of the Pauline "God was in Christ. " 
Whereas Barth, claims Moltmann, could at times speak almost in theo- 
paschite terms of God's suffering and involvement in the cross event, 
he nevertheless left a distinction between the deus revelatus and 
the dens absconditus, the God beyond contact with evil. 
167 
Molt- 
mann, denying this distinction, prefers to speak of the suffering 
of God as total and uninhibited, "but not in the same way" as the 
Son. Simple theopaschite talk of the 'death of God' will not hold 
up on close inspection, he claims. 
168 
If one expects any insight into the mystery of the trinity in 
Moltmann he will be disappointed. Moltmann has not set out in 
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either The Crucified God or The Trinity and the Kingdom to dispel 
mystery (he is at pains in fact we think, especially in the latter, 
to preserve the mystery) but to illuminate a set of relationships: 
the first between the Father and the Son, 
169 
the second between 
God and man, and the third between man and his fellow man. 
The first relationship, that between Father and Son, is cen- 
tered in the patripassionistic assertion that the Father suffers 
with the Son. Thus the death of Jesus becomes a statement about 
God, not in the sense of simple statements about the 'death of God, ' 
but in a trinitarian sense, understood as death in God. 
170 
The 
point is that God the Father is not removed from the scene of ex- 
piatory suffering but shares it to the fullest. 
The second relationship, that between God and'man, is based on 
this universal suffering of Father and Son and leads to Moltmann's 
stance that "the theology of the cross is the true Christian uni- 
versalism. " 
171 In addition, however, an answer is given to the 
only significant form of atheism, "protest" atheism, which Moltmann 
defines a atheism for the sake of the victims of injustice and op- 
pression. 
172 
As we have noted, Jesus' death in abandonment and judgment are 
seen by Moltmann as significant 
or for many. ' One is a sinner 
can be no more distinction. Li: 
without any merit on their part 
to pass in Christ Jesus (Romans 
suffering with the hopeless and 
for understanding his death 'for us' 
in solidarity with all people; there 
kewise, all will be made righteous 
through God's grace which has come 
3: 24). 173 Yet this solidarity in 
the unrighteous, and God's involvement 
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in it, has the further implication regarding atheism. 
Touched by the pathos of life evoked in Elie Wiesel's Nib 
and Dostoevsky's novel The Brothers Karamozov (which also influenced 
Barth) Moltmann paints the reality, and plausibility, of protest 
atheism. The question of God is not the central issue here, rather 
the image of God. This "atheism for God's sake" sees him as de- 
ceiver, executioner, sadist, despot. This is reflected in the state- 
ment of Ivan Karimazov: "I accept God, understand that, but I can- 
not accept the world that he has made. " 
174 
Moltmann actually ap- 
plauds the "metaphysical rebellion" (Camus) against a God who can- 
not suffer. With Dostoevsky (The Demons) he accepts that "a God 
who cannot suffer is poorer than any man. . 
175 
The atheistic protest against injustice, which is really 
against a God who sits enthroned in heaven in unapproachable glory, 
has been reduced in strength by Moltmann's understanding of God as 
the suffering God in the suffering of Christ. "For this theology, 
God and suffering are no longer contradictions, as in theism and 
atheism, but God's being itself, because God is love. It takes the 
'metaphysical rebellion' up into itself because it recognizes in the 
cross of Christ a rebellion in metaphysics, or better, a rebellion 
in God himself: God himself loves and suffers the death of Christ 
in his love. " 
176 
But what makes this sharing of suffering the answer to the 
'metaphysical rebellion'? What gives the protest atheist legitimate 
cause for reconsideration of his views? 
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There is now an alternative, claims Moltmann, between theism 
and atheism. The Resurrection and the crucifixion (or, to put it 
better, the "crucifixion of the risen Christ") show us that "God is 
not only other-worldly, but also this-worldly; he is not only God but 
also man; he is not only rule, authority and law but the event of 
suffering, liberating love. "177 Anyone who suffers seemingly with- 
out cause need not think that he has been forsaken by God. Rather, 
his cries to God echo the death-cry ("My God, why have you forsaken 
me": Mark 15: 34) of the dying Jesus, the Son of God. 
178 
The one 
who loves, and therefore suffers more deeply for this fact, can take 
solace in the fact that where we suffer because we love, God suffers 
in us. We find the power to continue to love in realization of the 
fact that God has suffered in Jesus and has thus shown us the force 
of his love. "Therefore anyone who enters into love, and through 
love experiences inextricable suffering and the fatality of death, 
enters into the history of the human God, for his forsakeness 
is 
lifted away from him in the forsakeness of Christ, and in this way 
he can continue to love, need not look away from the negative and 
179 
from death, but can sustain death. " 
Moltmann's final relationship, that between man and neighbor, 
revolve around the theme of 'freedom, ' or 'liberation. ' Indeed, 
the consequences of a theology of the cross for politics are lived 
out in political freedom, because Calvary serves to make us pain- 
fully aware of suffering in situations of exploitation, oppression, 
alienation and captivity. 
180 But the Church must be aware of the 
danger it assumes when it breaks with "political religion" and 
II, 
1 
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begins to live out its heritage. Moltmann states: "The memory of 
the passion and resurrection of Christ is at the same time both 
dangerous and liberating. It endangers a Church which is adapted 
to the religious politics of its time and brings it into fellowship 
with the sufferers of its time... (establishes) its political situ- 
ation and function in terms of the freedom of Christ. 
181 
Thus 
Christianity should serve to dispel all notions of political idol- 
atry. Political rule is no longer accepted as God-given, but is 
understood as a task the fulfilment of which must be constantly 
justified. 
Hopeless economic, social and political formations, which drive 
life towards death, are the object of the liberating drive of Christ- 
ianity. Every dimension of life, the economic, the political, the 
cultural, the environmental, must be touched with the Christian 
value of life to enhance the worth of human life and the esteem of 
the individual. This is, in other words, the this-worldly aspect of 
the promise of newness. "Thus the real presences of God acquire the 
character of a 'praesentia explosiva. ' Brotherhood with Christ 
means the suffering and active participation in the history of this 
God. Its criterion is the history of the crucified and risen Christ. 
Its power is the sighing and liberating Spirit of God. Its concum- 
mation lies in the kingdom of the triune God which sets all things 
free and fills them with meaning. "182 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) See J. Macquarrie, "Theologies of Hope: A Critical Examination, " 
The Expository Times, vol. 82, p. 100. 
2) This expression is from J. Moltmann, "Hope Without Faith: An 
Eschatological Humanism Without God, " Is God Dead?, J. B. Metz, 
ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 1966), p. 28. See also Theology 
of Hope, p. 15. [TH] 
3) TH, p. 16. 
4) J. Macquarrie, "Theologies of Hope, " op. cit., p. 100. 
5) TH, p. 16. 
6) Ibid., pp. 37f. 
7) Moltmann's well-known dislike of 'ephiphany' theology actually 
begins on p. 40 where he consigns the idea of the 'eternal pres- 
ent' to the Greek mindset, and thus to pagan philosophies which 
Judeo-Christianity has overcome. 
8) TH, p. 129. 
9) Ibid., p. 16. This interesting statement of Bloch's has achieved 
a degree of fame thanks to the theologies of hope. We note the 
passage here in its context: "'God spoke to Moses: I will be who 
I will be' (Exodus 3: 14)... In order to judge the singularity of 
this passage, we should compare it with another interpretation, the 
later commentary on another name of a god, that of Apollo. Plu- 
tarch tells us... that over the door of the temple of Apollo at 
Delphi there is carved the sign EI; he attempts to give the two 
letters the meaning of a mystic number, but in the end comes to 
the conclusion that EI grammatically and metaphysically means the 
same thing: that is, 'Thou art' in the sense of timelessly unchang- 
ing divine existence. Ehyeh asher ehyeh, on the other hand, on 
the very threshold of the Yahweh manifestation, sets up a God of 
the end of time, with the future as his state of being. The End 
and Omega God would have been a nonsense in Delphi, as in any 
religion where God is not a God of the Exodus. " Quote taken from 
H. Kling, Does God Exist (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 622, quot- 
ing Das Prinzip Hoffnung by Bloch. We may note that, for Moltmann, 
God is subject to the process of time (see Moltmann, "The Realism 
of Hope, " Concordia Theological Monthly, XL (March, 1969), pp. 149- 
55. Moltmann here espouses the view that Christ participates in 
the processes of time and the author shows his disfavor towards 
the 'eternal' Christ. In CG he states the conclusion that "christ- 
ology is essentially unconcluded and permanently in need of revis- 
ion, " since it is a response to the openness of the person and 
history of Jesus to the new creation. See The Crucified God 
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(London: SCM, 1974), pp. 106f. [CG) Also The Experiment Hope 
(London: SCM, 1975), pp. 65f. (We shall see more of this later). 
In this view God is not, in a sense, fully God, since He is 
part of time which has not as yet reached its conclusion. See 
Moltmann, "Hope and History, " Religion, Revolution, and Future 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 207f. We may 
note that, for Moltmann, the question of the existence of God, 
so prevalent in the history of theology, has been replaced by 
the question of when, and how, God will become fully God. The 
practical effect of this is that since God is limited by the 
future, man is given almost limitless possibilities to shape 
his destiny. (See RRF, p. 39, where Moltmann expounds his belief 
that "peoples have the right to determine their own future. ") 
Humanity does not wait passively for redemption to come in the 
form of the parousia of Christ. Rather, it hurries the coming 
of the end through active participation in the affairs of the 
world. (See "What Is New In Christianity, " RRF, p. 5. This "act- 
ive participation" is precisely the point of Moltmann's dis- 
cussions regarding "promise" and "mission" in TH. See espec- 
ially Chapters 3 and 5. This is his answer to the second of 
Kant's three questions, 'What must I do? ") The message of the 
Church, though tied to the past, is nonetheless future orient- 
ed. Change is the key. (See "Hope and History, " RRF, p. 207. 
The preaching of the Church is spoken of in terms such as 
"performance language. ") The Church's message is a catalyst 
for change even as it proclaims the crucified and risen Lord. 
10) TH, p. 129. 
11) See Ibid., pp. 46f. Moltmann is working here from Kant's "short, 
almost forgotten treatise" on Das Ende Aller Dinge (1794). 
12) Idem. 
13) TH, p. 47. 
14) Ibid., p. 5. Moltmann quotes two representative sentences from 
Barth. 1) From Romans, a comment on Romans 13 ("The night is 
far spent, the day is at hand"): "Being the transcendent mean- 
ing of all moments, the eternal 'Moment' can be compared with 
no moment in time" (p. 424). From Resurrection: "Of the real 
end of history it may be said at any time: The end is near" 
(p. 60). From the point of view of the history of philosophy, 
Moltmann attributes this transcendental eschatology (and that 
of Bultmann) not only to Kant, but also to Kierkegaard ("Where 
the eternal is concerned there is only one time: the present") 
and to Ranke ("every epoch has an immediate relation to God"). 
See TH, p. 51. 
15) TH, PP"57-8. 
16) Ibid., p. 228. Barth is quoted by Moltmann here regarding his 
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'unveiling' theology of the last things. "Christ's coming 
again... is described in the New Testament as the revelation. 
He will be revealed, not only to the Church but to everyone, 
as the Person He is... In full clarity and publicity the 'it 
is finished' will come to light... What is the future bringing? 
Not once more a turning-point in history, but the revelation 
of that which is. It is the future, but the future of that 
which the Church remembers, of that which has already taken 
place once and for all. The Alpha and the Omega are the same 
thing. " From Dogmatics in Outline, 1949, pp. 134f. 
17) This is called 
shaped form of 
moral proof of 
p. 61. 
18) TH, p. 62. 
by Moltmann "an advanced, deepened and re- 
the only proof of God left over by Kant - the 
God supplied by the practical reason. " TH, 
19) Idem. Quoting from "History and Eschatology in the New Tes- 
tament, " New Testament Studies, vol. 1,1954, p. 13. 
20) Bultmann is indebted to Augustine in this identification of 
the hiddenness of God and man's self. See, for instance, 
KM, 2, p. 192. 
21) TH, p. 66. From Existence and Faith, op. cit., p. 85. 
22) Moltmann also deals with 1) 'progressive revelation'; and 
2) 'history' as an indirect self-revelation of God. See TH, 
pp. 69f. We by-pass these for the time being since both are 
dealt with more favorably by Moltmann and the basic assumptions 
of each must be dealt with in our discussion of Moltmann's own 
approach to eschatology. 
23) Ibid., pp. 139-40. 
24) Ibid., p. 141. 
25) See Moltmann's chapter "Promise and History" which develops 
his understanding of the Old Testament God of promise. It is 
sufficient for our purposes here to note that for Moltmann the 
God of Israel was a God of promise and that the New Testament 
expression of Jesus is necessarily intertwined and based upon 
this background. 
26) TH, p. 142. 
27) Ibid., pp. 158-9. Moltmann does not claim this corruption for 
the entire Church, but remarks that "the trend towards early 
Catholicism and the life and thought of the ancient Church 
is plain. " 
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28) Ibid., P. M. 
29) Ibid., p. 139. 
30) Ibid., p. 163. 
31) Idem. This term is Moltmann's own. 
32) Ibid., p. 164. When Moltmann speaks of the "present" and the 
"coming" God he is not to be understood in the traditional meta- 
physical sense of being somehow 'beyond' time. Rather, Moltmann 
speaks in an Hegelian sense of the God involved in and moving 
history; God externalizing himself into the world. Much has 
been made regarding the return of the Hegelian influence to 
theology through the writings of Pannenberg and Moltmann. In- 
deed, Hegel's attempt to sketch out a universal history seems 
to have been picked up at least in part by them. Carl E. 
Braaten has rightly noted that: "If the end of history alone 
can provide us with the perspective from which to understand 
the total course of history, then Christian theology cannot 
eschew the concept of universal history so long as it claims 
that Jesus is the eschatological event. " See "Toward A Theo- 
logy of Hope, " Theology Today, vol. 3 (24 July, 1967), p. 221. 
Pannenberg differs from Hegel, however, because of his insist- 
ence that in the Resurrection of Jesus the final end of uni- 
versal history has occurred proleptically. Moltmann differs 
from Pannenberg in stressing "fulfilment" rather than "unveil- 
ing. " (See TH, pp. 228-9. ) The fact is that the view of his- 
tory found in both Pannenberg and Moltmann is, in some respect, 
and self-admittedly, very Hegelian. The existentialist separ- 
ation of fact and significance is denied, and history itself is 
taken to be revelation and the bearer of the eschaton. Hegel's 
concept of the individual as inseparable from the social con- 
text has had an obvious influence especially with Pannenberg 
(see Jesus: God and Man (London: SCM, 1968), p. 182). See also 
J. Macquarrie, "Theologies of Hope, ", op. cit., p. 103, who 
places the theologians of hope in the philosophical line of 
Hegel-Feuerbach-Marx as opposed to the Kierkegaard-Heidegger- 
Bultmann line. We might also-note Moltmann's indebtedness to 
Hegel in his explication of Hegel's notion of the "speculative 
Good Friday. " See TH, pp. 168f. This concept 'universalizes' 
the historical Good Friday, seeing the God who is 'dead' in 
the atheistic world as the precursor of the life-giving future 
open to all mankind. In this view Resurrection is a necessity 
for all that is, making the 'death of God' an element in the 
dialectical process of God, moving towards the future of God. 
33) TH, p. 164. 
34) This theme on the 'Death of God' anticipates major themes of 
The Crucified God and also gives notice of Moltmann's Hegelian 
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influence. The phrase 'God is Dead, ' popularly attributed to 
Nietzsche - "God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed 
Him" (The Gay Science, 1882) - was used by Hegel almost a cen- 
tury earlier to speak of the history of modern times. In Faith 
and Knowledge (1802) he borrowed the phrase from a Lutheran 
hymn, in the context of Christ's death on the cross, to focus 
the "infinite pain" of atheism. See H. King, Does God Exist?, 
op. cit., pp. 138f. for a discussion of the 'God is Dead' history. 
35) Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London: J. M. Dent and 
Sons, 1934), p. 457. 
36) TH, pp. 165f. 
37) Ibid., p. 168. 
38) In fairness to Descartes, this "theory of the two floors" as it 
has been called, implies conclusions that he himself did not 
seemingly want to draw. See H. Kling, Does God Exist?, op. cit., 
pp. 1-41. 
39) Whether the charge is justified or not, Fichte, in his turning 
toward a moral primal certainty, seemed to have eliminated any 
relationship to God. See S. Stumpf, From Socrates to Sartre 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1975), pp. 324-6. Also P. Edward ed., 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 192-5. 
40) See H. Kling, Does God Exist?, p. 139. 
41) E. Quinn (translator of Does God Exist? ) claims to have fol- 
lowed the practice of most Hegelian scholars by translating 
the verb aufheben, "sublate. " Derived from the past partic- 
iple of the Latin tollere - meaning both "to remove" and "to 
elevate" - it is a translation of the German word used by Hegel 
to mean at once "cancelling, " "preserving, " "elevating, " and 
"transfiguring. " See H. Kling, Does God Exist?, p. 140, trans- 
lator's note. 
42) See TH, p. 169. 
43) Idem. 
44) TH, pp. 171-2. D. Bonhoeffer is quoted here by Moltmann claim- 
ing that "we have to live in the world 'etsi deus non daretur. '" 
From Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 196. 
45) Idem. 
46) Idem. 
47) TH, p. 173. See footnote #2 for Moltmann's direct reference to 
Bultmann (and also to H. Conzelmann who concurs with Bultmann. 
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48) Idem. It is quite clear that Moltmann is critical of Barth's 
"orthodox way of asserting the truth, " which comes through in 
Moltmann as somewhat arrogant and contemptuous of attempts to 
"legitimate" the proclamation of the Resurrection. Barth's 
fear, it may be argued, was that the Resurrection would be 
deemed illegitimate by historical/critical methods and its some- 
what antagonistic Weltanschaaung. It is noteworthy that the 
theologies of hope, at least as found in Moltmann and Pannenberg, 
do not fear this and instead stress the credibility of belief 
in the Resurrection on scientific/historical grounds. 
49) Again there is no mention 
mann seems unmistakeable. 
major criticism by Barth. 
50) Ibid., pp. 175-6. 
of names, but the allusion to Bult- 
TH, p. 173. This, we recall, was a 
51) Ibid., p. 179. "The eschatologically new event of the Resur- 
rection of Christ, however, proves to be a novum ultimum both 
as against the similarity in ever-recurring reality and also 
as against the comparative dissimilarity of new possibilities 
emerging in history. To expand the historical approach to 
the extent of taking account of the contingent does not as 
yet bring the reality of the resurrection itself into view. " 
52) Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
53) Ibid., p. 180. 
54) Ibid., p. 182. With this sentence a proper basis is formed for 
all of Moltmann's future discussions of ethics and the life 
of the Church. 
55) Ibid., p. 185. Moltmann refers to KM 1, p. 41. 
56) Ibid., p. 187. Moltmann's approach here is reminiscent of 
Barth, who would agree fully with Moltmann's comments regard- 
ing 'self-understanding. ' We recall specifically Barth's 
"Rudolf Bultmann: An Attempt to Understand Him. " Likewise, 
Moltmann makes the claim that Bultmann and the form critics 
start with the presupposition that existential and not factual 
truth is the key. Further, criticism is made of the attempt 
to use the 'modern' worldview as the standard for all ages 
(pp. 186-7. ) This is Barth's polemic in the Dogmatics, 3/2, p. 447. 
57) Ibid., p. 188. 
58) Although Moltmann has spoken of the "reality" of the existential 
perspective it is clear throughout these pages that the eternal 
present of existentialism is distasteful and that the exist- 
ential separation of fact and significance is denied. 
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59) TH, p. 193. 
60) Ibid., p. 195. 
61) Ibid., p. 198. Moltmann's emphasis on these "auditions" and on 
the necessity of recognizing the risen Christ through his words, 
is based on his belief that: "Without the speaking and hearing 
of words it would have been unlikely - indeed impossible - to 
identify the one who appeared with the crucified Jesus. " And: 
"it is surely a fact that the appearances themselves hardly 
provided the possibility of identifying the one who appeared 
with the one who was crucified. " This seems to be an unneces- 
sary negation of the Biblical witness. If these appearances 
were visionary - and we would appreciate Moltmann's reasons for 
holding this view, nowhere given - is it so likely that the 
identity of the crucified one would have been obscured? Molt- 
mann seems to deny this possibility based on the fact that 
"such things also exist elsewhere in the history of religion, " 
and his resulting desire to give the Resurrection of Jesus its 
own particular characteristics. But does this not detour around 
Moltmann's own principle that: "Neither the historian nor the 
theologian can allow methods based on the principle that what 
must not be cannot be. " (p. 174). Likewise, for all the talk 
of Troeltsch's method of analogy, does it not seem a strange 
modification of this to deny the possibility of a certain Bib- 
lical witness because it may have analogy to other incidents 
in the history of religion. Lastly, before we could accept 
Moltmann's claim as valid, we are entitled to know his steps 
to this understanding of the Resurrection. Without this explana- 
tion it seems to us that Moltmann may be in danger of "postulat- 
ing 'historical' facts on dogmatic grounds. " (p. 174) See also 
Moltmann's The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1981), tr. M. Kohl, pp. 84-5. [TK]. 
62) Moltmann states that "the contradictions between the cross and 
the resurrection are an inherent part of his identity. Then the 
resurrection can neither be reduced to the cross, as showing its 
meaning, nor can the cross be reduced to the resurrection, as 
its preliminary. It is formally a question of... contradiction. " 
See TH, p. 200. 
63) Ibid., p. 201. 
64) Moltmann discusses the future of 1) Jesus Christ; 2) Righteous- 
ness; 3) Life; 4) the Kingdom of God and the Freedom of Man. 
See Ibid., pp. 202-24. 
65) Ibid., p. 203. Moltmann here speaks of cross and Resurrection 
as "event" stressing unity, but this does not seem to reflect 
the general tenor of his discussion. 
66) This is Moltmann's summarization of G. von Rad's understanding 
of righteousness. See footnote #1, ibid., p. 204. 
67) We shall defer discussion of the differences to our research 
into Pannenberg who has, in our opinion, the clearest and 
most encompassing treatment of this important distinction. 
68) Moltmann, in speaking of "God's due, " is influenced by Luther's 
justification Dei activa et passiva. Justification means that 
God justifies man by grace and that man acknowledges God's just- 
ice in confessing his sins, so that in this reciprocal event not 
only the sinner but God, too, is given his rights. " See TH, 
p. 207. 
69) Ibid., pp. 201f. 
70) Ibid., p. 211. 
71) Moltmann, interestingly, quotes Bultmann regarding the role of 
the Holy Spirit. Interesting since, to us, Bultmann discusses 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit very little. Still Moltmann 
likes the phrasing by Bultmann that the "Spirit may be called the 
power of futurity" (from TNT 1, p. 334). See TH, p. 212. After 
this correlation of the Spirit with "futurity, " however, he 
makes an immediate break with Bultmann by a real "difference 
between past and future, " not "an airy nunc aeternum. " In Molt- 
mann's own definition the Holy Spirit is "the power to suf- 
fer in participation in the mission and the love of Jesus 
Christ, and is in this suffering the passion for what is pos- 
sible, for what is coming and promised in the future of life, 
of freedom and of resurrection. " 
72) TH, p. 213. The work of the Holy Spirit is the focus of The 
Church in the Power of the Spirit, tr. M. Kohl (London: SCM, 
19 77). [CPS]. 
73) RRF, p. 16. 
74) Moltmann is critical of Bloch's philosophy at this point claim- 
ing that his view of hope is inadequate since it has nothing to 
offer man facing death. Idem. 
75) TH. P. 88. 
76) Ibid., p. 179. 
77) Ibid., pp. 172-3. 
78) Ibid., p. 165. 
79) W. C. Placher, "The Present Absence of Christ: Some Thoughts on 
Pannenberg and Moltmann, " Encounter, vol. 40 (1979), p. 176. 
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80) RRF, p. 51. 
81) Ibid., p. 53. 
82) Ibid., p. 50. 0 
83) These two points are mentioned by Placher, op. cit., p. 176. 
84) See P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op. cit., 
vol. 6, pp. 47f. 
85) See J. Macquarrie, "Theologies of Hope, " op. cit., p. 103. Mac- 
quarrie notes that in using terms like 'historical' and 'real', 
Moltmann (and Pannenberg) does not mean 'literal. ' 
86) Idem. 
87) TH, pp. 108f. 
88) Macquarrie, "Theologies of Hope, " op. cit., p. 104. 
89) TH, p. 176. 
90) Ibid., p. 180. 
91) The notion of 'eschatological verification' brings to mind 
current Anglo-Saxon discussion of 'religious language. ' These 
discussions primarily have centered on the questions "What 
possible experiences would verify 'God exists'? " and "What 
possible experiences would falsify 'God exists'? " It has been 
claimed by John Hick (see "Theology and Verification, " Theo- 
logy Today, vol. 17 (1960), pp. 12-31) that the notion of eschat- 
ological verification' is a sound one when dealing with the 
question of God's existence and his train of thought even leads 
him to rest his argument on a Resurrection analogy (a progres- 
sion of 'pictures' which demonstrate the possibility of our 
taking seriously the concept of a resurrected body). Such a 
view of verification certainly seems to lend weight to Molt- 
mann's contentions. It must, however, be remembered that, 
whereas Hick is speaking of the concept of God, Moltmann is 
attempting to use 'eschatological verification' to lend cre- 
dence to a particular historical (historisch) event. The dif- 
ficulties of transposing Hick's thought onto Moltmann's become 
clear. 
92) See D. L. Migliore, "How Historical is the Resurrection? ", 
Theology Today, vol. 33, (April, 1976), p. 7. 
93) KM, p. 40. 
94) Idem. 
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95) See CG, pp. 317f. Moltmann is speaking of 1) poverty; 2) in- 
stitütionalization; 3) racial and cultural alienation; 4) in- 
dustrial pollution; and 5) godforsakeness (apathy). Moltmann 
has taken up, to his great credit, the elaboration of what 
'authentic' existence really means. 
96) RRF, p. 53. He states later that: "In a world of death and 
forsakeness the coming glory of God shines forth at first on 
the face of the crucified Christ" (RRF, p. 215). 
97) CG, p. 39. 
98) J. Moltmann, Theology of Play, tr. R. Ulrich (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1972), p. 29. 
99) Such a view, claims Moltmann, "perceives neither the deadliness 
of his death nor the startling newness of his resurrection. " 
TH, p. 200. 
100) CG, p. 11. 
101) CG, p. 15. 
102) CG, p. 17. 
103) See J. Moltmann, The Future as Hope, ed. F. Herzog (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1970), p. 47, where he states: "The future of 
God is mediated in the world-changing powers of men... the 
question: if God is, why is there still evil in the world? 
becomes an accusation not against God, but against ourselves, 
and is answered, to begin with, through the verum facere of 
the Christians in their various vocations directed to the world 
of misery. " 
104) cG, pp. 18f. 
105) TH, p. 165. 
106) Ibid., p. 179. 
107) RRF, p. 51. 
108) Ibid., p. 53. 
109) Moltmann, The Future As Hope, op. cit., pp. 152-3. 
110) J. Macquarrie, "Today's Word for Today: Jürgen Moltmann, " The 
Expository Times, vol. 92 (October, 1980), p. 5. Also TH, pp. 228f. 
111) TH, p. 43. Moltmann appeals to "recent theology of the Old 
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Testament which has shown with new clarity the correlation 
between 'revelation' and 'promise. ' He also claims the back- 
ing of the Reformers for his stress on 'promise. ' The correl- 
ate of faith for them was not an idea of revelation but the 
"promissio dei fides et promissio sunt correlativa. " It was 
only the subsequent employment of Aristotle in Protestant ortho- 
doxy which brought about the dualism of reason and revelation, 
making theological talk of revelation increasingly irrelevant 
for our knowledge of reality and thus our dealing with it. 
112) CG, pp. 229-30. Barth would agree with Moltmann here. See, 
for instance, sections 2 and 3 of Barth's essay "The Humanity 
of God, " The Humanity of God, op. cit. 
113) CPS, p. 64. 
114) TH, p. 102. Here we can see implied the importance of the 
Resurrection as proleptic event. The expectation of what is 
to come is founded on the Resurrection. This is not to be 
taken in the sense that we await to happen to us what happened 
to Jesus. This is much too static for Moltmann. It is better 
understood in the sense that, given a proleptic 'taste' of the 
fulness of the kingdom of God we are forced to the understand- 
ing that reality does not yet contain what is held in prospect 
for it. Thus the Resurrection 'makes' history, as Moltmann 
says, by pointing the way for future events. 
115) See TH, pp. 102f., 112f. 
116) Ibid., p. 113. 
117) Ibid., p. 118. 
118) Moltmann states: "Theology of Hope began with the resurrection 
of the crucified Christ, and I am now turning to look at the 
cross of the risen Christ. " CG, p. 5. See also the excellent 
discussion by R. Bauckham regarding just how much of CG elab- 
orates themes already stressed in TH, in "Moltmann's Eschato- 
logy of the Cross, " Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 30, pp. 
301f. 
119) CG, pp. 87-98. 
120) CPS, pp. 75-108. 
121) CG, p. 72. "Theologia crucis is not a single chapter in theo- 
logy, but the key signature for all Christian theology. " 
122) The most serious errors of traditional Christianity are relat- 
ed to 1) stress of the epiphany of the divinity of Christ at 
the expense of eschatology and 2) influence by the Greek phil- 
osophical tradition with its emphasis on the immutability and 
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impassibility of God. See on this W. McWilliams, "The Passion 
of God and Moltmann's Christology, " Encounter, vol. 40 (Autumn, 
1979), p. 315. Also B. Mondin, "Theology of Hope, " Biblical 
Theology Bulletin, vol. 2 (Fall, 1972), p. 53. 
123) CG, pp. 168f. 
124) See Moltmann's discussion, CG, pp. 170-1. 
125) CG, pp. 171f. 
126) CG, p. 172 (from W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, 
1961, p. 98. ) 
127) Idem. 
128) Idem. 
129) Ibid., p. 173. 
130) Ibid., p. 174. 
131) Ibid., p. 175. 
132) Ibid., p. 176. 
133) Idem. 
134) See J. J. O'Donnell, "The Power of the Spirit, " op. cit., p. 54. 
135) Moltmann's eschatological perspective is well-known, that of 
reading history 'backwards, ' on the principle that the order of 
knowing reverses the order of being. In other words, the his- 
torical account of an event proceeds from the chronological 
beginning to its end, but the understanding of its significance 
proceeds from the end to the beginning. This is employed through- 
out Chapter 5 of CG. See also CG, p. 91; Hope and Planning 
(New York: Harpers, 1971), p. 42. 
136) CG, p. 182. 
137) Ibid., pp. 182-3. It is worth noting here the contrast to 
Bultmann who, we recall, simply interprets the Resurrection as 
expressing the meaning of the cross. The Resurrection, accord- 
ing to Bultmann, indicates that Christ's death is not a tragic 
human death, but rather the liberating judgment of God (KM, 
pp. 38f. ) Barth, likewise, tends to interpret the cross through 
the Resurrection (see 4/1, p. 318; 4/2, p. 133. ) There is, of 
course, an affinity here with Moltmann (see CG, p. 182. ) Yet 
Moltmann goes on to add the extra dimension of the cross man- 
ifesting the Resurrection, something not stressed in either 
Barth or Bultmann. By raising a godless Jesus from the dead, 
not to judge him but to affirm him, God confirmed Jesus' own 
315 
announcement of the coming Kingdom of grace and of the value - 
of all humanity. 
138) Ibid., p. 184. 
139) B. Mondin, "Theology of Hope, " op. cit., p. 60. In the same vein 
Macquarrie speaks of Moltmann's "obsession with the future, " 
in "Theologies of Hope, " op. cit., p. 104. 
140) J. Macquarrie, "Today's Word, " op. cit., p. 4. 
141) J. Macquarrie, "Theologies of Hope, " op. cit., p. 104. 
142) Moltmann does claim that "God reveals Himself in the form of, 
promise and in the history that is marked by promise" (TH, 
p. 42. ) Yet in the same paragraph Moltmann claims that this 
revelation is only "about the future of what is promised (TH, 
p. 43. ) 
143) D. P. Scaer, "Jürgen Moltmann and His Theology of Hope, " Jour- 
nal of the Evangelical Theological Society, vol. 13 (1970), p. 73. 
144) Increasing the danger here is the difficulty of defining pre- 
cisely what a promise of God is. (Macquarrie interestingly calls 
the category of promise "a somewhat mythological expression. " 
See "Theologies of Hope, " op. cit., p. 104. ) Can we unmistake- 
ably recognize such a promise, and its subsequent fulfilment? 
Moltmann himself seems to deny this in TH, claiming that we must 
never be limited in this regard by our own expectations. (See 
TH, pp. 102f. ) But are we not then in danger of subjective 
interpretations here, of a vagueness that invites a host of 
'fulfilments'? And, resultingly, does not the notion of 'pro- 
mise' become more and more illusory and insubstantial? Rubem 
Alves, in A Theology of Human Hope, speaks of the dangers of 
extreme preoccupation with the future, criticizing the God of 
the future of the theologians of hope as a new kind of docet- 
ism. (See Rubem Alves, A Theology of Human Hope (Corpus-Books, 
1969), p. 94. ) Yet his stress is more on the practical con- 
sequences of such preoccupation. Whereas Moltmann, following 
Hegel, claims that only our recognition of the godlessness of 
the present will incite us to seek the future of God, Alves' 
response is quite different. He states: "The revolutionary 
absolves man from inhumanity and brutality in the present be- 
cause this is the time which does not count - only the future 
matters. " (See Ibid., p. 155. ) Such a temptation to ignore 
the present, as we see in Moltmann and other theologians of 
hope, can thus be seen as dreadful. Everything (and everyone) 
it seems, can be sacrificed for a possibly delusive future. 
145) J. Moltmann, "Theology in the World of Modern Science, " in 
Hope and Planning, op. cit., pp. 200-202; quotation, p. 207. 
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146) H. Kling, Does God Exist?, especially pp. 1-125. 
147) Ibid., p. 124. 
148) Barth claims of the Resurrection: "Can such history, too, not 
really have taken place as history, and can there not also be 
a legitimate recognition of such history, which certainly for 
reasons of good taste, we will abstain from calling an 'his- 
torical fact, ' and... call 'saga' or 'Legends'... CD, 3/2, p. 535. 
149) See W. Schmithals, tr. J. Bowden, An Introduction to the Theo- 
logy of Rudolf Bultmann (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1968), pp. 171f. 
150) TH, p. 20, esp., "Hope is nothing else than the expectation of 
those things which faith has believed to have been truly pro- 
mised by God. " Also pp. 202-3. 
151) Ibid., p. 189. 
152) This we believe in spite of the fact that Moltmann goes well 
beyond the existentialist theology of Bultmann is stressing 
the historical character of the Resurrection of Jesus. 
153) TH, p. 188. 
154) J. Moltmann, Hope and Planning, op. cit., p. 15. 
155) TH, p. 281. 
156) D. P. Scaer, Jurgen Moltmann and His Theology of Hope, op. cit., 
p. 70. 
157) J. Moltmann, "Towards the Next Step in Dialogue" in The Future 
of Hope, ed., F. Herzog (Herder & Herder: 1970), pp. 152-3. 
158) See W. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf 
Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 171f. 
159) CG, p. 186. 
160) See Ibid., pp. 200f., esp. pp. 206f. 
161) Especially chapters 2, section 2; 4, section 2,6. We think it 
is important to note that Moltmann places the words Crucified 
God in his chapter title in apostrophe, thus acknowledging some 
intrinsic qualifications. 
162) TK, p. 38. See Moltmann's chapter entitled 'The Pathos of God, ' 
pp. 21f. 
163) Moltmann first begins to question the concept of God which 
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follows from his understanding of "the resurrection of the 
crucified Christ and the cross of the risen Christ" in CG, 
chapter 4, pp. 187f. See also chapter 6, footnotes 72-8-6---for 
a list of modern writers who also assert the necessity of qual- 
ifying any absolute notion of divine impassibility. His dis- 
cussion in TK begins on p. 22 and is not pre-empted by earlier 
discussions of this subject. Here he discusses the various 
attributes of impassibility separately to give a fuller dimen- 
sion to the problem than we have seen. 
164) CG, pp. 87-88,210,214-18,249-51. 
165) Ibid., p. 202. He does this in TK particularly through M. de 
Unamuno, pp. 37f. 
166) TK, p. 81. "The pain of the Father corresponds to the death 
of the Son. " 
167) Ibid., p. 203. Moltmann interprets Barth correctly in our op- 
inion. See CD, 4/1, pp. 557f. In spite of his acknowledged 
debt to Barth he still sees him as "not sufficiently trini- 
tarian" due perhaps to the still smouldering influence of Luth- 
er's deus absconditus. 
168) See CG, p. 204. "The more one understands the whole event of 
the cross as an event of God, the more any simple concept of 
God falls apart. " And: "One moves from the exterior of the 
mystery which is called 'God' to the interior, which is trini- 
tarian. " 
169) We deliberately omit the Holy Spirit here. In our view, the 
role of the Holy Spirit is almost non-existant in the cross 
event as portrayed by Moltmann in CG, and TK, in spite of his 
valient efforts to include him for the sake of 'trinitarian' 
understanding. Even Moltmann tells us that "what happened on 
the cross must be understood as an event between God and the 
Son of God, "(CG, p. 192. ) Note Moltmann, "The 'Crucified God': 
A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross, " Interpretation (1971) 
pp. 278-99, where Moltmann portrays the significance of the 
Holy Spirit in his Trinitarian theology in two sentences. (p. 
294). TK adds a new dimension under a section entitled 'The 
Surrender of the Son, ' which places the cross event "in trini- 
tarian terms - the Father lets his Son sacrifice himself through 
the Spirit" (p. 83). Also: "The common sacrifice of the Father 
and the Son comes about through the Holy Spirit, who joins and 
unites the Son in his forsakenness with the Father. " What this 
means precisely is not clear. It is obviously trinitarian 
language but seems to convey a desire of Moltmann's rather 
than real theological substance. 
170) CG, pp. 205,207. 
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171) Ibid., p. 194. 
172) Moltmann defines most atheism as "crude" atheism and insig- 
nificant intellectually. "Protest" atheism is defined, fol- 
lowing Bloch, as "atheism for God's sake. " It takes human suf- 
fering as the basis for denial of God. Moltmann quotes G. 
Buchner in this regard: "Why do I suffer? That is the rock of 
atheism. " See Hope and Planning, p. 32. Buchner is quoted also 
in TK, the section 'God and Suffering, ' pp. 47f. 
173) CG, pp. 194-5; TK, pp. 21f., 80f. 
174) Ibid., p. 220. 
175) Ibid., pp. 221-2. 
176) Ibid., pp. 227,242f. 
177) Ibid., p. 252. See p. 204 for Moltmann's intriguing phrase "the 
cross of the risen Christ. " 
178) Moltmann expresses dismay that: "People cannot get used to the 
idea that this cry of the God-forsaken Son stands at the center 
of the Christian faith. " TK, p. 78. 
179) CG, p. 254. 
180) Ibid., p. 318. 
181) Ibid., pp. 326-7. See also TK, 'The Trinitarian Doctrine of 
Freedom, ' pp. 212f. 
182) Ibid., pp. 338. 
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6. Wolfhart Pannenberg 
Proving the Resurrection? 
I 
Wolfhart Pannenberg has written some of the most far-reaching, 
novel, and in some cases controversial work on the Resurrection of 
Jesus ever done. His work on the concept of Resurrection is most 
comprehensive. It would not be too extreme to say that it relates 
to almost every important aspect of his theology thus far. His work 
on the historicity of the Resurrection is forthright and optimistic 
to unheard-of lengths for a modern major theologian. Without apology 
or qualification, indeed with a refreshing sense of hilaritas1 he 
boldly states and goes on to show that the Resurrection can be valid- 
ated by historical research. 
We shall initially be concerned to deal with Pannenberg's 
conceptual approach to Resurrection, which generally tends, in some 
form, to illuminate his understanding of revelation. This approach 
while standing in its own right and offering its own insights has 
the additional function of helping to establish the credibility of 
the Resurrection in the mind of modern man and for this reason is, 
not to be entirely disengaged from the area of historicity. It is 
not without good cause that John Cobb, speaking of Jesus: God and 
Man, 
2 
states that "the reader's final judgment of the systematic 
value of the book must rest on his judgment of the adequacy of 
Pannenberg's case for the historicity of Jesus' rising from the 
dead. "3 We shall see how these two areas merge to form a cohesive 
argument (though hardly beyond controversy) for the fact of the 
bodily Resurrection of Jesus. It is in this sense that the follow- 
ing chapter must be read almost entirely as an attempt at under- 
standing and critiquing Pannenberg's 'proof' of this Resurrection. 
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Essential to understanding Pannenberg's thought is a grasp of 
his total commitment to reasonableness in his theological stance. 
Cobb has claimed that he "is a rationalist... in the very broad 
sense that he is prepared to believe whatever the evidence appears 
to him to warrant and nothing more. "4 This is true and yet is 
somewhat understated. Pannenberg's commitment to reason seems to 
be the impelling force that moves him as a theologian. It is a 
passion. Thus to truly understand Pannenberg one must comprehend 
his resolve that 'all that is real is rational. ' It is, of course, 
a rationality "in relation to God"5 a "theology of reason", 
6 but 
it is none the less relentlessly intellectual for its theism. It 
is precisely this conviction that marks Pannenberg as unique and 
has resulted in his reputation as a creative force and a trend 
setter in theology. 
Pannenberg's rational determination in relation to the Christ- 
ian faith can be seen, in great part, as a reaction against the 
'retreat' of theology due to the encroachments of the Enlighten- 
ment. This has been expressed succinctly in our time by Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer who writes "how wrong it is to use God as a stop-gap 
for the incompleteness of our knowledge. If in fact the frontiers 
of knowledge are being pushed further and further back (and that 
is bound to be the case), then God is being pushed back with them, 
and is therefore continually in retreat. "8 In the twentieth cen- 
tury both Buitmann and Barth may, in their respective ways, be 
seen to represent this 'retreat' of theology behind a faith which 
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is self-authenticating and/or a history (Geschichte) which is in- 
sulated from the normal course of events. 
This separation between fact and meaning became a major force 
in twentieth century theology, primarily due to the forceful ap- 
peal by Bultmann, resulting in a dichotomy between "Jesus of Naz- 
areth" (the Historisch Jesus) and "Jesus Christ" (the Geschicht- 
lich Christ of faith). 
9 
Likewise Barth (relying on Kahler) utilized the German words 
for history - Historie and Geschichte - to achieve a separation 
of God's time and man's time. Man's time - Historie - is overcome 
and redeemed by Geschichte. 
10 
The result, quite obviously, is 
dual histories - the Historie of secular history as opposed to 
Heilsgeschichte - and a distinction between the time of revelation 
and secular history. 
We will not belabor a discussion dealt with at length else- 
where. Suffice it to say that Pannenberg's desire is to reverse 
the current trend in theology, and to reinstate the original 
unity of fact and meaning, of historical knowledge and faith. 
REVELATION 
The Hegelian influence: Karl Barth 
Hegel's concept of universal history as the self-disclosure 
of the Absolute as adapted by Pannenberg has become so associated 
with the latter's theology that he has drawn unwarranted criticism 
for being, at least in part, merely a re-starter of Hegel. 
11 Pan- 
nenberg has by no means merely engrafted Hegel in toto into his 
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theology. Interpretation and disagreement have occurred as we 
shall see. Yet Pannenberg does owe to Hegel the central insight 
that Christianity rests upon the ongoing process of history, which 
is the self-disclosure of God. As the Hegelian Philipp Marheineke 
has noted, with Pannenberg's approval: "It is not through the 
human spirit as such that God is revealed, but through himself and 
then to the human spirit. "12 
In a different manner, but with similarities to Hegel, Barth 
has stressed the notion that theology must be viewed as a function 
of revelation, and that revelation is to be seen as the self-dis- 
closure of God in historic events. As with Pannenberg's theology, 
revelation is not to be seen as propositional truth guarded by a 
fundamentalist doctrine of inspiration of the Bible (which view was 
for the most dealt a death-blow by the criticisms of the Enlight- 
enment). Revelation is the self-disclosure of God and has an 
historic setting. 
13 
And yet with Barth the primary medium of this 
revelation is to be formed in the 'Word' of God, be it the Christ, 
the Scriptures, or the preached Word. This is in obvious distinct- 
ion from Hegel's view of the historical self-revelation of the 
Absolute. Further for Barth, this self-revelation of God comes 
only in the 'veiled' form necessarily implied by revelation. 
14 
Revelation, he claims, is totally from God's side, at his will and 
pleasure, and our understanding of the act of grace is necessarily 
limited by our fallen nature. 
15 
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Faith and Knowledge 
Pannenberg could not disagree more. Revelation is the self- 
disclosure of God but at no point does it lie outside the normal 
sphere of man's cognitive ability. God's self-disclosure takes 
place within the normal cause and effect of everyday happenings and 
is approached in the same spirit of rationality as is any other 
discipline. Thus Pannenberg can quote to support his position a 
passage from 2 Corinthians chapter four: "By the open statement 
of the truth we would commend ourselves to every man's conscience 
in the sight of God. " 
16 There is no gnostic knowledge of the 
'enlightened'. 
Since Pannenberg denies any retreat into pious subjectivity 
for the establishment of faith, 
'7 
stressing rather the 'oneness' 
of truth, faith must be understood in direct relation to this 
'oneness'. Simply put, faith depends on historical knowledge, 
knowledge that is open to rational investigation. 
18 
Faith does not supply its own basis, it does not produce 
certainty in and of itself. If this were so "faith would be blind 
gullibility, credulity, or even superstition. "19 It must "trust" 
in something beyond itself, 
20 having as its foundation that which 
can provide probably certainty. It is held by many that the in- 
spiration of the Holy Spirit is necessary for an understanding of 
revelation and thus for faith, as seems to be suggested by texts 
such as 1 Corinthians 12: 3: "No man can say that Jesus is Lord, 
but by the Holy Ghost. " Yet for Pannenberg the Holy Spirit is 
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not an "additional condition without which the event of Christ 
could not be known as revelation. " Citing Bultmann for support he 
claims that Paul never meant to see faith as a gift of the Spirit 
but rather to see the Holy Spirit as the "gift received by means 
of faith. "21 
Pannenberg is careful here to avoid two errors regarding the relat- 
ion of faith to knowledge. First, he is careful to reemphasize 
the role of the Holy Spirit in coming to faith. To say that know- 
ledge of revelation is supplied apart from supernatural means is 
not to say that one is only confirming what is already known 
through one's own intellectual ability. Real revelational dis- 
closure does in fact happen. Even though no gnostic illumination 
comes through the Holy Spirit "no one comes to the knowledge of God 
by his own reason or strength. " 
22 
Through the events themselves 
God has shown who he is. The events of the history of Israel, 
straining after and culminating in the cross and Resurrection, 
are determinative in this sense, but the force of the knowledge of 
revelation resides within the events themselves, not the person 
who confronts them. The obvious fact that many do not 'see' the 
facts as they naturally emerge from the events of revelation is 
not indicative that reason must be supplemented by other means 
of knowing. Pannenberg claims, rather, that those who do not 
see have failed to use their reason to the fullest. 
23 
Secondly, Pannenberg seeks to avoid the misconception that 
"faith is made superfluous by the knowledge of God's revelation 
in the events that demonstrate his deity. "24 Only a faulty concept 
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of faith can result in this misconception. Faith is not, for 
Pannenberg, the means by which past events gain significance. 
"Faith has to do with the future... This (faith) is the essence 
of trust. Trust primarily directs itself toward the future. "25 
As we have noted, in order not to be blind gullibility, faith 
must be grounded upon the reasonable events that point toward the 
future which "justifies or disappoints. "26 Faith then carries a 
risk. With regard to the Resurrection, one commentator has noted 
of Pannenberg's view of faith that: "It is a kind of trust in 
which man hopes that his knowledge, based on the prolepsis (i. e., 
the Resurrection) will be justified rather than disappointed at 
the end.  
27 Yet, to be sure, this step of faith is not arrived 
at blindly but "by means of an event that can be appropriated as 
something that can be considered reliable. "28 
This is a good spot to illuminate briefly Pannenberg's regard 
for the reliability of historical 'fact' through his concept of 
'Christology from below' involving a distinction from Christology 
'from above'. That is, a distinction between a Christology begin- 
ning from a preconception of Jesus' divinity where the 
incarnation 
has the primacy, and a Christology rising from the historical 
29 
Jesus to the recognition of his divinity. 
In modern Protestant dogmatics Barth is the chief proponent 
of Christology 'from above'. He combines an incarnational Christ- 
ology with the doctrine of the humiliation and exaltation of the 
incarnate Son of God (descent from and return to heaven) as the 
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basic concept of his Christology. 
30 
Pannenberg, in denying a 
Christological starting point from faith, seems even less inclined 
to accept a kerygmatic "theology of experience". He acknowledges 
with every believer that "as risen and exalted Lord he is alive 
today. However, one cannot achieve such knowledge about the living, 
present Lord through direct, present-day experience in association 
with the exalted Lord. "31 It is, therefore, only on the basis of 
what happened in the past, not what happens in the present, that 
we know that Jesus now lives. Through trust in the historical 
reports of th3 Resurrection and exaltation we are now able to have 
a present communion with our Lord. 
32 
Summar 
Let us attempt to draw certain conclusions regarding our 
discussion thus far. According to Pannenberg: 
. faith 
is not faith in the past but the future. 
. this 
future becomes imminent through the inherent significance 
of certain historical events. Through these events God has shown 
who he is. 
. not 
knowledge but the faith resulting from knowledge "secures 
participation 
in salvation. " 
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. reason 
then, though not a substitute for faith, is the logi- 
cal presupposition of faith. 
Faith and Certainty 
Faith is, for Pannenberg, future-oriented, though based upon 
historical knowledge. What can be said then, regarding faith, of 
the certainty of such knowledge? Is historical knowledge some- 
thing that can be ascertained with finality? The answer is, of 
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course, no. And yet must we immediately presume that faith itself 
is relative? If it is not how can it be founded upon such imprecise 
judgments? Does faith, of necessity, alternately ebb and flow with 
the conclusions of the scientific historian? Can the 'certainty' 
of faith be made compatible with the probabilities (at best) of 
history? Pannenberg is aware that this "has a threatening appear- 
ance for many. x, 
34 
Pannenberg is first of all concerned to explore the 'certainty' 
after which so many seek. 'Certainty' is itself a relative term 
depending on the discipline in which it is applied. A mathematical 
statement has a type of certainty, statements of historical science 
another. 
35 It is important for Pannenberg's argument that his 
reader understand that there is no such thing as absolute cer- 
tainty (outside of a highly abstract one) in our existence. Even 
formal logic can evidence antinomies and paradox. Historical 
'conclusions' are based then on another type of certainty best 
interpreted by Otto Kirn's statement that: "A historical conclusion 
can be regarded as certain when... despite the fact that it is not 
removed from all possibility of attack, it is nevertheless in agree- 
ment with all the known facts. "36 Pannenberg's effort here is 
aimed, as he later states, at "freeing historical research from 
the influence of positivism. "37 According to Pannenberg probable 
knowledge is compatible psychologically with the 'certainty' of 
faith. It is possible, for instance, to look at the Resurrection 
critically as an historical event, weighing the evidence for and 
against, and at the same time to believe in its facticity. 
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This combination of probability with trust is not unreason- 
able and is the essence of the foundation of the Christian faith. 
Faith is not independent of knowledge and yet the alternate dim- 
ension becomes obvious in Pannenberg's writings, namely, faith 
is to be sharply distinguished from the knowledge on which it is 
based. For faith is able to exist, even to thrive, in the relat- 
ive uncertainty which characterizes all human knowledge. 
Allen Galloway has claimed that Pannenberg's is a "middle 
course between the attempt, on the one hand, to make faith sec- 
ure by divorcing it from factual knowledge altogether and, on 
the other hand, to make it rest upon 'infallible' truths. "38 
Galloway then goes on to claim (in footnote) that Pannenberg's 
solution seems so obvious that it can be queried why it has not 
been more seriously considered in the past two hundred years. 
Pannenberg, he notes, claims no novelty for it, suggesting that 
it is a fleshing out of the relation between historical know- 
ledge and faith intended by the Reformers in their distinction 
between notitia and assensus on the one hand and fiducia on the 
other. 
39 Pannenberg focuses to some degree on Collingwood's 
negative appraisal regarding a 'positivism' of historical re- 
search. Yet it seems to us that an even more consistent exponent 
of Pannenberg's particular view of knowledge (as it relates to faith) 
is to be found in the writings of Karl Popper. 
Popper, in opposing logical positivism, has stated that: 
"Our science is not knowledge: it can never claim to have attained 
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truth... "40 He continues: "We do not know; we can only guess... 
But these marvellously imaginative and bold conjectures... of ours 
are carefully and soberly controlled by systematic tests" which 
must continually be repeated. "It is not his possession of know- 
ledge, " writes Popper "of irrefutable truth, that makes the man 
of science, but his persistent and recklessly critical quest for 
truth. "41 We approach, through our simultaneous "quest" and 
"systematic control" what amounts to an ever closer resemblance 
to the truth. Popper's own 'middle course', between skepticism 
and rationalistic positivism (reminiscent of Pannenberg) lies 
within the context of his polemic against the epistemological 
pessimism of the skeptics: "an approach to the truth 
is possi- 
ble"; 
42 
and his equally strong stand versus the epistemological 
optimism of the positivists: "certain knowledge is denied to us. 
Our knowledge is critical guesswork,, a net of hypotheses, a web 
43 Popper makes a solid criticism of all dogmatism, of surmises. " 
43 
urmises. 
leveling against any manifest 'certainties' tied to either pes- 
simism or positivism. This certainly can inform the 
field of 
tension between the religious revelationists and the positivists 
of history. All knowledge, claims Popper, must be tested by 
44 Against the claims of dogmatic "the method of trial and error. " 
'infallibility' from both sides45 Popper presents the paradigm 
of truth as a possibility toward which we are ever approaching. 
Far from apprehending it however we must be content to base our 
judgments (i. e., place our faith) in that which seems to us to 
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be the most reasonable. Thus, as Pannenberg would claim, truth 
is compatible with a degree of uncertainty as long as it is, in 
the words of Kirn, "in agreement with all the known facts" (our 
emphasis). Pannenberg's 'middle course' would seem to have a 
solid secular precedent. 
summary 
Let us be aware of what Pannenberg has proposed. Though our 
discussion of how this specifically applies to the Resurrection 
lies ahead, it is obvious that Pannenberg is constructing an ap- 
proach to the question of verifiability which: 
. claims for theology an 
historical concept of 'certainty', 
while at the same time claiming that 
. certainty, 
knowledge and reason are constitutive of faith 
in a way that is compatible with the true scientific concept of 
these terms. 
It must be remembered, then, claims Pannenberg, that: 
. faith 
is not independent of, but is to be distinguished 
from, knowledge, for it is able to thrive in the relative un- 
certainty which characterizes all human knowledge. 
Indirect Self-Revelation 
In speaking of the uncertainty of all human knowledge Pan- 
nenberg has ruled out then any direct self-disclosure by God to 
man in his view of the relation of faith to history. We may thus 
note the first of several theses of Pannenberg's regarding revel- 
ation. These are vital to his understanding of the Resurrection. 
46 
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Thesis 1: The self-revelation of God in the Biblical witnesses is 
not of a direct type in the sense of a theophany, but is 
indirect and brought about by means of the historical 
acts of God. 
This is a most important concept in Pannenberg's theology. 
The self-revelation of God as found in the biblical witness is not 
of a direct type, it is not a theophany. On the contrary: "In- 
stead of a direct self-revelation of God, the facts... indicate a 
conception of indirect self-revelation as a reflex of his activity 
in history. The totality of his speech and activity, the history 
brought about by God, shows who he is in an indirect way. "47 
(Here Pannenberg breaks company with Barth, who claims direct self- 
revelation of God and thus a unity of essence between God and the 
means by which he becomes manifest). 
48 
Pannenberg regards the 
equating of indirect self-revelation with the historical activity 
of God to be true to the concept of revelation held in both ancient 
Israel and the primitive Church. God's activity in history re- 
vealed his power. States Pannenberg: "Direct communication trans- 
mits content without a break from the sender to the receiver. In 
indirect communication, the path is broken: the content first 
reveals its actual meaning by being considered from another per- 
spective. Indirect communication is on a higher level; it always 
has direct communication as its basis, but takes this into a new 
perspective. " 
49 
Thesis 2: Revelation is not comprehended completely in the begin- 
ning, but at the end of the revealing history. 
In contradiction to Barth and others, revelation is not 
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defined by any one or even any several events. Only at the close 
of history is the fullness of the deity of God perceived. 
50 
This 
means for Pannenberg that 1) the content of revelation is consist- 
ently being revised and deepened in the course of history, and 
that 2) more importantly for us the proof of Jahweh as the one 
true God will be experienced in its ultimate sense only at the 
end of history. 
51 
The question is raised implicitly by this view, as Pannenberg 
is aware, how anything can be known of God with surety in the past 
or the present. Pannenberg answers this by claiming that "in the 
fate of Jesus, the end of history is experienced in advance as an 
anticipation. "52 The end of history has made itself available with- 
in the course of history itself. Pannenberg speaks here, of course, 
of the Resurrection, and its revising effect upon all history since 
it represents, strange to say, a vantage point of history from his- 
. tory's 
end: the final Resurrection of the dead. 
Thesis 3: In distinction from special manifestations of the deity, 
the historical revelation is open to anyone who has eyes 
to see. It has a universal character/. 
We have touched on this anti-Gnostic point in Pannenberg. 
The meaning of the event inheres within the event itself and is 
to be grasped in the light of reason, not just by the "pious soul". 
We come in thesis 4 specifically to Jesus Christ. 
Thesis 4: The universal revelation of the deity of God is not yet 
realized in the history of Israel but first in the fate 
of Jesus of Nazareth, insofar as the end of all events 
is anticipated in his fate. 
God had not shown himself to be the God for all men in the 
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history of Israel, only the God of Israel. The historical self- 
demonstration of Jahweh was continually being surpassed with new 
events however, each developing further the Israelite concept of 
their God, yet it is only the end, as we have seen, that brings 
about the final self-manifestation of Jahweh. In the development 
of history apocalypticism was born. "The historical plan of God 
was disclosed to him (the apocalyptic writer) ahead of time"53 
and forms the background into which Jesus came and by which he is 
understood. In the Resurrection the world was given a "foretaste" 
of the end. 
54 
Whereas before the future had always been something 
beyond calculation, with the Resurrection the end of history has 
already occurred. Thus for Pannenberg the apocalyptic expectation 
forms the vital background for the Resurrection. As he states in 
Jesus: God and Man: "in the horizon of the apocalyptic expectation 
for the future... the occurrence of the resurrection did not first 
need to be interpreted, but... spoke meaningfully in itself. "55 
This Vorgriff (foretaste, pre-understanding; see footnote 50) 
based as it was within the Jewish apocalyptic expectation and re- 
maining essentially linked to this expectation, nevertheless mod- 
ifies it (for the Resurrection was found to be separated in time 
from the general Resurrection) and surpasses it. By Jesus' ful- 
fillment of the apocalyptic expectation and concurrently his 
breaking with it, "the universality of the eschatological self- 
vindication of God in the fate of Jesus comes to actual expression. "56 
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The Apocalyptic Expectation and the Present Age; the Revelatory 
Character of the Resurrection 
We have already mentioned that apocalypticism is that literary 
genre which viewed history as constantly provisional and open to 
reinterpretation by subsequent acts of God. The central theme of 
apocalyptic was its insistence upon the fact that even the his- 
torical self-manifestation of God is always surpassed by new events 
until the final consummation of God's self-revelation. 
For Pannenberg it is this apocalyptic expectation which forms 
the indispensable background for the understanding of the Resur- 
rection. It's critical importance is underscored by Pannenberg: 
"One must be clear about the fact that when one discusses the 
truth of the apocalyptic expectation of a future judgment and a 
resurrection of the dead, one is dealing directly with the basis 
of the Christian faith. Why the man Jesus can be the ultimate 
revelation of God, why in him and only in him God is supposed to 
have appeared, remains incomprehensible apart from the horizon 
57 
of the apocalyptic expectation. " 
Yet is this still binding for us? Although many of its details 
may be untenable, pushing beyond the wildest flights of our imagin- 
ation, the fundamental elements - "the expectation of a resurrection 
from the dead in connection with the end of the world and the Final 
judgment" 
58 
- can have 
not be an embarrassmen 
as the "Christ of God" 
expectation. " 
59 It is 
modern validity, claims Pannenberg. It need 
t that the Church's understanding of Jesus 
remains "essentially bound to the apocalyptic 
precisely through its essential relationship 
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to the end of the world that the Resurrection has the character of 
revelation for us. 
60 
The significance of Jesus' Resurrection is unfolded, Pannenberg 
feels, in the establishment of its revelatory character. He devel- 
ops his argument substantially in four parts (which we summarize 
here) all set within the context of the apocalyptic expectation for 
the future. 
61 
a) If Jesus has been raised, then the end of the world has 
begun. 
b) If Jesus has been raised, for one within the apocalyptic 
environment this can only mean that God himself has placed 
his confirmation upon the pre-Easter activity of Jesus. 
c) Through his Resurrection the obvious insight was recognized: 
the Son of Man is none other than the man Jesus who will 
come again. 
d) If Jesus, having been resurrected, is exalted and has init- 
ially the beginning of the end of the world, then God is 
ultimately revealed in Jesus. 
Thus by anticipating the end of world history - for it takes 
the whole of world history to reveal God - the Resurrection has 
allowed history in its totality to beste and God to be revealed. 
62 
In addition it is an important implication in Pannenberg's argu- 
ment that the revealer and the revealed are identical. "Thus to 
speak of a self-revelation of God in the Christ event means that the 
Christ event, that Jesus, belongs to the essence of God himself. 
If this were not so, then the human event of Jesus' life would veil 
the God who is active therein and thus exclude his full revelation. 
Self-revelation in the strict sense is only present where the medium 
through which God makes himself known is not something alien to 
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himself, brings with it no dimming of the divine light, but on the 
contrary, results in the knowledge of the divinity of God for the 
first time. That happens when the distinction of the revealing 
medium from God himself disappears with the coming of a more pre- 
cise understanding. "63 Thus, the idea of God's self-revelation 
in Jesus includes identity of essence. 
64 
The Apocalyptic Expectation; Questions Arising 
Let us note here briefly an important criticism that has been 
made regarding Pannenberg's view of the apocalyptic expectation. 
For Pannenberg, as we noted, this expectation of late Judaism 
was vital. On it hung much of the revelatory significance of the 
Resurrection. When the witnesses encountered the risen Lord they 
spontaneously understood that "the end of the world has begun, " 
that "God himself has confirmed'the activity of the pre-Easter 
Jesus, " etc. 
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Thus, by virtue of its proleptic nature, this event 
has taken on a universal significance in disclosing thw whole of 
reality. It becomes the event of God's self-revelation. 
H. Martin Rumscheidt has pointed out that the weakness of this 
argument is found in its starting point. "What compels us, " he 
asks, "to accept 'the horizon of the apocalyptic expectation' of 
late Judaism in order to perceive God's'revelation in Jesus? "66 
Taking Rumscheidt's lead G. G. O'Collins has commented: "In terms 
of Pannenberg's theology of revelation through history it would 
seem difficult to justify the 'horizon of apocalyptic expectation'. " 
p'Collin's reasons are as follows: "... if this category is necessary 
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to understand the revelation through the history of Christ's 
Resurrection, revelation through history would be needed to just- 
ify this category. "67 It would seem, he continues, that on the 
basis of Pannenberg's own revelatory thesis this would be impossible, 
for revelation 1) is restricted to God's indirect self-revelation 
through his deeds in history and 2) occurs not at the beginning 
but at the end of the revealing history. 
These criticisms have certainly highlighted a reciprocal 
relationship between the apocalyptic expectation and the Resur- 
rection: the expectation is vital for understanding the Resur- 
rection as 'the end of history', and, on the other hand, the 
understanding of the Resurrection seems to illuminate the apoc- 
alyptic expectation as revelatory in its own right. This is a 
strange type of revelation by Pannenberg's own standards, however, 
which leads us to see concrete events as the indirect manifesta- 
tions of the deity. The apocalyptic expectation is rather seen 
by Pannenberg as "arising" within the Jewish tradition, surely a 
prolonged process, and is described by him subsequently as nothing 
more than "the answer to a question", namely how the righteousness 
of God was to be fulfilled in the individual. 
68 It thus takes on 
a nebulous tint in Pannenberg as regards its character and origin. 
Only in its revelatory function does it acquire solid substance. 
Pannenberg's general discussion thus tends to place the apocalyp- 
tic expectation in a unique and actually unexplained (subject to 
the criticism above) category. We must recall this in a later 
discussion. 
339 
Problem of the Two-Natures Doctrine; Retroactive Power of the 
Resurrection 
Pannenberg, though not afraid to affirm in his own way the 
traditional themes of pre-existence and Incarnation, is very con- 
scious of the inherent difficulties. He sees the traditional 
doctrine of the Incarnation, as we have noted above, to be a fun- 
damental problem in Christology. Those like Barth, who begin 
Christology "from above", from an Incarnational posture, face the 
difficult, if not insoluble, problem of relating the divinity of 
Jesus to his humanity in a way that both natures retain distinction 
and yet are able to express a living unity of existence. 
Theologians have historically been drawn, with varying degree, 
to either of two extremes: 1) an Antiochene Christology which at- 
tempts to establish a 'separation' of Jesus from God, an indepen- 
dence of the two natures; 2) an Alexandrian Christology which 
attempts to establish a 'fusion' of the two natures thus threat- 
ening their distinction. 
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Pannenberg, in turn, also analyzes 1) the doctrine of the 
communicatio 
idiomatum (communication of attributes) proposing 
that it failed to show how Jesus was fully one with God from his 
beginnings as a human child in a way that he was able to develop 
as fully human. There 
is no moment in which there is something 
human in Christ that is not assumed by the divine; no moment or 
attribute that did not possess divine-human character. 
70 
He 
discusses also 2) the kenosis theory which either called into 
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question God's divinity and unchangeability or approached Jesus' 
humanity as problematic. 
71 And he deals briefly with 3) the 
Resurrection as it has been dealt with in modern theology, noting 
its relegation to secondary importance within the scope of incar- 
national theologies. 
72 
Pannenberg succeeds in showing that, against such an eternal 
difficulty as the reconciliation of the two natures of Christ, 
theology has not made much headway. The difficulties faced by 
early theologians are precisely those faced by the modern ones. 
It is to his great credit that Pannenberg has introduced an almost 
wholly novel approach to this ancient problem. 
Let us recall that, according to Pannenberg, there is a 
real identity of God and the risen Christ. The doctrine of 
incar- 
nation is based on this recognition, 
i. e., that Jesus is the final 
self-revelation of God. 
This derives from an understanding of 
the Resurrection as historical event and its meaning within the 
apocalyptic context. 
This is the order of knowing which cannot 
be reversed. 
But what about the order of being? If Jesus is recognized 
as the Christ 
through the Resurrection as is certainlythe case, 
is there any validity to the notion that this is when he becomes 
the Christ? 
Pannenberg is basically sympathetic to the notion of 'adopt- 
inn' as it is presented in Scripture, particularly in the "two- 
stage,, Christology73 of 
Romans 1: 3: "Concerning his Son, who was 
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born of a descendent of David according to the flesh, who was 
declared the Son of God with power by the resurrection of the 
dead, according to the Spirit of holiness, Jesus Christ our 
Lord" (New American Standard). Yet this does not carry the con- 
troversial connotation that the term 'adoption' characteristically 
implies. For Pannenberg it is essentially to say that Jesus is 
one with God on the basis of his Resurrection. He goes on to 
sidestep the problems of adoptionism with the claim that, while 
Jesus is one with God on the basis of the Resurrection event, his 
entire earthly existence is united essentially to God through the 
event's "retroactive force. "74 
It may seem on closer reading that Pannenberg has merely ag- 
gravated the historical frustration over this issue, his ruckwir- 
kende Kraft surpassing even the difficulty of the traditional 
two-natures doctrine. 
75 Pannenberg himself seems to struggle to 
explain his meaning. 
76 This is indicated in part by the fact that 
his proposal in regard to the relation between Jesus' divinity 
and the Resurrection is not clearly summarized in any one passage. 
B. O. McDermott has stated the difficulty as summarily as possible. 
He observes: "(1) Sometimes Jesus seems to be divine only because 
of the resurrection (JGM, pp. 224,325f., 364). (2) On the other 
hand, Pannenberg insists that it is wrong to say that Jesus re- 
ceived his divinity only at the resurrection... Jesus was divine 
from the beginning... apparent only at the resurrection (JGM, 
pp. 135f., 141,153). (3) There are times when Pannenberg advocates 
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a progressive incarnation (divinization) which is completed at the 
resurrection (JGM, pp. 307,322,328f., 344); this allows him to 
speak of Jesus' divinity as established in his earthly life by his 
dedication to his Father (JGM, pp. 294,336). (4) Yet he maintains 
that Jesus' life was thoroughly ambiguous... that His death was a 
catastrophe for Jesus and his disciples (JGM, pp. 224,332), so 
that the resurrection is sometimes called the confirmation of what 
Jesus was in his earthly life (JGM, p. 362). "77 
It is safe to say, with regard to Pannenberg, that "Jesus 
did not simply become something he had not been", 
78 he was not 
simply conferred divinity at the Resurrection without respect to 
his pre-Easter existence. At the same time, neither was a divin- 
ity existing prior to and separate from the Resurrection simply 
revealed by the Resurrection event. 
What is given here by Pannenberg is nothing less than a novel 
ontological system of perceiving Jesus' essential unity with God. 
To quote McDermott once again: "This (Pannenberg's idea of the 
retroactive power of the resurrection) 
involves him in a new meta- 
physical view... regarding the relation of future to present, a 
view which 
involves accepting the idea that the future can influence 
the present. " 
79 
This idea, that the future influences the present - which in 
Pannenberg takes the form that a being is essentially what it will 
become - perhaps does not strike the reader initially as very 
exceptional. 
Any being which is capable of development, of evolving, 
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'is easily visualized in this manner. Its final stage represents 
the maximizing of its potential; it has achieved, so to speak, 
-what it was 'meant' to achieve. Yet Pannenberg jars us out of 
"our smugness, by rejecting this essentially Greek mode of thought 
as an insight into the relationship of Christ and his historical 
existence. There is no basis, he claims, for understanding Jesus' 
divinity simply as a developing element within his being which 
`finally 'blossoms' at some point in his life. 
80 
Pannenberg attempts, not very successfully to be sure (as he is 
'-quite aware) to draw on experiences more or less familiar to the 
reader in illustrating what he means by "retroactive power. "81 
Initially he refers to a legal analogy in which laws can be said 
to have retroactive force. This fails to reach the depth of 
Pannenberg's theological proposals since, obviously, legal status 
`is not ontological status. He next points out that the essence 
of a person is not perceived in the present, that only the future 
will decide it. This is true as far as it goes (as is his legal 
analogy). It is, however, open to the 'developmental' interpret- 
ation (noted above) which Pannenberg himself rejects. Thus both 
analogies, though helpful, fail to sustain the magnitude of his 
own thought. We might better attempt to understand this concept 
by recourse to other of Pannenberg's essays. 
In a footnote to his introductory passage on retroactivity 
in Jesus: God and Man, Pannenberg refers the reader to his artic- 
le "What Is Truth? "82 In this important essay Pannenberg deals 
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with the contradictory concepts of truth held by the Hebrews and 
Greeks. It is Pannenberg's belief that we must free ourselves 
from the pervading Greek influence if we are to understand the 
biblical approach to truth. 
The Hebrew word for truth (emeth) contains an historical 
dimension. There is no concept of timelessness here, something that 
lies under or behind things. Rather truth must occur over and over. 
It is an essential 'faithfulness' which will show its element of 
truth in the future. This historical feature is precisely that 
which is lacking in the Greek concept of truth (aletheuein). Its 
meaning is to let something 
be seen as it is; not to be concealed. 
It is an eternal essence, always identical with itself, which is 
hidden behind the changing appearance of things. For the Greek 
concept an event 
in time can have no constitutive force for the 
eternal essence of something. 
For the Hebrew concept this is 
entirely possible. 
Pannenberg is convinced that the "Greek dual- 
t 
ism between true being and changing sense-appearances is superseded 
in the biblical understanding of things"83 and on this basis claims 
the truth of saying that the Resurrection has retroactive force for 
the entire life of Jesus. 
84 
Summary 
Let us attempt to summarize now the main points of Pannenberg's 
proposals regarding retroactivity and the Resurrection. 
Pannenberg's 
theology, having begun "from below, " sees: 
the Resurrection as the event which constitutes Jesus as the 
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Son of God. 
through Jesus' Resurrection it is decided, not only epistem- 
ologically but ontologically, that God is uniquely one with Jesus, 
and retroactively that Jesus was already one with God previously. 
as Jesus matured as a person, this unity with God grew in 
, the 
form of response to God's presence, which came to him out of 
the future, i. e., the Resurrection. 
85 
the inner logic of the confirmation of the Resurrection in- 
forms us that God was always one with Jesus, even before his earth- 
ly existence. He is from all eternity God's representative in 
creation. "We can no longer think of God in his eternal deity 
without Jesus. That is, indeed, the meaning of Jesus' resurrect- 
ion. " 
86 
Christology "from below": Questions Arising 
Peter Hodgson, though holding Jesus: God and Man in high esteem, 
has nevertheless been critical of Pannenberg's evaluation of the 
historical Jesus for Christology. It is Hodgson's contention that 
Pannenberg tends to radically devalue the importance of the his- 
torical Jesus in relation to the confirmation of the pre-Easter 
Jesus in the Resurrection. These pre-Easter acts and claims, states 
Hodgson, are only vaguely anticipatory of Jesus' divinity, bearing 
no substantive importance in relation to it. Pannenberg is thus 
seen to be a proponent of a progressive 
incarnation (in league with 
I. A. Dorner), taking the historical words and deeds of Jesus "with 
the same degree of radicalism as hermeneutical theology and the new 
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87 quest. 
We have already discussed Pannenberg's propensity for a 
progressive incarnational view which is completed at the Resur- 
rection, 
88 
thus allowing him to speak of Jesus' divinity as estab- 
lished in his earthly life by his dedication to his Father. This 
is not to be understood, however, in distinction from Pannenberg's 
conception of the retroactive power of the Resurrection. In light 
of this Pannenberg would have us see that, as Jesus matured in his 
pre-Easter existence, his unity with his Father grew in the form 
of response to God's presence, which comes to Jesus out of the 
future (i. e., the Resurrection). The Resurrection, as an eschato- 
logical event, is thus able to influence Jesus' earthly existence. 
89 
Hodgson's point regarding Pannenberg, that the argument for 
the divinity of Jesus is based de facto on the Resurrection and 
not on the historical Jesus 
is an insightful one nonetheless. 
Pannenberg has himself subsequently responded to it. 
90 
Chiding 
Hodgson for a rather one-sided view, Pannenberg claims "a corres- 
pondence between what we 
have inherited as information about the 
historical Jesus and the resurrection tradition. " Neither by 
itself, he continues, "could establish or explain the faith of 
Christian's in Jesus, but only their interrelationship. "91 Pan- 
nenberg's answer 
is no doubt the right one and we are fully in 
agreement. 
Yet it should be clarified that in fact in Jesus: God 
and Man the 
"interrelationship" of which Pannenberg speaks is 
hardly one of symmetry, the historical Jesus occupying a subordin- 
ate position 
to the Resurrection as regards the establishment of 
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divinity. 
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We must immediately qualify this, however, and 
claim regarding Pannenberg that his position does not in fact 
amount to an abandonment of the 'from below' principle. It is 
only the Resurrection which establishes the deity of Christ; the 
pre-Easter Jesus is ultimately vindicated by the resurrected 
Christ. Pannenberg has stayed securely 'below' with his strong 
emphasis on the historicity of the Resurrection. One must keep 
in mind that the Resurrection is never 'above' pure Historie. 
To be sure, our concern is not to deal so much with the crit- 
icism of Hodgson as with the answer by Pannenberg to the criticism. 
Pannenberg sees no need to retreat before these comments in an at- 
tempt to give something resembling equal time to the historical 
Jesus regarding divinity. Hodgson's point, although meant crit- 
ically, seems to us to grasp the situation as Pannenberg is at 
pains to present it. Even 
in light of the Son of Man sayings of 
Jesus (which only anticipate Jesus' divinity in a concealed, almost 
evasive, manner) the primacy 
is consistently placed on the Resur- 
rection. Pannenberg will doubtless be open to criticism in this 
area by those who view the 
life of Jesus from a more 'incarnation- 
al' perspective. 
He is himself obviously aware of this, as is 
shown in Jesus: 
God and Man by the scope of his polemic against 
the orthodox approach to the concept of incarnation. 
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Yet in 
our judgment Pannenberg's own approach is the more favorable 
biblically and theologically compared to the two-natures doctrine, 
and claims that 
he devalues the "radical seriousness" of Jesus' 
humanity (i. e., Hodgson) are unfounded. Indeed, the entire second 
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half of Jesus: God and Man deals with the man Jesus in his relation- 
ship to humanity in an extremely sympathetic and comprehensive man- 
ner. 
HISTORICITY OF THE RESURRECTION 
Beginning "from below", Pannenberg is concerned to show how 
this approach can be carried out by focusing his historical atten- 
tion on the Resurrection. That the Resurrection is the focus of 
Christology means specifically that it must be approached "from 
below, " seen in its relationship with other historical events. 
This requires dispelling several false views. 
The Barriers to Modern Understanding 
It is of considerable importance to Pannenberg that we under- 
stand 1) the distinctions 
between the biblical hope of the Resur- 
rection and the Greek concept of 
immortality of the soul. The 
Biblical concept of Resurrection has been adulterated by a Greek 
concept, namely the 
(Platonic) unchangeability of the soul, and 
thus its divine nature through participation in the universal 
Logos. The idea of a separation of body and soul has today become 
untenable, Pannenberg claims, on the basis of anthropological 
insights which stress the unity of personhood. So called 'life 
after death' can no 
longer be understood as a function of the 
t: 
soul's immortality, rather only as another mode of existence of 
the whole person. 
94 This is, of course, the biblical teaching 
regarding the 
Resurrection of the dead. 
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Not only does the biblical concept of Resurrection stress the 
contemporary scientific findings of unity of person, it also (and 
most importantly) does not stress 2) commonly held notions of mere 
resuscitation of corpses. "To speak about the resurrection of the 
dead is not comparable to speaking about any random circumstance 
that can be identified empirically at any time. Here we are deal- 
ing, rather, with a metaphor. "95 The metaphor is that of awakening 
and rising from sleep and it serves as a parable for what is a 
"completely unknown" destiny. 
Pannenberg is, in addition, concerned to cite two methodolog- 
ical principles, basic to his argument, which govern his research. 
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The first principle deals with the presuppositions of the historian. 
Should one approach his work with the conviction that the 'dead do 
not rise, ' then there is a priori judgment that the Resurrection of 
Jesus is absurdity. Generally this has been the case when the re- 
searcher has feared to violate obvious laws of nature. It is Pan- 
nenberg's contention that the progress of the last few years should 
have made us more cautious in regard to the judgments of modern 
physics. Only a part of the 
laws of nature are ever known. In 
addition, conformity to the 
laws of nature is only one aspect of 
the total of the world process. The other aspect, equally as im- 
portant, 
is that of contingency, which embraces all that happens. 
Natural science can thus express no certitude regarding the possib- 
ility or impossibility of an individual event, regardless of the 
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probabilities that can be established for that event's occurrence 
or non-occurrence. The judgment about whether any certain event 
has occurred is not within the province of natural science but 
historical science. 
Pannenberg's second methodological principle, as we have noted 
in relation to Kirn, states that if a certain event is shown to be 
the most adequate historical explanation of the total uncovered 
historical observations, then that event must be considered his- 
torically very probable. This probability "always means in his- 
torical inquiry that it (the event) is to be presupposed until 
contrary evidence appears. " Unqualified proof then 
is not the 
test of the historian's assent. All that must be done is to dem- 
onstrate that a certain event is the most probable explanation of 
the circumstances. 
The Evidence for the Traditions 
The Easter traditions of the primitive Church divide into two 
separate strands: the post-Resurrection appearances of the risen 
Lord and the ideas regarding the empty tomb. 
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It is around these 
themes that Pannenberg then carries out his inquiry in attempting 
to validate the Resurrection as historical event. 
Pannenberg begins with the evidence for the post-Resurrection 
appearances, characteristic of both the Gospels and the Pauline 
writings. It seems to Pannenberg that the historical question of 
the appearances must concentrate on the Pauline report of 1 Corinth- 
ians 15: 1-11, given the earlier date of the report and the 
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legendary character of the Gospel tendency to stress the corporeal- 
ity of the appearances. Regarding the former, it is important to 
note that Paul probably was in Jerusalem between six to eight years 
after the events. This closeness to the events is strengthened by 
further noting the pre-Pauline formula in the chapter. Paul does 
not rely on possibly inaccurate memory, but leans on an already 
formulated tradition. 
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Thus Paul speaks both from personal ex- 
perience and from evidence extremely close to the related appear- 
ances. The result is that: "In view of the age of the formulated 
traditions used by Paul and of the proximity of Paul to the events, 
the assumption that appearances of the resurrected Lord were really 
experienced by a number of members of the primitive Christian com- 
munity and not perhaps freely invented in the course of later leg- 
endary development has good historical foundation. 
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Yet the textual conclusion that we are dealing with actual 
appearances of the resurrected Jesus only leads us to the greater 
problem of what sort of experiences these might have been. With 
regard to the content of these experiences one must begin with 
Paul as the Gospel reports (with their over-emphasis on corporeal- 
ity) offer little or no firm historical basis. On the other hand, 
Paul seems to presuppose that the experiences he had were of the 
same kind as the other apostles. In addition, an analysis of Paul's 
statements in Galatians 1: 12 and 16f. lead us to conclude that all 
witnesses recognized Jesus of Nazareth in the appearances. This 
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fact, which can only be explained from the presupposition of the 
apocalyptic expectation, is the certain content of the experiences. 
With regard to the character of the experiences, the first thing 
to be considered, especially in regard to the Damascus event, is the 
possibility of an extraordinary vision. This is based on the fact 
that Paul's companions either did not perceive the appearance or 
did not comprehend its meaning. When one of sound mind sees some- 
thing that others present are not able to see, then we are speaking 
of a visionary experience, claims Pannenberg. To claim a visionary 
content for this event, however, is not the same as saying that it 
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was imaginary. Repeated attempts since D. F. Strauss to explain 
the experiences of the Resurrection appearances in terms of enthus- 
iastic imaginations have failed. Pannenberg explains that "Jesus' 
death exposed the faith of his disciples to the most severe stress. 
One could hardly expect the production of confirmatory experiences 
from the faith of the disciples that stood under such a burden. ýý101 
Pannenberg opts for a synthetic description of the Resurrection 
appearances, preferring to speak 
"not only of visions of Jesus' dis- 
ciples but also of appearances of 
the resurrected Jesus. " In doing 
so one speaks with 
the disciples in metaphorical language. Yet we 
are not hindered 
by this (as they were not) "from understanding the 
11 
course of events with 
the help of what is designated by such language 
I, I 
other possibilities for explanation remain unsatisfactory. "102 when 
On the basis of these considerations (indeed of all the con- 
side-rations we 
have so far seen) Pannenberg makes his claim to the 
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Resurrection as historical event in this sense: "If the emergence 
of primitive Christianity... 'traced back by Paul to appearances of 
the resurrected Jesus, can be understood... only if one examines it 
in the light of the eschatological hope for a resurrection from the 
dead, then that which is so designated is a historical event, even 
if we do not know anything more particular about it. " 
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Pannenberg next delves into the second strand of reports of 
the Easter tradition, the tradition of the empty tomb. Even though 
this tradition is independent of the 'appearances' (and thus the 
preceding results are valid regardless), this question is signifi- 
cant for the final outcome. 
That Paul never mentions the empty tomb does not, in Pannen- 
berg's opinion, shake the trustworthiness of this report since it 
does not affect Paul's main concern - the parallel between the 
Christ event and the destiny of the Christian. The empty tomb, 
should it be historical fact, belongs rather to the singularity 
of Jesus' fate, i. e., the fact that he was "'transformed' to another 
life (whatever that may mean). This singularity was not of immed- 
iate interest to Paul's proclamation and, at any rate, it seems 
doubtful to Pannenberg that Paul should even have known the Jerus- 
alem Church, whose proclamation could have been instantly refuted 
by a mere viewing of the interred body. "104 Pannenberg quotes ap- 
provingly 
from Paul Althaus who states that the proclamation of the 
Resurrection "demands that within the circle of the first community 
one had a reliable 
testimony for the fact that the grave had been 
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found empty" and that the Resurrection kerygma "could not have 
been maintained in Jerusalem for a single day... if the emptiness 
of the tomb had not been established as a fact for all concerned. ""105 
Among the general historical arguments that Pannenberg raises 
in favor of the empty tomb is, firstly, the fact that the early 
Jewish polemic against the Christian message about Jesus Resurrect- 
ion did not dispute that the tomb was empty. To the contrary, it 
shared this conviction in attempting to explain, in its own way, 
why this was so. Also of note is the fact that this tradition, 
obviously early, appears to have existed in its own right for a 
while (separate from the appearance tradition) as is indicated by 
the fact that Mark, the earliest Gospel, presents only the empty 
tomb tradition in its Resurrection report. Only in the remaining 
later Gospels, and in the spurious conclusion to Mark (16: 8b f. ) 
is there an attempt to combine the two traditions. 
This is not to cite a formal proof, of course. But if there 
was a period, however short, where the empty tomb tradition existed 
independently, as Pannenberg claims to show, "then by their mutually 
complementing each other they let the assertion of the reality of 
Jesus' resurrection.. . appear as historically very probable. " 
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All historical research must deal with evidence of this type. If 
the concept of Resurrection is not ruled out a priori, the factic- 
ity of a Resurrection having occurred is the most probable explana- 
tion of the simultaneous development and continuation of these two 
traditions. Unless contrary evidence is presented it will remain 
355 
the most probable explanation, Pannenberg claims. 
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Summ ar 
. It is Pannenberg's claim that once a pair of false views are 
dispelled the argument for the historicity of the Resurrection can 
be introduced. He thus denies: 1) the Greek concept of immortality 
of the soul and 2) commonly held notions of mere resuscitation of 
corpses. 
. The 
historical argument must proceed on two principles: 
1) Resurrection of the dead is a possibility (natural science must 
give way to historical science); 2) the test of an historical event 
lies not in unqualified proof but in probably explanation of the 
circumstances. 
The evidence then for the appearances and the empty tomb sug- 
gest to Pannenberg that: 
. both strands of 
the Easter tradition meet the criteria for 
historical event if the concept of Resurrection is not ruled out 
pyi. Resurrection remains the most probable answer. 
Within this summary let us also say a word regarding Pannen- 
berg's use of reason. This dynamic in Pannenberg's theology is not 
an easy one to classify, 
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and is notable in great part because of 
this. His approach to reason cannot be strictly equated with any 
formal type of rationalism; it rejects at once both the deductive, 
authority-based reasoning of traditional Protestantism and the 
reductive reason of 
logical positivism. While capturing the essence 
of the Renaissance man 
in his uses of historical-criticism, Pan- 
nenberg nevertheless seems 
to personify Kant's famous dictum, 
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'I had to put a halt to knowing to make room for faith. ' His 
conception of reason never loses its awareness of mystery, made 
all the more striking for Pannenberg's obvious rationality. 
While claiming that faith must operate within the arena of verifi- 
ability, Pannenberg recognizes quite clearly, in the words of E. F. 
Tupper: "that reason knows no absolute certainties, that it is 
stamped by provisionality, that its perceptions and conclusions 
are anticipatory and subject to the judgment of the future... for 
modification, invalidation, or confirmation. " 
109 Pannenberg also 
shows an interesting synthesis regarding his approach to some his- 
torical problems of Christianity. While emphasizing the historical- 
ity of knowledge and the stringency of rationality regarding his- 
torical science, he nonetheless approves the constructive use of 
creative imagination usually reserved for the more theoretical 
(abstract) sciences. 
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In short, Pannenberg's approach to reason 
is dynamic and expansive. It is based on the rationalism of a 
scientific approach and yet berates us for a truncated view of real- 
ity, challenging the reader to expand his conception of what is 
possible. Still, never is Pannenberg guilty of a sloppy meta- 
physics which functions to fill in the gaps of our knowledge. 
ill 
What is sought is a 'unity of truth, ' which is also to say a un- 
if ied approach to truth. What results is a forceful and appealing 
exercise in what we might call 'imaginative reason' - rigorously 
scientific yet religiously satisfying. 
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History as a Unity of Fact and Meaning 
Pannenberg's understanding of history as 'the history of the 
transmission of traditions' - i. e., the meaning of revelatory events 
is derived from the context of the tradition in which they occur - 
is an integral part of his theology of the Resurrection. The mean- 
ing of the Resurrection was thus open to Jesus' contemporaries, 
insofar as they shared the apocalyptic expectation. This has been 
one of the most controversial of Pannenberg's concepts. 
Pannenberg has come into sharp contrast with the modern views 
of the historical character of God's revelation. Barth, of course, 
emphasized this historical character regarding the Word of God as 
saving event (as did Emil Brunner), yet posited an historical dual- 
ism in connection with his rejection of the historical-critical 
method. The meaning of God's redemptive event is only available to 
faith (fides quarens intellectum). 
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Pannenberg views this as 
lamentable gnostic influence in Barth's theology. Likewise, Bult- 
mann works within the sphere of the historical event of Jesus 
Christ, he too positing a dualism between Historie and Geschichte. 
Yet Bultmann too rejects the critical approach, claiming that the 
significance of the revealing events (Geschichte) are understood 
only in the existential decision of faith. 
Pannenberg rejects this dualism as "neo-Kantian, " criticizing 
also in this regard Richard Rothe, Paul Althaus, and H. Richard 
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Niebuhr. It is Hiroshi Obayashi's view that Pannenberg's em- 
phasis on the correlation of fact and meaning "fundamentally... 
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was aimed at tearing down the epistemological barrier established 
by Kant. " Pannenberg himself speaks of bridging the yg gulf be- 
tween fact and meaning forcefully and without qualification. He 
states: "Such a splitting up of historical consciousness into a 
detection of facts and an evaluation of them (or into a history 
as known and experienced) is intolerable to Christian faith, not 
only because the message of the resurrection of Jesus and of God's 
revelation in him necessarily becomes subjective interpretation, 
but also because it is the reflection of an outmoded and question- 
able historical method... Against this we must reinstate today the 
original unity of facts and their meaning. " 
115 Yet once this is 
done some immediate questions arise. 
"Asking if theologians should then simply become historians, 
Allen Galloway claims that there "is a sense in which Pannenberg 
does tend to turn his historians into theologians and his theolog- 
fans into historians. " For Pannenberg, he observes, "the method 
and interest of the historian and the theologian are essentially 
the same. " 
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Lothar Steiger has proposed what is basically the same argu- 
ment, focusing on the role of the preacher rather than the theolog- 
117 Noting that, for Pannenberg, facts have an inherent onto- ian. 
logical quality, speaking the 'language of facts, ' Steiger quest- 
ions the very necessity of preaching as we know it. It would seem 
to Steiger that we need only expose people to the facts to gain 
the adequate response. "It is not clear why this unambiguous and 
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self-sufficient kerygmatic historical process must be preached 
at all, " he states, for the proclamation is really only an apology 
for the self-evidentness of the facts. "Whether a preacher pro- 
claims with authority is decided by how cleverly and ably he once 
again today makes evident the self-evidentness of the report coming 
out of the past. " 
118 Cross and Resurrection thus cease to be fool- 
ishness to the world. 
Lastly in this vein we may note the criticism of Paul Althaus, 
who views Pannenberg's theses on revelation generally positively, 
but who claims that 'revelation as history' is an overreaction to 
existentialist theology. 
119 According to Althaus, faith and know- 
ledge are not to be essentially distinguished (it is hope which 
looks to the future; faith, like knowledge, is oriented to the 
present). There are thus two kinds of knowledge - the knowledge 
received through reason and that received through faith. Revela- 
tion corresponds to each, unique revelatory events on the one side 
and Spirit-given interpretation on the other. On this basis Alt- 
haus rejects Pannenberg's "universal openness" of God's revelation 
in the Resurrection, for only the Holy Spirit's "inner revelation" 
can transform an open fact into revelation. It is Althaus' con- 
tention that Pannenberg's "revelation as history" should be modif- 
ied to include the revelatory illumination of the Holy Spirit - 
"revelation as history and faith. " 
We see Pannenberg's answer to these similar criticisms in two 
distinct though related replies. Initially, we note Pannenberg's 
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reply to Althaus, starting with an agreement that faith is the gift 
of God. 
120 Pannenberg's understanding of this is, nevertheless, 
considerably different. According to Althaus, the knowledge es- 
sential to faith discloses itself only in a faith reception of the 
message. To Pannenberg, this makes the decision of faith the basis 
for faith itself, which, in turn threatens any objective basis for 
a faith "outside myself. " We fully agree. Pannenberg appeals here 
to the Pauline basing of trust upon knowledge (Romans 6: 8f.; 2 Cor- 
inthians 4: 13). He is quick to point out, however, that the logical 
priority of knowledge to faith does not mean that the two could 
exist for long separately. "Such an alternative (faith or knowledge) 
is basically incorrect. "121 Rather, the logic and the psychology 
of faith must be distinguished. For Pannenberg, trust is compat- 
ible with the expectation that the corresponding knowledge will be 
forthcoming in the future. 
122 
It thus has a proleptic character- 
istic. Pannenberg also insists that this knowledge, which faith 
presupposes, is not to be distinguished from natural knowledge. 
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A special 'faith knowledge' as Althaus desires, and distinguished 
from natural knowledge, leads precisely to faith in the "decision" 
of faith - faith based entirely on itself without regard to any 
objective truth. 
Pannenberg goes on to reject any appeal to the Holy Spirit 
regarding the authenticating of unconvincing data, for the Spirit's 
function is not as a criterion for the truth of the message. "On 
the contrary, it is much more the assurance that one is speaking 
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in the power of the Holy Spirit that is itself in need of a cri- 
terion for its credibility (1 Corinthians 12: 3), thus the content 
of the message. " 
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Thus, the power of the Holy Spirit involves 
the content of the message (the meaning inherent in the reported 
event) rather than its authentication. Faith is essential to 
salvation, yet the ground of faith remains God's revelation 
in 
history. No inspiration adds to an event's inherent meaning. 
This moves us into the second phase, as we see it, of Pan- 
nenberg's replies to his critics regarding fact and meaning. Il- 
lumination is a necessary factor regarding truth for Pannenberg, 
for the reason that our prejudgments often obscure our perception 
of truth. Pannenberg states that: "Different anticipations of 
reality are possible, different 
frameworks to which we connect 
what occurs to us; and therefore the meaning of occurrences can 
be 
debated. They can be controversial and in certain cases even the 
facticity of occurrences can be debated, as with the resurrection 
of Christ.  
125 It is the case, however, that the illumination 
which negates these preconceptions adds nothing to 
the content of 
the message; the event rather becomes powerful through language - 
the spirit leading to the truth of the kerygma and showing 
itself 
as the power of 
the Word. The Spirit, a part of the event ex- 
pressed by the 
Word, is intrinsic to the receiving of that Word 
and thus the 
Word may be designated as Spirit-filled, as illumin- 
ative. 
Pannenberg, as we understand him, thus admits no supernatural 
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work of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is intrinsic to the historical 
event, speaking through the event itself in a manner that is com- 
patible with reason. For Pannenberg, the problem with regard to 
illumination of the Holy Spirit is not the paucity of supernatural- 
ism but the traditional tendency to identify the Spirit with pious 
subjectivity. In answer to Althaus' "revelation as history and 
faith, " Pannenberg speaks of "revelation as history... but for 
faith. " 
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We can summarize from this second part of Pannenberg's response 
regarding divine illumination and faith two main theses: 1) a rela- 
tivity regarding the relationship of fact and meaning and 2) the 
Holy Spirit's 'inactive' role (relative to traditional discourse) 
regarding faith. Let us look at these very briefly in light of the 
Resurrection. 
Regarding (1) Pannenberg has stated that: "In spite of our 
statement that the meaning of an event is inherent to its original 
context... nevertheless that meaning can be determined only in re- 
lation to the vantage point of the particular inquirer, " going on 
to say: "But one may not arbitrarily attach whatever meaning one 
will to a given fact. " 
127 We have already noted Pannenberg's claim 
that the facticity of the Resurrection of Christ can be debated. 
In light of these statements it seems difficult to reconcile Pan- 
nenberg's claim that one is not making proper use of one's reason 
in rejecting the truth of the Resurrection. 
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It is at times dif- 
f icult to know whether Pannenberg is claiming by the "openness" of 
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the truth that such truth is so open as to be unmistakeable (any 
number of critics interpret Pannenberg this way), or that such 
truth is, in spite of the relative vantage point of the inquirer, 
compatible with reason. It can appear that Pannenberg's emphasis 
is generally on the former, and yet a careful reading will expose 
qualifications which push our understanding of Pannenberg's real 
meaning to the latter. When we see Pannenberg as positing simply 
(though of course it is not simple at all) the reasonableness of the 
Resurrection, and thus the Christian faith, we are mindful of the 
great debt that theology owes to Pannenberg's assault both on his- 
torical positivism and the timidity that Christianity has felt in 
relationship to it. When on the other hand, we see Pannenberg as 
claiming an "ontological totalitarianism" 
129 
regarding the charac- 
ter of revelation, Pannenberg himself seemingly assumes a peculiar 
theological/positivistic approach to history. 
That different persons studying the same facts can reach mas- 
sively different conclusion - using accepted historical/critical 
methods - is too obvious to debate. One may read Pannenberg in 
comparison with Charles Guignebert's Jesus, for instance, to see 
the extremes. 
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Guignebert, with systematic cogency and critical 
thoroughness, rejects the Resurrection as the result of "religious 
enthusiasm" and "collective hallucination. " Questions regarding 
the 'emptiness' of the tomb are overshadowed by the denial that 
the tomb ever existed. 
131 Although Pannenberg would certainly 
disagree, does he really claim to point Guignebert out as being 
364 
'unreasonable'? 
We must fall back on Leslie Dewart's basic criticism of Pan- 
nenberg regarding fact and meaning, 
132 
namely, "were either the 
existence or the non-existence of God a matter of fact the issue 
would be both easily settled and unimportant. "133 We claim with 
him that faith is constituted by a commitment precisely because 
of the ambiguous evidence of certain realities; faith must include 
the decision to believe. It is, however, to Pannenberg's credit 
that such faith may (must) base itself on solid, scientific ground. 
It is not self-authenticating, nor does it exist in isolation from 
historically reliable fact. 
Regarding (2), in spite of Pannenberg's insistence that his 
view of the relationship between faith and the Holy Spirit does 
not devalue the Spirit's importance, 
134 
it is difficult to sense 
any real 'activity' in this relationship. The Holy Spirit seems 
to be condensed to the locus of the printed page, and this only 
secondarily, for the Spirit's true presence resides in the event 
reported and nothing more. 
135 When the content of the message 
itself lacks convincing power, states Pannenberg, it accomplishes 
nothing to appeal to the Holy 
Spirit136 (who is called a "haven 
of ignorance" for pious experience). We can appreciate Pannenberg's 
attempt to force some sort of objective accountability 
into the 
claims of faith. However, 
it seems that Pannenberg can be quest- 
ioned on two counts here. His reworking of the relationship be- 
tween the Holy Spirit and faith a) isolates the individual from 
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any divine assistance in regard to belief, other than the event 
of revelation itself. In spite of Pannenberg's enthusiastic case 
for the necessity of reason, it seems at times that we also may be 
left at the mercy of reason. Given Pannenberg's own admission that 
the meaning of occurrences can be debated, this can produce a bleak, 
even pessimistic perspective. Yet b) Pannenberg's conception in 
this regard seems to us to place a resultingly strong emphasis 
on the cultural conditioning of the individual. With regard to 
reason we are the result of any number of factors and influences 
which mold our perspective. In the final analysis the question 
may not be so much related to reason as perspective, for within 
the general framework of 'reasonableness' there are differences 
in understanding which may or may not embrace Pannenberg's theses. 
Without a supplementary illumination by the Holy Spirit in some form 
might we not then actually be at the mercy of reason, especially 
involving cultural conditioning? 
We are confronted again by the general relativity of fact and 
meaning, more specifically, however, by the question: why some 
believe and some do not. This seems to us an especially acute 
problem in Pannenberg, given little satisfaction except by the 
vague indictment (which really only heightens the problem) that 
they should see were they reasoning properly. It is Althaus who 
claims that, since Pannenberg posits the openness of revelation 
to anyone who has eyes to see, he must therefore attribute non- 
recognition of the revelatory event exclusively to man's sinfulness. 
137 
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This in turn, however, posits a "hiddenness" of revelation to human 
perception - "the possibility of unbelief is established in the 
manner of the revelation of God" - which Pannenberg would no doubt 
deny. Where does Pannenberg leave us in regard to the Holy Spirit? 
Pannenberg relates more recent discussions of the Holy Spirit 
specifically to the risen Christ. Thus "the resurrection reality and 
the Holy Spirit belong indissolubly together... It is only possible 
to talk appropriately about the Spirit of God in reference to the 
risen Christ, in connection with the new reality of life which has 
already appeared in Jesus. "138 Thus the Holy Spirit is intimately 
related to life-giving (Romans 8: 11; John 14: 26 and 16: 31f. ). With- 
in this context Pannenberg invokes Luther. While basically standing 
by what he has previously said regarding the Holy Spirit and faith 
he seems, on the basis of the reformer, to add a slightly different 
nuance to his discussion, this revolving around the subordination 
of the Spirit to the Word. The fact remains that it is only 
through the external Word of the message that the true Spirit is 
received; the Spirit adds nothing to that message. The Word 
(both 
Bible and proclamation) still contains its own inherent truth. Of 
course not everyone will recognize this and thus the need for 
the illuminating work of the Holy Spirit, i. e., "so that the Word 
of the message of Christ may dawn for the individual 
(and)... over- 
come his deeply-rooted prejudices. " This illumination 
is the work 
of the Spirit "which proceeds from the Word"[emphasis ours]. 
It is difficult to tell if Pannenberg is positing here what 
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amounts to a separate active existence for the Holy Spirit. This 
is possible, but at best the discussion is problematic, amounting 
to a serious gap in Pannenberg's schema due to his insistence on 
the openness of revelation. We note Thomas Parker's general crit- 
icism of Pannenberg, to the effect that certain aspects of Pan- 
nenberg's theology should be clarified more than has been done so 
far. 
139 Pannenberg himself admits that he is "constantly feeling 
that many things I have said are too simple. ""140 We propose that 
this is one of those topics and that the entire question of how one 
comes to faith needs a great deal more discussion. 
We leave Pannenberg at this point but only temporarily. Such 
is the influence of his theology that he will be a factor in our 
upcoming chapter on Catholic theologians and will be dealt with even 
more extensively in our Conclusion. There we will be able to better 
define our conviction that Pannenberg has pushed us to new levels 
in regard to the Resurrection, yet offers in the end a somewhat 
truncated perspective on belief in this event. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) This term we borrow from Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who ascribes 
it to certain persons who show "confidence in their own work, 
boldness and defiance of the world and of popular opinion... 
and a high-spirited self-confidence. " See Bonhoeffer: Letters 
and Papers from Prison, E. Bethge ed. (London: SCM, 1967), 
pp. 137,140. 
2) W. Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, tr. L. Wilkins and D. 
Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968). Here- 
after JGM. 
3) John B. Cobb, Jr., "Wolfhart Pannenberg's 'Jesus: God and 
Man'", The Journal of Religion, Vol. 49 (1969), p. 193. 
4) Ibid., p. 201. 
5) See Pannenberg, "The Crisis of the Scripture-Principle in 
Protestant Theology", Dialog 2 (Autumn, 1963), p. 308, where 
Pannenberg writes: "A conception of reality in relation to 
God, such that it cannot be understood at all without God, 
belongs to the task of theology. And that constitutes its 
universality. " 
6) JGM, p. 12. 
7) One of the more interesting features of Pannenberg's theo- 
logy is the intensity with which he decries the retreat of 
theology under the criticism of the Enlightenment, and yet 
the intellectual reception which he gives to critical rat- 
ionality, actually making an ally of what were formerly often 
seen as inimical methods and conclusions. We find this one 
of lPannenberg's most attractive features. 
8) Letters and Papers from Prison, op. cit., p. 174. 
9) R. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 210-11. Note 
also Bultmann's comment that: "As a matter of fact the Eas- 
ter faith has no interest in the historical question. " In 
"An Interview with Rudolf Bultmann", Christianity and Crisis, 
Vol. 26 (1966), pp. 254f. We have previously discussed Bult- 
mann's debt to Martin Kühler, who helped set the stage for 
a generation of theologians with his book The So-Called His- 
torical Jesus and the Hisoric Biblical Christ, in which he 
claimed that "the real Christ is the Christ who is preached. " 
(p. 66). Pannenberg, in his Basic Questions in Theology, I, 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970-71), pp. 66f., discusses 
Kähler's role in modern theology, claiming interestingly 
that Kühler himself retained a historical basis for faith and 
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that his concept of Heilsgeschichte kept him from becoming a 
'kerygmatic' theologian in the Bultmannian sense. 
10) There are numerous references in CD regarding this paradigm. 
See, for instance, 1/2, pp. 47-50; 2/1, p. 265; 3/1, pp. 59-60. 
See Lothar Steiger, "Revelation-History and Theological Rea- 
son", Journal for Theology and the Church, Vol. 4 (1967), pp. 
82-115, for a short but excellent discussion of Pannenberg's 
dispute with Bultmann and Barth regarding the historical 
problem, i. e., 'universal history' (Pannenberg) vs. the 'his- 
toricity of existence' (Bultmann and Gogarten) and 'Urgeschich- 
te' or 'Heilsgeschichte' (Barth). 
11) The essay "What Is Truth? " in Basic Questions, 2, pp. 1-27, 
is the best single source for understanding Pannenberg's 
reliance upon Hegel (see esp. pp. 21f. ) and the background of 
Pannenberg's concept, based upon Hegel, of 'universal history' 
But see also "Redemptive Event and History", Basic Questions, 
1, pp. 15-80, for an elaboration of this concept. See also 
D. Olive, Wolfhart Pannenberg (Waco: Word, 1973), p. 27. 
12) Pannenberg, Revelation As History, tr. D. Granskou (New York: 
MacMillan, 1968), p. 5. [Hereafter RH]. 
13) In this context Pannenberg has called himself a "rather pe- 
culiar Barthian. " See Olive, Wolfhart Pannenberg, op. cit., 
p. 25. 
14) Thus it is that Barth can describe the future of Christ, the 
parousia, as mainly only a matter of unveiling that which has 
been seen already in veiled form in Jesus. He states: "Christ's 
coming again... is described in the New Testament as the rev- 
elation. He will be revealed, not only to the Church but to 
everybody, as the Person He is... In full clarity and public- 
ity the 'it is finished' will come to light... What is the 
future bringing? Not once more a turning point in history but 
the revelation of that which is. It is the future, but the 
future of that which the Church remembers, of that which has 
taken place once and for all. The Alpha and the Omega are the 
same thing. " Dogmatics In Outline, tr. G. T. Thomas (London: 
SCM, 1949), pp. 134-5. See also RH, p. 7 and J. Moltmann, TH, 
p. 20. 
15) See CD, 1/1, p. 369. Pannenberg notes that here "Barth falls 
back on the Calvinistic axiom 'finitum non capax Infiniti'. " 
See RH, note 14, p. 20. 
16) RH, p. 136. 
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17) Pannenberg states that "for much too long a time faith has 
been misunderstood to be subjectivity's fortress into which 
Christianity could retreat from the attacks of scientific 
knowledge. " Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of 
Nazareth", Theology As History, vol. 3, New Frontiers in Theo- 
logy, ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr. (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1967), p. 131. 
18) RH, pp. 137-39; BQ, 1,65f., 150,199; BQ, 2,30f., 40. 
19) Pannenberg, "Revelation of God", op. cit., p. 131. 
20) Faith is defined basically as "trust" by Pannenberg. See 
RH, p. 138; BQ, 2,44f., 248. 
21) RH, pp. 19,136f., 195f. This seems to us a rather unfortunate 
way of phrasing. What Pannenberg is disallowing is not really 
the role of the Holy Spirit in a person's coming to faith, rath- 
er the desire evidenced by some to explain faith on the basis 
of a 'special' illumination of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spir- 
it, as Alan Galloway states explaining Pannenberg, "is not 
itself an organ of perception" but works in conjunction with 
the event itself. See Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 52. 
22) RH, p. 137. 
23) Idem. He states that men must better "use their reason in 
order to see correctly. " 
24) Ibid., p. 138. 
25) Idem. See also BQ, 2, pp. 63f. 
26) Idem. 
27) H. Obayashi, "Future and Responsibility: A Critique of Pan- 
nenberg's Eschatology", Canadian Journal of Theology, vol. 3 
(1971), p. 196. For Pannenberg faith is the risk taken on the 
"fact of God's having been revealed in the fate of Jesus. " 
RH, p. 138. 
28) RH, p. 138. 
29) JGM, p. 33. 
30) Barth, claims Pannenberg, with the wedding of these two elem- 
ents, comes "closer to the basic outline of the Gnostic re- 
deemer myth than is necessarily characteristic of an incarnat- 
ional Christology. " He acknowledges a difference, however, in 
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that Barth's redeemer redeems not himself but man, who is 
essentially different from God. In addition, Barth adds the 
view that God's humiliation is at the same time man's exal- 
tation, thereby forming a union. See JGM, pp. 34-5. 
31) JGM, pp. 25-30. Pannenberg takes exception here not only with 
Bultmann but with Otto Weber and Paul Althaus. Pannenberg 
quotes Melancthon's famous statement: "Who Jesus Christ is 
becomes known in his saving action. " Ibid., p. 38. 
32) Neither will Pannenberg allow soteriological interests to dom- 
inate Christology whether in the form proposed by Kant, Schleier- 
macher, Bultmann or Tillich. "Jesus", claims Pannenberg, "pos- 
sesses significance 'for us' only to the extent that this signif- 
icance is inherent in himself, in his history, and in his per- 
son constituted by this history... soteriology must follow from 
Christology, not vice versa. " (See JGM, p. 48). Thus, for Pan- 
nenberg, Christology is the interpretation of an historical 
event. We do not begin at the 'conclusion' that God became 
incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. This is something which must 
be allowed to rise out of the historical itself. 
33) RH, p. 139. 
34) B4,1, p. 53. 
35) Pannenberg, though he does not state it thus (and we could wish 
for a fuller treatment of the concept of 'certainty') seems to 
be evidencing agreement with the conclusion of H. Kling (Does 
God Exist?, pp. 29f. ) that: mathematical truth does not provide 
a basis for the formation of the concept of truth as such. Is 
truth exemplified, for instance, by such clear and distinct 
understanding as 2+ 2= 4? KUng's point in this regard is that: 
"The more abstract the situation in which knowledge occurs, the 
more clear and distinct this knowledge can be" (p. 30). Math- 
ematical knowledge then, is so clear and distinct because of 
the high degree of abstraction. It is interesting to note 
however - and this lends further support to Pannenberg - that 
modern mathematical logic has become immersed in difficulties 
which have shattered its own concept of universal certainty. 
Certain statements involving 'set theory' (Georg Cantor) when 
tied to the concept of infinity have led to formulae able to 
be mathematically both proved and refuted(p. 32). 
36) B4,1, p. 54. This view of historical verification differs, for 
instance, from that of John Hick who claims (somewhat positiv- 
istically) that "verification consists in the exclusion of 
grounds for rational doubt concerning the truth of a proposit- 
ion. " See "Theology and Verification", Theology Today, vol. 17 
(1960), pp. 12-31. 
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37) BQ, 1, p. 71. He leans heavily upon the work of Collingwood 
(The Idea of History), who had criticized that historical re- 
search as abstract which was done in isolation of its referen- 
tial relationships. This, of course, finds direct reflection in 
Pannenberg (through Hegel) in his concept of 'universal his- 
tory'. Pannenberg's general distaste for the positivistic 
approach to theology is in marked contrast to Barth's so- 
called 'positivism of revelation' (see Letters and Papers from 
Prison, op. cit., pp. 153,156-7. 
38) A. Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 48. 
39) Idem., citing BQ, 2, pp. 30f. Pannenberg also claims the sup- 
port of Luther's accounting of the relationship of faith and 
reason. See BQ, 1, pp. 61f. 
40) K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New York: 
Hutchinson, 1959), p. 278. Popper also goes on to say that 
science cannot even achieve a substitute for truth such as 
probability, in obvious contradiction to Pannenberg. 
41) Ibid., p. 281. See Pannenberg in New Frontiers in Theology, 
vol. 3, "Theology as History", J. M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, 
eds. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 256; RH, pp. 152f.; 
Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, p. 40. Critical-history is 
this 'systematic test' for Pannenberg regarding the object- 
ive facts of history. 
42) Ibid., XXV. 
43) Idem. 
44) K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of 
Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1663), pp. 15-17. See H. Kling, Does God Exist?, pp. 101-6. 
45) Thomas S. Kuhn has shown us the remarkable parallel between 
the Weltanschaaung which characterizes much of theology and 
natural science. This amounts to a general stubborn resist- 
ance to everything new, which might disrupt the established 
paradigm. See Kling, Does God Exist?, pp. lllf. What may be 
called 'religious revelationists' in the field of theology 
thus seem to find their moral equivelants in science. 
46) Pannenberg's most systematic undertaking regarding his concept 
of revelation is to be found in RH, pp. 125f. under the suc- 
cessive thesis heading we shall see. The explication of these 
will serve as an excellent point of entry into Pannenberg's 
theology of revelation, and a lead into his theology of the 
Resurrection. 
373 
47) RH, p. 13. 
48) Ibid., p. 7. See also Barth, CD, 1/1, p. 340: "This God him- 
self is not only himself but also his self-revelation. " Cited 
by Pannenberg in footnote, p. 20. Barth claims direct self- 
revelation, as Pannenberg shows, in both God's announcement of 
his name in Exodus 3 and in the unity of essence of Jesus with 
God. See CD, 1/1, p. 462. 
49) See RH, pp. 13-15. 
50) Ibid., p. 131. Pannenberg notes that: "The history that dem- 
onstrates the deity of God is broadened to include the total- 
ity of all events" (p. 133). 
51) Again we must make reference to the work of Popper already 
noted, specifically, his concept of man's approach to an ever 
outstanding truth. Pannenberg's concept of revelation ap- 
prehended at the end of history amends Popper by introducing 
an eschatological dimension into his thought. 
52) RH, p. 134. 
53) Ibid., p. 141. 
54) At this point Pannenberg introduces the category of Vorgriff. 
According to Ronald D. Pasquariello, "Pannenberg's Philosoph- 
ical Foundations", Journal of Religion, vol. 56, p. 341, this 
term "seems to have been chosen in conscious contrast to Hegel's 
Begriff. Hegel was forced to make his own time and standpoint 
the end of history in order to think the unity of history, 
which is a limitation of Hegel's vision of reality. He could 
not deal adequately with contingence, the appearance of new 
things and events in the course of history, so he excluded it 
in favor of the Begriff (as dialectically present result). 
The concept of Vorgriff, anticipation, enables Pannenberg to 
preserve the openness of history. " Vorgriff simply implies 
a foretaste or anticipation of what is to come; it is not the 
whole. It is, however, of the essence of this future event, 
is conscious of it, and allows Pannenberg an understanding of 
history that remains open to the future. Its prime feature 
is that ultimate meaning does not reside in the event of Vor- 
griff, such meaning resides only in the total context. 
55) JGM, p. 67. 
56) RH, p. 149. 
57) Ibid., pp. 82-3. 
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58) Ibid., p. 82. 
59) Idem. 
60) Pannenberg is critical of Karl Barth and Karl Rahner regarding 
this element of the future. Barth fails to find the ontic 
foundations of Christology in the statement of Jesus' Resur- 
rection, possibly as a result of its displacement by the doc- 
trine of the incarnation (see JGM, p. 11, footnote no. 126). 
Rahner comes to a similar result, stressing that the Resur- 
rection is merely the appearance of the meaning of the cross 
and claiming that Good Friday and Easter are "two essentially 
mutually interrelated aspects of an event that is strictly 
unified. " (JGM, p. 112). Claims Pannenberg: "The previously 
considered positions fail to appreciate the relatedness to the 
future and therefore the dependence on the future of Jesus' 
whole pre-Easter appearance. " 
61) JGM, pp. 66f. 
62) Pannenberg, speaking of the Resurrection, states in The Apos- 
tles' Creed in the Light of Today's Questions, tr. M. Kolh 
(London: SCM, 1972) that "it was through this, and through 
this alone, that Jesus, who was rejected by Israel, was shown 
to be God's only Son, and our Lord... It is only in light of 
the raising of Jesus that we have reason to speak of a divine 
incarnation in his person"(p. 96). See JGM, p. 129. 
63) JGM, pp. 129-30. - 
64) Ibid., pp. 132,150. Pannenberg, as he acknowledges, is in 
debt to Barth for the latter's notion that Jesus' union in 
being with God is the implication of God's self-revelation 
through Jesus. He does, however, break with Barth in his in- 
sistence that it is only on the basis of his Resurrection that 
Jesus is the revelation of God. He criticizes Barth rather 
severely for placing the virgin birth on the same level as the 
Resurrection. See JGM, pp. 143f. We should note also that 
this "idea of God's self-revelation in Jesus [including] ident- 
ity of essence" is not a denial by Pannenberg of his views on 
direct revelation. Rather his 'essential' understanding is 
based on the adoptionist understanding that "the person of Jesus 
Christ is not essentially 'God', but God is present in Jesus 
only as the power of the Spirit that fills the man. " (JGM, 
p. 122). It is in this light that Pannenberg can speak from the 
perspective of a "functional unity of Jesus with God" (JGM, 
p. 127). 
Pannenberg also goes on to discuss (within the general topic 
of incarnation) the subject of Jesus' pre-existence. It is 
his claim that: "Viewed from the confirmation of Jesus claim 
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by his resurrection, the inner logic of the matter dictates 
that Jesus was always one with God, not just after a certain 
date in his life. And in view of God's eternity, the revel- 
atory character of Jesus' resurrection means that God was 
always one with Jesus, even before his earthly birth. " Jesus 
is thus "from all eternity" God's representative. Otherwise 
"Jesus would not be in person the one revelation of the eternal 
God. " (JGM, p. 153). Pannenberg's claim is thus that "the 
resurrected Lord's essential unity with God leads to the idea 
of preexistence through its own intrinsic logic. " (JGM, pp. 
153-4). 
65) JGM, pp. 66f. 
66) See the Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 18 (1965), p. 489. 
67) G. G. O'Collins, "The Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg", op. 
cit., pp. 375-6. Also Interpretation, vol. 23 (1975), p. 231. 
68) Pannenberg, The Apostle's Creed, op. cit., p. 101. 
69) Ibid., p. 287f. If, as in the Alexandrian Christology, the 
living unity between the two natures is insisted on, it will 
not be preserved without their being mingled to form some third 
thing. If the two natures are kept independent, "the concrete 
picture of Jesus" will always be "oriented merely to one of 
them" (pp. 294-5). The result is that either divinity is sup- 
pressed or Jesus' humanity will be presented as something ex- 
traordinary and omniscient, and thus his humanity "as human 
in the sense of all other human" lives becomes "doubtful" 
(p. 313). 
70) Ibid., pp. 296f. 
71) Ibid., pp. 307f. 
72) Ibid., pp. 108f. 
73) The titles 'Son of David' and 'Son of God' characterize, in 
their respective placement within this verse (Romans 1: 3) the 
relationship of the pre-Easter Jesus to the resurrected Jesus. 
An 'adoption' is indicated as the "earthly Jesus was not yet 
designated as 'Son of God', but this title was, rather, at- 
tributed to him only on the basis of the resurrection and ex- 
altation" (JGM, p. 134). It is integral to the importance of 
this verse that one understand the purpose of the order of the 
titles. In this regard, the translation of the verse by Gal- 
loway (op. cit., p. 79), who transfers 'Jesus Christ our Lord' 
to the first clause, inadvertently misses the very point of 
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Pannenberg's effort. There is no justification for this read- 
ing (although it is somewhat smoother in the English). See 
The Greek New Testament, ed. Aland, Black, Metzger, Wikgren, 
Martini (New York: American Bible Society, 1966), p. 529. 
74) See JGM, pp. 135f. 
75) See, for instance, B. O. McDermott, "Pannenberg's Resurrection 
Christology", Theological Studies, vol. 35 (December, 1974), 
pp. 711f. A. Galloway, op. cit., p. 79 calls this a proposal of 
enormous importance and monstrous difficulty. " R. D. Pasquar- 
iello, op. cit., pp. 345-6 calls Pannenberg's argument "subtle" 
and "in a nascent state of development. " 
76) See, for instance, JGM, pp. 135-6, where Pannenberg attempts 
to find a proper analogy to his concept of retroactive signif- 
icance. 
77) B. O. McDermott, "Pannenberg's Resurrection Christology", op. 
cit., p. 712. 
78) JGM, p. 135. 
79) "Pannenberg's Resurrection Christology", op. cit., p. 712. 
80) See A. Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, p. 81. 
81) B4,2, pp. 1-27. 
82) JGM, pp. 135-6. 
83) B4,2, pp. 9,10. 
84) It is important to note that he is not promulgating a special 
ontology for the Christ event. The Resurrection has the same 
constitutive force for the life of Jesus as every other event 
in history. Hebraic truth is general, not special, truth. See 
Galloway, p. 81. JGM, pp. 134-5. Pannenberg's new ontological 
view is given its most thorough treatment in his essay "Theology 
and the Kingdom of God" where he attempts to lay new stress on 
the "resounding motif of Jesus' message - the imminent Kingdom 
of God" which "must be recovered as a key to the whole of Christ- 
ian theology. " (See Pannenberg, "Theology and the Kingdom of 
God", Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1969)). Pannenberg does not of course simply want to 
employ available conceptions of the Kingdom of God. He speaks 
disparagingly of those who have belittled or denied the futur- 
istic element it contains because of the association with Jew- 
ish apocalyptic. He likewise disagrees with Cullmann, who 
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claims that Jesus spoke of the Kingdom of God as beginning 
in his presence and being fulfilled in the future. In Pan- 
nenberg's view it is "more appropriate to reverse the con- 
nection between present and future, giving priority to the 
future. " (See "Theology and the Kingdom of God", p. 54). Pan- 
nenberg readily admits his debt to 'process' theology. He 
states: "One of A. N. Whitehead's most fascinating ideas is 
that the new is not set forth by the already existing but 
enters subjectively into relation with what is. Thus the 
continuity of nature is no longer understood as the irrestible 
dynamic of the already existing pushing forward, but as the 
building of bridges to the past that save the past from get- 
ting lost. " (See "Theology and the Kingdom of God", p. 67). 
Pannenberg does, however, seriously qualify Whitehead's 
thought with the introduction of the eschatological dimension 
which relates to the world in process as "the futuristic power 
of creative love. " (See "Theology and the Kingdom of God", 
p. 66). 
85) The Resurrection is able to influence-Jesus' pre-Easter exist- 
ence precisely because it is an eschatological event. See 
Pannenberg, "Future and Unity", E. H. Cousins ed., Hope and the 
Future of Man, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), pp. 
71f. According to Pannenberg, the unity between Jesus and God 
is first to be characterized as a functional unity marked by 
a personal relationship between the two. This involved a life 
of dedication to the point of self-surrender on the cross in 
which, paradoxically, Jesus' unity with the Father increased 
in direct proportion to his own loss of clarity regarding his 
union. This reached its extremity in his apparent rejection 
by God. (The perfection of this surrender to the Father also 
shows on the conscious level, a degree of ignorance regarding 
Jesus' own identity and his Father's plan). See JGM, pp. 332f. 
Pannenberg jeJ on Hegel's understanding of a person as that 
which acquires its essence through dedication (immersion) in 
another. This formula allows Pannenberg to say that Jesus' 
dedication to God is what mediates and establishes his divinity. 
JGM, p. 336. 
86) JGM, pp. 153,69. This is true despite Pannenberg's "detour" 
Christology which speaks of Jesus' divinity only in relation 
to the Father and his fellow man. This is at least paradox- 
ical, i. e., the relationship between 1) the Jesus from all 
eternity and 2) the human race. Yet one of the reasons Pan- 
nenberg feels uneasiness with traditional incarnational under- 
standings of Jesus is because of its implications that there 
was a time when the Logos was independent of the man Jesus. 
Pannenberg claims that this exhibits a misunderstanding of the 
378 
relationship between time and eternity. Ibid., pp. 134f. 
See also "A Theological Conversation with Wolfhart Pannenberg", 
pp. 287f. 
87) Peter C. Hodgson, "Pannenberg on Jesus", Journal of the Amer- 
ican Academy of Religion, vol. XXXVI (December 1968), p. 376. 
88) See B. O. McDermott, op. cit., p. 712. Also JGM, pp. 307,322, 
338f., 344. 
89) We can still be 
express clearly 
to present. As 
to Pannenberg's 
I cannot escape 
smuggles actual 
p. 714. 
troubled however by Pannenberg's failure to 
and consistently the relationship of future 
McDermott states: "As much as I am attracted 
view of the presence of God in Jesus' life, 
the impression that there are times when he 
ity into the still outstanding future. " Op. cit., 
90) See "A Theological Conversation", p. 29. 
91) Idem. 
92) It seems such an obvious fact in JGM that Jesus became essen- 
tially one with God at his Resurrection (and only in light of 
the Resurrection is he retroactively one with God in his entire 
life) that we fail to see how Norman Perrin can claim that Pan- 
nenberg's entire Christology is conditioned on his assumption 
that some of the Son of Man sayings (as we have seen) are his- 
torical. See Perrin, "Turning Back the Clock", The Christian 
Century (1968), pp. 1575f. Pannenberg himself readily and de- 
cisively refutes this claim of Perrin's in "A Theological Con- 
versation", p. 29. John Cobb likewise disagrees with Perrin's 
conclusions in "Wolfhart Pannenberg's Jesus: God and Man", 
pp. 194-5. 
93) See JGM, section 2, "Jesus' Essential Unity with God", pp. 
133-58. This is one of his chief sources of contention with 
Barth. We have noted that Pannenberg does develop a concept 
of pre-existence, however this is done through the "inner 
logic" of the revelatory character of the Resurrection. See 
pp. 152-54. 
94) Pannenberg is vague here, and therefore unconvincing, in his 
argument for rejecting immortality of the soul. It would seem 
that he is on solid biblical ground and yet his arguments in 
sum seem to be based on sociological and scientific grounds. 
Can science really hope to answer such a question? It would 
seem that these answers must rather be sought at a metaphysical/ 
philosophical level. See Galloway, p. 71, who criticizes his 
"reluctance to leave the historical/critical level and become 
fully engaged in metaphysics", which Pannenberg devoutly re- 
fuses to do. 
95) JGM, p. 74. 
96) JGM, pp. 89-90; 97-8. 
97) Pannenberg is on solid biblical ground in this dualistic ap- 
proach, noting that "in the oldest stratum of tradition... 
Mark reports only the empty tomb (ch. 16); Paul reports only 
appearances of the resurrected Lord (1 Cor., ch. 15). " JGM, 
p. 89. 
98) 1 Corinthians 15: 3b-5. Paul himself wog 
with the appearances reported in vs. 6f. 
ance with the information he received in 
p. 90. Pannenberg's intention is to show 
little, if any, evidence to suggest that 
for the sake of argument. 
ild have expanded this 
"presumably in accord- 
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notable but inconclusive. 
102) JGM, p. 98. 
103) Idem. 
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105) JGM, p. 100. 
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we see this as a necessary, if sometimes bothersome, element in 
his theology. 
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nenberg's Eschatology", Canadian Journal of Theology, vol. 3 
(1971), p. 197. 
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116) Galloway, p. 44. 
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124) Ibid., p. 35. 
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140) "A Theological Conversation", p. 289. 
383 
7. The Catholics: 
Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Hans Küng 
Looking Ahead: Introduction to the Catholic Section 
Throughout the previous chapters on our Protestant theologians 
it has become increasingly evident that the simple statement, "Jesus 
is risen, " is anything but simple. A novice, upon entering for the 
first time the world of Catholic Christology, might expect a more 
uniform concensus in contemporary systematics due to the Roman emphas- 
is on ecclesiastical authority. Yet, although the range of opinion 
among Catholic theologians seems to us to be somewhat more restricted 
than it is among Protestants, Catholics too exhibit a wide diversity 
even on such central tenets of faith as the Resurrection. The primary 
issues regarding the Resurrection focus on its nature (including its 
relationship to the cross). 
Regarding the former C. F. Evans has noted: "... the principal 
difficulty here is not to believe, but to know what it is which of- 
fers itself for belief. " 
t 
This has consumed a great amount of energy 
in Protestant circles, also. Yet the major disputed point - the re- 
lationship of Jesus' death and Resurrection - has drawn, if anything, 
even more discussion than on the Protestant side. Some retain the 
traditional view that the Resurrection is an event distinct from and 
subsequent to Jesus' death, 
2 
while others understand it as an inner 
aspect of that death. 
The ambiguity of this struggle can be seen clearly, for instance, 
in the theology of Walter Kasper, who shows certain signs of Karl 
Rahner's influence. At times Kasper links the Resurrection closely 
to the cross. He states (with specific reference to Rahner): "The 
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Resurrection is the perfected and perfecting end of the death on the 
cross. It is therefore not another event after the life and after 
the passion of Jesus, but rather that which took place most deeply 
in Jesus' death: the active and passive handing over of the one cor- 
poral man to God and the mercifully loving acceptance of this giving 
by God. The Resurrection is, in a sense, the deeper divine dimension 
of the cross... "3 Yet elsewhere Kasper can resist exclusive concen- 
tration on the historical Jesus with the argument that the Resurrect- 
ion has added content of its own - the new life of the Crucified in 
the kingdom of God. 
4 
Regarding the revelation of the Resurrection, Kasper departs 
somewhat from the traditional view (with other of his contemporaries. ) 
He can attribute a certain historical probability to the tradition 
of the discovery of the empty tomb, and refer enthusiastically to the 
appearances of the risen Christ - understood as representing a new 
initiative on the part of Christ or God - yet he insists that these 
appearances need not be conceived as miraculous. His phrase: that 
they are "the believing experience that the Spirit of Jesus is still 
operative and that Jesus is alive and present in the Spirit. "5 
Another exegete who has addressed the question of the origin 
of faith in the Resurrection is Rudolf Pesch. Pesch, who also refers 
favourably to Rahner's conception of the Resurrection, is not impressed 
by arguments for the historicity of the empty tomb or the appearances. 
Since Jesus' Jewish contemporaries had at their disposal traditions 
which envisioned the Resurrection of the eschatological martyr/prophet 
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(Pannenberg would speak in terms of "the horizon of the apocalyptic 
expectation" and he draws from it very different conclusions than 
Pesch) the transformation of their faith was possible without appeal 
to empty tombs or appearances. Pesch's understanding of the revelation 
of the Resurrection thus places considerable weight on the historical 
Jesus and presumes a high degree of reflection on the part of the 
disciples. Obviously, for Pesch, revelation and reflection are not 
mutually exclusive. 
6 
Related estimations of the Christological function of the Res- 
urrection have been advanced by Hans Jellouschek and Franz Schupp, 
both of whom are indebted to Rahner for their views on the Resurrect- 
ion. Jellouschek suggests that the term "Resurrection" adds nothing 
to the content of Christological affirmation, but instead points to 
the crucifixion for its content. Its reference is to Jesus' death 
and thus to his earthly life as genuinely salvific and it expresses, 
thus, the permanent importance of Jesus' person. The confession 
'Jesus is risen' is equal to the confession 'Jesus is the Christ' - 
the former is not the reason for the latter. 
Franz Schupp likewise concedes that the historical origins of 
faith in the Resurrection are problematic, and shifts the focus of 
his theology toward the conclusion that the cross is the center of 
soteriology, reflecting Jesus' personal acceptance of the consequenc- 
es of his preaching. Schupp declines to make the validity of Jesus' 
life depend on subsequent ratification fearing a devaluation of the 
cross should the focus of soteriology be located in a Resurrection 
objectified as event beside or after death. Thus, the Resurrection 
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amounts to the basic Christological confession of Jesus, and supreme- 
ly to his death, as salvific. 
7 
We have taken time for this brief discussion of contemporary 
Catholic systematics initially in order to provide an introduction to 
our next section by way of a more general context. It is hoped that 
it may be seen even at this early point that Catholic thought is hard- 
ly a uniform thing. It is rather dynamic and innovative as it seeks 
to place the Resurrection in its proper relationship to revelation 
and to Historie, especially the crucifixion. 
It may be noted from the preceding few pages that the influence 
of Karl Rahner has been quite considerable in Catholic thought. It 
is because his reflections on the nature of the Resurrection have been 
so influential (though by no means universally accepted - Rahner is 
considered quite radical in many Catholic quarters) that we shall begin 
with a presentation of his position. 
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SCM, 1970), p. 130. 
2) This is the thrust, we believe, of Vatican II. See The Documents 
of Vatican II, ed. W. M. Abbott, tr. J. Gallagher (New York: 
Guild Press, 1966). Specifically note "The Eschatological Nature 
of the Pilgrim Church and Her Union with the Heavenly Church, " 
p. 84; "The Liturgical Year, " pp. 168-9; "Christ as the New Man, " 
p. 222; and "Revelation Itself, " p. 113f. 
3) W. Kasper, Jesus the Christ (London: SCM, 1976), pp. 175-6. 
4) Ibid., pp. 35,135f. 
5) Ibid., pp. 136f. 
6) See J. P. Galvin, "Resurrection as the Theologia crucis Jesu: 
The Foundational Christology of Rudolf Pesch, " Theological Stud- 
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Karl Rahner 
It is in his Theological Investigations, vol. 1, that Rahner 
makes this interesting comment: "It goes without saying that it 
is above all the relationship of the spiritual creature to God that 
we must keep in mind, and that in a special way, as we have learnt 
from Existentialist philosophy. For it is the spiritual creature 
which in a special way, as person constituted by transcendence and 
freedom, enters into relationship with God... (Thus) it is at men 
above all that we must look in order to learn what the Creator- 
creature relationship is. It should thus appear... that Christology 
may be studied as self-transcending anthropology, and anthropology 
as deficient Christology; that Christology is the 'primitive concept- 
ion' (although 'for us' in part subsequent) of anthropology and the 
doctrine of creation, as Christ is the prototokos pasas ktiseos 
(Colossians 1: 15). "1 Rahner's theology of the Resurrection is in- 
dissolubly involved with his anthropological approach to theology. 
Implicit in this approach is Rahner's understanding of the 
relationship of Christology and human freedom. Rahner spends a great 
deal of time, in a variety of places, attempting to define freedom 
as he conceives it. 
2 
For our purposes it is enough to illuminate 
two points regarding this. A) Freedom must ultimately be defined in 
terms of grace. "Salvation is God communicating himself - it is his 
free act, which is God himself - since there is no salvation in the 
real order apart from God himself. "3 Without this divine self-com- 
munication, which touches man in his existential situation, man's 
'free will' would be farcical, for he could only 'choose' slavery 
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and death. God's grace thus actually preserves choice and thus, 
freedom. B) Christ and his salvation represents more than one side 
of a set of alternatives. Rather, Christ is the very manner in which 
man, in taking up a position towards God himself, establishes him- 
self as (spiritual) person, 
4 
constituting himself through his power 
of self-disposal. This places man in an incomparable position as one 
"who cannot be adequately classified into any system and cannot be 
adequately subsumed under any one concept. "5 Man's freedom is a 
transcendental mark of human existence itself, namely "the capacity 
6 
for the eternal. " 
This freedom, so intrinsic to and constitutive of man's very 
being, is exercised finally by each individual in the finite, situ- 
ated life-history which culminates in death.? Our death is by no 
means to be thought of in all respects as a mere biological 'exit' 
or the simple culmination of a process, like that which pertains to 
plants and animals. In the case of man we may speak of actual 'death' 
which combines both active and passive elements in a double aspect. 
The end of man as a spiritual person involves an active perfecting 
from within. For those who die in Christ, says Rahner, "death brings 
to its culmination both the reception and the production of salvation 
... 
death, as an act of man is precisely the event which gathers up 
the whole of the personal human life of the individual into one con- 
summation. "8 Correspondingly, there transpires as interruption from 
beyond our influence, one which delivers our most radical, physical 
suffering. Thus, death is simultaneously active and passive: it is 
alien, imposed from without, inescapable of course, and yet man's 
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"free, personal self-affirmation and self-realization achieves in 
death an absolute determination: death is the definitive exercise of 
freedom before God. "9 
Man is a being who intrinsically looks to the future for his 
fulfillment, a future which holds the hope of permanent validity for 
what one has become in one's life-history. This transcendental hope 
is not a desire for the mere indefinite extension of this life, rather 
for the permanence of what occurs in death, i. e., "the achieved defin- 
itiveness of the freely matured existence of man... the hard-won and 
untrammeled victory of what was once temporal. "10 This hope consti- 
tutes the anthropological horizon for an understanding of what is 
meant by Resurrection. Since man is not a dichotomy, but a unity, 
this hope is not merely thought of as a fulfillment of the 'soul, ' 
11 
but Resurrection of the body. 
For Rahner, the Resurrection of Jesus fulfills a double role 
being both a confirmation of this transcendental hope and the ful- 
fillment of this hope in a particular individual. 
12 
Jesus' Resurrect- 
ion is certainly unique, and elements of uniqueness are seen through- 
out this decisive event, 
13 
yet the formal elements associated with 
the Hebrew concept of Resurrection in general predominate. Since 
each person's death is the definitive exercise of freedom and self- 
realization before God, Jesus' Resurrection is the outcome of his 
earth existence, and is not a completely differentiated postscript 
following, but unrelated to, Jesus' life-history. As Rahner states: 
"... the Resurrection of Christ is not another event after his passion 
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and death. In spite of the duration of time which intervenes which 
is anyway an intrinsic component of even the most unified and indi- 
visible act of spatio-temporal man, the Resurrection is the manifest- 
ation of what happened in the death of Christ: the imposed and enforced 
handing over of the whole bodily man to the mystery of the merciful 
loving God, by the concentrated freedom of Christ as he disposes of 
his whole life and existence. In this way, Good Friday and Easter 
can be seen as two aspects of a strictly unitary event. "14 
Rahner is careful to establish a respectful distance from this 
event, for "we cannot really imagine the 'how' of this bodily con- 
summation. "15 It is quite fanciful, he claims to think that we will 
ever have a detailed knowledge of the mode of existence of the risen 
Christ. Yet this is not seen by Rahner as a hindrance to faith. 
Faith, rather, plays the greatest role in the Christian understanding 
of the Resurrection. Rahner states that: "We do not regard the Res- 
urrection as an event that takes place only in our faith; but we do 
say that it belongs to the permanent victory of Jesus and his cause 
that it must be perpetuated in our faith. If his Resurrection was 
nowhere going to find faith, it would never have happened, because 
it was to be God's victorious welf-promise to the world. "16 The 
Resurrection's result, then, is faith, not in the 'popular' Bult- 
mannian sense of an event totally circumscribed by faith (whose es- 
sence and reality is faith) but in the sense of an event which "can- 
not be conceived of as even possibly failing to result in faith., 
17 
God does not act without purpose and the purpose of the Resurrection, 
at least in part, was the announcement of the fact -a fact to be 
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heard and believed - that Jesus' life has been accepted and received, 
by God. 
18 
We have noted that Rahner is quite comfortable with a certain 
lack of knowledge regarding details of the mode of existence of the 
resurrected Jesus. He speaks of the Resurrection appearances as 
being a somewhat broken "translation" of the "perfected" into the 
world of the Apostles. They, being "unachieved, " were unable to view 
directly the actual mode of existence of the resurrected Lord. 
19 
It seems basic to Rahner's intention that he is attempting to avoid 
a positivistic understanding of the Resurrection event, emphasizing 
instead man's transcendental hope for Resurrection which is his basis 
for knowledge of the Resurrection of Jesus. Rahner has stated his 
belief that: "Man is constituted as supernaturally transcendent. 
Prior to any acts of knowing or willing, the human subject has a 
grace-given dynamic structure which directs his acts towards the self- 
communicating God... " Access to the Resurrection, the ground of faith, 
is only by faith, which, at the same time, finds the historical ground 
which makes faith possible and legitimate. But there is no access 
"from outside" to the Resurrection. It is an event of unique char- 
acter, "not in any way an ordinary object of experience, which could 
be subsumed under the common conditions and possibilities of exper- 
ience. "20 
The basis is thus formed for Rahner's emphasis on the "inner 
man" in regard to what is meant by the Resurrection of Jesus and why 
it is worthy of belief. Rahner evidences a respect for the Apostolic 
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witness as unique, holding out the value of their witness since: "We 
have no experience of the same kind as the Easter experience of the 
first disciples (and) ... are therefore dependent on the testimony of 
the disciples in an essentially more radical sense than in the case 
of the acceptance of other ocular testimony. "21 Yet Rahner also 
claims (generally in his more recent writings) that the reports of 
the empty tomb22and the post-Resurrection appearances are "tangential" 
to the disciples' more basic (human) experience that Jesus is alive 
in the liberating power of God. This experience (inner knowledge) 
is accessible to all believers, who "can experience for ourselves in 
our encounter with him that he lives. .. We are not 
(and could not be) 
as dependent on the 'eyewitnesses' of the first disciples as those 
people who learn only by report of an event which occurred quite out- 
side the circle of their own experience. "23 Primary witness to the 
Resurrection, then, is "transcendentally present within us. "24 Rahner 
has thus shown a trand toward emphasis on inner experience as the 
verification of the Resurrection, which in turn reflects his emphasis 
on man's hope as the point of departure for transcendental discussion. 
25 
Resurrection and the Historical Jesus 
Rahner's "saving history" approach has established a central 
place in his Christology. 
26 We may characterize this approach for 
our concerns as an emphasis on the historical Jesus in relation to 
Christology, in which the Resurrection occupies an important role. 
It is Rahner's contention (as is seen in his later works) that "in 
the historical Jesus there was an awareness and an assertion of the 
395 
significance of his own function and his person such that, in the 
fullness and authentication which they achieve through the Resur- 
rection, they effectively constitute the basis and the adequate point 
of departure for those beliefs which are proclaimed by Christian and 
Catholic dogma in the Christology of Jesus Christ. "27 Rahner then 
proposes two basic points of reference for a Christological method- 
ology: 1) Jesus of Nazareth's self-understanding as the eschatological 
event of salvation, and 2) the Resurrection. The Resurrection, in 
turn, is treated in a dual sense regarding its revelatory function. 
It is, initially, a divine confirmation of the life and teaching of 
Jesus. 
28 But, more than this, claims Rahner, the Resurrection ful- 
fills a faith-grounding role since, through it, we are convinced of 
the credibility of Jesus' life and works. 
29 
Rahner's historical point of reference for Christology seems 
to contain some rather 'circular' characteristics, however. He is 
well aware of the exegetical difficulties regarding the true his- 
torical Jesus. 
30 
Coupled with his inclination to see Jesus' self- 
understanding as eschatological Saviour as an object of faith rather 
than its basis, Rahner has actually wondered if the dogmatic theo- 
logian might consider the Resurrection as sufficient historical basis 
for Christology, with a minimum of information (the maximum we can 
achieve) regarding the question of Jesus' self-understanding. 
31 
Yet 
Rahner, who seems quite aware of the problematic nature of the Res- 
urrection as historically ascertainable fact32 (and also of the dif- 
ficulty modern man has had seeing the Resurrection as a basis for 
faith), has elsewhere appealed almost exclusively to the life and 
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death of the historical Jesus as the basis for Christology. 
33 
It may thus be seen that the role attributed to the Resurrection 
has varied somewhat in Rahner. And this shall launch us into a further 
discussion of Rahner by way of critique. 
Critique 
What we have noted as the 'varying' role of the Resurrection in 
Rahner has been noted by others and explained as a result of the fact 
that the Resurrection does not anchor Rahner's theology, being subor- 
dinated to the passion. 
34 
While this view may certainly be argued 
it hardly gives the whole picture. We think it more precise to say 
that Rahner's distinction of Jesus before and after the Resurrection 
involves a rather difficult historical understanding which must be 
elaborated. 
The pre-Easter Jesus is not simply the Jesus of Nazareth known 
by historical (historisch) understanding. Though he is partly acces- 
sible to such understanding there is more involved. For his words, 
deeds, miracles, and death are historical realities of the past which 
are known in faith as both object and ground of faith. Faith (while 
unitary) is an internally differentiated act which allows one to come 
into relationship to the one Jesus. The consummation of his life in 
death and Resurrection did not mean that the real history he had 
lived through came to mean less. Rather, the Resurrection of Jesus 
allows the believer to experience Jesus in the fulness of his reality 
as actual, present, accessible. 
The historical probability that can be attained regarding the 
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words and deeds of Jesus is important, y3t the relationship of the 
believer to the reality pointed to by those historical judgments is 
not reducible to historical understanding. Clearly, Rahner is not 
espousing that faith itself can produce historical, factual inform- 
ation, but he is making a claim, from within faith, that the histor- 
ical reasons why a Christian believes are yet predicated on an act 
of faith. 
35 
The pre-Easter Jesus is important to Rahner for two systematic 
theological reasons. First, the acceptance by Jesus in freedom of 
the Father's self-communication is the theological reason why God's 
self-gift has occurred in an unsurpassable manner. This acceptance 
on Jesus' part occurred in the concrete texture of his life: his 
prayer, preaching, teaching, his intercourse with people of all types. 
The incarnation came to concrete actuality through the graced, finite 
accepting freedom of Jesus of Nazareth. Secondly, the pre-Easter 
Jesus is the one who died and was raised. This is a simple proposi- 
tion which acquires significance to the degree that systematic theo- 
logy appreciates the theological role of the Resurrection. Not only 
does it vindicate Jesus' claim and message, but the Resurrection is 
the coming to totality of the life of Jesus. Who was raised is as 
important as the fact that he was raised. Thus, in a formal way at 
least, Rahner has secured an essential place for the pre-Easter Jesus 
in his Christology. 
To go on, we must deal with the fact that nowhere is there a 
serious, sustained attempt to ground the Resurrection historically. 
Rahner does give the occasional nod to the necessity of "real history. " 
398 
"The degree to which such a history is included in the actualization 
of genuine transcendentality, and of existential faith which is under- 
stood merely in a transcendental way, might vary greatly in different 
individuals, but there is no one who could actualize his transcenden- 
tality without it being mediated by history. "36 Yet this is usually 
within a context which downplays the necessity of the actual event of 
Resurrection, in favor of the transcendental approach to revelation. 
Transcendental reflection reveals that created human nature is 
able to receive a higher, more essential communication of being from 
God than it has already received in creation, if God chooses to grant 
it. This is thus a potency or potentiality to receive what Christian 
tradition calls supernatural grace and revelation. Historical reve- 
lation, though 'necessary' in Rahner's scheme, is nevertheless a some- 
what impoverished concept on this basis. Speaking on the Resurrection 
Rahner says that "faith and the knowledge of faith are not possible 
without grace, and. .. they entail the personal and free assent of the 
believing subject. "37 The true grasp of the historical grounds of faith 
takes place then only within the process of faith, making salvation 
history (Geschichte) an "'objective' reality" grasped only in faith 
while "merely profane history" (Historie) could be grasped outside 
such faith knowledge. 
Rahner's approach to the problem of the credibility of the 
Resurrection event, then, is a dogmatic one based on the traditional 
Catholic doctrine of faith and asserting that the "grace of faith" 
opens one's eyes to the credibility of certain historical events. 
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"The coming to faith of the first witnesses (speaks of) an experience 
of the successful combination of a gratuitous transcendental disposi- 
tion to believe on the one hand, and the grasping of particular his- 
torical events as the historical mediation of this transcendental dis- 
position to believe on the other hand..., 
38 
Faith in the Resurrect- 
ion is, as we can see, an intrinsic element of this Resurrection it- 
self. 
39 And the transcendental hope in Resurrection is "the horizon 
of understanding" for experiencing the Resurrection faith. 
40 
Rahner thus makes an unabashed appeal for an 'interiorized, ' 
'Spirit-inspired' faith. This is a far cry from Pannenberg's theo- 
logy of the Resurrection with its rational matrix, although not so 
distant in some ways from the basic approach of both Barth and Bult- 
mann. Rahner is, for all his philosophical approach and difficulty 
of style, basically pietistic in his understanding of faith and the 
Resurrection, and as such is open to the same criticism to be leveled 
at any approach based on 'self-authenticating' faith. His is, we be- 
lieve, a truncated approach to a genuine problem of our time. It is 
thus clear that for Rahner's theology the Resurrection is especially 
difficult. 
41 
Yet what we see as a redeeming factor in this area of 
Rahner's theology comes at a place which otherwise might seem his 
weakest. It is true that his theology stresses that the very nature 
of faith is to be found in the "existential decision in freedom, "42 
And yet the radical edge that 'choice' or 'decision' connotates in 
Bultmann's theology (authentic vs. inauthentic, etc. ) is softened 
somewhat by Rahner's conveyance of the transcendental potentiality 
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of human being. A quote from Rahner opens the way for the point we 
wish to make (and to which we must return at a later time. ) For 
Rahner's claim that there is no antinomy between theocentric, Christ- 
ocentric and anthropocentric theologies can inform a basis for trust 
in a God who is immediate, intimate, concerned. In its own way it 
cuts through much of the theology which over-objectivizes the relat- 
ionship between man and Creator. He states: "I would say this simply 
and with great conviction: if one does anthropology correctly and 
from the very beginning observes those limitations which it has of 
its very own and which need not be imposed from outside, then, such 
an anthropology can in no wise be in opposition to a theocentric 
theology. Why? Not only because in his very origin and being man 
has simply and radically openness to God as the absolute mystery, 
but also because the dynamism of the self-communication of God (known 
as Grace, Holy 
Spirit) is also equally at work from the very begin- 
Hing. Thus, as soon as we 
live this inner gracedness historically, 
we are already 
in the realm of revelation. To object by this lived 
grace in history 
by putting it into concepts and words is to do theo- 
logy, indeed, a theocentric theology. "43 
The immediate impression of this is that there must be Christ- 
ology from above and below. At least theoretically they have an 
essential sameness and are not 
in contradiction. It seems obvious 
to us (and Rahner would seem at times to agree) that Christology 
might originate from below, for Christology would have no basis if 
it were not based on the Christ of history. Rahner does not deduce 
` 401 
the idea of Christ and Christianity from some pure idea of being. 
But he is concerned to show that the Jesus of history has an inner 
relatedness to the transcendental constitution of human being. Jesus 
cannot be "only" historical, else could he be of interest to our 
human being? There must be a correlation between his ontological 
person and his historical mission. Rahner does attempt not to choose 
sides regarding the 'above' and 'below' approaches to Christology 
(although he claims that the approach which starts with the transcend- 
ent God was more at home in the ancient thought world. ) One can start 
from either concept but wherever one starts, the dual problems of his- 
tory and transcendence must be dealt with. The intrinsic tending of 
each to shortchange the other must be struggled against. Thus it is 
Rahner's claim that he is concerned to show that human transcendence 
is grounded historically. 
Has Pannenberg made a mistake, then, in forcing us to choose 
between a Christology from below, based on the model of revelation 
as history, and one from above, based on the model of incarnation? 
After familiarity with Rahner, we believe so to this extent: Pannen- 
berg's starting point can be argued to be the right one (we have no 
way to forsake our historical situation and achieve knowledge of 
reality based purely on some a priori or transcendental frame of 
reference) yet though we begin where we are the entire effort to 
understand reality, as one commentator reminds us, "is the effort to 
extend the range of what is intelligible beyond describing what is 
immediately given through our experience. " 
44 
Models are a necessary 
part of this endeavor. It follows that, as we are concerned with the 
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historical reality of the Resurrection, so we will be concerned with 
models such as incarnation (i. e., the transcendent sphere) which of- 
fer an interpretation of its meanings. The real question in Pannen- 
berg's approach to Christianity is whether incarnation is adequate, 
not whether it is "from above. " 
Pannenberg expresses a distaste, or reluctance, at times to 
think metaphysically, we believe. Rahner, in spite of what we view 
to be an inadequate theology of the Resurrection from an historical 
perspective, yet does expand the range of'what is intelligible through 
his appeal to the transcendent. 
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Edward Schillebeeckx 
Toward the end of his book Jesus: An Experiment in Christology 
Schillebeeckx summarizes his views on the Resurrection as follows: 
it is a) God's legitimation and therefore ratification of Jesus' 
"person, message and life of service 'unto death'"; b) it is also 
exaltation and new creation which states "there is life after death"; 
c) the Resurrection is the sending of the Spirit and, thus, the found- 
ing of the Church. 
' 
Though this interpretation of the Resurrection 
seems rather standard there is much in his prior argument - leading 
up to these conclusions - that is characteristic of his own perspect- 
ive. 
It is initially obvious that Schillebeeckx's understanding of 
the Resurrection differs somewhat from Rahner's. We note the latter's 
comment that: "The resurrection of Christ is not another event after 
his suffering and after his death, but... the appearance of what took 
place in Christ's death: the active and passive handing over of the 
entire reality of the one corporal man to the mystery of the merci- 
fully loving God through Christ's collected freedom, which disposes 
over his entire life and his entire existence. "2 
Schillebeeckx consistently claims that the Resurrection is more 
than the appearance of what took place in Jesus' death. He does not 
wish to assign to death such an "exclusive, all-determining import- 
ance. 
" Schillebeeckx rather stresses the negativity of death and, 
in the case of Jesus, this negativity (rejection) encompasses not 
only his end but also his message and his way of living his life. 
"This rejection of Jesus by people, " he claims, however, "is counter- 
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balanced by Jesus' belonging to God. "4 The Resurrection is thus a 
divine correcting victory over the negativity of death, the giving 
of a positive 'content' to the negative nature of death. Schillebeeckx 
can even speak of Jesus, through the Resurrection, "giving point to 
what was pointless. "5 But "unmeaning death" is not somehow annulled. 
It is for this strategic reason that Jesus' Resurrection must be seen 
as more than the publicizing of what transpired in the death of Jesus. 
,, It is precisely as the triumph that corrects the negativity even of 
Jesus' death that the Resurrection of Jesus (on God's side) is nat- 
urally an event both new and different from God's suffering and death, 
even in their salvific dimensions. " Thus the Resurrection is seen 
as an exaltation and a totally new mode of existence which rests on 
victory over death and obtains its final identity from God alone. 
6 
Nonetheless, Schillebeeckx considers the Resurrection of Jesus 
to be meta-historical and meta-empirical. Experiences come to ex- 
pression through a "language filter" and within given models of com- 
prehension, to the effect that: "Pure experiencing does not exist... 
it is articulated and in that respect interpreted. "7 Yet, it is 
obvious that Jesus himself stands at the center of the Easter exper- 
ience of the disciples, and that what we meet here, claims Schil- 
lebeeckx, is "an experience of grace. " The critical question regard- 
ing the historicity of the Easter experience becomes one of disting- 
uishing properly between "experience" and "the thing as interpreted. "8 
Are we obliged to see the Easter experience as simply an interpretat- 
ion of the pre-Easter Jesus? On balance, no. There must, of course, 
be some continuity with the earthly Jesus for Christianity arose out 
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of the message and total career of Jesus, up to and including his 
death. But Schillebeeckx firmly believes that the Christian inter- 
pretation is also undergirded by new experiences after his death: 
not the 'empty tomb' or 'appearances, ' but the "conversion process" 
of the disciples which reflects their "encounter with grace. " In a 
passage which seems to summarize Schillebeeckx' view of the character 
of the Easter experience (i. e., its historicity) he states: "May it 
not be that Simon Peter - and indeed the Twelve - arrived via their 
concrete experience of forgiveness after Jesus' death, encountered 
as grace and discussed among themselves (as they remembered Jesus' 
sayings about, among other things, the gracious God) at the 'evidence 
for belief': the Lord is alive? He renews for them the offer of sal- 
vation; this they experience in their own conversion; he must there- 
fore be alive. In their experience here and now of 'returning to Jesus, ' 
in the renewal of their own life they encounter in the present the 
grace of Jesus' forgiving; in doing so they experience Jesus as the 
one who is alive. A dead man does not proffer forgiveness. A present 
fellowship with Jesus is thus restored. The experience of having 
their cowardice and want of faith forgiven them, an experience fur- 
ther illuminated by what they were able to remember of the general 
tenor of Jesus' life on earth, thus became the matrix in which faith 
in Jesus as the risen one was brought to birth. They all of a sudden 
'saw' it. "9 Schillebeeckx claims to proceed from the 'Easter exper- 
ience' as reality, as an experience of reality, which none the less 
carries within it an element of articulation. 
4-1-(1 --- ---- -- -- ---- --- --- ---- 
It is no surprise then that Schillebeeckx asserts that the 
Easter faith arose independently of the traditions of the 'appear- 
ances' and the empty tomb. As regards the tomb, the stories (which 
were "distinctly local Jerusalem tradition") center around the un- 
mistakeable Christian concern with the absolute identity between 
the crucified Jesus and the risen Christ. The practice of venerat- 
ion of the tomb of Jesus at Jerusalem emphasizes only the fact that 
"some women" were witnesses to the site of the tomb. 
' 
The commun- 
ity articulates its faith in the One crucified and risen wherever it 
may be; and at Jerusalem, it does so within the context of a special 
place: "at the place where they laid him. " The tomb is thus a symbol 
of God's grace; a 'memorial' of the crucified. It was never intended 
to be an item of apologetic, rather, a "negative symbol" of the Res- 
urrection. 
11 Schillebeeckx thus denies that the bodily Resurrection 
of Jesus involved disappearance of his corpse, as if we were speaking 
of the Jewish anthropological notion of 're-animation of the body' 
(i. e., Lazarus). The tomb (in the veneration of the rite) 'speaks' 
the message that 'He has been raised! ' and that this place of death 
(with "whatever may or may not be present in this tomb") has become 
the symbol of God's revelation through Jesus. 
12 The sepulchre may 
well be in fact the place of death regarding Jesus' body, but to 
those who in faith have recognized the grace of conversion, this only 
serves to augment the fact (albeit through mystery) of Jesus' present 
life. As Mark announces: "A new age has dawned. "13 
Regarding the 'appearances, ' Schillebeeckx (as we have seen) 
interprets these to be experiences of grace in which the disciples 
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realize ("see") the truth of the risen Jesus. Visual seeing is 
not an important component of such an experience, rather, these 
'appearances' are intimate, personal, God-given experiences of the 
renewed divine offer of forgiveness of sin through the One who was 
crucified. 
14 
These are not to be understood as mere subjective vis- 
ions, for all they are "private account. " For in these accounts the 
community recognizes its own experience. This "intuition" gives a 
definite orientation, and apprehends Jesus as the One who lives, in 
a way that belief grounded purely in claims of authority can never 
do. In an illuminating passage Schillebeeckx exposes the core of 
his own belief about such 'private' experience. "There is not such 
a big difference between the way we are able, after Jesus' death, 
to come to faith in the crucified-and-risen one and the way in which 
the disciples of Jesus arrived at the same faith. Only we suffer 
from the crude and naive realism of what 'appearances of Jesus' came 
to be in the later tradition, through unfamiliarity with the dis- 
tinctive character of the Jewish-biblical way of speaking. " 
15 
The-Pre-Easter Jesus 
The role attributed to the Resurrection in Schillebeeckx' 
Christology is predicated upon belief that the pre-Easter Jesus is 
of profound theological significance. It seems evident that modern 
Christology cannot start from the kerygma about Jesus of Nazareth 
or from any, so-called portrait of the 'historical' Jesus. For Schil- 
lebeeckx, an historical and critical approach, set within the faith 
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context, can be the only approach. 
16 Yet in all the Christian move- 
ment, which Schilebeeckx speaks of as the "constant unitive factor"17 
in Christology, there is realization that the community experience 
(though pluriform in expression) has reference back to Jesus of Naz- 
areth. The kerygma refers back to the historical Jesus, and the 
Jesus-tradition is rooted in the personal fellowship of disciples 
with Jesus. Post-Bultmann exegesis (especially former students such 
as E. Kasemann) have been right to relativize the distinction between 
"Jesus of Nazareth" and the "Christ of the Church. "18 The Easter- 
event by itself is not able to function as the starting point for 
Christology, because the Easter kerygma is substantially informed by 
recollections of Jesus' life and death. 
It follows, then, that Schillebeeckx is critical of the opinion 
that salvation is joined only to the Resurrection. In fact he claims 
that the soteriological interpretations of the death of Jesus in 
early Christianity all refer one back "to his earthly life itself, 
to the 'historical Jesus. '" 
19 
Schillebeeckx in fact rejects as a 
false dilemma the alternative of locating salvation either in the 
historical Jesus of Nazareth or in the risen Christ, since Resurrect- 
ion without the historical Jesus would be a myth, while the histor- 
ical Jesus without what we call Resurrection would be merely a tragic 
failure. 
20 
The Decisive Break 
For Schillebeeckx, present-day discussion about continuity and 
discontinuity between Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ in the 
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preaching of the Church has reached a fundamental misunderstanding. 
The decisive break does not come with, on the one side the death of 
Jesus, and on the other side the Church's subsequent preaching of the 
Resurrection. Rather, he claims, the decisive break is the interpret- 
ation of Jesus comes earlier, with the resistance to him and the pub- 
lic rejection of his message. 
21 This, and not his death, is the great 
challenge to his trustworthiness. And the insistent question which 
comes out of our knowledge of this rejection is whether it did not 
give him occasion to interpret his approaching death22 prior to the 
event. Jesus, Schillebeeckx maintains, did foresee his death, in- 
terpreting his death prior to its occurrence and "was bound to in- 
tegrate it intohis overall surrender to God. "23 "But it can hardly 
be said that to accord with Jesus' self-understanding his message 
of salvation took its meaning only from his death. The truth is: 
he died just as he lived, and he lived as he died. "24 
Critique 
Schillebeeckx' major concern in Jesus is to reach historically 
based conclusions about Jesus of Nazareth, showing the need for this 
and, resultingly, how it is possible. Our critique here will focus 
on the evidence for the Resurrection as interpreted by Schillebeeckx, 
and we will conclude with an assessment of his theology of the Resur- 
rection in general. 
The two traditions which relate to the Easter kerygma are, of 
course, the empty tomb and the post-Resurrection appearances and 
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Schillebeeckx explores these both in great detail. We believe that 
considerable criticism can be leveled on both counts. Initially 
Schillebeeckx makes his case for the 'holy sepulchre' tradition, 
which is seemingly behind Mark 16: 1-8, laying out the understanding 
that the initial story of the women's discovery of the empty tomb is 
a cult-legend intended to shed light on the Church's pilgrimage to 
this place in honour of the risen One. 
25 We are given the alternatives 
then of understanding the tradition of the 'holy sepulchre' as based 
either on an "empty tomb" or a "holy tomb" (in other words a cultic 
tradition. ) There is no possibility of having both, i. e., a "holy" 
tomb that was also empty. 
Schillebeeckx would seem to base his alternative on two things 
(if we ignore a possibility of the much discussed a priori disbelief 
in 're-animate corpses'. ) Initially, John, we are told, "makes it 
very clear that an 'empty tomb', " if there were such a thing, could 
never be proof of the Resurrection (John 20: 8-9), but at most a 
token of an already existing faith in the Resurrection and secondly, 
Schillebeeckx' understanding of the process in which the disciples 
were converted (which we have seen) simply does not call for an 
empty tomb, is quite comfortable with an "experience of forgiveness" 
and an entombed body. 
26 
We would comment regarding the former that, although an empty 
tomb could never be proof of the Resurrection, Johnhardly seems to 
be presenting this pericope in hopes of disuading his hearers of the 
fact of an empty tomb. It is not true that such an empty tomb could 
be at most "a token" of prior faith in the Resurrection. The simple 
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reading of John shows that he affirms Mary Magdalene's discovery of 
the empty tomb, which is subsequently corroborated by Peter and 'the 
other disciple. ' It seems a clear point of this Gospel that the dis- 
covery of the empty tomb and the neatly wrapped graveclothes led the 
other disciple to Easter faith, for "he saw and believed. " 
Regarding the second thesis of Schillebeeckx, that the conversion 
of the disciples needed no empty tomb due to the nature of their con- 
version (an experience of grace) he seems to simply ignore one of 
the most consistent arguments revolving around the Resurrection. In 
a recent article by Hugo Standinger, 
27 
a quote is given by Erich Steir 
with which Standinger agrees. He states: "Eric Steir has rightly 
remarked ... 'Something simply must have happened here; it cannot just 
be explained by saying, "The impression Jesus had left behind him in 
the minds of the simple men of his following left them no peace until 
they thought they had found the saving word to describe that incom- 
prehensible happening that they had experienced. In doing so they 
became capable of making an unparalled impact on the world. " It is 
just asking too much to have to believe something like that. That 
is just not on, and I want to state quite categorically that some- 
thing like that is historically' out of the question. One cannot just 
switch off all historical experience in this case, simply because it 
does not suit us to accept that here something quite vast and tremend- 
ous must have happened. '"28 Such a view as Schillebeeckx presents - 
that through the disciples' "experience of grace" they reach the 
conclusion "he must therefore be alive" - is an aging one pushing 
beyond the bounds of credibility, we believe. 
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It is this experience, however, which also forms the basis for 
Schillebeeckx' conviction that "the resurrection kerygma was already 
present even before the traditions about the tomb and appearances 
had risen. The Easter faith emerged independently of these two trad- 
itions. ""9 Thus for "modern people" an empty tomb can only prove 
"largely disconcerting. " Structural analysis and semiotics will make 
it all meaningful for them by showing that Mark's story is simply un- 
concerned with the presence or absence of Jesus' corpse. 
30 
Schillebeeckx' position must be put fairly here. He disting- 
uishes between himself and Pannenberg's approach which he calls "em- 
pirical and objectivized, as though, given the empty tomb and the 
appearances, it should really be obvious to believer and unbeliever 
Yet he reserves his greatest distaste for the Buitmannian alike. " 
31 
tendency "to identify Jesus' resurrection with the renewed life and 
Easter... faith of the disciples after the death of their Master., 
32 
These writers (he names specifically Bultmann and W. Marxsen) "leave 
us guessing as to whether Jesus has risen in person and whether... 
it is he himself who brings about for the apostles this renewal of 
their lives - in his strength. " Schillebeeckx disassociates himself 
from it "completely, " for in his view it took the personal Resurrect- 
ion of Jesus himself to make possible the Easter experience of renewed 
life enjoyed by the disciples. 
33 It is still our view that this is 
only a slight difference from Bultmann's real intent and is hardly 
the complete disassociation Schilebeeckx seems to desire. For Schil- 
lebeeckx has Peter and the other disciples experience a "concrete 
experience of forgiveness" which does not precisely as such entail a 
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personal physical encounter with the one who forgives them (i. e., the 
;, belief 
in the Resurrection arose prior to and independent of the ap- 
pearances and empty tomb. ) 
Further, there are several weak points used to buttress Schil- 
lebeeckx' key affirmation that "the resurrection was believed in be- 
fore there was any question of appearances. "34 1) He interprets the 
tradition about the witnesses in 1 Corinthians 15: 3-8 to mean that the 
"apostles proclaim the crucified-and-risen one, " and that this sub- 
seguently legitimated what "has come to be called" in epiphany cir- 
cles "an 'appearing of Jesus. , 
35 2) Schillebeeckx attempts to go 
against the common wisdom that for Paul "the actual mandate of his 
apostleship" was the appearance of Jesus to him. 
36 
He makes the 
astounding statement that "nowhere in Paul's own writings does it 
appear that he grounds his apostolate on his Damascus experience as 
a 'seeing of Jesus'. " It is Schillebeeckx' contention that Paul's 
statements that he is "by calling an apostle" (Romans 1: 1) and that 
he is "set apart and called from the womb" (Galatians 1: 15) set the 
stage to sweep aside the traditional exegesis, and that, as with 
1 Corinthians 15, Paul's belief in the Resurrection is a "faith-moti- 
vated experience... the sole essence of all (Christ) manifestations. "37 
We note finally a comment by G. O'Collins in which he alludes to what 
, he calls 
"a major flaw" in Schillebeeckx' position. 3) O'Collins grants 
that it is true to say (quoting Schillebeeckx) "that the appearance 
stories and accounts of the empty tomb assume the fact of the reas- 
sembled community and 
its Christological kerygma. " Those stories 
and accounts were shaped 
by Christians in the preaching and activities 
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for at least thirty years before they were adopted (and modified 
by the Gospel writers. ) "But, " says O'Collins, "that does not mean 
that as events the appearances themselves and the discovery of the 
empty tomb as such assumed a reassembled community already believing 
in the resurrection and proclaiming its Christological kerygma, "38 
It is thus his contention that Schillebeeckx manifests an underlying 
confusion between the order of (elaborated) narration and the prior 
order of (historical) events. " 
For clarification let us touch on something once again which 
should be dealt with more specifically. Though Schillebeeckx is at 
pains to dissociate himself from the "popularized" Bultmannian notion, 
i. e., that faith arose not in the person of Jesus but only in the 
believing disciples and that Resurrection and belief in the Resur- 
rection are the same thing, his own view reads much like this (which 
perhaps explains his concern. ) What does Schillebeeckx say, then, 
about whether or not 'something happened'? 
Schillebeeckx is somewhat more inclined to speak metaphysically 
than is Bultmann. Though the Resurrection is an interiorized event 
or experience - whether there is a body in the tomb is of little 
concern to Schillebeeckx - he does speak of the Resurrection as an 
"encounter with grace. " a direct experience of the grace of God. 
40 
He refuses to allow that this is a purely subjective experience, for 
"after his death Jesus himself stands at the source of what we are 
calling the 'Easter experience. 
41 
There is nothing done merely 
in the name of Jesus. What is done is "in the power of the risen 
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Christ himself ... (who) from the Father's side (is) present in a new 
way with his disciples on earth. "42 
It is clear that for Schillebeeckx (and we believe that Bultmann 
might affirm as much) the Resurrection is more than a symbolic ex- 
pression of the renewed life of the apostles, boiling down to some 
grand, but indistinct, affirmation of 'Life. ' It is more than inspir- 
ation drawn from the earthly Jesus. They believed, and Schillebeeckx 
attests, that they had good, if not objective/historical, reasons to 
proclaim "He is alive! " 
Looking Ahead 
We recall Pannenberg's contention that events speak "the language 
of facts; " that there is 
innately in each historical occurrence what 
might be characterized as 
'truth' as opposed to cavalier subjective 
interpretation. To find this 'truth' we have reason and historical/ 
critical procedure to guide us. Even granting for differing 
inter- 
pretations based on this procedure as regards the 
Resurrection, 
'objective' scrutiny should be able to come to some consensus of 
opinion regarding what 
happened. 
And yet the relativity of historical interpretation becomes 
obvious in the writing of Schillebeeckx more than anyone else we have 
studied. Pannenberg's contention that events "speak the language of 
facts" may have an interesting theoretical basis, but does not a 
comparison of 
Schillebeeckx' work dent by practicality the pristine 
quality of this 
thesis? Perhaps the fatal flaw lies in the impossi- 
bility of scientific objective scrutiny, but regardless, it seems 
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clear now that a Christology, specifically a theology of the 
Resurrection, which is based more or less exclusively on the histor- 
ical Jesus (in spite of yielding a strong call to personal committ- 
ment) cannot hope to succeed presenting a clear-cut 'language of 
facts. ' Such a treatment of the Resurrection does open the problem 
of interpretation at significant points and, we believe, fails to 
convince by virtue of scientific inquiry itself - if this is meant 
to achieve for the Resurrection a 'self-evident' posture. We have 
been critical of some of Schillebeeckx' conclusions, but the very fact 
that these have been made on the basis of a fundamental reasonableness 
makes a point. To 'grasp' the Resurrection historically, to have 
faith in it as apocalyptic event, is to risk becoming entangled in a 
morass of 'reasonable' interpretation. The next chapters will have 
more to say about the limits of reasonableness in regard to twentieth 
century theologies of the Resurrection. 
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Hans Kung 
King leads into a discussion of the Resurrection in On BeingA 
Christian, 
' 
by propounding a series of questions, the most provoc- 
ative of which focus on the tension between Jesus of Nazareth and the 
exalted Christ, and announce King's now well-known distaste for the 
Chalcedonian 'model. '2 "How did this condemned heretical teacher 
become Israel's Messiah, the Christ? How did this disowned prophet 
become 'Lord, ' how did this unmasked seducer of the people become 
'Saviour, ' this rejected blasphemer 'God's Son'? " 
Kling shares with Pannenberg an insistence on the necessity of a 
Christology "from below. " If we aim at making Christ intelligible for 
man today nothing regarding pre-existence or divinity should be taken 
for granted. We must not deny, rather, in the first place we must 
exclaim his earthliness and humanity. Is it not more in line with the 
New Testament if we start "like the first disciples from the real 
human being Jesus, his historical message and manifestation, his life 
and fate, his historical reality and historical activity, and then ask 
about the relationship of this human being Jesus to God, about his unity 
with the Father. "3 Thus, Küng's approach to the Resurrection, while 
not devoid of traditional piety and conclusions, nevertheless proceeds 
with an eye to avoiding any premature theological mandates which could 
undermine the truth. 
May we speak with any truth of a 'bodily' Resurrection? Küng 
appeals to a personal conversation with Bultmann - and announces "Yes! " 
There is no continuity of our present physical body ("questions of nat- 
ural science, 
like that of the persistence of the molecules, do not 
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arise") but the New Testament does speak of the Soma, a continuing 
identity of person including personal history and feeling. 
4 
This, we 
may perceive, is what happened also to Jesus. 
Was the raising of Jesus an historical event? Kung here speaks 
like a Barthian, claiming that, since it cannot be proved, it cannot 
be an event of history in the strict sense. "There was nothing to 
photograph or record, " thus too much is demanded of historical methods. 
But KUng holds with Barth, 
5 
and against so-called Bultmannian 'tenden- 
cies' that Jesus' Resurrection is not to be seen primarily as an ex- 
pression of the significance of his death. This was not an event which 
transpired solely in the faith-energized minds of the disciples. It 
was a real event "even though it bursts through and goes beyond the 
bounds of history, " for in the Resurrection "God intervenes" in what 
is an otherwise hopeless situation. 
In a section written "for the challenged believer and the inquiring 
non-believers, " Küng asks next if the term Resurrection still holds 
validity today. Is it "imaginable"? Here the reader is challenged 
to lay aside the old metaphors (regarding an "awakening" or a "rising" 
from sleep) and to confront the concept from an even more radical per- 
spective. The Resurrection 
is actually nothing like returning from 
sleep and such a comparison 
does not represent the biblical concept of 
Resurrection. Rather, it is a "radical transformation into a wholly 
different state. " In terms reminiscent of Rahner he speaks of a "trans- 
cendental happening out of 
human death into the all-embracing dimension 
of God. "7 
While Küng would agree that the Resurrection of Jesus was a bodily 
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Resurrection (given the qualifications mentioned), this does not neces- 
arily imply an empty tomb. He recalls for the reader its conspicuous 
absence in Paul's writings, leading to the conclusion that the stories 
of the empty tomb are "legendary elaborations of the message of the 
resurrection. "8 While King's own understanding of bodily Resurrection 
does not necessitate an empty tomb, he does alert the reader that "a 
number of influential exegetes" hold the stories to be historically 
probable. Yet he also claims that there should be agreement on the 
fact that an empty tomb does nothing, even in light of the Gospel stor- 
ies, toward proving the fact of the Resurrection. In the mode of the 
Emmaus disciples of Luke (24: 22-24) who doubted the meaning of the 
empty tomb, such a thing is ambiguous, open to misinterpretation and 
to variant explanation. As an argument it begs the question. Claims 
Kling: "All that is conveyed by the empty tomb is: 'He is not here. ' 
9 
We have to add: 'he is risen. "' 
While Küng dismisses the empty tomb narratives as "legendary 
elaboration, " this view does not seem to minimize his assessment - 
one of two primary assessments in our view - that a Resurrection was 
the origin of faith for the disciples. Psychological, religious his- 
torical reconstructions, those which base the birth of the new faith 
strictly on the 
influence of the historical Jesus combined with preva- 
lent Jewish Resurrection expectations, simply do not hold up under 
close scrutiny. 
10 
If we keep strictly to the testimonies themselves 
"there can be no doubt about the unanimous agreement of the New Test- 
ament writings that the disciples did not conclude from Jesus' fate 
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to his resurrection but in fact experienced after his death the living 
person himself. "11 All objections to the disciples' reception of new 
experiences seem to Kung to be in fact centered on only one (a second 
primary assessment): "Are we postulating here a supernatural inter- 
vention...? " This is the kind of thing he has rigorously opposed in 
attempting to present a theology consistent with the laws of nature. 
Kling puts the dilemma: "[the new experience of the disciples] 
cannot be regarded as miracles cancelling the laws of nature, " yet 
neither does historical criticism "require us to regard the appear- 
ances merely as an expression of faith in the light of Jesus' death 
in his decisive significance, mission and authority. " In a claim 
which initially seems to conflict with his earlier statement that 
"God intervenes at the point where everything is at an end from a 
human point of view, "12 Küng claims most emphatically that then ex- 
periences are not to be understood as supernatural interventions. 
13 
This dilemma is reconciled, says KUng, by comparison to the cal- 
lings of the Old Testament prophets, who were enlisted by God with 
"visions and hearings... agitating the person affected mentally. "14 
This is a matter of trusting faith, and these experiences really amount 
to vocations received in faith. 
15 
God's action here, as everywhere, 
is not an observation demonstrated by historical criticism, but an 
action addressed to the minds of 
individuals. "All questions about 
the historicity of the empty tomb and the Easter experience cease to 
count beside the question of the significance of the resurrection 
message. 16 
The chief role attributed to the Resurrection by KUng, however, 
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is that of legitimating the historical Jesus. The historical Jesus 
does not provide a sufficient basis for belief since both his person 
and cause seemed to end with the cross as the apparent falsification 
of his message. 
17 
The public life and ministry of Jesus, which had 
aroused such expectations and hopes, seemed denied at his death by 
breakdown and rejection both by his disciples and by God. Yet it was 
only after this seeming failure that the movement invoking Jesus' name 
finally began to gather a true momentum. The Resurrection then, as 
experienced by his followers, was the undeniable divine legitimation 
of his life and message. It revealed that "this crucified Jesus, des- 
pite everything was right... The one forsaken by God was justified by 
God. " 
18 
Yet we must be wary of stressing the individuality of these events, 
he claims. For what is most important for the Christian faith is not 
the fact that a dead man has risen. "What is decisive is the fact that 
the very person who was crucified has been raised. If the risen one 
were not the Crucified, he would at best be an ideograph... a symbol. "19 
For Küng, Easter must not be allowed to detract from the centrality 
of the cross. It points to the cross, calling the believer to shape 
his life in accordance with the standard of the Crucified. There is 
no new revelation of additional truths coming from Jesus' assumption 
into the life of God. Rather it reveals that "his whole way was right, " 
even the way of the cross. "The Christian message is the word of the 
20 cross. 
The Resurrection is indispensable for Küng's theology, but the 
stress is certainly on the confirmation of his public ministry and 
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death. The pre-Resurrection Jesus is of supreme importance since 
Kung's theology of the Resurrection points us back to it time and 
again. Jesus of Nazareth is the sole final norm of the Christian 
faith, and our faith has to do with this man who is now risen and 
in God's presence. 
It has been rightly noted by one observer that: "The heart of 
Christology for Küng, as for Moltmann, is a restoration. "21 Rather 
than cause a shift of focus and a weakening of the cross, Easter 
strengthens it. The cross is shown to have a reason and one is called, 
as we have seen, to mold one's life to the pattern of the cross. But 
the differences between the two are also striking and qualify the 
above observation. Moltmann uses this "restoration" as a springboard 
for a detailed ecclesiological transformation, seeing the message of 
hope pouring through the cross into the world as a catalyst for an 
imaginative new re-assessment. By comparison, Kung's 'vocational' 
discussions seem stark. 
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Rahner, Küng, and Schillebeeckx 
Let us conclude this section on KUng with an attempt to relate 
the third of our Catholics to the other two. Our concern is for clar- 
ity here by highlighting the major differences as we see it between 
these perspectives on the Resurrection and what we see as the major 
distinction of each. We will follow then with a more specific final 
viewpoint on each, and especially 
Küng, in our concluding chapter. 
The "transcendental hope" which Rahner speaks of is for the perm- 
anent validity of what one becomes in one's life-history. It is not 
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a desire for the continuation of life in its present form, but rather 
for the permanence of what occurs in death - "the final and definitive 
validity of man's existence which has been achieved and has come to 
maturity in freedom. "23 Thus transcendental hope constitutes the an- 
thropological "horizon of understanding" of what is meant by Resurrect- 
ion and necessarily includes, so Rahner claims, what may be called 
Resurrection of the body. ' We may have severely restricted images re- 
garding the meaning of "resurrection, " especially with regard to its 
corporeal dimensions, yet the transcendental hope in Resurrection (in 
faith) presses to an "historical mediation and confirmation in which 
it can become explicit. It is this that sets up what we see as a pre- 
liminary distinguishing statement in Rahner's theology of the Resur- 
rection, namely, that the Resurrection of Jesus is the confirmation of 
this hope for the individual. 
"Rahner's entire theological enterprise, " notes Robert Kress, 
"is concerned with showing that Jesus can be and is the answer to the 
question which we are. "24 The starting point, as we have noted pre- 
viously, is always the already graced human being, the transcendental 
method concentrating, not on the individual contents of systematic 
theology, but on the individual believing Christian. It is critical 
to understanding Rahner, we believe, to note that his transcendental 
reflection on the human being reveals that so-called human nature is 
able to receive a higher, greater communication of being from God 
which accounts for the fact that one's consciousness does not end 
with oneself or any particular act of knowing or*choosing. It always 
stretches beyond itself. It is a thrust toward the absolute. The 
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Resurrection, as we state above, is the confirmation of this hope 
for the individual and in addition is its fulfilment in a particular 
individual - Jesus of Nazareth. 
Yet Rahner's view, as one may surmise already, is not to claim 
that we are simply dependent on someone else's word, or impressions 
as if we stood absolutely outside of their experience. For we hear 
the message of the Resurrection from within the context of grace. It 
is not the least tainted with suspicion of mythological theory. Rather, 
we experience in faith and in the hope of our own Resurrection the 
courage to stand beyond death, for this divine transcendence allows 
us to gaze upon the risen Jesus who comes before us in the apostolic 
witness. 
The chief role attributed to the Resurrection by Hans Kung is not 
that of confirming the hope of the individual, so much as that of leg- 
itimating the historical Jesus. The verbs which he uses to express 
the effect his Resurrection had on Jesus are closely related in mean- 
ing: his Resurrection justified who Jesus was and what he did; it con- 
firmed the cross; it revealed Jesus as right; God acknowledged, ap- 
proved, and authenticated Jesus; his freedom has prevailed, his way 
has been proved. It is true that KUng speaks of the Resurrection as 
Jesus' assumption into the life of God, and he affirms that Jesus is 
now the content of faith, but his consistent stress seems to be on 
the Resurrection as confirmation and vindication of his life and death. 
Most notable is Kung's explicit denial that the Resurrection effected 
the revelation of additional truths. The Jesus who is active and alive 
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in the world is identical with the pre-Resurrection Jesus,. To be sure, 
he lives in a radically new mode of existence, but the substance of 
the risen Lord's reality is the earthly one as uniquely confirmed by 
his God. Kung's theology of the Resurrection points us back to the 
life and death of Jesus of Nazareth and it is apparent how supremely 
important the theological role of the pre-Easter Jesus is. This is, 
if ours is a faithful understanding of Catholic Christology, quite a 
sharp departure from that tradition. 
In light of this avowed preference for the life, message and fate 
of Jesus of Nazareth as the center of Christian faith, it comes as no 
surprise that the formula of Chalcedon and the type of Christology 
favoring the Chalcedonian 'model' comes under considerable critique. 
25 
Kling initially disavows the simplicity of the formula (and that of 
other early creeds and councils), claiming that the classical answer 
in terms of the "hypostatic union" and the "God-man" could not do 
justice to the "infinitely richer" person of Christ and thus failed 
to solve the difficulties prevelant even at that time. It led, in- 
stead, to ever new logical dilemmas. 
King also regrets the pervasiveness of the Hellenistic imprint 
on Chalcedon, whose doctrine of the two natures is an interpretation 
in Hellenistic language and concepts of what Jesus really means. This 
mentality is no longer understood today and translates poorly across 
the centuries into the Church's teaching. Finally, claims KUng, it 
is the opinion of many exegetes that the two-natures doctrine is by 
no means identical with the original New Testament message about 
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Christ. And some go further, believing that the doctrine displaced 
or perhaps even corrupted the original message. 
King reacts with something of a contradiction regarding the place 
of Chalcedon in modern Christology. He notes a well-known phrase by 
Rahner that the Chalcedonian formula must be regarded more as a be- 
ginning than an end, 
26 in other words opening the way to Christological 
research rather than answering any questions definitively. Yet he 
notes within a few paragraphs his scepticism that Christ can ever be- 
come intelligible for us today "if we simply start out dogmatically 
from established teaching on the Trinity. "27 His point is clear how- 
ever: The value of Chalcedon, he believes, is not in answering but 
affirming. Divinity is affirmed, unity with the Father is affirmed, 
Resurrection is affirmed, but this cannot alter the necessary path 
to such affirmation. For Küng this path "(starts) out like the first 
disciples from the real human being Jesus. " Without disputing the 
legitimacy of the older Christology he desires a more historical Christ- 
ology "from below, " in the light of the concrete Jesus, more suited 
to modern man. 
Schillebeeckx' understanding of the Resurrection clearly differs 
from Rahner's and Kong's. Schillebeeckx insists, contrary to the 
general thrust of Rahner, that the Resurrection is much more than the 
revelation of what happened in Jesus' death (and thus the confirmation 
of this hope in the individual). It is rather for Schillebeeckx the 
divine correcting victory over the negativity of death. Contrary to 
Rahner it is a new and different event, and contrary to KUng, it is 
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an event which confers on Jesus' death a new meaning. The clearest 
exposition of this is to be found in Christ: The Experience of Jesus 
as Lord. 
28 
Not only does the Resurrection illuminate the crucifixion, 
it is "the continuation of the personal life of Jesus as a man beyond 
death, " and goes even farther, in fact, by expressing a novel creative 
aspect of God that can only be exemplified through the word 'new. ' 
The theme of this section seems to be summed up in his sentence: "Even 
beyond death, Jesus lives among us from God in a new way. " And this 
"new way, " this "powerful force of the Resurrection, " 1) guides be- 
lievers to be grounded in the present, 2) gives believers freedom to 
confront the 'powers of this world' through conviction of victory over 
death, 3) instills "hope" for all for the healing of man and society, 
and 4) relieves us of a central preoccupation with death, 
destroying 
that "ground for anxiety. " 
Let us be absolutely clear that we are not claiming that the Res- 
urrection is of no present importance to KUng or Rahner. For 
Rahner 
it is a present hope for a total personal permanence. And Kung gives 
a great deal of discussion to the 
Resurrection maintaining that it is 
not to be equated with a mere 
"cause" or the significance of an indiv- 
idual. Jesus does not live merely through the faith of the disciples: 
Easter is not a function of their faith. "Even according to Bultmann, " 
he states, "the formula 'Jesus is risen into the kerygma (proclamation), ' 
is liable to be misunderstood. Even according to Bultmann, it does not 
mean that Jesus lives because 
he is proclaimed: he is proclaimed be- 
cause he lives.  
29 But the focus of Kung's thought is captured in 
statements such as: "... Easter 
is an event primarily for Jesus 
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himself. "30 Likewise: "... the Crucified lives forever with God, as 
obligation and hope for us. The men of the New Testament are sustained, 
even fascinated, by the certainty that the one who was killed did not 
remain dead but is alive and that the person who clings to him will 
likewise live. "31 This is, for Kung, the unambiguous meaning of the 
Easter message and faith and shows the basic passivity that the event 
holds for him. Christ lives but definitely "with God, " neither an 
unsupportable nor a sterile theological statement by any means, but 
in its context meant to define a present separation. The Resurrection 
is thus not allowed to detract from the centrality of the cross (which 
in turn remains connected to Jesus' public life. 
32 
KUng's theology 
of the Resurrection has as its most consequent and notable declaration 
one which looks essentially backward: the Crucified lives. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In this section we will attempt finally to bring to a completion 
our appreciation and our criticisms of the individual theologians 
we have studied, and to suggest some constructive conclusions of 
our own concerning the direction which thought on the Resurrection 
must take. 
The twentieth century has spawned some remarkable developments 
in the theology of the Resurrection. As we have seen, the preeminence 
of faith as the sole criteria for belief in the Resurrection(Barth 
and Bultmann) has slowly given way to theologies of the Resurrection 
which emphasize verification(Moltmann and Pannenberg). But what is 
the methodology of this verification? Does it rest on 'proving' 
the Resurrection according to historical/critical technique(Pannen- 
berg) or are we called to witness faith in the Resurrection in 
accordance with the hope of an eschatological verification(Moltmann)? 
From the catholic side have come stresses on "the transcendental dis- 
position to believe"(Rahner), the need for "relativizing the dis- 
tinction between 'Jesus of Nazareth' and the (risen) 'Christ of the 
Church'" as the starting point for Christology(Schillebeeckx), and 
enlightening discussion on the limits of science, the possibility 
of basic trust, and the rationality of experience(KUng). 
A major thrust, perhaps the major thrust in twentieth century 
discussion on the Resurrection, then, has been a concern with verifi- 
cation: how does one prove, or at least how does one come to trust in, 
the kind of event told of in the text of the New Testament? Few 
could deny the wisdom of Karl Barth's statement: "We may be Protest- 
ants or Catholics, Lutherans or Reformed, to the right or to the 
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left, but in some way we must have seen and heard the angels at 
the open and empty tomb is we are to be sure of our ground. "1 The 
various modes of 'seeing' and 'hearing' are precisely the issue. 
Can one speak with any sense of a 'raising from the dead'? We 
are told by Paul that the question of our life and future depends 
entirely upon the assurance we have in the Resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth(I Cor. 15: 14). Yet is the very idea a kind of unverifiable 
curiosity? We must conclude that the trend of twentieth century 
theology has been consistently away from Schleiermacher's rather 
comfortable ambivalence in regard to the Resurrection: "The discip- 
les recognized in him the Son of God without having the faintest 
premonition of His Resurrection... and we too may say the same of 
ourselves... " Thus: "... all that can be required of any Protestant 
Christian is that he shall believe[the Scriptures in regard to the 
Resurrection] in so far as they seem to him to be adequately attested. "2 
Yet having charted a firmer course regarding the Resurrection by 
bringing it once again, and indispensibly, into the heart of faith, 
contemporary theology 
has correspondingly lost Schleiermacher's 
relative comfort with the 
issue. 
Karl Barth: Bodily Resurrection? 
Barth has pleaded eloquently the traditional concept of bodily 
Resurrection. This is replete with the claim that such a concept is 
not at all repugnant 
to modern thought, and can exist harmoniously 
alongside the growing 
body of human" knowledge and conception. But 
the basic question of factual, historisch truth cannot, we believe, 
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be avoided. Such a concept cries out for 'a reasonable approach, 
or at least for the exposure of essential reasonableness, if any, 
inherent in the issue. 
Barth's classic stand on "bodily resurrection"("leibliche 
Auferstehung") is, predicated, as with all knowledge of God, upon 
understanding that one's faith and therewith one's experience must 
always be viewed in terms of God's activity in the life of the 
Church, and thus in the individual life, enabling one to believe. 
3 
There is the consistent presupposition that the Holy Spirit, the 
subjective reality of revelation, makes it possible for God to 
be known by his people. 
4 
So, when Barth poses the specific question, 
5 
how does the revelation of God "come into man? ", the suggestion is 
ultimately that: "We have to respect the mystery of the given-ness 
of this fact as such, i. e., as the inconceivable and therefore the 
unspeakable mystery of the person and*work of God. " 
6 
It is only in 
and with the response of faith that it becomes possible to speak about 
man knowing God's actions and will at all. 
It is, of course, true that Barth regards as most appropriate 
to express humanity's total participation in the experience of the 
Word of God the concept of "acknowledgment"(Anerkennung). The 
concept, among other things signifies for Barth a "rational event. "7 
Yet whenever Barth uses this concept he intends to point to a 
unique kind of human knowledge: "It is recognition in the form of 
acknowledgment: recognition under the law of faith and obedience. "8 
(emphasis ours). 
Likewise, when Barth discusses the "Act of Faith" he writes 
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that Christian faith is "an acknowledgment(Anerkennung), a recog- 
nition(Erkennen), and a confession(Bekennen). As these terms indi- 
cate, it is a knowledge. "9 Faith understood as acknowledgment is 
above all else a cognitive act in which man takes notice of the 
prior work and being of the living Christ. In the normal order 
of man's relationship with an object external to him, recognition 
precedes his acknowledgment. But in the faith moment the opposite 
is true: the act of acknowledgment is primary and the act of cog- 
nition flows from it as its necessary consequence. Concerning 
the priority of acknowledgment in the faith moment, Barth writes: 
"It [i. e., acknowledgment] is not preceded by any other kind of 
knowledge, wither recognition or confession. The recognition and 
confession of faith are included in and follow from the fact that 
they are originally and properly an acknowledgment, the free 
act of obedience. "10 
One may argue that it is difficult (especially in light of 
Pannenberg) to fault Barth's conclusions on bodily Resurrection. 
But his method is difficult, in our opinion, to justify. Barth 
speaks, as we see it, from faith to faith, and within that faith the 
issue is not as devouring as when one stands in the arena of reason. 
For here prime recourse to the supernatural and to 'higher levels 
of history' seem less puissant, if justifiable at all. If modern 
man is to accept the Resurrection alongside the growing body of 
human knowledge, it is difficult to see the 'Holy Spirit' and the 
'obedience of faith' as the ultimate arguments. 
Barth's hidden agenda in his discussion of the geschichtlich 
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nature of the Resurrection seems to us not only an aim to take the 
ultimate decision on Resurrection out of the hands of the scientific 
historian but to make the concept of Resurrection a more palatable 
one for modern man (thereby qualifying his own expressed faith in 
modern man). This is 'accomplished' simply by denying the need for 
any discussion regarding bodily Resurrection from a scientific 
historical perspective: the Resurrection as an historical event 
must actually be conceived of as a non-historical event. Any need 
to show 'Resurrection' as a meaningful term before the bar of 
reason is diminished in light of man's (as it is proposed) ability 
in faith to believe such a thing is possible. If 'Resurrection' 
as a concept is not pitted against its detractors it certainly 
may be said that 'Resurrection' becomes, in a sense, a less assail- 
able concept. It is ultimately a matter of faith, purely and 
simply, and of the ability of the human mind to cope with radical 
contingency. These are not matters to be overlooked, but they are 
not, we repeat, the answer for those who would perform the Christ- 
ian apologetic outside the womb of dogmatics. Faith, we claim, 
may be linked to a rational foundation. And specifically faith in 
the Resurrection, at the heart of Christianity, must have this sup- 
port. Barth, for all his claim of bodily Resurrection, fails to give 
the concept the rational support needed by many for belief. 
Rudolf Bultmann: Resurrection 'Now' 
Bultmann has likewise, for all his grasping of essentials, 
led us down a path of no discovery. How does one have faith in 
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the Resurrection? We are confronted in the Word of preaching by 
the resurrected Lord; we encounter God's Word. The "Occurrence" is 
not so much a past event, as always present here and now, at this 
moment. The Resurrection occurs when one accepts the cross and 
rises to new life. Though this does not deny that certain events 
have actually taken place, it is the Resurrection as present 
occurrence that challenges us to decision, the possibilities con- 
tained in the death and Resurrection of Jesus becoming real events 
for the here and now. The Word is thus not a simple announcement 
or recounting of the past events on which it is based - this is 
mere Historie - but is a concrete, present saving event. There- 
fore, it is not by the understanding of more or less abstract 
propositions or by objectifying knowledge that we conceive the 
possibility of Resurrection, it is through decision. Through the 
Word God demands concrete decision, and, resultingly in this decision 
discloses Himself. What constitutes the resurrection? Man's own 
Resurrection from his inauthentic existence. 
We have stated previously, and stand by our claim, that 
Bultmann does not deny a 'Resurrection' of some type, for some- 
thing happened (though it did not have the indisputable character 
of the crucifixion event). Yet this is nonetheless affirmed almost 
incidentally as a puzzling 'turning point' in the life of the 
disciples, certainly not a constitutive element in the saving event. 
The Resurrection as Historie is arguably left as a "dishonoured 
casualty to the preached Word. "11 The past becomes a mere prologue 
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to the present, to the 'Moment' in which we actualize a spiritual 
Resurrection. 
As an act of decision, faith for Bultmann, is in response to 
God's prior act of grace in Christ. My act is a free act of decis- 
ion, when, as a sinner, I hear God's Word telling me that "I am a 
sinner and that God in Christ forgives my sins - and such faith 
is a free act of decision. " 
12 
This obedient hearing of faith is 
the responsive act of a person to God's own act; thus, it becomes 
possible to speak also of faith as obedience. 
Likewise, Bultmann stresses faith as an act of decision by 
saying that God calls man to faith by the preaching of the Word. 
He denies to man the power to generate faith (differing here from 
Heidegger who believes that man has within himself the power to 
make the decision for authentic existence), such faith arising 
only when God calls it forth. Consequently, faith is solely God's 
creation. It is not a natural, or rational, event. It is, as 
if God crucified and then resurrected one again in the call to faith. 
Just as the Resurrection of Jesus, my faith is produced only as a 
"miraculous act of God. " 
13 
There is then in Bultmann a spirited and consistent attempt 
to flee from proofs, evidences, historisch judgments. Bultmann 
does not care to stand before the bar of reason in any objective 
sense, since the Resurrection is not primarily rational but exist- 
ential. And yet this too is an attempt in the direction of theolog- 
ical relevance. Just as Barth in his way attempted to make the 
Resurrection relevant to modern man, so Bultmann has proceeded to 
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translate difficult scriptural, philosophical, and historical 
concepts into palatable theology. If one demands 'proofs', Bultmann 
reminds us that God for His part also demands faith. If one quest- 
ions the rationality of Resurrection, Bultmann reminds us that man 
is not simply a rationalist inquirer but basically a religious 
individual. One's questioning is stopped cold and turned back upon 
oneself, in an attempt to modify his existence: 'Become a new creature; 
find life in the eschatological now' we are told. 
For all the truth here does Bultmann ask too much? We think so, 
even in the name of faith. For faith is not an affair of "blank immed- 
iacy"(Cobb) but we believe a complex intertwining of reason, decision 
and hope. In denying that faith can even be talked about, 
14 
Bultmann 
has denied us rational choice; any possibility of fundamental reason- 
ableness in our pursuit of faith. One cannot say regarding faith 
that a choice by Bultmann's method must always leave one in the 
realm of doubt, just as we cannot say that a rational choice will 
invariably produce a totally secure stance. But does the necessity 
of faith mean that the problem of reasonableness may be dismissed? 
Are we free, on the basis of Christian faith to deny what Karl Popper 
has called "faith in reason"15 a certain trust, albeit modest, in 
rational reflection? Must we come so close to the brink, on which 
these two great theologians teeter, of 'all or nothing' regarding 
logical justification? 
In this we must stand diametrically opposed to Bultmann's 
strident claims that "to speak of God", i. e., "to speak in scientific 
propositions" is sin. The conflict, as noted by Popper, is nothing 
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less than "the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism" 
which has become "the most important intellectual, and perhaps 
even moral, issue of our time. "16 Popper does not posit a thor- 
oughgoing rationalism, simply a relative "trust" in scientific in- 
quiry as a necessity for informed decisions in certain areas, and 
we may recall that he stresses the limitations of rational reflect- 
ion. 17 We propose that the Resurrection is a logical object for 
such inquiry. The idea of Resurrection is not self-evident; the 
historical accounts are not readily transparent. Should one, indeed 
can one, then, give glib intellectual assent to what they view as 
not in the least historically obvious or demonstrable? Does one not 
leave room for unhealthy suspicion by a demand for a "blank, immed- 
iate" faith? And, furthermore, is the immorality (the 'sin' if 
you will) not on the side of those who demand from inside the 
bastion of faith, what faith shall be (and not be) and precisely 
how faith shall come (or not come)? This stance smacks of theo- 
logical impertinence, of desdain for the consistency of reality and 
the value of true decision. Such trust in God as Bultmann would have 
us claim has arguably as its counterpart a mistrust of reality. 
Moltmann: Future 'Proof' 
If one risks the over-simplifying of a great theology to 
distill into one sentence its essence, perhaps Jürgen Moltmann 
would not be badly served by the claim that: the fundamental chal- 
lenge of the Resurrection is directed at our practice of history 
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rather than our theory of history. Indeed, Moltmann's discussions 
on the contradiction between cross and Resurrection are some of 
the most provocative and challenging, regarding the Christian's 
actions under grace, since Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He awakens both 
an historical and a social consciousness from the disparity between 
the promised future (Resurrection) and the experienced (cross). 
Just as the Resurrection contradicts the canons of historical 
verification, so the promised future contradicts the possibilities 
of the present as seen from the perspective of the past. Moltmann, 
on the basis of Resurrection hope, refuses to allow us to become 
numb to history's real possibilities for change. 
The changes he speaks of are not simply social, i. e., the 
complementing of the kingdom of God with our utopian dreams. 
"What is the abundance of life? The death of death. What is 
complete freedom? The elimination of every rule, every authority 
and power. What is God? The elimination of nothingness itself, 
which threatens and cajoles everything that exists and insults 
everything that wants to live but must die. "18 
Resurrection hope always goes beyond any social successess in 
understandingthat "it is not human activity that makes the future. "19 
Thus Resurrection faith releases us to be fearless ("Freedom begins 
when men suddenly find themselves to be without fear. "20) in the 
certain knowledge that: "Peace with God means conflict with the 
"21 For this "conflict" takes place within a promised world. 
universal life. God's raising of Jesus from the dead is not merely 
a consolation; it is the divine protest against a world that 
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accomodates itself to death. 
The Resurrection really matters within history and no one has 
said it more forcefully than Moltmann. Yet Moltmann's forceful 
rendering of this truth, along with his now famous claim that 
"Christian faith lives from the raising of the crucified Christ.. "22 
makes even more urgent, in our opinion, a reasonable basis for 
belief in the Resurrection. We can walk with Moltmann through his 
claim that the Resurrection of Jesus is important because it makes 
history in laying the groundwork for a future Resurrection of all 
flesh. But it is disappointing to discover that this Resurrection is 
not to be interpreted historically but eschatologically. The quest- 
ion of the historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus is not valid 
for Moltmann, since this question would require a static answer. 
For him the Resurrection is to be understood from the future. 
"What happened between the cross and the Easter appearances is then 
an eschatological event which has its goal in future revelation and 
universal fulfillment. "23 Where traditional Christian doctrine 
has 
stated that Jesus' Resurrection 
is the historical basis of the final 
Resurrection, Moltmann now comes to us saying that the final Resur- 
rection is the basis of Jesus' Resurrection and it is there alone 
that Jesus' Resurrection can be legitimated. 
This 'grounding' of the Resurrection event, i. e., its verif- 
ication eschatologically but not historically, for all the appeal 
in its awakening of ethical and historical consciousness, yet falls 
short of Moltmann's own expressed understanding of the need to 
r 
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discover what we can about the historical facts. 
24 He claims, on the 
basis of I Peter, that we can justifiably hope only if we can "make 
a defense... for the hope that is in us. "25 And yet his final word 
is that the Resurrection event can never be verified in a world not 
dominated by death and sin. By pushing the question into the future, 
Moltmann can avoid dealing in any meaningful way with historicity. 
In our opinion this is anything but a certain hope. Moltmann him- 
self hardly stirs confidence with claims such as: "... now, of 
course, we naturally have the feeling that all conceptions of the 
future and above all a future after death are dreams, fantasies, 
speculations. We know nothing precise about the future. We would 
rather not believe anyone who says he knows anything about it. "26 
We must ask: why should the principle of future hope be the 
overarching principle of the Church or of reality? This 
is not to 
deny the importance of the future in either the Old or the New 
Testaments. The numerous promises of God are, of course, as prom- 
ises future oriented. And yet they are also based on God's defin- 
itive acts in history. Could Israel continue its hopes for a future 
divine deliverance without its history of deliverance? The word-of 
promise can be accepted sincerely because Israel 
has understood its 
history as showing God to be reliable. For the Christian, the 
promise of Jesus regarding deliverance and eternal 
life receive 
substance because he is the one who 
has come forth from the grave. 
precisely how this happened if, of course, a matter of dispute. 
Yet Moltmann's professed concern for the historical and his result- 
ing lack of concern for the same is inconsistent. At any rate, 
that God is ahead of time in the future may be true, but the Church 
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has traditionally understood God also as being prior to time. 
Moltmann seems to understand the former but does scant justice to 
the latter. 
It is also one of Moltmann's major tenets that there are no 
fixed forms and structures in the world. Replacing structures are 
functional forms. God has not laid down authoritarian forms in the 
past which must be followed. 
27 
Rather, humanity sets down forms 
which are to be used in realizing the future. Now, we will leave 
to others any praise or criticism of Moltmann regarding the impact 
this thinking has on society, revolution, violence, etc. But we 
may note that when Moltmann allows for the destruction of categor- 
ies of the past in order to realize the future, and when he claims 
that there is essentially nothing which is not open to correction28 
regarding 'fixed' natural or moral law, he runs a certain risk. 
This is not a totally theological criticism, but if Moltmann's 
theology of "hope" removes finality from everything which is 
present or-past, is not the concept of hope itself also open to 
possible change and even radical overhaul in the future? Put another 
way, the principle seems to us self-destructing, at least potentially. 
29 
If "hope" is a final world in interpreting history and reality, then 
on what is that final word based? If that final word is a word of 
God spoken sometime in the past, then is it not arguable that the 
future gets its meaning from the past and not the past from the 
future? In light of Moltmann's lack of stable equilibrium there 
seems to be no satisfactory epistemological answer to this theology 
of hope. Misty spiritual categories rather than solid ground-work 
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are laid for understanding his concepts, including the Resurrection 
of Jesus. 
We now propose to look at two of our Catholic theologians - 
Edward Schillebeeckx and Karl Rahner - before dealing with Wolfhart 
Pannenberg and Hans Küng. 
Edward Schillebeeckx: the Subjective-Objective Event 
In these few pages let us expand on the documentation we have 
presented earlier on looking at Schillebeeckx' theology of the 
Resurrection, in order to facilitate our closing points on that 
theology. We believe that the best access for our particular 
approach is'through the issue of experience as the medium of God's 
revelation. More particularly, Schillebeeckx focuses on Jesus' 
own experience and the experience of Jesus' first followers, both 
as individuals and, after his death, the primitive community's 
experience of his presence. Schillebeeckx seems to trust a revel- 
ation that can be located in human experience and, on the other 
hand, distrusts a revelation that loses touch with experience. Not 
surprisingly, it is from the experience of being redeemed by what 
Jesus said to his disciples and did in their midst, that a Christ- 
ologizing process began. Schillebeeckx states: "In my Jesus books 
I want to show that soteriology - the kingdome of God as salvation 
for man: the heart of Jesus' preaching - precedes Christology in 
the order of the genesis of Christological knowledge. "30 It is as a 
consequence of the experience of salvation, then, that the disciples 
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wonder: Who is he and what is his relationship to God? 
In Jesus the one whom Israel had awaited was seen to have come 
in person. Salvation was experienced in his words and deeds. He 
was the prophet of eschatological salvation. Thus, the term 
"eschatological prophet" becomes "the matrix of all other titles 
and creedal strands. " 
31 
Schillebeeckx traces these creedal strands, 
or models, 
32 back to some aspect in the historical life of Jesus 
which helped to create the Christology. 
33 
For the "eschatological 
prophet, " underlying all these Christologies, is where Schillebeeckx 
perceives a link with the parousia kerygma which began immediately 
after Jesus' death. The parousia kerygma emphasized the coming of 
the kingdom. What Jesus preached was still to come at his death. 
And the passage from a parousia kerygma (the earliest form found 
in the "Q tradition") to a Resurrection Christology is no more or 
less than a movement from a concentration on the kingdom to a con- 
centration on the person of Jesus. 
What, then, happened? What is the Resurrection? How do we 
come to believe it? 
In attempting to reconstruct the passage from parousia kerygma 
to Resurrection Christology Schillebeeckx contends that the followers 
of Jesus underwent a much more thoroughgoing conversion after his 
death. This contention is at the heart of Schillebeeckx' recon- 
struction. The disciples experienced themselves being forgiven 
for deserting Jesus, they recommitted themselves to him and to his 
cause after his death, and they did both of these things because 
they sensed his presence! That he was present to them by reason 
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of a Resurrection was not their initial understanding. Rather, they 
experienced only this sensing that he was present with them. As 
Schillebeeckx states: "For the Q community, the crucified one is 
the savior and judge of the world soon to return, but even now 
actively present in the preaching of the Christian prophets; in 
other words, for them Jesus has evidently been taken up to God. 
How? This is nowhere dwelt upon. Their Easter experience is the 
enthusiastic one of the Lord actively present in their community and 
soon to come: a maranatha experience. "34 
Schillebeeckx makes the interesting observation that it 
would have been impossible for the apocalyptic traditions to suggest 
Jesus' Resurrection to the disciples' minds. Though it did conceive 
of Resurrection, it was a general Resurrection of the last days. 
Rather than apocalyptic (i. e., Pannenberg's explanation), the idea 
that Jesus rose from the dead was suggested to the early Christ- 
ians by reflection on his ministry, his teaching, and his identifi- 
cation with the kingdom of God. 
35 
It is at this point that we must look specifically to Schille- 
beeckx' Interim Report where he attempts to clarify his previous 
work on the Resurrection (in Jesus and Christ) and respond to 
criticism leveled against that work. 
Schillebeeckx acknowledges the claims of W. Leser and W. Kasper 
that his treatment of Easter Christology in Jesus was "too narrow 
and distorted, "36 and admits that he may have given rise to mis- 
understanding. The problem. relates to the impression given that 
"faith in the Resurrection is separate from what is meant in the 
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New Testament by 'appearances'. "37 Schillebeeckx rather attempts 
to set the record straight by the assertion that the disciple's 
experience of the presence of the resurrected Jesus "chronologically 
precedes" any further working out of the Easter kerygma. 
For Schillebeeckx the problem centers on the question 'How 
do you know? ' In other words, how did the first Christians come to 
the conclusion that Jesus was, in fact, resurrected? Faith in the 
Resurrection is firstly, it is claimed, "a revelation-grace from 
God in and through the risen Jesus" and, secondly, not "hocus- 
pocus, " or a sudden "incursion from above. "38 Here Schillebeeckx 
makes a point that seems to counter what he had heretofore stated 
and what we have seen earlier in this thesis. He states: "What 
is meant by appearances is not simply and solely the fruit of a 
reflection by the disciples on the pre-Easter Jesus, however much 
this reflection inevitably plays an important role in the history 
of the origin of belief in Jesus' resurrection. " 
39 It is Jesus 
himself who makes his disciples aware that he has been resurrected. 
How? Schillebeeckx refuses to put any limits to God's possibilities. 
Something happened, if we may speak for Schillebeeckx in the most 
general sense(and reminiscent of Bultmann). For soon after his 
death that defeated group began to proclaim his Resurrection from 
the dead. Schillebeeckx can now only say that the Resurrection 
itself "is a real event, accomplished by God in Jesus"40 but as an 
event beyond the bounds of death was non-participatory for the 
disciples and meta-historical. 
Schillebeeckx is at great pains to dissociate himself in one 
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sense from Rudolf Buitmann (which also perhaps shows that he is 
only too aware of the similarities). He recalls his disclaimer 
in Jesus to the effect that the Resurrection was achieved in the 
person of Jesus and not only in the believing disciples, 
41 
and 
places great weight upon the impression this should make. He 
marvels that Loser could nevertheless write: "For Schillebeeckx, 
the Easter experience is an experience the 'subject' of which is 
the disciples themselves and their new state of consciousness 
after Jesus' death. " 
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Yet our conception is that Schillebeeckx has caused this 
criticism and confusion by his own attempt to so closely match 
the subjective and objective aspects of the Resurrection. For 
Schillebeeckx, Jesus' personal and corporeal Resurrection from 
the dead and the experience of faith which is invariably present 
in the scriptural accounts of the appearances, cannot be separated. 
"Without the Christian experience of faith we have no organ which 
can give us a view of Jesus' Resurrection, " he claims. 
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Yet 
we question whether Schillebeeckx can really dissociate himself 
completely from a theology which "leaves us guessing as to whether 
Jesus has risen in person"44 as long as an inner faith-motivated 
experience is the sole key for establishing the veracity of such 
a Resurrection. No matter that Schillebeeckx claims "he has truly 
risen, "45 and "without the personal Resurrection of Jesus there can 
be no Christian experience of Easter. "46 We believe he has come 
against objectivity with subjectivistic one-sidedness of this 
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kind of existential experience: one must have faith to 'see' and 
not vice-versa. It is no less, but little more, than a neo- 
Bultmannian stance on Easter, surrounded by an intense and enlight- 
ening new quest for the historical Jesus. 
We may ask in closing whether it is really true that only 
the faithful 'see' and is Schillebeeckx correct to place such 
emphasis on experience as the sole entry into the truth of the 
Resurrection event? We shall, in fact, close this thesis with an 
example of one Jewish scholar who confesses belief in the Resur- 
rection from the dead of Jesus of Nazareth, but not to his mes- 
sianic fulfillment or any Christian soteriological claims. He 
believes totally in this event but remains a Jew, eschewing 
Christian baptism. If Schillebeeckx is not interested in focusing 
the mystery of the Resurrection simply on Jesus himself, but wants 
to keep it ensconced in the experience of the individual, it 
would seem to us (and it will be more clear at the conclusion) 
that he has not properly dealt with the range of 'experience' 
which could admit one to belief in the Resurrection. 
Karl Rahner: Belief by Endowment 
Rahner's entire theological method is concerned to show that 
Jesus is the answer to the question which we are. To demonstrate 
this belief Rahner has chosen the transcendental-anthropological 
method which starts with the presupposition of the already graced 
human being. Its effect is to show that in our daily lives people 
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are not simply and meaninglessly tossed to and fro from one 
isolated individual event to another, rather in "these mundane 
everyday activities.. . (we) live on the shore of the infinite 
mystery. "47 
Rahner has thus developed the theory, which seems to be one 
of his most controversial, of the supernatural existential. It 
is his attempt to explain how God's universal saving will actually 
affects the world. When Rahner speaks of the supernatural exist- 
ential, he is then attempting to describe how the human being 
actually exists in the real world. The ontological constitution 
and status of the human being in the world, he claims, is super- 
natural because it is in fact constituted in grace by the univers- 
al saving will of God. Since the human being is graced, one of the 
human being's ontological dimensions (existentials) is supernatural. 
The supernatural existential is a claim that God has provided 
in the concrete historical experience an ontological horizon 
called grace which deepens and moves all that is mundane. There 
is in this world, claims Rahner, an innate desire for the super- 
natural and it is not human being but divine being that is the 
cause. We take this to mean then that there is no such thing 
as a purely human nature. We are, as 
it were, a divine-human 
combination, existing with an ontological, existential relation- 
ship to Christian grace and salvation. To prevent a dualism 
between the grace that has been poured into us and our daily 
lives is in fact the purpose of Rahner's theology of the 
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supernatural existential and indeed of his entire theology as 
we understand it. 
Rahner has been criticized by Hans Küng regarding his theo- 
logy's lack of historical sophistication. Kling has spoken of 
Rahner's method as "speculative-transcendental mediation"48 a 
term which is an obvious attempt to associate him with absolute 
German idealism, its deduction of existence from some abstract 
idea of pure being, and its disdain of everything historical. 
There is a sense in which Rahner is guilty of theological reduct- 
ionism for he is inclined we believe to use the events of salvation- 
history, the so-called 'brute facts' of history, as mere vehicles 
for transcendental experience. As a result, one has consistently 
the uneasy feeling that the acts of salvation-history are never 
fully appreciated for their grandeur insofar as they eclipse 
sheer human derivation; that they are given a second-tier importance 
to transcendental reflection. And even though one could argue that 
it is this transcendental reflection which reveals that these facts 
of history are precisely not brute, one is speaking still about 
a discernment, not an establishment, by the transcendental method. 
History as such speaks nothing to those outside the womb of faith. 
It is therefore difficult for us to accept wholeheartedly what we 
see as a reduction of revelation to a rational pre-understanding 
of God's existence, of the 'divine. ' 
Yet when one attempts to answer the question 'How does the 
individual come to have faith in the Resurrection? ' there is much 
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food for thought in Rahner's method. Basically, the approach is 
'faith seeking understanding. ' Yet he pushes us a little further 
than Barth. "As the fundamental eschatological saving event, this 
resurrection is essentially an object of faith and consequently 
is attained only in faith itself, in the light of faith which, as 
divine self-communication, is itself the dynamism directed towards 
such fulfillment. At the same time in this saving event faith 
finds the historical ground which makes faith possible and legit- 
imate. "49 
At this point we might refer to Foundations of Christian 
Faith where Rahner attempts to distinguish more clearly between 
the object of faith and the ground of faith. The distinction is, 
in fact, a very slight one "since in practice and in the concrete 
every ground of faith is also an object of faith. "50 It is not 
surprising then that Rahner can say shortly after: "It is quite 
conceivable that the ground of faith is reached only in faith, 
but nevertheless can exercise a true grounding function within 
it, and is not only an object of faith posited arbitrarily or 
because of the formal essence of faith. "51 
For Rahner then man in constituted as supernaturally trans- 
cendent, that is, prior to any acts of knowledge or will, we have 
a grace-given structure which predisposes our actions toward God 
and towards supernatural salvation. The first thing then in regard 
to establishing religious truth, for instance the credibility of 
the Resurrection, is the establishment of "the a prior horizon 
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within which it can 'dawn' intelligibly and credibly. 52, Once 
this is done by the theologian it is perhaps easier for history 
to work in harmony with faith in a reciprocal conditioning of 
faith and the motive of faith. It is not surprising that Rahner 
rejects a strict divisional relationship between the ground and 
object of faith ultimately on dogmatic reasons for "the Catholic 
doctrine of faith maintains that faith and the knowledge of 
faith are not possible without grace, and that they entail the 
personal and free assent of the believing subject. A real and 
effective grasp of the historical grounds of faith takes place 
only within the process of faith itself in grace and freedom. "53 
The difficulty comes, for us, when we begin to think out 
the relationship between the supernatural existential and the 
actual committment of faith; the relationship between "grace" 
and "freedom". Precisely what Rahner means to imply by his 
transcendental reflections on revelation has been disputed, 
54 
and 
can perhaps leave some of his readers with at least the following 
unresolved questions: What precisely is the capacity or function 
of this supernatural ontological constitution in the human being? 
What does Rahner mean in saying that human nature is thus intrins- 
ically able to receive a higher, greater communication of being 
from God than it has already received in creation? Does this 
ability of the human to perceive a divine revelation, not as a 
supposedly disinterested objective outsider, predispose us in 
some way to Christian faith and committment? Does it somehow deduce 
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Christianity's possibility and necessityfrom some exalted idea 
of human nature? And following from this, how does this 
transcendental reflection on the human being affect the possibil- 
ity and necessity of decision in coming to faith? 
We think Rahner does not intend to place within every 
person the flowering prospect of explicit , realized Christian- 
ity. His concept of "anonymous" Christianity is specifically to 
understand how the benefits of Christ we enjoy because of our 
explicit Christian faith might also be available to the whole of 
human history and creation. It perhaps is reflective of Rahner's 
writings on this subject that the very concept of transcendence 
in human nature is not a definite, defined idea. It seems to us 
to approximate the idea we saw in Pannenberg, that the Resurrection 
of Jesus is a Vorgriff (fore-grasp) of the future Resurrection. 
So Rahner deals with an unthematic, non-explicit concept in human 
nature whose main function, we believe, is to show that the finite 
and infinite are not in hostile conflict with each other. Rather 
they are so related that the finite draws its existence from the 
infinite. So, the finite is enabled to enjoy an inner dynamism 
for the infinite. Finite being necessarily strives toward, moves, 
reaches out for the infinte. 
Precisely how far Rahner is taken here makes all the differ- 
ence. If this is a faithful rendering of his thought we are care- 
ful to criticize, for what he explicates is such a hopeful and 
dynamic perspective in understanding the human being. Can any 
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Christian not believe that this world and each of its inhabitants 
is in some way graced, and that we have an obediential potency for 
whatever further sharing may please God? This hardly destroys the 
gratuity of grace as some have claimed. 
55 Rather it powerfully 
reminds us that we are consistently "in touch" with our Creator; 
that we have never really existed without a close relationship 
to Christian grace and salvation. 
The danger, it seems, comes in how we perceive this exper- 
ience of grace in everyday life, and this is, we believe, a sub- 
stantial problem for Rahner's theology. Do we really respond to 
the situations we encounter as 'transcendentally' as Rahner's 
philosophy requires? Does the supernatural existential enable 
us to respond in the love to neighbor that his theology would 
seem to dictate? Do we really experience the presence of God in 
all the moments of our lives - and not just in a few isolated 
experiences, if that - as we might expect from such a supernatural 
grounding? Rahner's book Everyday Faith56 we must complain, hardly 
describes our everydays. His theology in this sense, is a hopeful 
one but, by the same token, life and progress and the 'striving 
to become' is not always all he (or we) would wish it to be. His 
own personal intensity and positive thinking must be factored 
into his theological method. 
It is thus important to understand - and this is perhaps 
the difficulty in reconciling history and transcendence - that the 
inclination toward the infinite need not make the act of decision 
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for faith an easier one. The consequence of Rahner's emphasis 
on the theory of the supernatural existential (and anonymous 
Christianity) may resolve itself in a certain optimism about 
salvation, yet empiricäl evidence is there to counter idealism. 
Life is not always an infinite progression, no matter what one 
theorizes about human constitution, and to rest in the fact of 
a basic thrust toward the absolute (should Rahner be taken this 
way) may, on the one hand contain a certain degree of truth, and 
on the other hand only postpone or camouflage the more basic 
questions of choice, evidence, decision. 
We think that one of Rahner's main contributions is to 
ground philosophically the Judeo-Christian claims that the infin- 
ite and the finite are in relationship; that this are not inher- 
ently absurd or unthinkable. This is extremely important but is 
not given by Rahner the importance it is due. For his own method 
seems not to allow him access to the counter-side of that argu- 
ment: that what is not inherently absurd or unthinkable may yet 
be just that to someone - and with good reason. 
How does one come to faith, then, in Christ, in his Resur- 
rection? We agree with Rahner to a point. Faith is a part of 
the decision throughout, and this is not absurd. Faith in Christ 
"finds the historical ground which makes faith possible. " But 
what are the actual dynamics of becoming faithful? What must be 
considered in my decision(? ) to believe? Do 'externals' matter 
or do I look deeper inside myself to find God? Rahner provokes 
anumber of questions? 
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Yet in our own scheme of things his theology because of 
some excellent insights is a natural springboard into the dis- 
cussions to which we now move. For these authors would find 
much to agree with her, as well as much to add. We shall see in the 
coming pages how our remaining Catholic (Kung) and Protestant 
(Pannenberg) enlarge, each in their own way, on the relationship 
of faith to history, a priori disposition toward God and faith, 
the role of decision in faith, and the availability these give to 
belief in the Resurrection of Jesus. 
Having dealt with five of our theologians thus far we have 
yet to conclude our comments on Pannenberg and Küng. We have 
saved these two, a perhaps unlikely pairing, for two reasons. 
Initially, they offer their readers approaches to faith that 
differ substantially from what we have seen to this point. But 
secondly, though their own approaches to the Resurrection and to 
faith differ even from each other, they yet compliment and rein- 
force each other at strategic points. It is our impression that 
Pannenberg and Küng offer, when properly understood, a highly 
acceptable approach to belief, and specifically belief in the 
Resurrection of Jesus, that takes into consideration the rich 
diversity of ingredients which combine to make faith possible. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg: Knowledge, Assent and Trust 
The dedication of Jürgen Moltmann which we recall in pinning 
the question of the reality of the Resurrection to that of Historie 
is answered by Pannenberg with a bold affirmative. He simply 
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gathers the evidence, 
57 
and this leads him to affirm as the most 
reasonable belief what others have presupposed could be asserted 
only on the basis of faith. And yet this 'simple' process is 
actually a relentless polemic against the radical separation of 
faith and evidence, against the too fideistic elements in neo- 
orthodoxy. 
Pannenberg's benefit for theology in this regard - of which 
the Resurrection is paramount - is a self-conscious distancing 
from the dialectical thought world. As an heir to this world 
Pannenberg has interpreted the current situation regarding faith 
(i. e., faith is the knowledge of God[Barth] or of human existence 
before God[Bultmann]) as a breakdown of the relationship between 
history and faith; as a breakdown of the "theology of the Word. " 
While dialectical theology may have been a necessity from a 
developmental sense, it has spent itself in an increasingly 
formal existentialist theology (Buitmann) or a retrenched con- 
fessional dogmatism (Barth). Both are criticized for failing to 
give enough attention to a rational justification for belief and 
thus assuming a rather wizened and arcane stance in respect to 
the moving currents of thought which, in our day, are secular 
in orientation. This orientation is not to be feared, he claims. 
The result, for Pannenberg, is that appeals to self-verifying 
authority (Word) which command obedience - per dialectical 
theology - have become obsolescent. One of the prime character- 
istics of our day is the rejection of arbitrary authority and a 
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corresponding desire for assumptions and approaches. Can a 
theology which denies the spirit of rational approach in favor 
of a self-authenticating Word speak to the Christian faith in our 
time? Or will such a position only further push the Christian 
faith into every more esoteric (and thus possibly meaningless) 
stands relative to this secular current? Pannenberg's claim 
is that we must reassess the relation of faith to history in 
order to restore the credibility of Christian faith in our time 
and do this in the light of publicly shareable history? 
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As we have seen, Pannenberg does not sacrifice the notion 
of revelation in this reassessment. He rather takes exception to the 
concept of revelation as used in dialectical theology59 opposing 
its exclusive dependence on 'Word' alone instead of Word and his- 
tory. Pannenberg has borrowed the concept of self-revelation from 
Barth while at the same time altering it significantly. Instead 
of a direct self-revelation mediated through the Word, Pannenberg 
prefers to speak, of course, of the indirect self-revelation mediated 
through historical events. 
But the old theological problem is persistent: can any finite 
event(s) reveal an infinite power? Pannenberg's position is that 
revelation is only at the end of history. Only on the basis of 
the whole of history can we 'see' direct evidence of God. This 
is the view indicated by the apocalyptic tradition (as well as by 
the philosophy of history of Hegel). But the implication is that 
revelation in history is open (in principle) for all to know; the 
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knowledge of revelation is not supernatural, but natural and rat- 
ional. The brute facts of history do not cimply 'expose' God to our 
reason, for the future is still open, we are not yet at the end. 
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Yet this universal revelation of the deity of God has occurred in 
a proleptic way in the fate (death and Resurrection) of Jesus. 
It is not yet a matter of universal history, but the occurrence 
forms the historical basis upon which faith relies when it trusts 
the word of promise for our future. 
If then, as Pannenberg believes, revelation is a matter of 
truth given in history, of what use is the Word? It is no longer 
self-contained and so is not self-authenticating: It depends on his- 
torical reality for its content and its confirmation. "The Word 
relates itself to revelation as foretelling, forthtelling, and 
report. "61 Thus faith and obedience are fundamentally related to 
events. To turn from history is to turn from reality in which we 
live and in which God is known. Apart from this the 'Word' is in- 
conceivable. 
Pannenberg's intention is clear. He is rejecting a basic 
premise of dialectical theology (and its liberal forbears) that 
faith is a self-authenticating act of man which is unconcerned with 
either historisch event or rational content. 
62 He argues that 
faith is tied to knowledge, must arise with the rational assent of 
the mind to truth, as relative as that may be in our post-Enlight- 
enment world. In this way he is restoring the traditional order 
of knowledge, assent and trust to theology (refer to Introduction), 
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but not in the classical Protestant sense that all three are 
deemed to be the gift of God. 
Pannenberg's incompatibility with the central convictions of 
dialectical theology become focused in his distinguishing of two is- 
sues: the logic and the psychology of faith. 
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Whereas the dialect- 
ical approach speaks of faith's knowledge grounded in faith itself, 
and faith as the gift of God not as rational conclusion, 
64 Pannen- 
berg claims that, though theology remains a task of fides quarens 
intellectum, knowledge precedes faith logically. And this know- 
ledge is historical knowledge. He is particularly outspoken in his 
attack on Barth. The theology of the Word of God is, he says, an 
extreme form of "subjectivism in theology, " an example of "irrat- 
ional subjectivity. "65 Theology has the task of investigating 
critically the knowledge which is logically (not necessarily psy- 
chologically) presupposed by faith, and to show its foundation in 
reality before the bar of reason. 
66 
It would be best, Pannenberg 
believes, to limit the word 'faith' to the element of trust so 
far as logic is concerned. Faith as trust, he says, must be ground- 
ed in the trustworthiness of that which is trusted. And in order 
to assess trustworthiness, we must know something about the pos- 
sible object of trust. In his view, then, faith must be grounded 
in knowledge. 
Such a knowledge is not offered to buttress an otherwise un- 
steady faith or to 'prove' the Christian faith for all from the 
brute facts of history. That is an existential concern. But the 
logical presuppositions dictate that, if we want to understand faith's 
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soteriological confession of Jesus we must probe the historical 
context, especially what happened regarding his "fate", i. e., 
his death and Resurrection. 
The question must then be addressed regarding what kind of 
knowledge Pannenberg is talking about. And it is here that he 
forms the synthesis, we believe, which allows him both to remain 
comfortably within the general Protestant tradition and yet to 
preserve his heavily rational orientation. He says on the one 
hand that the knowledge which is presupposed by faith is not dif- 
ferent from natural knowledge. In other words, it is not a special 
gift beyond ordinary insight, something supernatural belonging 
only to the elect. As he clarifies his own position: "I admit 
that I cannot understand any knowledge as other than 'natural'. "67 
Yet, on the other hand, he maintains a continuity with the tradit- 
ion with his stance that only the revelation of God can ultimately 
be the ground for faith. "Only in this way is faith's vital 
interest in being rooted beyond itself, beyond its decision, 
, 68 secured. " 
Yet the question arises: how is it possible for faith to be 
based only on the revelation of God if there is no supernatural 
knowledge? The answer to that question can perhaps serve as a 
key to understanding Pannenberg's approach in general. We submit 
that Pannenberg wants to establish a link between natural knowledge 
and revelation. In other words, it is possible for faith to be 
based only on the revelation of God in spite of the fact that the 
471 
revelation may be a self-unveiling of God which can be appropriated 
by any ordinary, objective observer through his historical know- 
ledge. Thus conceived, it is true that revelation is the basis 
for faith; and since revelation can be appropriated by human 
knowledge, it is also true that faith presupposes knowledge. 
It is worth noting that Pannenberg seems to be reestablishing 
a perception that was held three centuries ago by Lutheran ration- 
alsim. It was a commonly accepted view at that time that natural 
theology could be accepted alongside the 'revealed theology' of 
Scripture. There were numerous attempts made to provide a ration- 
al justification for the truths of faith which would not be strict- 
ly reliant on revelation, the conventional wisdom assuming that 
natural knowledge is finally harmonious with divine truth. 
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Pannenberg's attempts to establish a link to the tradition by 
setting forth the view that the Protestant Reformation actually 
gave impetus to a rational approach to theology. Rather than 
merely exchanging papal authority for biblical, the general and 
more lasting effect was to place the believer in more proximate 
relationship to God, and he recalls the fact that Protestants 
have always insisted that individual interpretation of Scripture 
under the guidance of the Holy Spirit is best. In this way the 
believer comes only under the authority of God; there is no 
institutional authority over his thought. 
70 
It follows that for Pannenberg the Reformation has been 
instrumental in recognizing the autonomy of human reason. 
71 
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As a consequence of Reformation perspective it became a possib- 
ility for the individual to exercise his own reason (illuminated 
by faith and the Holy Spirit) in order to decide what counted as 
truth. And it was only a question of time before this idea took a 
stronger hold in the willingness to decide critically towards even 
Scripture. So, the distinction between believer and unbeliever 
collapsed in the sense that now every person stands, armed with 
reason, before the alleged revelation and decides its truth. 
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The consequences of these reflections have been neatly sum- 
marized by David Mackenzie, 
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who arrives at what we might call 
a model of the unconstrained, autonomous theologian (and thus the 
evolution of a rational theology). This liberated individual 
accepts in regard to divine revelation only what can be justified 
as a reasonable projection of truth. Such a one is free of any 
a priori constraints to the effect that God speaks only through 
a certain medium, i. e., Scripture or tradition (and is, in fact, 
open even to the possibility that God does not speak at all). 
Most importantly for our task this theologian takes for himself 
responsibility for the creative synthesis of various strata of 
evidence available through scientific-historical methods. 
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The very reason we have, in fact, attempted to distinguish 
Pannenberg from his contemporaries is that he has rejected the 
basic presuppositions of the leading currents of twentieth- 
century theology precisely because they make the attempt by some 
method to separate the decision of faith from the results of 
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historico-critical research. We do not mean to say that modern 
theology has not been aware of and contributed to the advance of 
historical inquiry. Rather the problem with, for example, Barth 
and Bultmann, is that they seem not to have understood how such 
research could contribute positively to religious truth claims. 
In fact, both were of the persuasion that historical-critical 
research left no room for divine redemptive events. It is no 
surprise, then, that their theologies fled into a safety above and 
beyond the storms raised by historical research, even though they 
had themselves promoted and furthered such research. 
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Pannen- 
berg's stance is against all fideistic and existential attempts 
to separate religious truth claims from the results of historical 
investigation. 
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Pannenberg clearly is attempting to establish a method for 
the development of historical hypotheses which will claim universal 
rational acceptance. In our opinion he is to be applauded for this 
approach. But the questions remain finally, how well has Pannen- 
berg made his case 1) for history as the basis of faith, and 2) 
for the Resurrection as an event of history. We shall take these 
in order. 
How does faith arise from and how is it given shape by history? 
This rather formidable task, which Pannenberg aims at courageously, 
is made significantly less difficult for him by an a priori assump- 
tion arising out of biblical experience: that "history is not a sub- 
ject which subsists independently over against God. In its very 
idea, history is constituted by the active presence of the 
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infinite God. "77 The images which the events of history spark are 
not unchanging but are reshaped within the never-ending process of 
reflection and tradition. But does faith, then, have an unsettled 
basis? What if the historian makes the case that certain tradi- 
tional facts really do not exist, or that they have been conceived 
in fallacious images. For Pannenberg it is plain: "faith cannot 
ascertain anything certain about events of the past that would 
perhaps be inaccessible to the historian, " and likewise, the unsound 
images "must be modified and corrected. "78 Yet, in the final sense, 
claims Pannenberg, faith does remain certain precisely because 
the believer can be certain that history is of God. "The knowledge 
of God's revelation in the history demonstrating his deity must... 
be the basis of faith. "79 This faith does not need to worry that 
such knowledge has been exposed as false by subsequent historical 
work. 
Pannenberg's stress upon history as that which leads us into 
faith is to be commended since it means that the concrete histor- 
ical event (along with its context of tradition) is crucial as the 
basis for faith. And yet an intrinsic vagueness must be seen to 
appear at precisely this point. Must not Pannenberg's hypotheses 
include hypotheses about the relationship of God the the events 
in question? Helmut G. Harder and W. Taylor Stevenson have re- 
sponded to Pannenberg with the view that the transition from 
historical fact to faith is not so straightforward as Pannenberg 
would like us to believe - even on the basis of his own program. 
80 
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Pannenberg's case, though it has much merit, has been overstated, 
they claim, neglecting the fact that "the movement of faith is already 
operative in the very perception of historical fact. " They reject 
Pannenberg's distinction between the logical and psychological 
structures of faith (the logical structure of faith meaning that 
something different from faith is presupposed as its basis) because 
"in a real sense, even logically, there is a precedence of faith 
over historical fact" in Pannenberg's program. This first logical 
step is the a priori assumption that God reveals himself in history. 
Claim Harder and Stevenson: "This is nothing less than an assertion 
of faith without which one could not follow his arguments further. " 
Does not, then, faith establish the basis which allows us to 
affirm the revelation of God in history? 
We may push this critique farther, we believe, to touch upon 
what Pannenberg has termed "the apocalyptic expectation" which 
provides the indispensible framework for understanding the Resur- 
rection of Jesus. Such a thing, imperative as it is to Pannen- 
berg's theology is given no foundation really, other than a meta- 
physical one: certain persons received "visions" through the 
years which collated into the general Jewish belief in a universal 
history for all humanity. 
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Yet what compels-us to accept this 
"apocalyptic'expectation" of late Judaism in order to understand 
God's revelation in Jesus. 
82 
If this category is necessary to 
understand the revelation through history of Christ's Resurrection, 
is not revelation through history needed in the understanding 
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and acceptance of such a category? Is not Pannenberg then saying 
that faith is operative in the coming to faith? Harder and Stev- 
enson press Pannenberg's understanding of the meaning inherent in 
historical facts with the claim that: "From the beginning, the 
perception of historical fact is inherently a perception of reality 
by means of faith. Or, in other words, the perception of the facts 
of Jesus' history... is at every point a perception of reality by 
means of the Holy Spirit, 'the Spirit which causes the self-evi- 
dence of the history of Jesus to radiate. "'83 
In reply Pannenberg attempts to minimize these differences as 
"largely a matter of terminology"84 but this is untenable. Where 
he finds Harder and Stevenson's expression "history from beginning 
to end is a matter of faith" to be disturbing and unfortunate (and 
it is not without ambiguity we believe) since it leaves unsure the 
basis of faith, he must admit that that basis "to be sure, is ac- 
cessible only from within anticipated horizons of meaning. " There 
follows the qualification that to project these horizons of mean- 
ing "is a function of reason and... of faith. " 
Yet Pannenberg - and this is true only in his later work85- 
seems to have finally begun to provide an adequate base for the free- 
dom of judgment which belongs to the historical sphere. The role 
of the Holy Spirit appears occasionally in Pannenberg's earlier 
writings (as noted by Harder and Stevenson) as a curious allurement 
for those who desire some sort of corresponding emphasis on a sub- 
jective nature of faith, but the trail leads nowhere. Rather the 
role of history in its relationship to faith seems to have been given 
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its definitive role in his book Theology and the Philosophy of 
Science. Although this work is not. concerned specifically with 
the Resurrection it is not irrelevant to the topic as we hope 
to show. 
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Near the beginning of Pannenberg's second main part, i. e., 
his proposal for theology as a science of God, there is a critical 
discussion regarding "Karl Barth and the Positivity of Revelation. "87 
As we have seen, a characteristic feature of Barth's theology is 
that revelation cannot be justified; the 'Word' is the only starting 
point. In the Church Dogmatics in 1932 Barth rejected H. Scholz's 
views that attempted to give the basis for a theological science. 
Scholz's three formal postulates, 
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which call for necessary min- 
imum conditions for any claim to truth by theological statements, 
were met by Barth with the claim that: "We cannot give an inch with- 
out betraying theology... "89 Pannenberg's reaction to Barth can 
seem initially extreme. Calling this an "irrational venture of 
faith" he claims that Barth's emphasis on the Word of God is am- 
biguous as it remains "at least problematical whether it is God 
and divine revelation and not merely human convictions. " 
Does Pannenberg propose, then, to resolve any problematical 
element in the area of faith? This has been the understanding of 
a number of critics going back at least to Lothar Steiger's (1967) 
scathing comments based on Pannenberg's contention that facts have 
an inherent ontological quality, i. e., the "power to convince. " 
"It is not clear, " says Steiger, "why this unambiguous and self- 
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sufficient kerygmatic historical process must be preached at all. "90 
A sympathetic Allen Galloway has also confirmed that: "There is a 
sense in which Pannenberg does tend to turn his historians into 
theologians and his theologians into historians. "91 And it is true 
that Pannenberg has not dispensed entirely with his predilection 
for calling his theses "proofs"92 when they have reached the point 
of a certain lack of contradiction. But Pannenberg here explains, 
we believe for the first time systematically, the conditional state 
of theological and historical statements. "It is... quite possible 
to verify theological statements, " he claims, but it "is quite a 
different question, however, whether such verification can ever be 
brought to a final conclusion, negative or positive. "93 Such 
verification cannot compel by force of logic the assent of one who 
remains closed to its premises, for different anticipations of the 
final truth are still possible. There is no theoretical certainty. 
Based upon this understanding (which is as true for anynatural 
science as for theology it may be argued) we believe that Pannen- 
berg can make his case for history-fact-knowledge as the logical 
predecessor of faith. It need only be recalled that such knowledge 
must include the drive to understand reality in its largest dimen- 
sions and cannot stop short of a universal history. To stop short of 
the question of reality as a whole is to stop short of the question 
of God, and to make it impossible to put the question of God. 
For faith itself is a conviction and committment to the One whose 
power over all things is indirectly given in historical events. 
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Jesus has universal significance because in him and "fate" the 
destiny of all things is revealed. 
The second question that must be put to Pannenberg - has the 
Resurrection been shown to be an event of history? - thus becomes 
much easier. Pannenberg has himself spoken to it specifically in 
his book Faith and Reality. 
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Our knowledge of the Resurrection 
is a matter of reason, presupposing knowledge of certain events 
viewed reliable by historical research. These conclusions are 
never completely incontestable, rather they are probable. Once 
we rediscover the courage to face that fact we will see that 
"historically-assured certainty is the greatest certainty we can 
ever have of past events. " Yet there is no "sheltered area" for 
faith. That the fate of Jesus, in which God himself is manifest- 
ed, remains open to doubt, is an essential part of the humanity 
of Jesus. 
By exalting the role of reason and maintaining with such force 
that faith depends upon prior knowledge Pannenberg has left us still, 
when all is said and done, with no more than an historical probabil- 
ity. He has opened up in new and attractive ways the possibility 
for belief yet it follows logically that in expressing belief in 
the Resurrection, and thus faith in the future, we must go beyond 
the evidence. What, then, is added to give faith its certainty in 
the face of mere probability? Is faith merely "a kind of trust in 
which man hopes that his knowledge, based on [the Resurrection] 
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will be justified? " 
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Pannenberg has attempted but has finally failed we believe to 
deal adequately with what we have called the 'freedom' (i. e., 
risk) of faith. Not that this excludes evidence. But, granted that 
historical-critical research has its limits (and Pannenberg rather 
gingerly does), what then? We can say 'yes' or 'no' to an uncer- 
tain reality, this much is clear. But based on what? The Resur- 
rection as the center point of the Christian faith can be substant- 
iated to a degree. If the concept of resurrection is not ruled 
out a priori it seems that Pannenberg can make his case for possi- 
bility or even probability. So is faith simply a risk beyond this 
point? Is that all that can be said? And if so have we, then, 
really moved beyond Pascal's dictum: "You must wager, there is no 
choice... "96 If Pannenberg has moved a great way from the concept 
of self-authenticating authority has he not left us with something 
yet to discover regarding a true basis for faith? And does not 
Pannenberg's Program yet need an underlying and extrinsic 'faith' 
to make it viable? On the basis of Harder and Stevenson's crit- 
ique, can we not question whether any historical event, to be 
judged revelatory, must be approached with an attitude 'toward' 
or 'in favor of' God and faith? Pannenberg's case for probability 
can always be rejected on the grounds of reasonable interpretation! 
It is clear from Pannenberg that faith based on the Resur- 
rection need not (must not) mean irrational, random choice. Yet 
it is just as clear that this same faith is, at least to a degree, 
a venture in freedom. We are not seeking a protection from risk, 
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a guarantee of success in the faith venture. Such a thing is im- 
possible. But we are seeking understanding, seeking to probe beyond 
the committment that independent historical knowledge can draw in 
regard to the Resurrection. Or, to put it another way, Pannenberg's 
greatest contribution to the critical reader has been we think to 
show us not only the place of reason but also the limits of reason 
in regard to faith. 
97 
And these limits can fall surprisingly short 
of the actual decision for faith. The existential decision, regard- 
ing 'salvation' and 'new life' is not an affair of "blank immediacy. " 
There is a place, a necessity, for the inclusion of the historisch 
in the decision-making process. But 
an affair of blank immediacy - brute 
into faith. There comes to the read 
an awareness that there is yet a gap 
closed at least understood - between 
decision for faith. 
neither is this, in its turn, 
fact effortlessly resolving 
er, after reviewing Pannenberg, 
to be closed - or if not 
history and the existential 
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Kling: Reason plus Risk 
We look now at an approach to verification which Küng has 
made outside the specific realm of the Resurrection, yet which 
informs an approach to that issue. We speak of Does God Exist? 
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This massive but highly 
previously in this work 
relation to our topic. 
conclusions are enlighti 
through his approach to 
balanced and reasonable 
engrossing book has been referred to 
but nowhere dealt with properly in 
Such is our aim now for we believe the 
aning and that Küng helps to inform, 
the question of the existence of God, a 
approach to a theology of the Resurrection. 
King has made two issues the foci of this inquiry into the 
possibility of belief in God: the overcoming of nihilism and the 
consequent case for theism. It is on these two points that we 
wish to concentrate our present discussion. 
1. One of Küng's most cogent attempts to justify a decision 
for fundamental trust99 has been to argue, in dialogue with any 
number of scholars, that such trust or faith provides the only 
adequate basis for science and morality. 
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Here he takes 
Pannenberg's Theology and the Philosophy of Science to task for 
overlooking the central importance of fundamental trust for the 
-theory of knowledge. Kung's argument rests mainly 
(but not solely) 
on Wolfgang Stegmüller who, within the discipline of analytical 
philosophy, has worked at systematically presenting the 
importance of "faith" for "knowledge. " Any evidence or insight, 
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Stegmüller claims, rests on a decision of conscience, which 
amounts to an existential perspective pervading all true 
science. Stegmüller claims: "If someone maintains that there is 
evidence. ... and thinks he 
is giving reasons for this, he is 
himself disguising the fact that he is merely expressing his 
belief in the evidence. " Likewise: "Anyone who fights against 
(evidence) and at the same time likewise offers reasons for his 
opposition is only expressing his unbelief and belying himself, 
since he could not even attempt to argue if he really did not 
believe in evidence. 'ý°' The conclusion reached is that problems, 
even those related to 'hard' evidence, cannot be settled purely 
with regard to reason. As Küng notes, Stegmüller both confirms 
and surpasses Kant when he claims: "We must not deny knowledge 
to make room for faith. Instead we must believe something from 
the outset in order to be able to talk of knowledge or science 
at all. " 
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We ask, does this not give assistance in informing Herder 
and Stevenson's critique of Pannenberg that "all historical know- 
ledge assumes faith? " Pannenberg's subsequent reply to his critics, 
that this leaves the presuppositions of faith 'questionable' shows, 
we believe, a strained rationality, which refuses to weigh the 
considerable grounds for assuming that faith does, in fact, 
precede knowledge and science. This "belief" or "faith, " Küng 
notes, "might be misunderstood as specifically religious belief 
484 
.... even Biblical 
faith in God, " and he cautions in his next major 
section on ethics, that it is not only the believer in God who 
can have "aims and priorities, ideals and models, values and 
norms, criteria for true and false, good and evil, " that "today 
less than ever can we call down from heaven ready-made solutions. " 
Yet it is not only within the scope of religious faith that such 
a 'faith in reality' appears reasonable. This "Prerational 
decision" (Stegmüller) is a "rationally justifiable fundamental 
trust. " This is Küng's point, impressively made. throughout 
this section. 
2. Yet does fundamental trust necessarily imply theistic 
belief? In the crucial sixth part of the book, Küng sets out his 
case for theism. The argument is unapologetically post-Kantian, 
for King rejects both a proof of theism in the style of Vatican I 
natural theology and an uncompromising appeal to revelation in 
the style of Barthian dialectical theology. Rather, the existence 
of God is to be "verified, " but not proved. He states: "Ours 
is an indirect criterion of verification. This means that God 
as the supposedly all-determining reality will be verified by 
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With a basis the experienced reality of man and the world. " 
in fundamental trust Küng believes that "God's existence can be 
made understandable'a04 against the background of our experience 
of life. It is certainly true that both affirmation and denial 
of God are possible; we must decide finally without indisputable 
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rational proof. For "both atheism and belief in God are there- 
fore ventures, they are also risks. " 
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But fundamental trust- 
in reality, in God - is by no means irrational; it is not just 
risk. "If I do not close my mind to reality but remain open to 
it, if I do not try to get away from the very last and very first 
ground, support and goal of reality, but dare to apply myself and 
give myself up to it, then I know, not indeed before, not yet only 
afterward, but by the very fact of doing this, that I am doing 
the right thing, and even what is absolutely the most reasonable 
thing. For what cannot be proved in advance I experience in the 
accomplishment.... " 
106 (Küng's emphases). Though Kün g presents 
several possibilities of such indirect verification 
107 let us 
use this seminal thought as a springboard in another direction, 
and back towards the Resurrection. 
The Logic of Experience 
We must agree with Küng (and with Pannenberg who also proclaims 
the idea though far less boldly) that it is impossible "to go back 
with the aid of logical methods... to secure and therefore indubit- 
able reasons as a basis of our knowledge and action. "108 Yet, 
we also believe this does not allow us to dispense with the obli- 
gation of rendering a reasonable account of such knowledge and 
actions. How is it possible, then, to render such a reasonable 
account since faith, by its very nature, implies a pledge, a venture, 
a risk in spite of all possible grounding? 
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For Küng, faith is ultimately a question of committment 
and experience. "Reality is given to me from the start: if I 
commit myself trustingly to it, I get it back filled with meaning 
and value. " As it is with reality, so also personal existence 
and freedom are waiting to be "experienced as real. " 
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For faith 
is a "task. " It must "be proved in practice. " There is no 
possibility for flight into fantasy. Kling must here be understood 
as pursuing a two-edged approach to faith, pushing us to consider 
what grounding rational inquiry has to offer and yet proposing also 
the grounding of experience. We become acquainted with two 
spheres, then, in transposing this to a theology of the Resurrection: 
the historical (including not only evidence, but the historical 
concepts of the Resurrection) and the experiential which concerns 
our human existence now. Both are vital, neither is exclusive 
of the other. This perception is both corroborated and deepened 
by brief reference to two other Catholic writers. 
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Gerald O'Collins, in his book, The Resurrection of Jesus, 
has himself proposed what he calls "the experiential correlate, " 
in answering the question: based upon historical probability, what 
is added to give faith its certainty? His answer is summarized 
in the statement: "Ultimately an assent to the reality of Jesus' 
Resurrection combines knowledge of past facts with an interpre- 
tation of present experience. " We look to the past, continues 
O'Collins for a "credible report" but in expressing belief in 
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the Resurrection we are going "beyond the evidence. " For unless 
our own lives yield some knowledge of God and allow us to 
experience now something of the Resurrection, to say that Jesus 
was raised from the dead will prove "unintelligible and unacceptable. " 
O'Collins goes on to "risk some generalizations" as to how this 
experiential correlate might play out in practice, but his theme 
is that it "will vary from person to person, " that there is no 
"standard list of experiences or fixed set of questions. " 
This conclusion is backed up in the E. Schillenbeeckx and 
B. van Iersel edited Revelation and Experience, in an article by 
Dietmar Mieth, entitled "What is Experience? 
"11 "Many exper- 
iences can be 'explained, '" says Mieth, "without being truly 
comprehended. .. The transmission of experience, though 
it can 
be analyzed especially well. .. nevertheless conceals the secret 
of human experience. " And human beings, he claims, exhibit a 
proclivity for the experience which has to do with, faith. "There 
is a kind of general potential for the experience of trust, known 
as 'basic trust'. .. (and) the more it is actively used, the more 
powerful it becomes, thus making concrete, absolute trust even 
more possible. " Mieth reminds us that this trust, this experience 
spoken of is "historical in a dual sense: in the sense of its 
ultimate originality and in the sense of its continued existence 
in history. " Thus the "continuity of history is the reconstruction 
of history with a practical view in mind. Historical thought 
itself is dependent on a theory of action. " 
488 
The perception that Mieth arouses is intriguing and yet 
basic. Some facts as they are can be believed on the basis of 
historical research, for instance that on such and such a day 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon or that on such and such a day Churchill 
became Prime Minister. But a religious fact which impels trust 
and committment of one's life must be consistently historical, both 
as regards its ultimate originality and its continued existence 
in history. Thus, an event such as the Resurrection demands by its 
nature something more than intellectual acquiescence, it demands 
the living out of its truth, if that truth is to be known in its 
fullness. as Reinhold Niebuhr has noted: "The Resurrection 
shares in the arbitrariness, irrationality and independence which 
characterize all events to some degree; and like them it is prob- 
lematic ... But otherwise the Resurrection of Jesus Christ differs 
from (them) because it draws upon the past and evokes the historical 
possibilities of the future, "112 calling us as "witnesses to the 
faithfulness of God. "113 Mieth's probing is even more basic, how- 
ever: "Theology makes the claim that God 'is'. Experience claims 
to provide an answer to a different but necessary question; namely, 
what happens if I live with God? " 
Again, the perception arises that factual "claims" - of theology, 
of history, or science - answer a different question, or perhaps 
only partially answer the question, can I have faith in the 
Resurrection? For there is a desire for a corresponding claim 
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for "authenticity of the experience of God" (Mieth) which brute 
fact alone cannot touch. The 'conveyance of experience' which 
dictates in the old, orthodox tone, an experience which is told 
and must be believed, which dictates within clearly defined limits 
and will not admit any new ideas, is "dead, " claims Mieth. In its 
place must come that "experience for which the world is full of 
wonder and misery, which breaks through conventional safeguards 
and lays itself open to the danger of failure. " Like Küng (and 
O'Collins), Mieth calls for the necessity of experience in the 
realm of faith and revelation, denying that "definitive" answers 
may be found, for experience is "open-minded and flexible. " One 
thing becomes certain: revelation is a continuous dialogue with 
reason and experience. Kling, among our twentieth century Catholics, 
has brought this to our attention in a bold way. 
The necessity to decide 
It is with the element of 'decision' in Kung's Does God Exist? 
however that we come to what we view as perhaps the most important 
single element in his theology as it applies to our concerns. This 
is especially true in relation to our discussion of Pannenberg. 
"Reality, " claims Küng, "demands a reaction. "114 And we all 
decide for ourselves our "fundamental attitude" to reality, that 
basic approach which colors and characterizes our whole experience. 
Kling characterizes this decision as the freedom to say Yes or No 
and this is indicative of an approach to life which is basically 
positive or negative. Basic answers and approaches are uncertain 
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we are told; there is no one to dictate finally what is Truth. 
Nearly every "absolute" can be argued. But still we can reason- 
ably say Yes or No to uncertain reality - reality demands this 
answer. 
But the question about reality is actually a question about 
myself. Early in KUng's book, in his discussion of Descartes, the 
thesis was presented (based on Descartes) that we are never merely 
reason. This is strengthened subsequently by recourse to Thomas 
Aquinas' view that reason and will cannot be separated. "Aquinas 
himself makes intellect and will wholly and entirely coordinated 
factors ... 
in every genuine human act, the will must bring the 
intellect into activity... (and) the intellect must direct the 
(blind) will to a particular object ... For Aquinas, therefore, 
between intellect and will, there is reciprocal priority and 
completion. " 
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Therefore, what KUng calls the "attitude toward 
uncertain reality" concerns the whole person, intellect and will, 
head and heart. Objective and subjective, rational and irrational 
cannot be neatly divided in the human being. 
Kling has claimed in an earlier section116 both that nihilism 
is possible ("The thoroughgoing uncertainty of reality itself 
makes nihilism possible. ") and that it is irrefutable ("There is 
no rationally conclusive argument against the possibility of 
nihilism. "). But these characteristics also apply to its "oppos- 
ite. " The fundamental alternative then - the Yes or No to 
491 
uncertain reality - always involves a risk, and at bottom is a 
matter of "trust or mistrust... either I express my trust in 
reality - or not. "117 
No one can evade this alternative, not even the critical 
rationalist. As Küng is at pains to point out, even the reason- 
ableness of reason is often uncertain, for "it is not an argument 
of reason, but a trust in reason (fundamental trust) that... 
even critical rationalists must simply assume as the basis of 
their entire system. "118 
Thus fundamental decision is a venture in freedom, but to 
King a Yes to reality makes infinitely more sense than a No. In 
this Yes to reality we have "identity, meaningfulness, and value" 
thrust upon us. 
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Surely it includes a pledge, a venture, a 
risk, but it is not an unreasonable risk. As nihilism cannot 
be refuted or proved, so it is with basic trust. But this trust 
is at least compatible with our nature for we are "drawn toward 
being. " 
120 Fundamental trust, KUng attempts to show, is the basis 
of science, 
121 
and of ethics, 
122 
as well as religious faith. 
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It is what gives life foundation, purpose and meaning. 
Now, it seems important at this point to note for our pur- 
poses what Küng seems to be saying. Initially, and this is quite 
clear throughout, he claims that the term "proof" is a relative 
one. In fact, it would seem fair to'substitute "decision" or 
("choice") for it in his scheme. Kling allows Kant to make the 
case that there is no purely objective knowledge, and modern 
physics seems to confirm that this is true even in natural science. 
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It is not to say that all fundamental categories can be reduced 
to pure subjectivity. But "the most exact science today starts 
out from the assumption that what we are dealing with is never 
the world in itself, but always the world as it appears to us. "124 
This leads Küng to claim that, up to a point, we "make" our truth: 
"from universal truth 'in itself, ' in my perception, cognition, 
feeling appreciation, I make the concrete truth 'for me. 
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Secondly, Küng applies this point specifically to the 
Resurrection, and we believe it provides an important link to 
understanding and therefore believing in this event. It is clear 
that many who have followed the path of fundamental trust in 
affirming life, God, and Jesus Christ, may yet have reservations 
when it comes to historicizing the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazar- 
eth. The primary reason for such a stand in most cases we may 
assume will hinge on a skeptical position toward the miraculous 
based on current observation, Enlightenment tradition, the fact 
that the historical-critical method has, in general, tended not 
to support the contention, etc. And this is not inconsistent with 
faith in God as the author of life and Jesus as "His only Son our 
Lord. " It is here, however, that the whole issue becomes personal, 
not credal. It is precisely here that, at least to a point, we 
create our own reality. It is KUng's personal contention, with 
regard to the Resurrection, that "it seems to me only logical not 
to stop halfway, but with this trusting faith in God to continue 
consistently to the end. For if God really exists and if this 
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existing God is really God, then He is not the God onlyof the 
beginning but also the God of the end... For death is my affair; 
raising up to life can only be God's affair. "126 
Yet Küng is quite content, with others (Barth, Bultmann, 
Moltmann, Rahner, Schillebeeckx), to take the Resurrection event 
as "admittedly not a historical event (verifiable by means of 
historical research), but... certainly (for faith) a real event. "127 
That this (again on a personal level) does not please me is not 
meant to be a totally negative reflection on that belief. For 
My perspective on the reality of the Resurrection is surely 
conditioned by a different feeling and instinctual structure, a 
different psychology than Küng and these theologians. My reason 
and my will perform with a different impulse and deliberation 
than theirs. I am satisfied with something other than they in 
this area. And though we may disagree it is yet meaningful to 
state that bold argument and criticism can perhaps do little to 
condition our respective stands. A "fundamental trust in reality 
by no means excludes mistrust in a particular case, " 
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exclaims 
Kling, and such is the case here. We must choose. And I find 
that, in my experience, to ask for faith in the Resurrection 
without benefit of historical-critical research asks too much. 
It seems logical to us and near the conclusion of this thesis 
now more than ever, to demand of the Resurrection event and of 
faith a detail not fulfilled in our opinion by blank, immediate 
faith itself. We appreciate Pannenberg. His arguments are as 
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sound as his attempt. Faith should not, we believe, be divorced 
from the results of historical-critical research. 
But there is required of this perspective the dimension to 
which we are led by Küng: a type of reasonable faith is necessary 
for attainment of a reasonable approach to the Resurrection 
event. It is rooted in God, belief in whom may be a risk, but 
not an unreasonable risk. And it is determined by the fundament- 
ally positive perspective that God is the Finisher of life. 
"It is obvious to me from the outset that (the question of 
ultimate reality, of God himself) is a matter of faith, " says 
Kling in his section on the Resurrection. 
129 And this must be 
decided, he has claimed, without intellectual constraint and 
without rational proof. But once this attitude of fundamental 
trust is in place, there is established the link to historical- 
critical inquiry and to reason in general, that admits of 
relative 'proof', that gives substance to faith. Kung's state- 
ment regarding the Resurrection to the effect that it is logical 
not to stop halfway in affirmation of God's consistency, that 
he is the God of the beginning and the God of the end, firmly 
establishes Kling in a faith posture toward the Resurrection 
event. This reasonable, he claims, and we agree. But is it not 
also reasonable to assume that this fundamental trust can also 
make us 'ready' to perceive within history those events which 
can, without relative scientific accuracy, further confirm our 
belief in what we have already decided to trust? 
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Is this not then a pandering to faith? Do we not make our 
wishes and then accomodate their fulfilment, establishing our 
historical facts out of our own faith resources? Yes and No. 
Yes in the sense that we have "decided" without ultimate proof, 
and because of that faith is always operative in our stance 
toward life God and the Resurrection. In this sense we can 
never do more (better) than believe. Belief hits the summit of 
the human experience. It is not to be subjugated to reason for, 
as Küng has shown, all reason is operative only on the basis of 
some type of faith. 
Yet we must also answer 'No' to any charges of 'pandering' 
to faith. For once we have said 'Yes' to uncertain reality we 
find we are able to maintain this attitude consistently in 
practice. Does not a mistrust of reality in principle make every 
single step in the whole journey of life absurd, meaningful life 
an impossibility? 
130 In this case we can appeal to Nietzsche's 
rather refined sense of justice. In his nineteenth-century 
intellectual world there was nothing unusual about his rejection 
of religion and of classical philosophy's claim to know something 
about the nature of the good. Such rejection was almost de rigueur. 
What seems unusual (and also quite admirable) to us regarding 
Nietzsche was his determination to face up to the consequences 
of that rejection. As one writer has noted: "His most withering 
scorn was not directed at believers nor at those who philosoph- 
ically affirmed knowledge of the good. He believed they were 
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wrong but at least they were consistent and coherent. His most 
withering scorn... was directed at those who, having abandoned 
the idea of an objective grounding of truth and morality, went 
on chattering about truth and morality. "131 
As there are then recognized consequences of the rejection 
of fundamental trust, so there are also, it seems reasonable to 
assume, consequences of the decision to approach life with fun- 
damental trust. And we claim that one of the consequences is 
the openness to 'see' that faith really is more than a wager, a 
risk, a mere decision. Pascal was right: "You must wager. "132 
But as Küng has stated the modern approaches to science and 
truth133 tell us more, it seems. For once the will has made 
its choice, the reasonableness of the decision to believe 
becomes more obvious. It is Pannenberg who has shown us how 
this is possible through the efforts of scientific criticism. 
Thus we assert that the rather gloomy prediction of Küng, that 
in the life of faith based on choice and fundamental trust alone 
"faith is... everywhere followed by doubt as its shadow, " that 
"throughout life there always will be temptations to give up 
the faith, " and that we "shall constantly have (in faith)... 
all doubts, uncertainties, and obscurities1'3`. s somewhat buf- 
fered by the inclusion of Pannenberg's approach. For this 
approach is truly one that complements the strong and logical 
departure into faith that Küng has illustrated, with an enhance- 
ment of knowledge that can progress with the experience of life. 
Perennial "obscurity" can, at least to some degree, give way 
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to perennial bracing of faith. And while we cannot perhaps achieve 
the wholly and entirely certain faith (as even Pannenberg will ad- 
mit) yet we can, both through initial commitment and subsequent 
reflection on the new depths of scholarship, come to a faith that 
is intelligent and justifiable enough to avoid unnecessary crises. 
$ 
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The Resurrection in Pinchas Lapide 
We now move to a discussion which is intended as a sort of 
post-script, although there will be some closing comment on this 
work as a whole to follow. It is not only meant to enlighten the 
reader to an important, albeit unusual, current approach to the 
Resurrection of Jesus, but is also meant to stimulate what we con- 
sider to be some rather provocative possibilities regarding 
future work on the theology of the Resurrection. If we are to 
more fully grasp the impact of the Resurrection of Jesus on 
twentieth century theology, we think it indispensable to add 
this final perspective. 
Resurrection as True Hope: The Church and Israel in the Work of 
Pinchas Lapide 
Kling has pressed a point in his theology which is, we believe, 
crucial to pointing the way to future discussion on the Resur- 
rection. To paraphrase: how can one view the disastrous elements 
in the history of the Church and of humanity - Küng's concern 
is primarily aimed at hostility between Christians and Jews - 
and yet really see the Resurrection as true hope, as foundational 
in God's bringing to perfection his creation. 
135 KUng has been 
commendable honest to raise the issue without blunting its 
considerable shock value. It is a weighty problem indeed and 
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has been dealt with by Christian-theologians with perhaps less 
candor than it warrants. It is this expression of concern that 
has propelled us into the present discussion. 
The Christian proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth as the Mes- 
siah of God has been based, as we see it, on a resolution of this 
theodicy-related problem. The One who was crucified has been resur- 
rected by God and has thus fulfilled all the prophecy, all the 
criteria to be proclaimed as "the One who is to come"(Lk. 7: 20). 
The Church has been mindful of what Küng calls the "sad situation" 
of reality but the Resurrection has towered over all reality and 
given rise to the Christian understanding of the time "between the 
times" - in the afterglow of God's Easter victory over death and 
yet prior to God's ultimate perfection of creation. For all this 
history of "blood, sweat and tears"(Kung) which still continues, 
the Church has never lost confidence that the Almighty Creator 
has moved us and creation from death into life. We agree with 
Kung when he sees "God's will as supreme norm and as aimed at noth- 
ing but the well-being of man. "136 Present reality has not been 
a serious drawback in the Church's understanding and interpretation 
of the Resurrection and of Jesus' person due to that Resurrection. 
It has provided, rather, the creative spark for our theologies of 
the Resurrection; the fertile, if "sad", medium which by its very 
contrast shows up the hope of the Resurrection and its message in 
even bolder outline. 
It is with something of a sense of superiority then that the 
Church of the Resurrection has related historically to the Jews. 
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Not only have their dietary laws, segregation, ritualism, festiv- 
als and special days been seen as strange and outmoded, but their 
understanding of Jesus has caused to erupt a Christian outrage at 
times throughout history. It can still seem something of an af- 
front to come across these views in print. For instance Rabbi 
Hayim Halevy Donin, in his book To Be A Jew, speaks of the Messiah 
in these terms: "The Messiah in Jewish thought was never conceived 
of as a Divine Being. As God's annointed representative, the Mes- 
siah would be a person who would bring about the political and spir- 
itual redemption of the people Israel through the ingathering of 
the Jews to their ancestral home of Eretz Yisrael and the restoration 
of Jerusalem to its spiritual glory. He would bring about an era 
marked by the moral perfection of all mankind and the harmonious 
coexistence of all peoples free of war, fear, hatred and intoler- 
ance (see Isaiah 2 and 11, Micah 4). Claimants to the Messianic 
title arose at various times throughout Jewish history. The crit- 
erion by which each was judged was: Did he succeed in accomplishing 
what the Messiah was supposed to accomplish? By this criterion, 
clearly none qualified. The Messianic era is still ahead of us. "137 
The state of reality, then, would seem to speak differently 
to our faiths. For the Christian the Resurrection lives as a 
prolepsis (Pannenberg) - straining toward the universal future con- 
summation of what has been "fore-grasped" in the Resurrection of 
Jesus - thus placing Christianity "within the horizon of the ex- 
pectation of the Kingdom of God" (Moltmann). But for the Jew 
reality itself forces a different interpretation. It is not 
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possible for the Messiah to have come since one does not witness 
"harmonious coexistence" and "moral perfection. " One must there- 
fore assume (from a Jewish perspective) that the claims of Christ, 
chiefly, "that in his person and work the reign of God is dawning 
and that here the decision is made for salvation or judgment, "138 
based on his Resurrection, are not to be believed. Put simply, 
the choice is this: one assents to the obvious facts of existence 
which are known and witnessed every day or one assents to the claims 
of Christ. 
It therefore jars somewhat when an Orthodox Jew takes up the 
Resurrection and decides in favor of its historicity while at the 
same time remaining consistent to the traditional denial of Jesus' 
Messiahship. But in this paradox is pointed up at least the pos- 
sibility, 1) of a new Christian perspective on our relationship 
with Judaism based on the Resurrection, and 2) perhaps even our 
perspective on the Resurrection itself. We are speaking of Pinchas 
Lapide's writings culminating in The Resurrection of Jesus: A 
Jewish Perspective. 
139 
As Carl Braaten notes in his introduction to the book: "A 
Jewish-Christian dialogue is possible today as never before. There 
is a 'Hebrew wave' passing through Christianity in the search for 
roots of spiritual identity... " 
140 
This certainly cannot be seen 
in such works as Pannenberg's Jesus: God and Man where the view is 
stated that the Resurrection provides the perspective needed to see 
those who rejected Jesus as blasphemers and the Law itself as void. 
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"This explains why the Jews took... offense at the resurrection of 
him who had been rejected in the name of the law as blasphemer. 
With this message the foundations of Jewish religion collapsed. 
This point must be held fast even today in the discussion with 
Judaism. "141 But Pannenberg did not speak for all the Church here 
and one is aware, for instance, of a Lapide-Moltmann dialogue on 
the Trinity, 
142 
and other Christian-Jewish discussions. 
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It is perhaps most interesting of all to note a change in the 
attitude of fundamental Christianity (at least in the United 
States). Fundamentalism, it may be argued, is as a religious 
phenomenon extremely slow to change from traditional points of 
view such as the historical evangelical posture of Christians 
toward Jews and other non-Christians. Yet recent statements 
from the fundamentalist camp show that even here there is the 
perception of the possibility of a new trend emerging involving 
the relationship between evangelical Christians and Jews. 
144 
Braaten also notes that there is "a 'Jesus-wave' passing 
through Judaism. " Lapide has, for instance, in his book entit- 
led Israelis, Jews and Jesus, cited 187 Hebrew books, research 
articles, plays, dissertations and essays that have been written 
about Jesus of Nazareth since the founding of the state of Is- 
rael. 
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This phenomenon as a whole is beyond the scope of our 
research but does serve to provide the background for our dis- 
cussion on the Resurrection and its possible place in future Jewish- 
Christian relations. To that end we now turn. 
In Lapide we see a Jewish theologian of prominence who has 
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helped to shape Jewish-Christian dialogue firstly through his 
deep engagement in the historical-critical reconstruction of the 
life and message of Jesus and secondly through his surprising 
views on Jesus' Resurrection. 
It is in his dialogue with Jürgen Moltmann, entitled Jewish 
Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine, that Lapide reveals 
something akin to devotion to Jesus of Nazareth and an initially 
puzzling ambivalence when he states: "I believe that the Christ 
event leads to a way of salvation which God has opened up in order 
to bring the Gentile world into the community of God's Israel. " 
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Again he claims: "I accept Jesus as a believing Jew who had a cen- 
tral role to play in God's plan of salvation and in whose name a 
worldwide church was founded. " This is followed by: "I do not be- 
lieve in God's plan of salvation... a charge was give to [Jesus] 
to lead Israel to God. " 
147 
In his dialogue with Hans Kung, Lapide 
says: "My Judaism is 'catholic' enough, in the original meaning of 
the word, to find a place for Spinoza as well as for Jesus, for 
Philo as well as for Josephus. I do not see why I should reject 
a person out of Judaism such as the Rabbi of Nazareth, just because 
some of the Christian pictures of Christ do not suit me. "148 
Lapide has approached the life and teachings of Jesus as a Jew 
(albeit a Jewish New Testament theologian), found that he can 
embrace this Jew to a considerable degree, and attempted to de- 
Hellenize and to re-Judaize Jesus' message and person. His desire 
is that, through rediscovering the historical Jesus (which is by 
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no means simply identical to the one that any of the four gospel 
writers portray), Jews might be able to reclaim him as a fellow 
Jew, a blood brother as well as a religious relation. 
It has been of considerable concern to Lapide that certain mis- 
conceptions surrounding Jesus' relationship to his own people be 
corrected. Chief among these, perhaps, is the common belief that 
Jesus' contemporaries rejected him or that he rejected the people 
of Israel. We are reminded that from the earliest believers, to 
the apostles, to the mother Church in Jerusalem, all were Jews. 
There was not the slightest concern among these people that faith 
in Jesus as Christ constituted a break with the Hebrew faith. Re- 
garding Jesus' rejection of his people Lapide makes a case on two 
fronts. Firstly, his disputes with the Pharisees are seen to in- 
dicate for Lapide only that Jesus had certain enemies among the 
ecclesiastical leadership of his time. And this, it is claimed, 
puts him squarely in the great line of Jewish prophets standing, 
not as a sign of rejection, but as a telling proof of his great- 
ness. We are reminded that Moses (and there has been no Jew great- 
er) suffered continuous conflict with his own people. 
Secondly, Lapide sees the cross itself as a kind of negative 
alignment with Judaism. Jesus was "one of thousands" of Jews who 
died by Rome's hand in suffering the death of a rebel. At his 
crucifixion there were three crosses - and three Jews hung on them. 
Historical reports speak of the thousands of Jewish young men who 
died this way, and they were for the most part "the most devout 
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in Israel... because of their belief in God. "149 
Kling has quarreled with Lapide over this interpretation of 
Jesus' supposed unity with the faith of Israel. "Why then was 
Jesus liquidated... if it was not because he challenged the law and 
its authority? " 
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But Lapide retorts on the basis of the Gospel 
accounts. These reports claim, no doubt correctly, Jesus' high 
regard for the commandments - he never broke one of them; he was 
not a blasphemer, he was not a lawbreaker. "This Jesus was utterly 
true to the Torah, as I myself hope to be. I even suspect that 
Jesus was more true to the Torah than I, an orthodox Jew. "151 
These alleged misconceptions surrounding Jesus are attacked 
then by one who sees the New Testament from a sympathetic Jewish 
perspective. Sympathetic, but not indiscriminate; Jewish, and not 
Christian. In his dialogue with Moltmann Lapide answers the 
question: "What prevents you then from having yourself baptized 
and becoming a Christian? " A key part of his answer is found in 
his statement that: "Jews and Christians can walk together until 
Easter Monday. "152 The question of course arises: what happens 
to this 'walking together' because of Easter? Let us see 
Lapide's viewpoint which has, surprisingly to us, some strong 
basis in Jewish tradition. 
In his dialogue with Kling Lapide speaks of the difference 
between Christianity and Judaism. "Christianity is a who-religion, 
Judaism a what-religion. Or, if you will, Judaism is a religion 
of redemption; Christianity one with a redeemer. For you Christians 
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what is important is the redeemer, the king; for us it is the king- 
dom. We Jews know - under God - of a kingdom of heaven also, with- 
out a Saviour-King; but we do not know a Saviour-King with the 
Kingdom already having come. Every morning television and the 
press confirm with terrible clarity that this world is not yet 
redeemed. " 
153 
Where should the emphasis lie? Can the Christian church so 
easily put aside such fundamental Jewish perspective and establish 
that the Messiah should be the focus of faith rather than the king- 
dom which the Messiah brings? Can we hold tenaciously to proclaim- 
ing that thekingdom has come already - even as Vorgriff - in spite 
of all the aridity and disenchantment of this world, stated so 
starkly and accurately by KUng? And we ask: is it possible from 
a Christian perspective, certainly not to deny but to rethink, 
what is meant by Jesus' 'Messiahship'; not his meaning for the 
Church but for the Jews? 
There seems little cause to do this (the argument is an old 
one and sides clearly drawn) until we realize Lapide's unusual 
approach to the Jewish-Christian dialogue. For in his own words 
he states: "I accept the resurrection of Easter Sunday not as 
an invention of the community of disciples but as a historical 
event. "154 We agree with Braaten when he comments that Lapide's 
argument fits closely that of Pannenberg or Ulrich Wilckens, 
155 
The only difference one can detect is that Pannenberg attempts to 
base assent to the Resurrection on historical, whereas Lapide 
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considers such assent ultimately a step of faith. But they both 
agree that the Resurrection was a real occurrence, and not some- 
thing qualified by resort to the hearts and minds and especially 
the desires of the first believers. 
Lapide even laments what he sees as a Christian reticence to 
proclaim the fact of the Resurrection. Quoting Rudolf Bultmann 
("Jesus has risen into the kerygma"), Karl Rahner ("He has risen 
because he has conquered the innermost center of all earthly being 
eternally in his death"), Willi Marxsen ("Easter means: The cause 
of Jesus goes on"), and others, 
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he continues: "I cannot rid my- 
self of the impression that some modern Christian theologians are 
ashamed of the material facticity of the resurrection. Their 
varying attempts at dehistoricizing the Easter experience which 
give the lie to all four evangelists are simply not understandable 
to me in any other way... For all these Christians who believe in 
the incarnation (something which I am unable to do) but have dif- 
ficulty with the historically understood resurrection, the word 
of Jesus of the 'blind guides, straining out a gnat and swallow- 
ing a camel' (Mt. 23: 24) probably applies. " 
157 
Basis for belief 
How did Lapide come to this viewpoint? This must be discussed 
as we ponder exactly what his viewpoint means. There are, as we can 
see it, two reasons. Firstly, we note the influence of Franz 
Rosenzweig. This agnostic Jew was befriended by the Christian 
philosopher of religion Eugen rosenstock-Huessy. Their conversa- 
tions brought Rosenzweig close to a Christian committment but 
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ultimately drove him back to Judaism. It was after this recom- 
mittment to his traditional faith that Rosenzweig and Rosenstock 
began the correspondence 
158 
which so influenced Lapide. Rosenz- 
weig, in this exchange of views, was able to develop his insight 
into the basic compatibility between Judaism and Christianity. 
Simply put, Christianity is the "Judaizing" of the pagans. Through 
this dialog, and Rosenzweig's book, The Star of Redemption, 
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Lapide has come to his belief (albeit it, he states, one difficult 
to fit "into my spiritual framework") "that the coming-to-believe 
of Christendom was without doubt a God-willed messianic act, a 
messianic event on the way to the conversion of the world to the 
One God. " 
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As Judaism has been God's 'entry' into the world, so this 
entry must expand to include the world, and the Christian Church 
is seen by Rosenzweig - and then Lapide - as the go-between. Both 
lead to the One God, with this stipulation: Judaism knows (since 
Abraham and Moses) the way to God, it does not need Jesus; but 
Jesus is needed to bring the knowledge of God into the Gentile 
world. To claim that Jews need Jesus for salvation is, in Lapide's 
view, like "sprinkling sugar on top of honey. "161 
Lapide then initially seems to have come under an influence - 
a Jewish influence - which helped dissolve any traditional repug- 
nance he may have felt toward the Christian Church and Jesus of 
Nazareth in particular. The broad-minded perspective of Rosenz- 
weig helped to form a more objective atmosphere within which to 
contemplate the course of Jesus' life and ministry and especially 
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that most controversial problem of Christology, the Resurrection 
of Jesus. We are reminded of the admonition given by both Barth 
and Pannenberg (and, in a fashion, by Küng): if one approaches 
the Resurrection of Jesus without the concrete preconception that 
the dead do not rise, lthen the possibilityof belief at least is 
present. For Lapide, and this is the second reason, once freed 
of any negative preconceptions the New Testament evidence evoked 
belief in the historical facticity of the Resurrection. 
There is one historical fact, which can hardly be disputed, 
that has made a special impression on this Jewish New Testament 
scholar. It can be illuminated in this comment: "I am completely 
convinced that the Twelve from Galilee, who were all farmers, shep- 
herds, and fishermen - there was not a single theology professor to 
be found among them - were totally unimpressed by scholarly 
theologumena, as Karl Rahner or Rudolf Bultmann write them. If 
they, through such a concrete historical event as the crucifixion, 
were so totally in despair and crushed, as all the four evangelists 
report to us, then no less concrete a historical event was needed 
in order to bring them out of the deep valley of their despair and 
within a short time to transform them into a community of salvat- 
ion rejoicing to the high heavens. "162 Thus it is under "all the 
multiple layers of narrative embellishment and the fiction of later 
generations"163 that Lapide finds a rock-bottom resting point in 
this amazing change of attitude on the part of the disciples. 
This is not the only evidence presented, 
164 but is certainly for 
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Lapide the most compelling by far. It is the "recognizable histor- 
ical kernel which cannot simply be demythologized. " 
165 
The Common Hope: Toward a Jewish-Christian Theology of the 
Resurrection 
All this does not, as we have seen, provoke Lapide (nor, we 
presume does Lapide think it should necessarily provoke any Jew) 
to baptism into the christian faith. The Resurrection is to be 
believed, he claims, and seen as a part of God's plan of salvat- 
ion. Maimonides is recalled for traditional support: "All these 
matters which refer to Jesus of Nazareth... only served to make 
the way free for the King Messiah and to prepare the whole world 
for the worhsip of God with a united heart... "166 The question 
may be asked in light of this preparatory role in Messianic history, 
why so few Jews came tok believe in Jesus as the central cohesive 
figure in the history of salvation which God was broadening to 
include not only Jews but all nations? The question, it turns out, 
is analagous to asking why the character of the Resurrection was 
so nonpublic, i. e., to Jews only (Acts 10: 41). States Lapide: "If 
Jesus had appeared to all, or to many of his Jewish contemporaries, 
in that feverish climate of expectation of the imminent advent of 
the Messiah that permeated all of Israel, then there would have been 
the possibility that the Jesus movement and the Church which fol- 
lowed in its wake would have remained an intra-Jewish institution - 
as indeed was the case in its initial years - without the message 
of the one God and his gracious love being carried into the world 
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of the Gentiles. " 
167 It thus took a majority No and a minority 
"Yes" of Jews to Jesus to push the history of salvation beyiond the 
borders of Israel into the era of the universal horizon of all 
nations. 
The Resurrection, we may then presume from Lapide, did what 
the diaspora could not. It gave not only the spatial geographical 
distance needed for such evangelism, but also - and this is crucial 
(although somewhat softened by Lapide) - it gave the proper dis- 
tance from Judaism itself. It was the "pedagogy of God" that the 
Gentiles could only become heirs of Jewish monotheism through Jew- 
ish refusal of the gospel of Jesus. The Resurrection then provides 
the means by which the Gentile world is, so to speak, Judaized, or, 
exposed and brought to belief in the one God. It is the task of 
Christianity according to Lapide to go among the Gentiles with the 
message of the Gospel. It is the task of Judaism to keep Christian- 
ity on its proper course and aware of its historical relationship 
(going back through the Old Testament) with God. One becomes aware 
of the almost sacramental place of Judaism for the Christian Church 
as Lapide conceives it, as it encapsulates the innermost meaning and 
aim of our faith in its holy and historic relationship with God, 
as it continues to point to the heart of the Gospel ("the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob"), and so keeps the New Testament Church 
from veering away and perhaps becoming assimilated into paganism. 
Thus we have in this view, as we see it, two roads, exclusive 
but very complimentary, which lead to the one God. Christianity 
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becomes a necessary adjunct of the original one-God faith and the 
Resurrection is seen as the fuel of this strange relationship pro- 
pelling the Church into its place in messianic salvation-history. 
The fact of Jewish-Christian relations has, as is well-known, been 
hardly so compatible. As Lapide puts it: "... what separates 
Jews and Christians from each other... is: a Jew... a pious, devoted 
Jew... who wanted to bring the kingdom of heaven in harmony, concord, 
and peace - certainly not hatred, schism, let alone bloodshed. " 
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He goes on to claim that the Resurrection is by far the most 
important pillar (compared to Calvary) of the Christian faith and 
to acknowledge the stumbling block this has historically been 
"between the brothers of Jesus and his disciples. " 
Lapide can not be accused of a shallow presentation. His is 
not an attempt to gloss over or bypass significant differences 
between the Jewish and Christian faiths. Nor is he striving for 
some kind of syncretism between the two. But he - along with other 
of his contemporaries and numerous Christian authors 
169 has en- 
hanced the ability of each side to take the faith of the other as 
seriously as their own. His work on the Resurrection, though 
hardly grappling with all the questions that have exercised our 
other theologians, is novel, distinctly Jewish, and yet capable 
of being understood sympathetically, we believe, by the Christian 
audience. There is in this for the Christian Church a promise and, 
correspondingly we believe a danger. 
The promise as we see it is that of freedom and enhanced 
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relationships. Freedom to slip the surly ties of vision-lacking 
and earth-bound 'religion' and to glory in the magnanimity of 
God's grace to all his creatures. We recall Barth's fear of the 
danger of "the eternally skeptical-critical theologian who is 
ever and again suspiciously questioning, because fundamentally 
always legalistic and therefore in the main morosely gloomy. " 
170 
And correspondingly his belief "that we have no theological right 
to set any sort of limits to the loving-kindness of God which has 
appeared in Jesus Christ. " 
171 
It is our belief that in the Christian interrelation with 
the world religions Judaism maintains a separate place. Initially 
we would claim that the Church must re-think its historical, but 
rather stark, posture that everyone and every faith not Christian 
is the legitimate object of Christian mission. Here our concern 
must not be so much with the feelings of those who are (or have 
been) objects of that Christian thrust, i. e., Barth's fear that 
Jews will consider themselves "misunderstood and insulted" when 
they hear the term 'mission' applied to them. 
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The concern is 
more basic and more a seeking after truth than a sifting of feel- 
ings. We must not overlook the Apostle Paul's answer to his own 
question in Romans 3: 1,2,: "What advantage then bath the Jew?... 
Much every way. " 
For centuries a great part of the Church has seemingly over- 
looked this verse and has thought and written as if Judaism were a 
mere relic of the dead past. It is hardly the whole truth to say 
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that Judaism merely prepared the way for something better for 
clearly the Church was already in existence when Paul affirmed 
here the superiority of the Jew. His "advantage" was not that God 
sowed Judaism and reaped Christianity. That blots out Judaism. 
It was first of all "that unto them were committed the oracles of 
God"(3: 2), not that they were a mere Bible depositary, but that 
God gave them, as Jews, promises not yet fulfilled, and peculiarly 
their own. The Old Testament, the record of these oracles, con- 
tains not one promise either of or to the Church as an organization. 
It does not even predict a Church! It rather foreshadows a king- 
dom in which the Jew shall be the head and not lose his national 
distinction as he does in the Church. Israel is not a shadow or 
"type" of the Church. It is not fulfilled and absorbed in and 
overcome by the Church, but is the basis on which the Church 
rests. God has, is, and shall remain the God of Israel. 
To the Jews according to Paul (Rom. 9: 4f. ) belong the 
UiO of - o( (the adoption or sonship as children), 
d«BjK« t (the 
covenant with all its privileges), the y ogrj (God's giving 
of the law to Israel), the Ao cx (the rights and duties of true 
worship), the 
tTa 
E/(, xc(the history and hope of the divine promises), 
and the _Ft 
(the forefathers, ancestors who established tradit- 
ion). As Barth notes: "It is we Christians called out of the 
nations who have been associated with them. It is we who as wild 
shoots have been grafted onto the cultivated tree (Rom. 11: 17f. ). 
The Gentile Christian community of every age and land is a guest 
516 
in the house of Israel. " 
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Yet, secondly, a caution of sorts must be added to our 'accep- 
tance' of Judaism based upon what Barth has termed "the shattering 
fact" of Israel's denial - at the decisive moment! - of the goal 
of their promises, traditions and covenants, namely, Jesus of 
Nazareth. Thus "the Jew... offers the picture of an existence 
which, characterized by the rejection of its Messiah and therefore 
of its salvation and mission, is dreadfully empty of grace and 
blessing. " 
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This is surely meant to counter a danger, a possible 
over- reaction to the admitted continuing place of Judaism, that 
would relativize the gospel to a way among many that leads to 
salvation, or that would, perhaps, wash away the unique place of 
Christ on a flood of guilt over percieved intrinsic New 
Testament anti-Semitism. One notes, for instance, Rosemary 
Reuther's Faith and Fratricide which, in attempting to dispel the 
theological roots of anti-Semitism asks whether it is really 
possible to say 'Jesus is Messiah' without, implicitly or explicitly, 
saying at the same time, and the Jews be damned". "' 
175 
We must ask, then, can one really expect a Jewish-Christian 
dialogue to achieve meaningful results while the unique place of 
(i. e., messiahship) of Christ is maintained? Will our claim "Jesus 
is Messiah" really preclude any genuine rapproachment between our 
perspectives? Must the fact of the Resurrection - little matter 
precisely how it is perceived from a Christian perspective - not 
always stand as a wall between us? 
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Yet is it not possible to see the Ist century Jewish treatment 
of Jesus, not so much as a rejection of his person or message, as 
a disillusionment with his "kingdom"? If, as has been recognized 
since at least Monefiore, 
176 Jesus said almost nothing new to Jewish 
theology (with the sole exception of his concept of God as the Good 
Shepherd who leaves the ninety-nine to seek the one lost sheep) 
how could this treatment be the total rejection that the Church has 
historically seen it to be? Might we not see this 'delivering up 
to the Gentiles' of Jesus as the predictable Jewish response to 
his 'kingdom', in other words to continued genocide, racism, viol- 
ence, and hegemony within the world and most obviously within their 
own borders. Based on Jewish understanding of the 
dtv 6; kot 
(covenant), the Aa? rla (true worship of God), and the Td; Ef 
(the tradition of the fathers) could they be expected to make 
en masse any other response? It is perhaps - at least for the 
sake of argument - more to the point for us, the Church, to see 
the statement of Jesus (i. e., in his life, message and death) as 
standing separate from this Jewish response. And if we are care- 
ful to see it in the light of its own intrinsic merit, do we not 
realize that this life and death were not, in the first place, 
specifically opposed to anyone or anything. This ministry needed 
no evil revenant to play against in order to make theological points. 
It seems, rather, at its crucial points, an interiorization (Mt. 6: 6; 
Luke 17: 21), which still appears subtle when compared with the overt 
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legalistic obedience of Israel. Yet it was a statement about God 
which both seared and uplifted all who heard it including the Jews 
and it was in their case, we must remember, a 'fulfillment' and not 
a denial. Without doubt Israel had over the years since the exile 
undergone a hardening and narrowing of belief. It has been rightly 
noted that: "the Lord of all peoples had become the party leader of 
the legalists, obedience to the ruler of history had become a 
finespun technique of piety. " 
177 Yet, even through the ritual 
obligation, notes Günther Bornkhamm "the original understanding of 
God's power and law, to which both the ancient and the changed 
Israel owes its being, is recognizable. "178 
Can the Church then, we ask, afford to see the Jewish response 
to Jesus as a conditioned, and therefore a highly predictable - 
even understandable and thus forgiveable - response? This does 
not make it less regrettable, for truth is never advantageously 
denied. But this might also be seen as within the nature of God's 
will, a paradox by which Jesus' denial (by the Jews) becomes accept- 
ance (for the Gentiles). Thus it is hardly beyond understanding 
that Lapide can claim that through his death and Resurrection Christ 
has become the Saviour of the Gentiles. While the Jews await the 
Kingdom Lapide can even claim that, if the Messiah should one day 
reveal himself to the Jews, "I cannot imagine that even a single 
Jew who believes in God would have the least thing against that... 
Should the coming one be Jesus, he would be precisely as welcome 
to us as any other whom God would designate as the redeemer of 
the world. If he would only come! " 
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It is therefore we believe not a sign of our theological arro- 
gance to affirm that while Jews continue praying for the Messiah, 
not knowing his name, Christians will go on praying to the Messiah, 
knowing no other name than Jesus of Nazareth through whom God is 
working out his universal plan of salvation. 
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The point is this: 
both Jews and Christians must realize initially that the other has 
a continuing validity in the scheme of things. And the fulcrum 
point on which rests the possibility of a truly symmetrical and 
balanced view in this relationship is none other than the 
Resurrection. 
The Resurrection of Jesus can be, for the Jew who admits its 
facticity, not a threat but a sign of hope that God is working 
out his plan for the future fulfillment of his fr fýa C 
(promises). The messiahship of Jesus for the people of Israel as 
well as the Pauline interpretation of the Resurrection of Jesus 
need not be accepted by them to see this hope. But between our 
common Old Testament origins and our common messianic goal is 
there not room at the Resurrection for genuine contact and convers- 
ation if not conversion? 
The Resurrection of Jesus can be, for the Christian who admits 
its fundamental meaning of God's victory over death, not a quali- 
fication of the uniqueness of Jesus, but the basis for an authentic 
and positive Christian theology of Israel. We must not be possessive 
of this good news but recall a number of things from our history and 
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from our Scriptures. Initially, that we share the majority of our 
Bible with the Jews. Their promises, though not ours, are yet ours 
through "ingrafting. " We also live within these promises of Israel. 
Secondly, we recall that our New Testament holds quite clearly that 
there is continuing relevance in Israel. As we are told that 
"salvation is from the Jews"(John 4: 22) so also we are told that 
"all Israel will be saved"(Rom. 11: 26). Does this mean, thirdly, that 
Israel continues to be God's chosen people; that the Church has not 
supplanted Israel or succeeded to this enviable position? Is our 
glory always in some sense reflected glory from these "chosen 
people"? And does this mean that in the Jewish-Christian dialogue 
the question of 'who is the Messiah' is ultra vires? Surely 
Christians would be reluctant to agree that Jesus is the Messiah for 
Christians and not for Jews. (One recalls here Rahner's concept 
of 'anonymous Christianity'). Lastly, we agree with Karl Barth's 
reminder: "Above all it was of their flesh and blood that Jesus 
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Himself was born, so that K'crd /apKac He is first their Christ. " 
We take this to mean, among other things, that the Christian res- 
ponse to the Jews can afford to view the Jews with a graciousness 
based not on a false urgency born of mission, but on a patience 
born of confidence that they are yet in the hand of God. 
Speculative Good Friday? 
Is the Christian-relationship to Israel then, to be one of 
easy compatibility? Do we discharge our obligation to the Jews 
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simply by a mode of understanding, simply by mental assent to their 
place in salvation-history? We think not. For though they are 
the 'origin', the first appointed of the covenant, they have also 
become since the Resurrection a penultimate faith, straining 
for a completion that is not, presently, theirs. And as we hearken 
back to Paul for his critical views on the continuing validity of 
Israel, so we must recall that he also speaks of discharging a 
ministry to the Jews, specifically, that ofTa a d'4rac - making 
the Jews jealous. How is this to be handled? 
It must be admitted that historically a Christianity which 
has seen little except 1) the messiahship of Christ and 2) his 
rejection by the Jews, has failed miserably at anything approaching 
the arousal of jealousy within the Jew. We have, claims Barth 
"debated with him, tolerated him, persecuted him, or abandoned him 
to persecution without protest. "182 Seldom, if ever, we might 
add because of our perceived superior position (and in fact 
historically safer one), have we seen the Jew as a fellow sufferer, 
as a fellow journeyman along the trail of tears that so often is 
this existence. We have neglected to share their situation of 
exile, homelessness and persecution. Indeed, the Church has done 
its share to augment this catastrophe. 
This then brings to mind the words of Lapide which focus on 
this aspect of the Resurrection: 
"All honest theology is a theology of catastrophe, 
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a theology that receives its impulse from the misery 
and the nobility of our human nature: 
. from the fear of death... the great hope 
that not everything is at an end when death comes... 
.a hope that tears, death and mourning 
will not have the last word; 
.a hope that draws from its confidence 
'upward' the courage to look 'ahead'... 
.a hope that grants the power to commit 
oneself without question to the God who 'kills and 
makes alive' (Deut. 32: 39) and does not forget 
his righteous ones (Ps. 37: 25). 
That is the quintessence of the biblical faith in the 
Resurrection, both of Jews and Christians. " 
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It is realistic to admit that Lapide's views are hardly 
widespread in Judaism or in Christianity. Yet some changes can 
surely be noted today. The Church must continue to struggle to 
come to peace with itself, and the assurance within itself we 
believe in allowing Israel to share in the hope of the Resurrection 
of Jesus without the correlate acceptance of Jesus as its Messiah. 
This is nothing more or less as we see it than an attempt to 
reconcile the universal saving will of God and the unique mediator- 
ship of Jesus with an allowance that the Jews yet have to them- 
selves a faith, history and future which has distinct saving virtue. 
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And we propose this as perhaps the highest form of Karl Rahner's 
concept of "anonymous Christianity" (and we are aware of some of the 
hostile reactions this concept has evoked). 
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We do think also 
that this specific term applied to the Jew would be both an insult 
and a destroying of the very point we are presenting - that Jews 
have their continuing place under God outside Christianity. But 
if the term is inadequate the idea itself is important. Rahner 
has attempted with this concept as we see it to explain the teachings 
of Vatican II. "In contrast to the customary theology until then 
(namely, that one could not be an atheist in good will for a long 
period of time), it allows for the possibility that the saving 
virtues of faith, hope and charity can also be present in atheists 
who continue their atheism. " 
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How much more then can this idea be 
applied to the Jews, who with great desire and tradition, hold to 
faith in the one God? 
The Church, in allowing and encouraging the Jew to share in 
its Resurrection hope - "that tears, death, and mourning will not 
have the last word" - does not, in our opinion, qualify or truncate 
its Christology. Rather we accentuate the message and hope of the 
Gospel itself - that love have the primacy in our endeavors with 
our fellow human beings. And this would, we believe, open the 
possibility, at least, of Paul's desire that we make Israel jealous - 
not possessively, but lovingly. 
We stand today at a crossroads in time that is surely unique 
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in the history of Israel. The Holocaust has frightened not only 
the Jew but has uncovered the dark and frightening side of the so- 
called 'Christian' nations themselves. We have seen the shame 
that 'faith' without compassion can bring. Lapide has voiced his 
conclusion "that Auschwitz and the founding of the State of 
Israel stand in the same spiritual relationship with each other as 
Good Friday and Easter Sunday do in the hearts of believing 
Christians. The same abyss yawns between cross and the Resurrection 
as between the mass Golgotha of the Hitler years and the national 
Resurrection in the year 1948. "186 What a pregnant statement! 
And how reminiscent of Moltmann's use of Hegel's universalizing of 
the historic Good Friday which we recall from Theology of Hope. 
For Hegel meant that modern atheism and nihilism, causing the dis- 
appearance (as Hegel perceived it) of theism in its notion that 
'God himself is dead, ' "can be understood as a universalizing of the 
historic Good Friday of the god-forsakenness of Jesus, so that it 
becomes a speculative Good Friday of the forsakenness of all that 
is. "187 Has the world and this generation not actually witnessed the 
purest form to date of that universalizing of the historic Good 
Friday? Lapide is right, the Church and Israel can walk together 
through Good Friday. For this unbelievable madness stands in our 
century of death and mourning as perhaps the most glaring wound 
inflicted. As Christ himself would have been drawn to such suffer- 
ing, so his Church - his presence in this world - must go to the 
victim as healer. Only in this instance the healer bears some of 
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the guilt of "[abandoning] him to persecution without protest" 
(Barth). 
The Jews have found their Good Friday. And no discussion 
of theology of the Resurrection in this century can afford to deny 
it. Yet the Church's opportunity is that we might recognize our 
Easter Sunday as necessary to all that is, and that we might offer 
its prospect as "the birth of freedom and cheerfulness out of 
infinite pain. " 
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The Jew cannot accept the messiahship of Jesus 
for his people of Israel, but Lapide, among others, has shown that 
it can accept the genuineness of the Easter experience. And while 
they await the coming of the Messiah we believe to be Jesus, the 
Resurrection can even now open their eyes and hearts to the paradox 
which lies at the root of both our faiths: death need be neither 
defeat nor ruin but the way to life, a sign of hope "renewing faith 
in the future fulfillment of God. " 
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Carl Braaten recounts a story from Franz Rosenzweig which tells 
of a pastor asked by Frederick the Great for the decisive proof 
of Christianity. His crowning answer comes: "Your Majesty, the 
Jews! " Braaten notes: "Even under the present ambiguous conditions 
of history, there remains a mysterious depth in that response. "190 
The promise of enlightenment rising from these mysterious depths 
must light our way in dialogue for years to come. 
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Liebliche Auferstehung 
There remains one point in regard to this survey of 20th 
century Resurrection theology which we wish to emphasize regarding 
the Resurrection of Jesus. It has remained until this very late 
point because it is both summary and conclusive - also because it 
is presented best by a final, chiding quote from Lapide. We 
quote in its entirety what we have touched on earlier. Claims 
Lapide: "I cannot rid myself of the impression that some modern 
Christian theologians are ashamed of the material facticity of 
the resurrection. Their varying attempts at dehistoricizing the 
Easter experience which give the lie to all four evangelists are 
simply not understandable to me in any other way. Indeed, the 
four authors of the Gospels definitely compete with one another 
in illustrating the tangible, substantial dimension of this 
resurrection explicitly. Often it seems as if renowned New 
Testament scholars in our days want to insert a kind of ideolog- 
ical or dogmatic curtain between the pre-Easter and the risen 
Jesus in order to protect the latter against any kind of contam- 
ination by earthly three-dimensionality. However, for the first 
Christians who thought, believed, and hoped in a Jewish manner, 
the immediate historicity was not only a part of that happening 
but the indispensable precondition for the recognition of its 
significance for salvation. For all these Christians who believe 
in the incarnation (something which I am unable to do) but have 
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difficulty with the historically understood resurrection, the 
word of Jesus of the 'blind guides, straining out a gnat and 
swallowing a camel' (Matt. 23: 24) probably applies. "191 
Lapide takes to task here "renowned New Testament scholars" 
for their reluctance to grasp the "material facticity" of the 
Resurrection. Indeed, it has seemed at numerous times throughout 
this study that we have been a witness across the span of the 
20th century to just that -a theological appetency to conform 
to a dehistoricizing emphasis regarding the Easter experience. 
Lapide - an 'outsider', a Jew - here calls our motive 
into question 
over an event that gives the Christian his very reason for being. 
At the risk of being brusque, the fact that this event is basic- 
ally 'ours' and not 'his' (from a strict Jewish-Christian dilene- 
ation) give his words added emphasis and sting. 
Yet his extra-Christian perspective shows itself in his mis- 
taken belief that this dehistoricizing emphasis is "in order to 
protect (the risen Jesus) against any kind of contamination 
by 
earthly three-dimensionality. " The motive for this emphasis 
is 
in fact not a mis-placed docetic piety nor, for that matter, do 
we see it as a lamentable quasi-Christian impiety. Rather we 
believe it a desire on the part of certain 20th century theologians 
not to appear naively pious. The reasons for and results of this 
secularizing trend have been seen throughout certain portions of 
this work yet we feel that some summary is in order here. 
528 
Firstly, those theologians who would not argue for the 
bodily Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth have added a tremendous 
amount to the Christian understanding of the Resurrection. It is, 
we believe, in some cases precisely because of their reluctance to 
embrace this seemingly basic tenet of the Resurrection event, that 
they have endeavored to pursue deeper notions of faith in the 
Resurrection. By their circuitous nod to the 'reality' of the 
Resurrection, they have enriched us and caused us to consider 
vistas which a movement too quickly and unquestioningly to the 
empty tomb and the 'allelujahs' might not have uncovered. We 
must for instance ultimately disagree with Barth when he states 
regarding Bultmann: "Whoever begins with the Easter faith in 
order to make it the content of the Easter message and finally 
indulgently to let the Easter event fall away - his talk on this 
subject is boring and certainly not legitimate. "192 Bultmann 
is certainly difficult but hardly boring and to call his work a 
bastardization of legitimate theology is, to turn the point around, 
hardly worthy of Barth. 
Yet does this mean that such theologies are essentially correct 
in distancing themselves from the historical facticity of the 
Resurrection? We wish here to make only three short observations 
in which an antagonistic stance toward the theologies of Bultmann, 
Moltmann, Rahner, Schillebeeckx or any who distance themselves in 
faith from the bodily Resurrection of Jesus is not to be seen. 
1. This century has gone far toward a balanced perspective 
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on the Enlightenment. From the revealing sentence that "Reason 
is to the philosophe what grace is to the Christian, " 
193 
belying 
an original optimistic, this-wordly belief in the power of human 
beings, we have come in the last few decades to a more realistic 
understanding of both the power and limits of reason. We have 
looked at Küng's Does God Exist? as an excellent recounting of this 
gradual coming to maturity. As the Church has developed the capacity 
in the last two hundred years to look at its own Scriptures and 
dogma critically, so it is time - indeed past time - to fully 
recognize that in its extreme forms the Enlightenment was a repudi- 
ation, and in some respects an antithesis, of much of the essentials 
of Christian belief. We in turn are once again within a reasonable 
approach in looking critically at any perspective which is in the 
main pessimistic. We can be critical of 'enlightenment' denials 
of any kind of transcendence of the external world and of personal 
immortality, and especially denials of the Resurrection of Jesus. 
It has become reasonable to be distrustful of reason as understood 
by the philosophes! Christianity need not be passive when con- 
fronted by the challenge of the Enlightenment. 
2. It seems to us that any theologian who has distanced 
himself from the historical facticity of the Resurrection because 
of a perceived incompatibility with contemporary world views has 
done so unnecessarily. We share Lapides' conclusion that: "Some 
modern Christian theologians are ashamed of the material facticity 
of the Resurrection. " But we wonder if this stance is not the 
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result in some cases of simple submission in the face of seemingly 
weighty rationalistic challenges. We must take caution that our 
pre-conceptions do not become merely fashionable, and therefore 
marginally theological beliefs, cut through with all sorts of ir- 
resolute compromises. 
3. The Church at large should at least be stimulated by the 
fact that persons such as Karl Barth, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and 
Pinchas Lapide have attempted, in contradiction to some of the 
mainline schools of theology - and again, in their own ways - to 
rescue the Resurrection from the categories of myth or hallucina- 
tion with no real basis in historical fact. This is while being 
fully at home in the use of the critical-historical method. And 
so, after all we have seen, it must be admitted as at least pos- 
sible, toward the close of this century, for an open-minded person, 
A) to peruse the biblical statements of the Resurrection; B) to 
consider their veracity on the basis of consistent critical method; 
C) to come to the opinion that the Resurrection did in fact occur 
historically, that it was an historisch event. If one indeed 
reaches this conclusion there seems no reason why he should be seen 
as romantic, sentimental, naive, or anti-rational. 
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A Final Comment 
We began this study of the Resurrection in twentieth century 
theology with a look at what conventional scholarship tells us is 
the oldest gospel, that of Mark, and the oldest ending to that 
gospel, vs. 16: 1-8. The story ends with three women leaving the 
empty tomb "frightened out of their wits" and saying "nothing to 
anyone for they were afraid"(Jerusalem Bible). It is to be noted 
as a remarkable thing that this gospel which begins on the note 
of "the good news about Jesus Christ" ends with these women trembling 
and apprehensive before the pronouncement that "he is risen; he is 
not here. " And after all the research, all the criticism, and 
the hopes that this event inspires for the future we would be 
remiss in passing over this point which the writer of Mark so 
obviously desires to make. 
The Resurrection produced, and is meant to produce, fear. 
Not the everyday, run-of-the-mill anxiety for which our age is aptly 
noted. Nor the searing 
'Turn-or-Burn' frenzy which has so often 
been associated with religion. Rather it is the fear that comes 
in the realization that the event itself is powerful, not passive; 
that it corresponds to fulness, abundance, and denies us the 
option to withdraw 
into our own little kingdoms. For this new 
Kingdom calls our kingdoms into question. It pushes, presses, 
cajoles, threatens, 
demands, and finally requires that we live - 
if we live as a Christian - outside the notion that we can have 
God as we want him: only our friend, no questions asked, all 
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expenses paid. The Resurrection is life, life to the extreme. 
It penetrates, and exposes our smallness and false pride. Like 
those first disciples who heard the message 'He is risen', it 
must be more than heard, it must be dealt with. For us too, it 
exposes desertion, denial, sleeping in the garden while he anguish- 
es, and much more. 
So perhaps the words 'they were afraid', if not the most import- 
ant words to be stated of the Resurrection, are still those vital 
words which afford us entry into its world. For until the Resur- 
rection can be conceived as an event powerful enough to produce 
fear, we cannot hear that it also says Yes to those whose sight 
exceeds their grasp. It is grace also. And this also marks it 
with awe. It is Gerald O'Collins who refers to that magical 
time in Tolkein's work, The Lord of the Rings, 
194 
when the friends 
of Gandolf fall silent as the old man returns unexpectedly: "Between 
wonder, joy, and fear they stood and found no words to say. " We 
cannot help but ponder the wisdom of that original silence of the 
women at the tomb as a result of all that we have heretofore seen. 
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